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Abstract 
Since the initiation of economic reforms in the late 1970s, China has 
undergone a radical socioeconomic transition, characterised by 
unprecedented economic growth and poverty reduction, but also rapidly 
increasing inequality – particularly between rural and urban areas. In recent 
years this uneven development has been increasingly perceived as a threat 
to ‘harmonious’ development, and the central government has prioritised the 
de-marginalisation of the countryside. Key to this development agenda is the 
incorporation of rural areas into the urban-based market-oriented financial 
system. For this reason, Chinese development planners have turned to 
microcredit – i.e. the provision of small-scale loans to ‘financially excluded’ 
rural households – as a means of increasing ‘financial consciousness’ and 
facilitating rural de-marginalisation. Drawing on a large original qualitative 
data set collected during in-depth ethnographic fieldwork in rural Jiangxi 
Province, this Ph.D. dissertation employs an actor-oriented livelihoods 
approach to address the question: What role do microcredit programmes 
play in local processes of socioeconomic development and the livelihoods of 
diverse local actors? By examining this overarching research question, this 
study makes a number of original contributions to current understandings of, 
and debates over, the nexus between microcredit, development and 
livelihoods in rural China and beyond. First, the research outlines how the 
heterogeneously implemented microcredit programmes must be understood 
as emerging from locally (re)produced processes, rather than the inevitable 
result of top-down causality. Second, the dissertation details how microcredit 
facilitates de-marginalisation for some, while simultaneously exacerbating 
the marginalisation of others – thereby contributing to our understanding of 
the multifaceted, non-linear and relational nature of external ‘impact’. Finally, 
this study exposes the ways in which external interventions (such as 
microcredit) reflect the contradictions and paradoxes implicit in rural China’s 
contemporary development landscape, thereby contributing to wider debates 
over the nature of rural development in China and other ‘developmental’ 
contexts.  
 
Keywords: China; Rural Development; Microfinance; Microcredit; Financial 
Inclusion; Marginalisation; Neoliberalism; Actor-oriented Approach; 
Relational Approach; Livelihoods 
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nongcun hezuo jijinhui 
RCT 
Randomised 
Control Trial 
ē°wÃõ
ě
suiji duizhao shiyan 
RMCC 
Rural Mutual 
Credit 
Cooperative 
±čĀĊ
CÔ
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ªkS"

guojia jingji maoyi weiyuanhui 
SME 
Small and 
Medium 
Enterprise 
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 16 
TVE 
Township and 
Village 
Enterprise 
č! xiangzhen qiye 
VTB 
Village and 
Township 
Bank 
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qiang 
ëcéc 
Destroying the west wall 
to build the east wall 
chaxu geju ·{ 
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gaige kaifang ¢ė¤ Reform and opening 
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Cadre Responsibility 
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genju shiji qingkuang ¶¡sĐ8 
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conditions 
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Supply and marketing 
cooperatives 
gua paizi danwei  ÅmK# Hanging sign work unit 
guanxi 2Û Social connection 
guanxi wang 2Ûà Social networks 
guojia baqi fupin 
gongjian jihua 
[u/ü£^ï: 8-7 national poverty 
reduction programme 
guojia fagaiwei [uM¢k 
National Development 
and Reform Commission 
guoqing jueding [7q National conditions 
guoyou qiye gaige [¬!¢ė 
Reform and privatisation 
of SOEs (mainly in the 
late 1990s) 
hexie shehui UøÔ" Harmonious society 
Huizhou  
Huizhou region 
straddling southern 
Anhui Province and 
northern Jiangxi 
Province 
Huizu X© Hui ethnicity 
hukou ben N® 
Household registration 
documents 
jia he wanshi xing uU	3 
Harmonious familial 
relations 
jiao î RMB 0.1 
jiating lianchan 
chengbao zerenzhi 
uãEú > Household 
Responsibility System 
jin § 0.5 kilograms 
 19 
kexue fazhan guan ÖnM|ì 
Scientific development 
concept 
laobaixing áÌj Regular people 
liangguan suo ÚÙ 
Grain management 
office 
lishang wanglai Óy² Reciprocity 
lisu Ó( Rituals and customs 
mamu ĝ­ Numbness 
meiyou wenhua ¼¬¦F Uncultured/backward 
mu  
Land measurement (1/15 
of a hectare) 
nengli ä? Ability 
nengren ä Capable person 
nongcun 6± Rural areas 
nongmin 6º Farmers 
nongye 6 Agriculture 
nongye jishu zhan 6¯ 
Agricultural technology 
extension station 
putonghua «Ć÷ Mandarin Chinese 
rang yibufen ren xian 
fu qilai 
ðĉ9-vā² 
Let some people get rich 
first 
rende xiandaihua ÍÆF 
Humanistic 
modernisation 
renmin gongshe º0Ô People’s commune 
sange daibiao 
ê The three represents 
sannong wenti 
6ĎĘ Three rural issues 
shan gao huangdi yuan }ĜÎą 
The mountains are high 
and the emperor is far 
away 
shangfang ó 
Petition a higher level of 
government 
 20 
shang you zhengce, 
xia you duice 
¬¥Ø¬wØ 
The centre has policies, 
local areas have counter 
policies 
shehui zhuyi shichang 
jingji 
Ô"]ß¾ 
Socialist market 
economy 
shengchan dadui Èeď Production brigade 
shengchan dui Èď Production team 
sige xiandaihua WÆF The four modernisations 
suzhi Üû Quality 
tianrang zhibie fd< 
The difference between 
the earth and the sky 
(worlds apart) 
wenhua dageming ¦FeėT Cultural revolution 
xian guan buru xian 
guan 
LpiÆÙ 
The governor of the 
county has less power 
than one’s direct 
supervisor 
xianpin aifu lüÄv 
Suspicious of the poor 
but loves the rich 
xiaokang shehui xÔ" Well-off society 
xibu dakaifa ëĉeM 
The campaign to open 
up the west 
xinli Ç Mentality 
xinxing nongcun hezuo 
yiliao 
¨_6±Q&HË 
New cooperative medical 
system 
yindi zhiyi  Y\>r 
In accordance with local 
conditions 
yishi ô Consciousness 
youdian daomian ÊÀ=Ė 
Proceeding from point to 
surface (policy 
modelling) 
zhangshu ¸µ Camphor tree 
 21 
zhen/xiang č Township/town 
Zhongguo [ China 
zhonghua xiangyan IĚÁ Zhonghua cigarettes 
zhongyang yihao 
wenjian 
gO¦ 
Number one central 
document 
zirancun åÂ± Natural village 
zutang Õb Ancestral hall 
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Note on Language, Currency Units and Referencing 
 
Commonly used Chinese terms are followed by pinyin (without tonal 
diacritics) and the simplified Chinese characters in the first instance. In 
subsequent instances only the italicised pinyin is used. Proper names of 
people and places (e.g. Jiangxi Province, Deng Xiaoping, etc.) are not 
italicised or rendered in Chinese. 
 
Currency amounts are either provided in United States Dollars (USD) or 
Chinese Yuan (RMB). As of July 2015 USD 1.00 = RMB 6.21. 
 
The dissertation adheres to Harvard referencing style throughout. In-text 
citations consist of the author’s last name followed by the year of publication. 
For works with more than three authors, all names are listed in the first 
instance, and the first author’s name followed by “et al.” is provided in 
subsequent instances. Harvard referencing style is also utilised to cite policy 
documents and reports issued by government departments and 
organisations. Since these institutions often have long names, in some 
cases I have opted to use acronyms in both in-text citations and the 
bibliography. Below is a list of these acronyms along with the full names of 
the institutions. 
 
Additionally, this dissertation uses footnotes to reference the primary 
interviews, conversations and observational data that form the basis of this 
ethnographic study. Interviews and conversations have been assigned a 
number and can be found in the References (just before the Bibliography), 
along with a list of the different types of observational data collected during 
fieldwork.  
 
In order to protect the identities of the people I spoke with I have not used 
any real names and the three townships where the majority of data collection 
took place have been given pseudonyms according to the primary means of 
earning a living in the respective localities – the agricultural township (AT), 
the migrant work township (MWT) and the diverse economy township (DET). 
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Unless explicitly stated, all photographs, tables and diagrams were taken or 
created by me. Some photographs have been altered to protect the identity 
of people and places. 
 
Acronyms used for referencing 
Acronym Full Name 
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom) 
JXPABC Jiangxi Province Agricultural Bank of China 
JXPMoHRSS 
Jiangxi Province Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security 
JXPMoF Jiangxi Province Ministry of Finance 
JXPMoLSS Jiangxi Province Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
JXPPAO Jiangxi Province Poverty Alleviation Office 
JXPPG Jiangxi Province People’s Government 
JXPRCCU Jiangxi Province Rural Credit Cooperative Union 
MoF Ministry of Finance 
MoLSS Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
NCCPBC Nanchang City People’s Bank of China 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAO Poverty Alleviation Office 
PBC People’s Bank of China 
SETC State Economic and Trade Commission 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
I turned onto the road and was greeted by two rows of identical newly-built 
three-story buildings facing each other. This was the most recent housing 
development in the township – a tract of dusty inhabitation reclaimed from 
the green of the rice paddies that still dominated the landscape, extending 
as far as the lush hills in the distance where agricultural instead manifested 
itself as a hodgepodge of gnarled tea and fruit trees. My research assistant 
and I were attempting to systematically chart the socioeconomic distribution 
of households in the township centre in order to select research participants 
from different strata of society, and we both breathed a sigh of relief when 
we saw that this final ‘neighbourhood’ was essentially homogeneous, 
making our mapping exercise significantly easier than it had been up until 
that point. Aside from a few of the more ostentatiously large mansions 
owned by the very richest residents in the other parts of the township, these 
were the nicest houses, and this new development was obviously the most 
desirable place to live in town. All the buildings had been constructed within 
the last seven years in the ‘traditional’ style of the Huizhou region (Huizhou 
) as mandated by the county government in order to attract tourists, and 
they looked airy, clean and tidy. They all had a place for a business on the 
ground floor and a spacious two-story living area above. Almost all the 
households were engaged in entrepreneurial activity, primarily selling ‘high-
value’ products from urban areas – such as jewellery, musical instruments, 
or fashionable clothes and shoes – in well-presented shops. This, I thought, 
was a potentially effective way to preserve tradition in the face of rapid 
economic growth, out-migration and in situ urbanisation, which had resulted 
in the widespread adoption of ‘modern’ modes of existence in rural China. 
 
However, as we continued our walk down the newest street in town, there 
was, quite suddenly, a break in the uniform row of buildings to our left. 
Standing in this void was an ancient camphor tree (zhangshu ¸µ) at the 
centre of a newly-built stone plaza. I asked my research assistant why this 
tree had not been removed during the construction of the new houses, and 
was told that every village has a camphor tree (sometimes hundreds of 
years old) that serves as a protective spirit for the village residents, 
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especially the children. Therefore, it would have been bad luck to cut down 
the tree. As I contemplated this display of ‘real’ tradition side-by-side with the 
‘reproduced’ tradition appropriated by the modern Huizhou constructions, I 
noticed a small dirt track running behind the tree and leading to a 
disorganised grouping of smaller houses in the shadow of the new 
neighbourhood and obscured from view. These houses, while possessing 
many of the same Huizhou stylistic features as their newer counterparts, 
were much older, in varying states of disrepair and far from homogeneous. 
Some of the houses were constructed of mud bricks and seemed to date 
back to the 1960s and 1970s. Others were very old traditional houses built 
during the early 20th century, and still others were concrete houses built 
during the 1980s and 1990s. My research assistant looked at me with an 
expression of resignation and acceptance. It was only early afternoon, but 
we were already exhausted from hours of walking around under the mid-
summer sun in temperatures nearing 40 degrees Celsius. However, with a 
whole new neighbourhood consisting of the full range of different types of 
household to map, and probably even some household types we had not 
encountered in other parts of the township, there would be no early finish 
that day. “Come on” I said smiling as I wiped the sweat from my forehead 
and took out my phone to take a picture, “you didn’t really think it was going 
to be that easy did you?” 
 
Figure 1.1: View of the New Huizhou-style Housing Development from a 
Rice Paddy 
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1.1 Contested and Paradoxical Rural Development in China 
At this point, most readers are probably quite rightly asking themselves why I 
have decided to open a Ph.D. dissertation on microcredit in rural China by 
recounting the difficulties of socioeconomic mapping in a single township. 
While this short anecdote is, admittedly, not specifically related to the topic 
of microcredit, it does provide a brief glimpse into the complex, contradictory 
and paradoxical ‘story’ of socioeconomic transformation in contemporary 
rural China. The processes underpinning these patterns of development and 
change – which are, in actuality, the central concern of this study – are 
difficult to ‘pin down’, as they consist of a multitude of competing narratives 
and interpretations. At first glance, these developmental processes often 
appear deceivingly homogenous, leading many to believe that they can 
clearly identify generalisable patterns, trends, variables and determinants, 
and, in so doing, track linear causation and make universalist statements 
about the nature of China’s rural development. However, in reality, just 
under the surface there often exist countertrends, contradictions and 
unforeseen/unintended transformations and consequences, all of which lead 
to unavoidable paradoxes, which are then reflected and reproduced by 
external development interventions, such as microcredit. 
 
Of course, this same observation could be made in relation to the vast 
majority of research on any social process in any context at any point in 
history. However, the extraordinarily rapid rate of socioeconomic 
development and change in rural China over the past three and a half 
decades has, undoubtedly, magnified these developmental contradictions, 
thus making them both more visible and also more difficult to accurately 
depict. Indeed, while there is some sort of consensus with regard to the 
enormity of change in rural China – with most everyone agreeing that 
“compared with the 1970s, the current situation is like the difference 
between the earth and the sky (tianrang zhibie fd< ).” 1  This 
transformation is understood and portrayed in dramatically different ways by 
different people and groups. For many, rural China – particularly the rural 
China characterised by the uniform rows of modern/traditional houses 
described above – is a shining example of the type of beneficial progression 
that can be achieved through economic liberalisation and the devolution of 
                                            
1 Interview 56. 
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responsibility to rural households (K. X. Zhou, 1996). This view sees rural 
development and modernisation as the result of socioeconomic de-
marginalisation, brought about by integrating rural people and places into 
‘modern’ China’s market-oriented economic system and, more broadly, the 
global capitalist economy through inclusive and participatory practices.  
 
After all, China’s unrivalled economic growth since the introduction of the 
Reform and Opening policies (gaige kaifang ¢ė¤) at the end of the 
1970s has meant that rural household incomes have, on average, grown at 
over six per cent per year (Schak, 2009). At the same time, the country’s 
rural poverty reduction has been unprecedented, with some estimating that 
the economic reforms helped pull up to 700 million rural people out of 
poverty, essentially singlehandedly meeting the United Nation’s Millennium 
Development Goal for poverty reduction and improving rural living standards 
dramatically (S. Wang, 2013; Yao, 2000; Yeh, O’Brien, & Ye, 2013). This 
perspective of continual beneficial socioeconomic progression in the 
Chinese countryside, primarily due to economic liberalisation, was 
expressed by a majority of the rural people I spoke with during fieldwork in 
northern Jiangxi Province, with many framing the improvement of rural 
livelihoods as being the natural (and inevitable) result of wider 
socioeconomic development that was bound to continue due to the country’s 
‘correct’ development trajectory. In the words of one rural resident: “In the 
1970s life was not very good, in the 1980s it improved a bit, and the 1990s 
were better than the 1980s. All of society is continually improving, so in the 
future our lives will continue to improve.”2 
 
On the other hand, competing narratives also proliferate – espoused by 
those experiencing life in rural China, as well as in research and public 
discourse. Indeed, some of the most marginal and vulnerable households in 
the townships where I did fieldwork – such as those living in the mud brick 
houses mentioned above – pointed out that the shift towards ‘market 
socialism’ and the inevitable commercialisation (or neoliberalisation) of local 
society had increased competition over limited resources, resulting in 
exclusion from the benefits of ‘modern’ development as well as active 
marginalisation actually making life worse. In the words of one poor rural 
                                            
2 Interview 30. 
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resident: “If today’s society is so good, then why do people like me have no 
income but still need to buy medicine; my daughter needs to buy books, how 
is my living situation any good?”3  
 
This issue of decreasing support for marginal households and rapidly 
increasing socioeconomic inequality within rural areas – particularly after the 
waves of privatisation in the 1990s – resulting in seemingly intractable 
poverty for certain segments of the rural population, has also been 
highlighted in much research on rural China (Bislev, 2010; Sanders, Chen, & 
Cao, 2007; Schak, 2009; Unger, 2002b). At the same time, China’s wider 
integration into the global capitalist system and the ensuing market-oriented 
policy reform has systematically marginalised rural China in favour of urban 
areas that are better linked to the world economy and, therefore, represent 
more secure and profitable locations for investment (Loubere & Zhang, 
2015). Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in rapidly increasing inequality 
between rural and urban areas, as reflected in the national Gini coefficient, 
which is frequently estimated to be over 0.5 (indicating extreme income 
inequality), and highlighted by the fact that average urban incomes are now 
three times larger than those in rural areas (J. Chen, Dai, Pu, Hou, & Feng, 
2010; S. Li & Sicular, 2014; Thøgersen, 2011; Yeh et al., 2013). This 
disparity within rural areas and between rural and urban China has, 
unsurprisingly, caught the attention of the central government. In particular, 
since the beginning of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration in the early 
2000s, rural development inequalities have been problematised through their 
depiction as the ‘three rural issues’ (sannong wenti 
6ĎĘ),4 which have 
served as the impetus for the formulation of a number of overarching (and 
often overlapping) policy frameworks, such as the Construction of a New 
Socialist Countryside (shehuizhuyi xinnongcun jianshe Ô"¨6±ò, 
hereafter XNCJS) and Urban-Rural Integration (chengxiang yitihua `%
F, hereafter CXYTH), which (paradoxically) largely aim to de-marginalise 
rural areas and people through further integration into the urban-based 
                                            
3 Interview 59. 
4 The term sannong wenti refers to development problems related to a lack 
of support for agriculture (nongye 6), and increasing marginalisation of 
rural areas (nongcun 6±) and farmers (nongmin 6º), particularly in 
relation to more prosperous urban areas. For more detailed discussions on 
these issues see (Christiansen & Zhang, 2009; H. X. Zhang, 2009b). 
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market system that resulted in their more extreme marginalisation in the first 
place. 
 
In this way, the “script, or ‘meta-narrative’” of the overarching ‘story’ of 
dramatic and rapid rural development in China is, for the most part, agreed 
on, and situated within a paradigm that sees development as an evolutionary 
and linear process. However, “the basic elements of this central story about 
China are constantly being adapted by any number of interpreters and 
performers far from Beijing” (Tomba, 2012, p. N/A). These micro-narratives 
are heavily contested and often inherently contradictory, but, nevertheless, 
each seek to claim hegemony as dominant depictions of China’s rural 
development trajectory, thereby gaining more influence in guiding the 
country’s direction going forward. Indeed, probably due to the 
unprecedented nature of China’s socioeconomic transformation, 
characterisations of the country’s rural development lend themselves to 
hyperbole and grand statements. Depending on who is providing the 
interpretation, China is either depicted as destined to become a ‘first world’ 
power with dramatically improved rural living standards, or a country on the 
brink of social, political and economic collapse, requiring policy ‘fixes’ to 
reorient its development path. In reality, however, China’s rural development 
trajectory is not a coherent or logical progression from point A to point B, 
which can be tracked, analysed, predicted, or technocratically guided 
through the formulation and implementation of external interventions (e.g. 
microcredit). The unprecedented nature of socioeconomic change in rural 
China means that, rather than consisting of a clear storyline, the country’s 
rural development story is, in actuality, characterised by messiness. 
Tradition and modernity, underdevelopment and development, 
impoverishment and prosperity, all exist side-by-side. Moreover, rather than 
being separate and clearly delineated ‘stages’ of socioeconomic 
progression, these ‘conditions’ are mutually constituted and co-produced in 
relation to each other, and are, therefore, two sides of the same coin. For 
this reason, external interventions like microcredit ultimately become 
reconstituted at the local level, and reflect these developmental 
contradictions, which often results in complex, emergent, unpredictable and 
unintended outcomes, rather than the simple, clear and linear ‘impacts’ 
envisioned during their formulation. In this way, China’s rural development is 
both complex and inherently paradoxical, as the very reforms and 
interventions that have made it an unprecedented example of beneficial 
 30 
socioeconomic transformation have also (re)produced dramatic inequality, 
intractable poverty and the dichotomous division of rural and urban areas, 
leading to the inevitable marginalisation of the countryside and certain 
segments of the rural population. Rural China is, therefore, both the epitome 
of the country’s developmental success and, simultaneously, the cause of its 
continued ‘backwardness’. 
 
1.2 The Rise of the Global Microfinance Movement and the 
Adoption of Microcredit in Rural China 
Of course, this paradoxical simultaneous co-production (and mutual 
constitution) of development and underdevelopment is not unique to China, 
and critical theorists have pointed out that it is a necessary feature of the 
contemporary development paradigm, particularly with the rise of a more 
ideologically neoliberal understanding of how development should proceed 
over the past few decades – both in China and globally (see Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7) (Escobar, 1995). Therefore, the same fundamental contradictions 
underpinning China’s rural development since the reform and opening 
outlined above are also present in processes of development worldwide and, 
by extension, the tools (i.e. interventions) utilised to induce development. 
The most visible example of this has been the rise of the global microfinance 
movement. Indeed, since its popularisation in the 1970s (i.e. basically in 
parallel with China’s economic liberalisation), microfinance has also 
captured the global developmental imagination with its seductive philosophy 
of economic openness, liberalisation and the promotion of entrepreneurship 
as easy and cost-effective ways of facilitating ‘sustainable development’. 
Ultimately, this has resulted in microfinance becoming the most prominent 
and well-funded type of development intervention in the world (Bateman, 
2014). 
 
Similar to conceptualisations of development and underdevelopment in 
contemporary China, proponents of microfinance perceive marginalisation 
as the result of exclusion from the capitalist system, and see access to 
formal financial services as a powerful remedy. The primary, and original, 
goal of the microfinance movement, is the provision of microcredit (i.e. small 
loans) “to the poor to allow them to establish a range of very simple income-
generating activities, thereby supposedly helping facilitate an escape from 
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poverty” (Bateman, 2014, p. 2).5 While this idea of providing small-scale 
credit to the poor to induce development has been utilised in different 
contexts throughout history, the modern microfinance movement is widely 
understood to have began with the establishment of the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh by Muhammad Yunus, a professor of economics, who has 
subsequently become the leading proponent and face of microfinance 
worldwide, in part due to his claim that microfinance has the potential to 
relegate poverty to a museum (Bateman, 2010; Brau & Woller, 2004; 
Hospes & Lont, 2004; Woolcock, 1999; Yunus & Weber, 2007). Yunus 
established the Grameen Bank with financing from international donors after 
returning to Bangladesh from Ph.D. study in the United States. The original 
Grameen model saw access to credit as being a basic human right. It 
primarily targeted women with collateral-free loans, and sought to reduce 
risk by requiring frequent repayments and lending to joint-liability loan 
groups (usually consisting of around five people), which reduced costs 
associated with monitoring and exploited existing social dynamics to 
pressure borrowers to repay, as the group as a whole was excluded from 
future loans if one member defaulted. Moreover, the original Grameen model 
utilised progressive lending to encourage repayment, with borrowers being 
allowed to access increasingly larger sums after the successful repayment of 
previous loans (Bateman, 2014; Bislev, 2010; Khandker, 1998; Yunus & 
Jolis, 2001). 
 
Throughout the 1980s microfinance quickly gained popularity globally, 
resulting in the explosion of microcredit programmes and microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), often based on the Grameen model (called ‘Grameen 
clones’).6 Microcredit also caught the attention of the World Bank and the 
                                            
5 Originally, microfinance and microcredit were essentially interchangeable 
terms. However, with the increasing focus on ‘financial inclusion’ as an 
important development goal in its own right, microfinance has come to 
include other financial services, such as savings, remittances and insurance 
– although credit is still the primary focus. For the sake of clarity, throughout 
this dissertation I will use the term microfinance when I am referring to the 
global microfinance movement or the concept of microfinance more 
generally, and microcredit when I am referring specifically to microcredit 
programmes. 
6 It is necessary to distinguish between microcredit programmes, which are 
often run by governments or development organisations, and MFIs, which 
are usually autonomous organisations dedicated to providing financial 
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International Monetary Fund, where it was included in schemes aimed at 
mitigating some of the adverse effects of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (i.e. austerity measures) in low-income countries (Weber, 
2004). The 1990s saw a debate over the ideological soul of microfinance, 
with the movement shifting from the ‘poverty lending approach’ – which was 
characterised by heavily subsidised interest rates and the targeting of the 
very poorest – to the ‘financial systems approach’, which rejected 
concessional and subsidised loans (for the most part) in order to build a 
microfinance industry that was financially sustainable and even profitable 
(i.e. imitating the commercial financial sector). In this way, commercialised 
microcredit was seen as a ‘win-win’, in that it created sustainable institutions 
and provided profit-making opportunities for investors. This transition 
towards commercialisation resulted in the Grameen Bank adopting the 
‘Grameen II” model, which offered a range of different services (other than 
just credit) and also downplayed the importance of the original Grameen 
methodology (e.g. targeting women, joint liability loan groups, etc.) in favour 
of experimenting with techniques that would allow for financial sustainability 
and increased ‘financial inclusion’ (Rutherford, 2006). Ultimately, this 
development signalled the emergence of a diversified global microfinance 
movement consisting of a huge range of programmes and institutions 
utilising a variety of different techniques (i.e. departing from the original 
Grameen methodology) in order to provide financial services in the name of 
development. 
 
In order to facilitate this move away from the poverty lending approach, 
microfinance proponents began lobbying for the de-regulation of rural 
financial sectors around the world in an attempt to allow microcredit 
programmes and MFIs to operate in a ‘free market’ like regular banks 
(Bateman, 2010). This ideological shift to an even more explicitly neoliberal 
mode of organisation was justified on the grounds that financial sustainability 
through a market-oriented approach would allow for the expansion of 
microcredit programmes, thereby ‘financially including’ more people, as they 
would no longer need to rely on charity for their continued operation (Aitken, 
2013; Hulme, 2008; Morduch, 2008; Robinson, 2008). The overall adoption 
                                                                                                                           
services. For the sake of clarity, throughout this dissertation I will only use 
the term MFI when referring to specific institutions. Otherwise the term 
microcredit programme will be used. 
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of the financial systems approach by the microfinance movement has, 
unsurprisingly, received strong support from the global commercial financial 
sector,7 and ultimately resulted in the incredibly rapid and unprecedented 
growth of the microfinance industry worldwide. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that a World Bank questionnaire aiming to measure microcredit outreach 
in the early 1990s only received responses from 206 programmes and 
institutions, representing USD 7 billion in loans to 14 million borrowers 
(Paxton, 1996), while the Mix Market – a website dedicated to tracking the 
global microfinance movement (www.mixmarket.org) – currently has 
information for tens of thousands of programmes representing an 
outstanding loan balance of over USD 75 billion to over 95 million borrowers. 
In this way, microcredit has become the most popular type of development 
intervention globally and, particularly throughout the first decade of the 
2000s, the microfinance movement was perceived as being basically 
synonymous with beneficial and sustainable development, resulting in the 
United Nations declaring 2005 the ‘international year of microcredit’, and 
Yunus and the Grameen Bank jointly winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2006. 
 
Considering the rapid ascension of the global microfinance movement 
outlined above, it is unsurprising that research on the subject has 
proliferated. This research largely attempts to assess the impact of 
microcredit on economic development and the well being of local actors (see 
Chapter 5). Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of studies 
on microfinance essentially took the normative stance that increased access 
to credit was implicitly good, and therefore attempted to determine the types 
of benefit that emerged from expanding ‘financial inclusion’ (Helms, 2006; 
United Nations, 2006; Yaron & Benjamin, 1997). While there are far too 
many examples of research finding different positive ‘impacts’ to 
comprehensively cover here, many studies have credited microcredit 
                                            
7 Citi Bank, MasterCard, Visa, HSBC and many other global financial players 
have provided funding and guidance for MFIs and microfinance 
associations. For instance, the China Association of Microfinance (CAM), 
which is located in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Rural 
Development Institute (CASS-RDI), was established with the support of Citi 
Bank and other international institutions that are heavily involved in 
promoting the financial systems approach through the privatisation and 
financialisation of MFIs, and the deregulation of the rural financial sector 
(see http://www.chinamfi.net/). 
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programmes with the ability to empower women by giving them an active 
economic role in the family and community; facilitate consumption smoothing 
across seasons for agricultural producers; improve access to education and 
diversify labour, thereby increasing income, consumption and overall 
household net worth; and improve access to nutrition, healthcare and health-
related information. In this way, microcredit was attributed with the ability to 
help the rural poor reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience to 
shocks, thereby increasing their chances to pull themselves out of poverty 
(Hashemi, Schuler, & Riley, 1996; Holcombe, 1995; Khandker, 2005; 
Leatherman & Dunford, 2010; Morduch, 1998; Pitt, 2014; Pitt & Khandker, 
1998). 
 
At the same time, however, in recent years there has been a growing body 
of literature critiquing the normative understanding of financial inclusion as 
inherently positive. Even some prominent supporters of the microfinance 
movement have started to shift their position on the ability of microcredit 
programmes to affect beneficial change, with recent systematic reviews and 
impact assessments finding no evidence of net positive impact (Angelucci, 
Karlan, & Zinman, 2013; Bateman, 2013; Duvendack et al., 2011; Korth, 
Stewart, Van Rooyen, & De Wet, 2012; Roodman, 2012; Roodman & 
Morduch, 2014; van Rooyen, Stewart, & de Wet, 2012). More important, 
however, are the increasing number of studies outlining fundamental flaws in 
the concepts of microfinance and financial inclusion as facilitators of 
development more generally. This body of research sees the global 
microfinance movement as instigating “the rise of destructive local 
neoliberalism” (Bateman, 2010, p. 1), and details a range of negative 
impacts associated with microcredit programmes, especially those adhering 
to the financial systems approach. In particular, investigations have refuted 
the notion that microcredit empowers women, and have contradicted claims 
that access to credit improves the lives of marginalised individuals and 
groups, instead showing that programmes reflect local power imbalances. 
Other research has shown how microcredit can trap borrowers in destructive 
debt cycles and even create subprime-type crises that can threaten local 
and national economies. Ultimately, these critical studies highlight the fact 
that facilitating the expansion of microentrepreneurial activity can often be 
inherently harmful to local social cohesion, economic activity and livelihoods; 
that it is ridiculous to believe that the rich can make profit off the poor while 
simultaneously helping them; and that local development would be better 
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served by promoting small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly 
those that are cooperative in nature (Bateman, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013; 
Bateman & Chang, 2012; Brigg, 2006; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Hickel, 2015; 
Karnani, 2007; Maclean, 2010; R. Montgomery, 1996; Taylor, 2011, 2012; 
Weber, 2004, 2006). 
 
Therefore, much like rural development in China, the global microfinance 
movement has been heavily contested and defined by a multitude of 
overlapping but contradictory narratives – with some claiming that 
microcredit is a ‘magic bullet’ for facilitating ‘sustainable development’, while 
others deride it as an example of the worst excesses of fundamentalist free-
market capitalism, describing it as a ‘zombie idea’ that will not die despite 
being widely discredited (Bateman, 2012, 2015; Hickel, 2015; Oya, 2012). At 
the same time, as stated above, both the global microfinance movement and 
rural development in China are similar in that they have followed an 
increasingly neoliberal trajectory over the past three and a half decades, 
depicting marginalisation as essentially the result of disconnection and 
exclusion from the wider capitalist system. The prescription in both cases, 
therefore, is integration into urban markets – firstly through inclusion into the 
formal financial system; which then, secondly, provides marginalised actors 
and areas with the necessary capital to foster entrepreneurial activities, 
thereby enabling their entrance into other markets.  
 
Considering these ideological similarities between the ways in which 
Chinese rural development planners and proponents of microcredit 
conceptualise development and de-marginalisation, it is unsurprising that 
microcredit programmes have become increasingly important components in 
Chinese rural development strategies. Indeed, despite the fact that most 
people would first think of countries in South Asia, Africa or Latin America 
when discussing microfinance, China’s microfinance industry is undoubtedly 
one of the largest in the world (or even the largest outright) in terms of size 
and scale.8 While it is true that microcredit was relatively late to catch on in 
                                            
8 Of course, the size of a ‘microfinance industry’ depends on how the terms 
microfinance and microcredit are defined. Since Chinese government 
microcredit programmes and new commercial MFIs often do not follow the 
original Grameen methodology, they have sometimes not been considered 
to be ‘microcredit’ in the same way as NGO programmes (often ‘Grameen 
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China, with only a few international non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
programmes in the 1980s, and the first domestic NGO and government 
programmes not really taking off until the 1990s, it has become arguably the 
most important development intervention (or at least the fastest growing) 
since the reform of the rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) in the early 2000s, 
and the liberalisation of the rural financial sector through the introduction of 
private commercialised village and township banks (VTBs) and microloan 
companies (MLCs) in 2006 (see Chapter 2 for a detailed overview of the 
historical development of rural China’s microfinance industry). In this way, 
China’s rural development efforts and rural financial restructuring have 
undoubtedly been influenced by the global microfinance movement’s 
increasingly neoliberal approach, resulting in a stronger emphasis on 
financial sustainability, profitability and the creation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
in the name of development progress. At the same time, as a chief 
constituent element in China’s overarching rural development strategy, 
Chinese microcredit programmes have come to reflect (and strengthen) the 
fundamental paradoxes at the core of the country’s rural development since 
the reform and opening outlined above. 
 
1.3 Research Questions, Objectives and Original 
Contributions 
Based on the above, it is clear that microcredit in rural China is, in many 
ways, the embodiment of the country’s unprecedented and paradoxical rural 
development landscape and, at the same time, provides a fascinating view 
into the contradictions underpinning the global microfinance movement, 
which is at the very heart of contemporary conceptualisations of what 
development means worldwide. It is, therefore, surprising that there has not 
been more research on microcredit in China – particularly from actor-
oriented or locally-focused perspectives which allow for a more direct 
                                                                                                                           
clones’). However, with the worldwide adoption of the financial systems 
approach and the resulting diversification of the microfinance movement, 
government programmes and commercial providers have been widely 
accepted as being part of the Chinese microfinance industry (He, Du, Bai, & 
Li, 2009). For the purposes of this dissertation, microcredit is simply 
considered to be the provision of small-scale loans targeting excluded areas 
and/or actors with the stated aim of inducing bottom-up socioeconomic 
development. 
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examination of how these paradoxes play out at the local level and what 
they mean for the lives of rural people.9 Indeed, continued research on 
Chinese rural finance and microcredit from different approaches – with 
different foci and at different levels of analysis – is of vital importance for a 
number of reasons. For one, there can be no doubt that the rural financial 
system – and especially credit provision – has played a critical role in the 
transformative and unprecedented development of rural China since the 
reform and opening. In particular, rural development has depended on the 
financing of agricultural producers and township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), as well as the transfer of remittances from migrant workers in urban 
areas back to their rural origins (Y. Cheng, 2006; Tsai, 2002; L. Zhou & 
Takeuchi, 2010), making it important to examine how different financial 
institutions and services have facilitated beneficial development for certain 
areas and actors.  
 
At the same time, there are innumerable examples in different contexts, and 
throughout history, of financial systems and institutions causing severe 
crises, often with catastrophic outcomes for local, regional and national 
economies. These crises have the potential to destroy the foundations of 
livelihoods across the spectrum, but are particularly dangerous for the most 
marginal members of society. 10  With the continued transition toward 
commercialised approaches to financial operation and organisation in rural 
China (Loubere & Zhang, 2015), the financial sustainability of local financial 
institutions and the governments that borrow from them has become a 
growing concern, requiring careful and vigilant observation and analysis (L. 
Ong, 2006, 2012). Finally, and more fundamentally, the organisation, 
distribution and utilisation of financial resources reflect the formation and 
constitution of local society, and local understandings of what development 
entails. Therefore, by exploring the ways in which rural financial services 
generally, and microcredit in particular, manifest themselves at the local 
                                            
9 Of course, this does not mean to say that there has not been some 
excellent research touching on different aspects of these issues. See 
Chapter 2 for a comprehensive literature review outlining the key strengths 
and weaknesses in our knowledge of rural finance and microcredit in China. 
10 Obviously, the most recent example of this is the ongoing fallout from the 
2008 global financial crisis; however, microcredit has also recently been 
implicated in local crises in South Africa and India (Bateman, 2015; Taylor, 
2012). 
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level, it becomes possible to gain important insight into the ways in which 
rural people conceptualise and (re)produce their existences, thereby 
allowing for an in-depth examination of the paradoxical processes 
underpinning rural China’s contemporary socioeconomic transformation. 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation, therefore, will attempt to engage with these critically 
important issues by asking the question: What role do microcredit 
programmes play in local processes of socioeconomic development and the 
livelihoods of diverse local actors? This broad overarching research question 
is addressed through in-depth examination of the three largest government-
run microcredit programmes in three rural townships located in Jiangxi 
Province. These microcredit programmes were formulated at different points 
in history as key components of different rural development strategies, but, 
nevertheless, each attempt to address different aspects of the country’s 
post-reform rural de-marginalisation agenda – e.g. reducing poverty, 
expanding financial inclusion or modernising rural employment. The three 
townships where the vast majority of data collection took place are all 
located in relatively close proximity to each other in the north of Jiangxi. 
However, they nevertheless each represent strikingly different 
socioeconomic contexts (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 for more details). In 
order to examine the overarching research question from the perspectives of 
the local actors involved in (and/or affected by) microcredit, this research 
project adopted an actor-oriented livelihoods approach, necessitating in-
depth ethnographic fieldwork to collect a majority of the data. This fieldwork 
was conducted based on the principles of grounded theory, which requires 
the researcher to remain open and allow themes to emerge organically 
rather than imposing external concepts and theories on the field or the data 
(Charmaz, 2006). For this reason, I began the research project by broadly 
focusing on the nexus between microcredit, development and livelihoods at 
the local level (i.e. the research question above) and avoided formulating 
specific hypotheses requiring testing or verification – i.e. positivistic 
approaches based on methods used in the natural sciences. Instead, I 
identified important emergent themes before, during and after the 
collection/analysis of empirical data and engagement with the literature, 
which allowed me to shift my research direction and flexibly follow-up on 
leads while formulating secondary research questions and objectives (see 
Chapter 3) (Chambers & Loubere, 2016). 
 
 39 
This open, iterative and reflexive approach allowed me to identify a number 
of issues of fundamental importance to the local manifestation of microcredit 
in the context of rural China that warranted in-depth investigation in order to 
address the overarching research question outlined above. Therefore, the 
examination of each of these issues in turn (described as follows) became 
the secondary research objectives that shaped the lines of inquiry I took 
during data collection and analysis, and ultimately structured the dissertation 
itself. To begin with, the dissertation looks at how and why the three 
microcredit programmes have been formulated by policy actors at different 
levels – i.e. how the programmes fit into overarching development goals and 
priorities. It then explores the reasons for the heterogeneous implementation 
of the three programmes in the different townships, thus exposing divergent 
understandings of what development means, and who development should 
benefit, at the local level. Finally, the dissertation scrutinises the ways in 
which this variation in implementation has caused the programmes to play 
very different roles in the (re)production of local processes of development 
and livelihood strategies – facilitating various types of de-marginalisation for 
some, while continuing and exacerbating the marginalisation of others. In 
this way, by examining a broad research question and allowing the research 
objectives, and associated themes and concepts, to emerge organically from 
the ground up, this Ph.D. dissertation seeks to construct micro/meso level 
grounded theories that improve our understanding of the role that 
microcredit plays in development and livelihoods at the local level, and also 
allow for the extrapolation and interrogation of the fundamental principles 
and theories underpinning the microfinance movement and rural 
development more generally. 
 
This grounded approach to theory development permits this Ph.D. 
dissertation to make a number of original contributions to our understanding 
of the policy, practice and outcomes of microcredit programmes and 
processes of development in rural China and beyond. For one, while there 
are a few examples of excellent locally-focused research on rural finance 
and microcredit at the township and village levels (Bislev, 2010, 2012; L. 
Ong, 2006, 2012; Tsai, 2004; Tsien, 2002; Y. Zhao, 2011), the research in 
this Ph.D. dissertation is grounded in a rich set of original empirical data 
collected on programmes (and in localities) that have not previously been 
the subject of ethnographic examination and are, in general, severely under-
researched considering their size and importance to Chinese rural 
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development strategies. Specifically, this dissertation draws on over 100 
interviews and conversations with policy-makers, implementers, borrowers 
and non-borrowers; systematic participant and contextual observation; and 
primary documentary data, the vast majority of which has not been 
examined in previous studies. Therefore, this research represents an 
important original empirical contribution to the field of Chinese rural 
development generally, and the study of rural finance/microcredit in 
particular. 
 
In order to access and analyse this large original data set, this research also 
makes original contributions through the development of conceptual and 
methodological approaches in an effort to more effectively study local areas 
and actors in rural China. In particular, by combining Ane Bislev’s use of 
social capital in the study of Chinese microcredit (Bislev, 2010) with 
approaches in the conceptual and methodological literature in the field of 
global development (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Long, 1999, 2001), this 
research developed an actor-oriented livelihoods approach that has not 
previously been applied to research on rural finance or microcredit in the 
context of rural China. This novel conceptual approach provides the means 
to understand microcredit from the perspective of a range of actors at 
different levels. It also necessitated the development of new research tools – 
referred to in this dissertation as ‘systematic interview reports’ and ‘reflexive 
dialoguing’ – which represent a significant methodological contribution to the 
field of development studies in China and elsewhere (see Chapter 3 for 
more details on these empirical, conceptual and methodological 
contributions). 
 
Based on these original data and innovative conceptual/methodological 
approaches, this research is able to provide valuable insights into the ways 
in which microcredit programmes manifest themselves at the township and 
village levels, and what this means for different types of rural actor, thereby 
contributing significantly to our understanding of microcredit and processes 
of socioeconomic development in China and elsewhere. Specifically, this 
dissertation provides a richly detailed depiction and analysis of the 
heterogeneous formulation and implementation of the microcredit 
programmes across the three townships, which contributes to the large (and 
still growing) body of research on policy implementation in rural China by 
providing evidence for the need to understand the local (re)production of 
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microcredit and other development interventions as the emergent results of 
complex, non-linear and relational processes. At the same time, by 
examining variation in outcomes at the local level, the dissertation 
contributes to our understanding of the divergent and multidimensional 
‘impacts’ that development interventions such as microcredit have on 
different local actors. Ultimately, therefore, this research outlines the ways in 
which microcredit in rural China contributes to the production of different 
patterns of de-marginalisation, while simultaneously feeding into 
undercurrents of marginalisation, thus reflecting (and even strengthening) 
many of the contradictions inherent in China’s rural development and the 
global microfinance movement outlined above. In this way, this dissertation 
provides a means of understanding contemporary development, both in 
China and globally, as inherently paradoxical, and emerging from unequal 
relationships and mutually constituted patterns of development and 
underdevelopment (see Chapters 4 through 8). 
 
Of course, the research questions, objectives and contributions outlined 
above represent an agenda that departs substantially from the vast majority 
of research on microcredit and development, both in China and globally. 
Therefore, it is also important to outline what this dissertation does not aim 
(or claim) to do. For one, unlike most of the research on microcredit and 
rural finance in China, which is largely from the disciplinary perspectives of 
finance and/or economics, this study does not seek to systematically 
investigate the functioning of the rural financial system as a whole or the 
operation of rural financial institutions in order to make universalist and/or 
normative claims about how to fix ‘problems’ or ‘irregularities’. While the 
dissertation does not ignore systemic and institutional issues, it instead 
observes them through the perspectives of local actors, and therefore values 
multiple understandings and interpretations, rather than generalisabilty and 
universality. At the same time, this dissertation does not uncritically accept 
the normative foundations of the ‘financial inclusion’ discourse, which 
implicitly assumes that more access to financial services (and credit in 
particular) is positive, and, therefore, I avoid making policy recommendations 
on this basis. Finally, this Ph.D. research is not interested in addressing the 
most commonly asked question in research on microcredit – i.e. ‘does 
microcredit work?’ – by assessing top-down linear causal ‘impact’. Instead, 
this dissertation understands impact as multifaceted and relational, and, 
therefore, seeks to explore the role that microcredit programmes play in local 
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development and livelihoods. In other words, rather than attempting to 
identify generalisable trends, ‘best practices’ and/or linear causation in order 
to provide prescriptions for future policy, the research in this Ph.D. 
dissertation aims to understand the processes underpinning the provision, 
acquisition and utilisation of microcredit by diverse actors, all of whom have 
their own understandings of development and divergent livelihood goals. 
Simply put, I do not seek to answer “whether microfinance does or does not 
‘work’ but, rather: ‘What are the workings of microfinance?’” (Taylor, 2012, p. 
602) – and, in this way, use microcredit as a lens to examine the nature of 
paradoxical and contradictory development in China and elsewhere. 
 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation consists of eight chapters (including this introduction), 
which are organised as follows. To begin with, in order to historicise and 
contextualise the financial and development landscapes that the three 
microcredit programmes have been embedded in, Chapter 2 starts by 
outlining the historical development of rural finance and microcredit in the 
country since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949. This is followed by a systematic review of the literature on rural 
financial services in China, which allows for the identification of the strengths 
and weaknesses in our current understanding of the nexus between financial 
services (and particularly microcredit), local development and livelihoods in 
the Chinese countryside. The chapter concludes by pointing to the need to 
develop a new set of conceptual and methodological approaches to address 
the gaps diagnosed in the literature review. 
 
Chapter 3 represents an ‘audit trail’ for the dissertation by providing a 
detailed and reflexive account of how the research has been conceptualised 
and undertaken. Section 1 begins by outlining the need to shift the mode of 
inquiry from a top-down structuralist approach to an ‘actor-oriented 
perspective’ focusing analytically on actor interfaces, livelihoods and 
financial landscapes, in order to accurately represent multiple (and often 
contradictory) perceptions and experiences of microcredit and development 
at the local level. Section 2 details the grounded and ethnographic principles 
that underpinned the empirical fieldwork and data collection, which 
necessitated openness and flexibility in order to allow themes and concepts 
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to emerge naturally. It then gives a reflexive account of the fieldwork that 
was undertaken, a detailed overview of the specific methods utilised to 
collect data, and a description of how data was analysed – both in the field 
and in the office. The final section of the chapter presents contextual 
socioeconomic backgrounds of the three townships and their constituent 
villages where the vast majority of the data were collected. 
 
Chapter 4 begins by providing detailed historical backgrounds for the three 
microcredit programmes, outlining how they have been formulated at the 
central and provincial levels as components of overarching rural 
development strategies and frameworks – thereby largely adhering to the 
prevailing narratives and discourses defining rural development in China. 
This is followed by an analysis of key areas where microcredit policy has 
been left relatively open to interpretation, allowing for local policy 
experimentation. The rest of the chapter explicitly outlines how the three 
programmes have been implemented (or not) in each of the townships, 
setting the stage for an analysis of heterogeneous implementation in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 starts with a brief review of the literature on policy transformation 
and variation in local implementation, both globally and in rural China, and 
outlines the key ways in which heterogeneous implementation is 
conceptualised, particularly with regard to development policy. The chapter 
then turns to examine the ways in which differentiated financial landscapes, 
alongside a variety of exogenous and endogenous pressures and incentives, 
have been internalised and interpreted very differently by implementers 
across the three townships. This is followed by an analysis of local policy 
interpretation and implementation from a relational perspective, which 
illustrates how implementation outcomes are actually formed at the 
interfaces of interaction between diverse actors at different levels – 
producing complex and emergent results. The chapter concludes by pointing 
out that heterogeneous implementation is ultimately a reflection of relational 
dynamics at different levels, which has serious implications for the role that 
microcredit (or any external intervention) plays in local development 
strategies and livelihoods. 
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The beginning of Chapter 6 is dedicated to outlining the fundamental 
features of the linear progression development paradigm (i.e. the dominant 
means of understanding contemporary development), which depicts 
development as following predetermined stages, and conceptualises 
underdevelopment as being the result of spatial, material and temporal 
marginalisation and detachment from the ‘modern’ world. The chapter then 
goes on to outline how microcredit programmes have been envisioned as 
facilitating de-marginalisation and local development based on this 
paradigm, albeit in different ways by different actors in different places. The 
chapter then analyses ways in which the microcredit programmes have been 
perceived to deliver on these paradigmatic developmental goals – for 
instance, by facilitating urban to rural transfers of technology, knowledge and 
financial capital; creating new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages 
between rural and urban individuals and groups; and promoting livelihood 
diversification through new types of employment, local cooperation and 
financial inclusion. The chapter concludes by observing that microcredit has 
undoubtedly had some success in contributing to certain types of de-
marginalisation and socioeconomic development for some areas/actors. 
However, these apparent benefits have not been equally distributed across 
or within the three localities. 
 
Chapter 7 starts by briefly summarising the ‘alternative development’ 
literature, which provides a critique of the dominant linear progression 
development paradigm and modernisation discourses outlined in Chapter 6. 
The chapter then goes on to show how China’s rural margins and urban 
centres have been dichotomously mutually constituted – and are, therefore, 
inherently relational – necessitating the marginalisation of the countryside (in 
relation to urban areas) and certain rural actors. This is followed by an 
illustration of how microcredit and other development interventions implicitly 
reproduce (and sometimes strengthen) patterns of marginality – for instance, 
by facilitating the diversion and extraction of resources from marginal rural 
areas to central urban zones; by exacerbating patterns of socioeconomic 
exclusion at the local level; and by aggravating already precarious 
livelihoods through exploitation and risk transference. The chapter concludes 
by analysing how the heterogeneous implementation of microcredit (and 
other development interventions) ultimately reflects, magnifies and/or 
transforms unequal relationships of power at different levels, hence 
 45 
facilitating de-marginalisation for some, while simultaneously feeding into 
undercurrents of marginalisation that disadvantage others. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the Ph.D. It summarises, in detail, the content of the 
dissertation, provides an overview of the original contributions and outlines 
the key findings. The chapter ends by examining areas where future 
research could build on the approaches and findings in this dissertation to 
further improve our understanding of microcredit and rural development in 
China and elsewhere. 
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Chapter 2 
Rural Financial Services in China: Historical Background and 
a Review of the Literature 
 
There is a growing fascination with the mechanics of microfinance, with the 
vehicle. There is less and less concern about the passengers and their 
destination. 
- Aminur Rahman 
 
As ‘external interventions’ that aim to positively transform socioeconomic 
development landscapes and improve the livelihoods of ‘financially excluded’ 
actors through the provision of loans, microcredit programmes are often 
viewed in relative isolation from the pre-existing local financial landscapes 
(which are perceived as being ‘underdeveloped’). At the same time, 
microcredit ‘impact’ is assessed in a more or less linear fashion, in an 
attempt to determine how the intervention changes (or correlates with 
changes in) specific measurable indicators. This perspective, however, 
obscures the fact that microcredit programmes necessarily enter into, and 
become reconstituted within, complex and often highly differentiated regimes 
of resource acquisition, accumulation and utilisation at the local level. As 
Stuart Rutherford points out in his book The Poor and their Money, all 
financial instruments (including savings, loans, insurance, etc.) are really just 
different methods of helping people gather together “usefully large lump 
sums of money” (Rutherford, 2000, p. 9), and are thus simply modern 
manifestations of the fundamental human need to accumulate resources in 
order to affect beneficial change in living situations. Therefore, ‘external’ 
microcredit programmes cannot be divorced from the existing financial and 
developmental terrains, as all local actors – even the ‘financially excluded’ – 
have their own methods of gathering together ‘usefully large lump sums’ of 
financial capital and/or other resources, and thus perceive, access and 
utilise microcredit programmes in very different ways, thereby changing what 
microcredit actually means in different contexts. 
 
For this reason, before it is possible to undertake an in-depth analysis of 
how and why microcredit programmes manifest themselves in rural China, 
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and what this means for various aspects of socioeconomic development and 
the livelihoods of diverse rural actors, it is first essential to establish the 
historical, political and socioeconomic development contexts, as well as the 
nature of the financial landscapes within which these programmes come to 
be located. At the same time, it is also necessary to critically review the 
literature on rural financial service provision more generally, in order to 
assess the current state of the art, and identify key strengths and 
weaknesses in our understanding of the topic. Therefore, this chapter 
attempts to ‘set the scene’ by providing this necessary background 
knowledge. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
comprehensively outlines the historical trajectory of rural financial service 
provision in China from the founding of the PRC to the present day. The 
chapter then turns to systematically review the research on contemporary 
rural financial services in China, and identifies key strengths in the current 
scholarship, as well as areas where our knowledge is relatively less 
developed. The chapter concludes by highlighting the need to develop a 
conceptual and methodological approach that has the ability address a 
number of lacunae in the current literature in order to improve our 
understanding of the nexus between microcredit, development and 
livelihoods in rural China. 
 
2.1 The Trajectories and Contours of the Rural Financial 
Landscape since 1949 
Since the first half of the twentieth century, China’s rural financial and 
developmental landscapes have been characterised by continuous and rapid 
dynamism. We first turn to look at the period starting just before the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the beginning of the reform period at 
the end of the 1970s. 
 
The pre-reform period 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began restructuring the rural financial 
system through the introduction of RCCs in CCP-controlled areas before 
1949. As cooperative institutions, RCCs were initially owned by rural 
households (as members) and provided both savings and loans for small-
scale agricultural producers. Politically and ideologically, RCCs were 
established to protect peasants from the usurious money-lending practices 
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that were commonplace in rural areas at that time, and therefore can be 
considered an initial social policy intervention aimed at improving rural 
welfare and achieving greater levels of equality, rather than just another 
financial institution (Y. Cheng, 2006; Herrmann-Pillath, 2009b). After coming 
to power, the CCP continued to restructure the rural financial system and in 
the 1950s the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was established to finance 
agricultural production. At the same time the RCC network was expanded 
nationwide to become the main financial service provider in rural areas, and 
by the mid-1950s there were over 103,000 RCC branches across the 
country with more than 100 million member households (Y. Cheng, 2006, p. 
26). However, with the push towards agricultural collectivisation after the 
mid-1950s, control over RCCs quickly shifted from the member households 
to the people’s communes (renmin gongshe º0Ô),11 which incorporated 
the RCCs along with the supply and marketing cooperatives (gongxiao 
hezuoshe 'ČQ&Ô) into a single system (Y. Zhao, 2011). Following the 
Great Leap Forward (da yuejin eĂĄ ) from 1958 to 1961, economic 
readjustment policies handed the management of some of the RCCs to the 
smaller production brigades until the Cultural Revolution (wenhua dageming 
¦FeėT) of the 1970s when the People’s Bank of China (PBC) took over 
full administration of the RCC network. The ABC, on the other hand, was 
merged with the PBC in the 1950s and only re-established after the initiation 
of the reform and opening policies of the late 1970s (Herrmann-Pillath, 
2009b). 
 
Under the system of collectivised agriculture, the Chinese rural economy 
was less diverse and rural people were paid largely in kind (e.g. grain), 
which meant that, for the most part, households were short of cash (Oi, 
1989; Riskin, 2009). At the same time, private entrepreneurship and local 
collective efforts to diversify economies and livelihoods were largely 
discouraged due to ideological rigidness, and the overarching policy 
frameworks put forth by the central government favoured urban heavy 
                                            
11 From the late 1950s to the early 1980s rural China was organised into a 
three-tiered administrative system consisting of the people’s communes, the 
production brigades (shengchan dadui Èeď) and the production teams 
(shengchan dui È  ď ), which have since been converted into 
townships/towns (zhen/xiang č/), villages (cun ±) and natural villages 
(zirancun åÂ±), respectively. 
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industry over agriculture and the rural sector. Within this context, RCCs 
became one of the institutional mechanisms that facilitated the transfer of 
rural resources (including rural household deposits) to urban areas and 
industries – particularly through policies mandating that RCCs place their 
local deposits in the more central branches of the PBC (Loubere & Zhang, 
2015). At the same time, however, RCCs also provided limited financial 
support (e.g. the necessary start-up and operational capital) for an emerging 
sector of rural enterprises, which generated extra cash income for both the 
collectives and rural households, especially in relatively better-off areas with 
stronger collective entities. While these enterprises did not receive as much 
support as larger, often urban-based, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), they 
did manage to acquire some loans from local RCCs, laying the foundation 
for their transformation into the dynamic TVE sector in the post-reform 
period (Y. Cheng, 2006; Herrmann-Pillath, 2009b; Tam, 1988). 
 
Informal finance for the purpose of investment was also constrained during 
this period because of the restrictions mentioned above on almost all forms 
of private economic and financial activities, as well as the predominance of 
subsistence agriculture as opposed to entrepreneurial livelihood strategies. 
Nevertheless, in some areas rural people still continued to utilise informal 
methods of accumulation, such as rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs), in order to provide mutual help (often interest-free) to 
households for consumption purposes – e.g. to cover costs during times of 
crisis or for ceremonial events – rather than for entrepreneurial or 
commercial ventures. These informal modes of financial organisation often 
had long traditions, sometimes dating back to before the establishment of 
the Qing Dynasty over 350 years ago (Hu, 2003; Tsai, 2004). 
 
The early post-reform period 
Since the initiation of the reform and opening policies in the late 1970s 
leading to agricultural de-collectivisation through the introduction of the 
household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi uã
Eú >), China’s rural financial system has changed dramatically. In 
1979, the central government made the PBC the country’s central bank 
responsible for setting national monetary policy and regulating the financial 
sector. The ABC was demerged out and restructured to become one of the 
‘big four’ state-owned banks under the administration of the PBC, along with 
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the Bank of China (BoC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) and China Construction Bank (CCB). The ABC was redefined as 
both a policy and commercial bank, and it also took over the governance of 
the RCCs from the PBC (He, 2014). These reforms were also meant to re-
establish the cooperative nature of RCCs to meet the increasing credit 
needs of farmers, which went hand in hand with rapidly diversifying rural 
livelihoods and increasing incomes in the first half of the 1980s (see Chapter 
1). However, this attempt to redirect RCCs back towards their rural members 
largely failed, and RCCs continued to use local savings to support local 
governments (e.g. to cover budget shortages, fund local initiatives and 
projects, etc.) and TVEs, but were, in general, reluctant to lend to private 
individuals and households for initiating small business ventures, which 
resulted in a perceived shortage of formal credit in many rural areas (L. Ong, 
2011; Tsai, 2004). At the same time, the RCCs continued to facilitate the 
transfer of rural resources to urban areas, and while rural savings deposited 
in the RCCs increased rapidly from RMB 16.6 billion in 1978 to RMB 214.5 
billion in 1990 (Y. Cheng, 2006, p. 27), RCCs were required to deposit 30 
per cent of these savings in the ABC – most of which were located at the 
county level or higher – at low interest rates. In the 1980s these deposits 
from the RCCs were the largest source of funds for the ABC, accounting for 
some 50 per cent of the bank’s total deposits (Tam, 1988; Watson, 2003). 
Drained of their resources, the RCCs were only able to lend 50 per cent of 
their total savings to local (i.e. township and village) areas (Y. Cheng, 2006, 
p. 27), most of which went to the TVEs within a wider policy environment 
that encouraged rural industrialisation and in situ urbanisation.  
 
The ABC and RCCs were also required to provide loans at below market 
interest rates to support this rural industrialisation strategy. This was 
evidenced by the fact that between 1985 and 1990, even though the RCCs 
expanded their loan provision tremendously from RMB 4.5 billion to RMB 
141.3 billion, and the ABC registered rapid growth in loans from RMB 168.8 
billion to RMB 377.4 billion, both institutions were loss-making (Y. Cheng, 
2006; Tam, 1988). Considering the leading role that TVEs played in driving 
China’s miraculous economic growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s – this 
strong government support for the TVE sector can be considered a success 
story of state-led rural industrialisation (Bateman, 2010; Loubere & Zhang, 
2015). However, the strategy also contributed to widening inequalities 
across the country, since the eastern coastal region was home to larger and 
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more successful TVEs, better infrastructure and better access to export 
markets, and therefore received the bulk of government support in the form 
of subsidised loans, which reduced the amount of lending capital available to 
small-scale private entrepreneurs in less prosperous regions (L. Ong, 2011). 
 
In the second half of the 1980s two important structural changes to the rural 
financial system occurred resulting in further increases to rural-urban capital 
outflow. First, the ABC was allowed to pursue profitable commercial lending 
opportunities, most of which were in urban areas, by using rural deposits 
(Tam, 1988). This pursuit of profits resulted in the rapidly declining presence 
of the ABC in rural areas. Second, in 1986 the Postal Savings and 
Remittance Bureau (PSRB) was established offering savings and remittance 
services through the China Post network. Since the PSRB was not a bank at 
that time, it reached a special agreement with the PBC whereby the PSRB 
could store funds in the central bank at preferential interest rates. This 
enabled the PSRB to provide its customers with higher interest rates for their 
savings, resulting in the rapid growth of PSRB deposits from RMB 128.8 
billion in 1996 to RMB 442.1 billion in 2002. While most PSRB funds were 
deposited by rural households, the PBC opted to allocate most of the funds 
for lending in non-rural areas (Bislev, 2010; Y. Cheng, 2006, p. 33; Feng, 
He, & Ljungwall, 2013; L. Ong, 2009c, p. 53). This capital flow from rural to 
urban areas through the RCCs, the ABC and the PSRB occurred despite the 
government’s intention to provide increasing numbers of migrant workers in 
Chinese cities with improved services to remit money back to their rural 
origins. As such, the newly established financial institutions continued the 
pre-reform policy of channelling rural financial resources to feed into urban 
development and industrialisation. 
 
Meanwhile, semi-formal and informal financial intermediaries and services 
expanded rapidly to meet the needs of rural actors operating within the 
diversifying rural economy. In the early 1980s, the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA) introduced another network of financial service providers known as 
rural cooperative foundations (RCFs) to ease the shortage of lending capital 
in the countryside (Nyberg & Rozelle, 1999). RCFs became an immediate 
success – attracting deposits of RMB 10 billion by the end of the decade (Y. 
Cheng, 2006; Tsai, 2004; Wen, 2009). However, because RCFs were 
sanctioned by the MoA, a government ministry rather than a state financial 
regulator, the PBC did not recognise them as formal financial institutions. 
 52 
Thus, RCFs fell into a legal grey zone with only a semi-formal status (Y. 
Cheng, 2006). At the same time, informal providers such as ROSCAs, 
pawnshops and even loan sharks made a dramatic return to the countryside. 
Rural people have also continued to rely heavily on their social networks – 
e.g. friends, families (historically on the male’s side but increasingly on the 
female’s side as well) and fellow villagers – for loans or pooled mutual help 
funds for a variety of purposes, including consumption, start-up capital for 
microenterprises, children’s education, medical expenses, house-building 
and ceremonial events. Some researchers, therefore, estimate that informal 
finance has become the largest source of lending capital in rural China since 
the reform period began (Hu, 2003; Tsai, 2004; Turvey & Kong, 2010; Y. 
Zhao, 2011). 
 
The 1980s also saw the first attempts at emulating the global microfinance 
movement with the incorporation of microcredit programmes based on the 
‘poverty lending approach’ associated with the Grameen Bank’s joint-liability 
lending methodology into some small-scale projects run by international 
development agencies and non-profit organisations (NPOs) or NGOs, such 
as the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development, Oxfam and others. These projects, initially 
relying on exogenous sources (e.g. grants) to fund their activities, were often 
run in coordination with local authorities and aimed to reduce poverty in rural 
areas (He, Du, Bai, & Li, 2009). In 1986 the central government started its 
own subsidised Poverty Alleviation Microcredit Programme (guojia fupin tiexi 
daikuan [uüýþ¹, hereafter PAMP) in rural areas as part of its 
overall poverty reduction strategy.12 These loans had interest rates set as 
low as 2.88 per cent and subsidies were paid for by the central Ministry of 
Finance (MoF). The PAMP was further expanded after 1996 as the main 
component of the 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Programme (guojia baqi 
                                            
12 As stated in Chapter 1, sometimes the PAMP and other government 
lending programmes have not been considered to be ‘real’ microcredit, as 
they do not strictly adhere to the original Grameen lending methodology. 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, microcredit is simply 
considered to be the provision of small-scale loans targeting excluded areas 
and/or actors with the stated aim of inducing bottom-up socioeconomic 
development. 
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fupin gongjian jihua [u/ü£^ï:, hereafter 8-7 Programme)13 to 
become one of the largest microcredit schemes in the world (Park & Ren, 
2001; Park & Wang, 2010). 
 
The 1990s brought more change through the official restructuring and 
differentiation of rural financial providers into policy, commercial and 
cooperative institutions. 14  The Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC) was created in 1994 to take over the unprofitable policy lending 
duties of the ABC, which also included the PAMP. The RCCs, which had 
been under the governance of the ABC since the beginning of the reform 
period, had their administration transferred to county credit unions, which 
were directly responsible to the PBC (Y. Cheng, 2006; Feng et al., 2013; X. 
Xu, Deng, Xue, Liu, & Hu, 1994; Y. Zhao, 2011). These reforms marked a 
shift in the operating principles of the financial intermediaries. The RCCs, as 
cooperative institutions, were expected to be more responsive to the needs 
of farmers, microenterprises, and SMEs. As the ADBC started shouldering 
the bulk of policy lending duties, the ABC was increasingly engaged in 
profitable commercial endeavours, which were often better achieved in 
urban areas. This led to the ABC’s further retreat from rural areas, and by 
the end of the 1990s the bank had closed almost all of its township and 
village level branches, as well as many county level branches (Feng et al., 
2013; X. Li, Gan, & Hu, 2011b; L. Ong, 2009a). Meanwhile, the PSRB 
continued expanding into both urban and rural areas (Y. Cheng, 2006). 
 
In 1994, a group of researchers from the CASS-RDI established the Funding 
the Poor Cooperative (FPC) with support from the Ford Foundation and the 
Grameen Trust. Although some microcredit projects had been initiated in the 
1980s (see above), the FPC was the first purpose-run MFI in China, and its 
                                            
13 The 8-7 Programme was named for its declared targets of lifting 80 million 
rural people out of poverty in seven years (from 1994-2000) (Bislev, 2010; 
Tsai, 2004). 
14  According to the legislation, policy banks are not profit-oriented but 
instead provide loans for policy objectives (e.g. poverty reduction). 
Commercial banks are expected to be profit-oriented and financially 
sustainable. Cooperative institutions, typified in the case of the RCCs, are 
mutually owned and should meet the needs of their members (X. Chen, 
Zhao, Chen, & Luo, 2009). 
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establishment is considered to be the beginning of ‘institutionalised’ 
microcredit in the country (X. Du, 2003; He et al., 2009). Throughout the 
1990s, NPO and NGO-style MFIs (both domestic and international) 
modelled on the Grameen group-lending practice and the ‘poverty lending 
approach’ gained popularity, and by the end of the decade there were more 
than 200 such MFIs across the country. The largest and most well-known of 
these were the FPC, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 
and the Association for Rural Development of Yilong (ARDY) (Chan, 2009; 
Druschel, 2002; He et al., 2009). These MFIs, however, have not been 
allowed to register as formal financial institutions, and are thus not 
considered to be a part of the formal financial market subject to government 
supervision and regulation. They are, therefore, not permitted to conduct the 
full range of financial business, particularly with regard to accepting and 
mobilising deposits. Nevertheless, in many rural areas they have been 
allowed to operate and provide microloans to low-income groups at the 
discretion of local governments (He et al., 2009; Jia, 2008; Tsai, 2004). 
 
After 1996, the PAMP was expanded and its management reverted back 
from the ADBC to the ABC. 15  The ABC was required to allocate the 
microloan quotas to township and village poverty alleviation offices (PAOs) – 
under the auspices of the State Council’s PAO – which were then 
responsible for organising Grameen-style lending groups (consisting of 
about five people), and disbursing the loans in accordance with the quotas. It 
has been reported, however, that these subsidised loans often missed the 
target groups, and instead were ‘captured’ by more powerful local ‘elites’ – 
e.g. officials and better-off groups – to either promote local development 
projects or serve self-interests not necessarily related to the poverty 
reduction objectives. Moreover, with policy goals and local interests 
frequently overriding commercial considerations, these loans tended to 
become outstanding with repayment rates sometimes as low as 50 per cent, 
and thus became a liability for the ABC (Bislev, 2010; L. Ong, 2011; Park & 
Ren, 2001).  
 
                                            
15 The fact that responsibility for the PAMP was returned to the ABC after it 
had been converted into a profit-oriented commercial bank illustrates the 
often blurred category boundaries between policy, commercial and 
cooperative financial institutions. 
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The end of the 1990s was a turbulent time for rural finance in China, which 
went hand in hand with the privatisation of many SOEs and TVEs, and the 
exacerbation of development ‘problems’ in rural areas, i.e. the sannong 
wenti. With the exception of the PSRB, other rural financial institutions were 
considered commercially ‘unsustainable’ because of their policy lending 
practices and loss-making outcomes, and thus subjected to further 
restructuring in an increasingly neoliberal climate. The existing rural financial 
system was seen as incompatible with the core commercial objectives of 
making and maximising profits, and improving ‘efficiency’ and 
‘competitiveness’, and the primary rural financial institutions (i.e. the RCCs 
and RCFs) were, therefore, reformed within the logic of a market-driven 
commercial system, which prioritised ‘financial sustainability’. This meant 
that ‘underperforming’ RCCs were closed or merged with more ‘financially 
successful’ ones, reducing the total number of branches from around 50,000 
to just over 33,000 (Y. Cheng, 2006; Tsai, 2004; Wen, 2009), and RCC 
administration was shifted from the local county unions to more central 
provincial unions. In other words, RCCs underwent a process of ‘de-
localisation’ through consolidation, commercialisation and centralisation 
(Loubere & Zhang, 2015). The RCFs, on the other hand, were deemed too 
big of a liability due to the fact that they were not technically a part of the 
formal financial system and were more independent (and therefore more 
difficult to control), and all 45,000 were forced to either shut down or merge 
with RCCs, causing protests across the country (Feng et al., 2013; State 
Council, 1998; Tsai, 2004; Wen, 2009). Wen Tiejun, Professor of Agriculture 
and Rural Development at China’s Renmin University, has noted that the 
cost of this massive financial restructuring was mainly born by local 
governments and, by extension, the rural residents and enterprises whose 
taxes financed these governments, as this was before the abolition of 
agricultural taxes in 2006 (Wen, 2009). 
 
These reductions in RCC branch numbers and the abolition of the RCFs, 
along with the ABC’s retreat from townships and villages, represented a 
significant retraction of the rural financial sector and substantially hindered 
access (e.g. through increased travel distances) to financial information, 
services and institutions for many rural actors, and especially for farmers. At 
the same time, the remaining RCCs and the PSRB continued to channel 
rural household deposits to local and non-local governments, and TVEs or 
SOEs, most of which had transformed from collective to private or semi-
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private entities by the turn of the new century (X. Chen, Zhao, Chen, & Luo, 
2009). While it is true that government and NGO microcredit programmes 
were becoming more popular, they were still not widespread. Therefore, a 
majority of rural households and microenterprises continued to rely on 
informal sources to meet their credit needs (Tsai, 2004).  
 
The current situation 
Since the early 2000s there have been two divergent trends in the Chinese 
rural financial system. Firstly, the continued exacerbation of the sannong 
wenti and increasing social discontent in the countryside has led to serious 
concerns within the central government about potential social instability and 
its own political legitimacy, which has prompted the leadership to put a 
greater emphasis on promoting rural development. For example, rural 
development issues have been the main feature of every Number One 
Central Document (zhongyang yihao wenjian gO¦) since 2004, 
resulting in the formulation of overarching policy frameworks aimed at 
addressing the widening gap between rural and urban areas. These include 
the Campaign to Open up the West (xibu dakaifa ëĉeM), the XNCJS 
and the CXYTH. These development frameworks/strategies have pushed 
forward a number of specific policy measures, including the abolition of 
agricultural taxes and fees, the provision of agricultural subsidies, and the 
establishment of basic pension and healthcare systems for rural residents 
and migrant workers, to name a few (P. H. Brown, de Brauw, & Du, 2009; 
Fan, 2006; Veeck & Shui, 2011; Watson, 2009; H. X. Zhang, 2009a). More 
importantly for this dissertation, this renewed focus on the sannong wenti 
has emphasised the need to extend access to formal ‘modern’ financial 
services to rural areas (State Council, 2014), drawing on global narratives 
stressing the importance of ‘financial inclusion’ in order to promote rural 
development, modernise the countryside and ‘empower’ the poor 
(Sparreboom & Duflos, 2012; World Bank, 2014). 
 
Within this context, the government again attempted to reform the RCCs in 
order to facilitate the extension of financial services to ‘excluded’ segments 
of the population. Along with various changes to RCC structure,16 a large 
                                            
16 After 2003 the RCCs were put under the administration of provincial 
unions and three different RCC models were introduced: rural credit 
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portion of RCC debt from the non-performing loans was written off and 
RCCs were required to begin providing subsidised microcredit through the 
RCC microcredit programme (nonghu xiao’e xinyong daikuan 6xę*É
þ¹, hereafter RCCMP). The RCCMP was envisioned as a way to promote 
rural microenterprises and further diversify livelihoods through loans that are 
accessible to low-income households without collateral (diya ), thereby 
‘financially including’ them. Additionally, the PAMP has seen continued 
expansion as part of the Poor Village Investment Programme, and in the 
early 2000s the central government initiated the Employment Microcredit 
Programme (xiagang shiye zaijiuye xiao’e danbao daikuan~h5z
xę)þ¹, hereafter EMP)17 for urban workers who had been laid-off 
during the reform and privatisation of the SOEs (guoyou qiye gaige [¬!
¢ė). The EMP was then extended to rural areas in 2006, and has since 
provided microcredit at 0 per cent interest in an effort to generate 
employment opportunities and increase income for a number of rural actors, 
such as returning migrant workers and local farmers (for more details on the 
RCCMP, PAMP and EMP see Chapter 4). Another important development 
was the transformation of the PSRB into the Postal Savings Bank of China 
(PSBC) in 2007 with the ability to provide loans in both urban and rural 
settings. The PSBC has been mandated to redirect investment capital back 
into rural areas through its national network by providing credit to rural 
individuals, households and microenterprises, as well as through wholesale 
loans to MFIs and private commercial financial institutions (X. Du, 2008a).  
 
Clearly, these government-led and government-subsidised microcredit 
initiatives, and the PSBC’s mandate to increase rural coverage, represent 
social policies aiming to more effectively address the sannong wenti, which 
is seemingly in contradiction to the earlier neoliberal policy discourse 
prioritising the ‘financial sustainability’ and ‘efficiency’ of financial institutions. 
However, the growing domination of the global neoliberal ideology, and the 
shift in the global microfinance movement from the ‘poverty lending 
                                                                                                                           
cooperatives, rural cooperative banks and rural commercial banks. For more 
on the institutional transformation of the RCCs see (L. Ong, 2009a). 
17~h5zxę)þ¹ is actually more accurately translated as the 
‘re-employment microcredit programme’. However, since being extended to 
rural areas, the EMP’s focus has expanded to include a variety of other 
target groups in addition to laid-off workers; therefore, I have opted to 
choose a translation that reflects the current objectives of the programme. 
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approach’ to the ‘financial systems approach’ (see Chapter 1), has also had 
major implications for China’s rural financial system and the provision of 
microcredit specifically, and since 2004 the central government has also 
pushed for new types of market-oriented rural financial service providers 
alongside the expansion of the government-subsidised initiatives outlined 
above (Feng, He, & Du, 2006; Feng et al., 2013; State Council, 2004). For 
instance, in 2005 the PBC initiated a new type of profit-oriented private MLC 
in rural areas; in 2006 the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
piloted and subsequently legalised private VTBs; and in 2007 the CBRC 
approved the formalisation of rural mutual credit cooperatives (RMCCs), 
which are the regulated equivalent of ROSCAs and not commercially-
oriented. While different rules apply to MLCs and VTBs, the two emerging 
commercial rural financial institutions can lend at up to four times basic 
lending rate set by the PBC (as of July 2015 the rate was 5.6 per cent), 
which is much higher than the 2.3 times the basic rate allowed for state-
owned financial institutions. However, in an attempt to prevent the type of 
rural-urban capital outflow discussed earlier, current rules forbid MLCs and 
VTBs from operating beyond their home counties, and they cannot link up to 
central administrative units at higher levels (X. Du, 2008a; He et al., 2009).  
 
The entry of these commercial institutional forms into the rural financial 
sector has created new opportunities for private financial institutions, local 
investors and global capital – represented by international commercial banks 
– to tap into China’s rural cash reserves. Indeed, since 2008 major 
international players, such as HSBC, the Bank of East Asia, and Standard 
Chartered Bank have set up VTBs, and Citi Bank has invested in MLCs (He, 
2008). These large international financial institutions have often sought to 
frame investment in these new commercial MFIs as a form of corporate 
social responsibility, while also acknowledging their desire to gain a foothold 
in the Chinese countryside (which prior to the advent of MLCs and VTBs had 
been off-limits to foreign financial institutions) in the hopes that the 
restrictions on coordinating branch activities at higher administrative levels 
will be relaxed in the future (Stiles, 2009).18  
 
                                            
18 Conversation 02. 
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Unsurprisingly, this commercialisation of the rural financial landscape has 
also instigated a rapid expansion and diversification of financial institutions 
at the grassroots. For instance, between 2008 and 2012 over 4,000 MLCs 
and VTBs were established nationwide (Y. Wang & Wang, 2012), mainly by 
small private investors. Practically, this has resulted in the formalisation of 
previously informal moneylenders and underground banks, with most VTBs 
and MLCs being located in more urbanised county seats rather than in 
townships and villages. Moreover, rather than lending to the poor and 
‘financially excluded’ segments of society for ‘development’ activities, these 
commercial MFIs often lend at illegally high rates (i.e. higher than four times 
the PBC rate) for ‘unproductive’ activities, such as gambling, that regular 
banks would not provide loans for, with property (often real estate in 
urbanised county seats) being used as collateral rather than joint-liability 
groups.19 At the same time, in a reversal of earlier practices, the ABC has 
started reopening some of its closed township level branches, while other 
state-owned banks have begun investing in VTBs and MLCs themselves (X. 
Du, 2008b). The increased competition caused by the growing number of 
providers backed by international, private and state-owned capital threatens 
the RCCs’ position as the leading rural financial institution, and RCCs, in 
response, have become increasingly profit-driven, despite the fact that they 
are required to provide subsidised loans through the RCCMP. In other 
words, the rural financial system as a whole has become more 
commercialised, which has resulted in rural financial institutions increasingly 
prioritising profit-making over social policy objectives (Loubere & Zhang, 
2015).20 
 
These two contradictory trends (subsidised/directed lending versus a 
commercialised ‘financial systems approach’) have created a complex, 
dynamic but often fragmented financial landscape composed of an 
increasing number of players with diverse and sometimes conflicting 
objectives, providing a variety of financial services and products to different 
rural actors. For instance, the RCCs should meet the central government’s 
mandate of providing support to rural households and microenterprises 
through subsidised loans (i.e. the RCCMP), but, at the same time, the 
                                            
19 Conversation 35; Conversation 41. 
20 Interview 01; Interview 05; Interview 10. 
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government expects the RCCs to be financially independent and 
‘sustainable’, i.e. responsible for their own profits and losses (Y. Cheng, 
2006; He, 2014).21 To achieve this, the RCCs must operate on a for-profit 
basis. Thus, there is clear inconsistency between the political and social 
goals on the one hand, and the market-oriented demands on the other. 
Without strong government fiscal support, the RCCs tend to operate more as 
commercial entities regardless of their officially defined duties, and this is 
particularly true in the context of growing competition in the rural financial 
market.22 Furthermore, it is, at this stage, still unclear whether or how this 
increasingly complex rural financial market has been effectively regulated by 
the state to protect rural clients, particularly small-scale farmers, 
microenterprises and vulnerable social groups (e.g. low-income individuals 
and families, and the elderly) from falling victim to the unbridled profit-
seeking malpractices and even fraud as witnessed in almost all parts of the 
world, particularly in relation to the new commercial institutions. 23
                                            
21 PAMP and EMP implementers are also often under increasing pressure to 
ensure repayment. See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for more details. 
22 Interview 01. 
23 Recently, there have been particularly blatant examples of fraud in the 
rural financial sector. See, for instance (G. Zhu, 2015). 
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Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 outline the current financial landscape (since 2006) 
in rural China (township level and below) in terms of the different types of 
providers in operation, both ideologically and for regulatory purposes, and 
the services available. From the tables, it is clear that the only providers of 
microcredit services are NPO-style MFIs, government agencies offering 
subsidised policy-oriented microloans – e.g. the PAMP and the EMP – and 
the RCCs through the RCCMP. Meanwhile, other financial services – e.g. 
policy loans, savings, remittances and commercial credit – are provided by a 
wider variety of financial institutions and informal sources. Mapping the 
financial landscape in this way allows for a better understanding of where 
microcredit ‘slots in’ to the increasingly segmented rural financial landscape 
in China, which is essential for an analysis of what these programmes mean 
for local socioeconomic development and the livelihoods of different local 
actors. We now turn to analyse the current state of our knowledge of rural 
financial services generally, and microcredit in particular, based on a 
systematic review of the current literature. 
 
2.2 Research on Rural Financial Services in China 
The historical review above shows that China’s rural financial system has 
transformed dramatically during the past few decades against the backdrop 
of major ideological shifts in the philosophical underpinnings of national rural 
development strategies. Obviously, these changes in the organisation of 
rural financial institutions and the provision of rural financial services have 
had significant implications for local socioeconomic development and rural 
livelihoods. Given this, it is unsurprising that there is a considerable, and still 
growing, body of research in both English and Chinese examining the role of 
China’s financial system in general, and microfinance industry in particular, 
in rural development. This research is mainly situated within the disciplines 
of economics, finance or political economy,24 and tends to focus on macro-
structural issues related to the functioning of the rural financial system 
and/or financial institutions, or is interested in the impact that changes in the 
supply and demand of financial services (particularly credit) have on rural 
                                            
24 With a few notable exception (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Tsai, 2004; Tsien, 2002; 
Y. Zhang, Lin, & Li, 2012), see below for more details. 
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individuals, households and enterprises.25 In this section I critically review 
the current scholarship on rural finance and microcredit in China in order to 
identify some of the field’s strengths, the main assumptions underlying both 
research and policymaking, and areas where our understanding is relatively 
less developed. 
 
The financial system, institutions and service provision 
Current research has paid considerable attention to the functioning of 
China’s rural financial markets (Findlay, Cheng, & Watson, 2003; Meyer & 
Nagarajan, 2000; OECD, 2003; L. Ong, 2012; Turvey, He, Kong, Ma, & 
Meagher, 2011), the role that rural finance has played in economic growth 
(Nyberg & Rozelle, 1999; L. Ong, 2011), as well as the growth of the 
country’s microfinance industry (Brandt, Park, & Wang, 2001; Dubas & 
Harris, 2008; He et al., 2009; H. Montgomery & Weiss, 2006; Park & Ren, 
2001; Ren, 2012; World Microfinance Forum Geneva, 2008; L. Zhu, Jiang, & 
Braun, 2002). Literature has also focused on how regulatory reforms have 
changed the institutional environment for financial service providers, e.g. the 
differentiation between policy, commercial and cooperative financial 
intermediaries (Y. Cheng, 2006; X. Chen et al., 2009), and how policies have 
either facilitated or constrained the expansion and diversification of the rural 
financial industry, especially with regard to microcredit provision by both 
banks and non-banking institutions (Gowrie-Smith, 2010; Kwong, 2011; Ma, 
2003; T. Sun, 2008; J. Thompson, 2003). Most commentators tend to 
consider the current state of China’s rural financial system to be ‘weak’ or 
‘underdeveloped’. This is mainly attributed to ‘unwanted’ government 
interventions that have ‘distorted’ the market through subsidies (e.g. 
subsidised microcredit undermining commercial financial providers) and a 
legal framework that restricts the operation of financial service providers 
both directly, through the perceived ‘overregulation’ of the rural financial 
system, and indirectly, by not clarifying property rights (Farrell & Lund, 2006; 
OECD, 2003; Osthoff, 2005; Rahman & Luo, 2011). 
 
                                            
25 The vast majority of studies on rural financial services focus on credit with 
a very small minority looking into savings and/or remittances. For example, 
see (Fleisher, Liu, & Li, 1994; Murphy, 2006; H. X. Zhang, 2004). 
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In addition to this system focus, there has been significant interest in 
examining the structural changes to rural financial intermediaries, and what 
this has meant for their operation. For example, the RCCs, which have the 
widest network and outreach in rural China, are the focus of many studies, 
most of which analyse how their operation has been impacted by the 
reforms made over the past few decades to their organisation and 
governance, their regulatory environment, the institutional factors 
contributing to the RCC crisis in the late 1990s, and the on-going expansion 
of the RCCMP (Y. Cheng, 2006; Deer, 2014; L. Ong, 2012; Swoboda & 
Zhang, 2007; Wenjun Wang, 2003; Xie, 2003; Y. Zhao, 2011). Similarly, the 
role of the ABC in rural China is the focus of much attention, especially with 
regard to the bank’s relationship with the RCCs in the 1980s and 1990s, its 
transformation from a policy bank to a state-owned commercial bank in the 
early 1990s, its retreat from the countryside in the mid-late 1990s and 
subsequent return, and its perceived responsibility to support the central 
government’s rural development strategies while maintaining ‘financial 
sustainability’ (Y. Cheng, 2006; X. Du, 2008b; L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 
2001; Park & Wang, 2010; Tam, 1988). Additionally, there are some detailed 
accounts of the regulatory environment, institutional structures, and current 
outreach of traditional NGO-style MFIs, and the new players that have come 
onto the stage since 2005, such as the PSBC, VTBs, MLCs and RMCCs, 
and what their emergence means for the microcredit environment (X. Du, 
2008a; He et al., 2009; He, Tang, Zhang, Xie, & Rong, 2012; Lau, 2008; L. 
Ong, 2011; Rahman & Luo, 2011; B. Sun, 2011). However, as of yet there 
has been limited empirical investigation into how these new actors operate 
at the local level, how they have been perceived and utilised by local people, 
or the impact that they are having on rural livelihoods and development. 
Finally, there is some in-depth empirically-based research on informal 
finance, mainly focusing on the classification of its types, the operation of 
informal financial systems in different contexts, and the practices of pooling 
financial capital through informal social networks, in an attempt to 
understand how rural people, enterprises and communities have dealt with 
credit constraints, and sustained diverse livelihoods through informal lending 
and borrowing (Hu, 2003; J. Li & Hsu, 2009; Tsai, 2000, 2002, 2004; Y. 
Zhang, Lin, & Li, 2012; L. Zhou & Takeuchi, 2010).  
 
Much of the existing research seeks to provide policy recommendations for 
‘improving’ the financial system as a whole and the provision of specific 
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financial services (particularly microcredit), which are increasingly informed 
by a normative global neoliberal agenda that has largely underpinned the 
fundamental shift from promoting agricultural and rural development through 
state support, to the present-day profit-seeking ‘financial systems approach’ 
to microcredit (see Chapter 1). These recommendations include, for 
example, a discourse diagnosing China’s rural financial institutions as 
‘unsustainable’ and ‘inefficient’, and providing prescriptions for greater 
market liberalisation through the further privatisation of existing financial 
institutions (e.g. the RCCs) and deregulation of the financial market 
(Byström, 2007; OECD, 2003). The advocacy for further commercialisation 
and financialisation of the microfinance industry typifies this trend (He et al., 
2009). These recommendations are made on the grounds that state 
subsidies create ‘distortions’, thus worsening the existing ‘unsustainability’ 
and ‘inefficiency’ of China’s rural financial system as a whole. Furthermore, 
government actions in the form of monitoring and regulating the financial 
sector have been under increasing attack and are frequently framed in 
negative terms as inhibiting free market operation, restricting institutional 
entry and creating credit shortages, prohibiting competition, preventing the 
market’s automatic optimal allocation of resources, discouraging 
entrepreneurship and, thus, hindering economic growth and development. 
Therefore, much research in the field, implicitly or explicitly, advocates 
further financial market liberalisation with regard to regulation of interest 
rates, services, institutional practices, ownership forms, geographical 
limitations, and so forth (Brandt et al., 2001; H. Montgomery & Weiss, 2006; 
Nyberg & Rozelle, 1999; OECD, 2003; L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 2001; L. 
Xu, 2009). More controversial is the advocacy for full-scale privatisation 
through fundamental property rights changes, particularly regarding 
collectively-owned agricultural land, which, according to such logic, would 
provide a form of collateral for loans, thus enabling the release of capital 
locked up in land for farmers to invest in larger-scale agribusiness and other 
‘productive’ assets (OECD, 2003; L. Ong, 2009c).26  
 
                                            
26  This is largely based on the influential work of Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto, which conceptualises land with vague or communal 
property rights as ‘dead capital’ (de Soto, 2000). For a counter-argument in 
the Chinese context see (Q. F. Zhang & Donaldson, 2013). 
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Supply, demand and impact assessment 
Apart from the institutional foci identified above, there is also a substantial 
amount of research paying attention to the ‘impact’ of rural financial services 
on diverse actors. This research, however, is also largely dominated by the 
disciplinary perspectives of finance and economics, and is primarily 
concerned with measuring impact in a linear way by focusing on the effects 
that changes in the supply and demand of credit have on different actors. 
The main argument put forward is that the market reforms since the late 
1970s have brought about increasing demand for credit from households, 
communities and enterprises, but supply by the formal financial sector has 
fallen far short, causing credit constraints and the formation of a large and 
diverse curb market to meet the demands of those ‘excluded’ actors (E. 
Cheng, 2007; Y. Cheng, 2006; Z. Du, 2004; Feder, Lau, Lin, & Luo, 1989; 
Kumar, Turvey, & Kropp, 2013; X. Li, Gan, & Hu, 2011a). For example, the 
OECD estimated that only 16 per cent of Chinese farmers had access to 
credit due to difficulties in meeting lenders’ requirements (e.g. for collateral 
or a guarantor), that more than 70 per cent of loans to rural people were 
obtained through informal channels, and noted that formal financial 
institutions were reluctant to lend to small businesses because of the high 
transaction costs involved (OECD, 2003, p. 7).  
 
Most studies attribute this situation to a restrictive policy environment 
created through onerous government interventions as discussed above, and 
also recommend further liberalisation and deregulation of the financial 
market in order to meet demand and promote ‘financial inclusion’ (Z. Du, 
2004; Feder et al., 1989; Feng et al., 2006; He, 2008; He et al., 2009; 
OECD, 2003). At the same time, however, some researchers argue that 
credit constraints are not universally or evenly observed in the rural Chinese 
context, pointing to survey data that show widespread and sometimes 
concurrent use of both formal and informal sources (Park & Ren, 2001; Tsai, 
2004; L. Zhou & Takeuchi, 2010). Other studies contest the predominant 
view that low-income rural households have high demand for loans by 
showing that many such households have actually decided not to participate 
(i.e. ‘self exclusion’) in credit programmes based on careful calculations of 
potential risks and returns (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Park & Ren, 2001; Turvey & 
Kong, 2010). Still others have begun investigating – in greater detail through 
micro level research – individuals’ and households’ awareness of, access to 
and utilisation of, financial information and services as vital livelihood 
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resources, their selection of different providers and services (formal and/or 
informal), as well as their borrowing behaviours, revealing dynamism, 
diversity and heterogeneity in local preferences, practices and goals with 
regard to lending and borrowing (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Tsai, 2004; L. Xu, 
2009; G. Zhang, 2008; Y. Zhang et al., 2012; Y. Zhao, 2011). 
 
Investigation into the use of financial services (again mainly credit) 
constitutes another aspect of impact-oriented research. Loans are found to 
have been used for ‘productive’ purposes – such as investment in 
agriculture, TVEs, microenterprises, and to facilitate rural-urban migration – 
and/or for ‘consumption’ purposes, such as children’s education, healthcare, 
house construction, consumer durables, weddings, funerals, and daily 
necessities.27  These studies usually come to the conclusion that easier 
access to credit (i.e. more ‘inclusive’ financial services) correlates positively 
with increased income, consumption, higher levels of educational 
attainment, and other beneficial ‘impacts’ (X. Li et al., 2011b; Nichols, 2004; 
Pan, Rejesus, & He, 2009; Park & Ren, 2001; Rahman, Luo, & Minjuan, 
2014; You & Annim, 2014). Some other research has gone into more depth, 
exploring the heterogeneous and multiple uses of loans in diverse household 
livelihood strategies – with borrowers simultaneously engaging in farm, off-
farm and non-farm activities – which has uncovered ‘multiple impacts’ 
(Kumar et al., 2013; H. Li, Rozelle, & Zhang, 2004). However, most of these 
studies still rely on econometric methods that attempt to identify causal 
linear relationships, and are, therefore, fundamentally structuralist and top-
down in their approaches. 
 
                                            
27  In existing research, borrowed capital used to help individuals and 
households survive due to poor harvests or other contingencies is 
conceptualised as ‘consumption smoothing’ (Park, Ren, & Wang, 2003; 
Unger, 2002a; L. Zhou & Takeuchi, 2010). This notion and the associated 
dichotomous division of loan use between ‘productive investment’ and 
‘consumption smoothing’, however, have recently been questioned by critics, 
particularly in relation to global debates surrounding microfinance (Taylor, 
2012). Certainly in the context of rural China the boundaries between 
productive investment and non-productive consumption are often blurred 
since the latter can also be considered investment in human and/or social 
capital and is, therefore, ‘productive’ in socio-cultural as well as economic 
senses. 
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However, while the vast majority of research is top-down and structurally-
oriented, and largely neglects (or minimises) local agency, there is a small 
body of scholarship which examines the processes and dynamics involved in 
the acquisition and utilisation of financial information and services from the 
perspectives of local actors through in-depth fieldwork in Chinese townships 
and villages. This research explores the local political economy of formal 
and informal financial intermediation (Hu, 2003; L. Ong, 2006; Tsai, 2004), 
and often finds that rural financial services – and even ‘external 
interventions’ such as microcredit – become ‘embedded’ within existing 
socioeconomic and socio-political contexts at the local level (Bislev, 2010, 
2012). In particular, it has been observed that access to financial information 
– especially with regard to subsidised loans – is differentiated based on 
existing social relations, power and widening social stratification in rural 
society (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Tsai, 2000, 2004; Unger, 2002a; Y. Zhang et al., 
2012). Therefore, the negotiations surrounding access to, and utilisation of, 
financial intermediaries and their services, often have broader societal 
implications, e.g. for local power differentials, gendered divisions of labour, 
control of various resources and knowledge, etc. (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Tsai, 
2000; Tsien, 2002), and provide a lens through which we can view the 
organisation and functioning of rural Chinese societies undergoing 
processes of dynamic and rapid socioeconomic development and change. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses in the current scholarship 
This systematic review of the literature reveals that there has been a 
tremendous amount of work analysing the organisation of the rural financial 
system as a whole – particularly with regard to changes to policy, regulatory 
bodies and ideology. There has also been substantial focus on the operation 
of rural financial institutions, especially in terms of changes to institutional 
classifications (i.e. policy, commercial and cooperative financial institutions), 
the goals and objectives of different financial intermediaries, and the wide 
variety of informal providers. 28  Therefore, the current state of the art 
                                            
28 However, financial providers are not equally represented in the literature. 
As stated above, most research is interested in the RCCs, the ABC and/or 
informal intermediaries, while other providers are often only mentioned in 
passing. For instance, there are only a few studies focusing primarily on 
government-subsidised microcredit programmes. In particular, the EMP has 
not been the main focus of any English-language research and is minimally 
represented in the Chinese-language scholarship. 
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represents a relatively comprehensive understanding of the top-down 
structures governing rural financial service provision in China, both 
historically and today – i.e. how (and why) the system and its constituent 
elements ‘should’ be operating. However, this (overly) structural focus, 
largely grounded in neoliberal assumptions, reinforces biases and 
misperceptions that obscure the high levels of complexity that are inherent in 
financial organisation in rural China, and, because much less effort has been 
made through the application of micro level sociological and anthropological 
approaches, there has been limited representation of the voices and 
perspectives of local people. Therefore, there are a number of ‘blind spots’ in 
areas of critical importance for an in-depth understanding of what rural 
financial services actually mean at the local level. Below I outline three key 
areas where our knowledge is relatively underdeveloped that will be 
addressed in this dissertation in order to answer the overarching and 
secondary research questions put forth in Chapter 1. 
 
Firstly, the structural emphasis outlined above does not accurately represent 
the hugely important role that local agency plays in the negotiations between 
different actors, which ultimately determines how rural financial services are 
perceived and manifested in different localities. In other words, the 
understanding of how financial institutions and services are designed 
centrally is prioritised over in-depth analysis of their implementation and 
provision at the local level. This is surprising considering the comprehensive 
body of literature dedicated to the analysis of transformation and variation in 
the implementation of policy at the local level in rural China (Ahlers, 2014; P. 
H. Brown et al., 2009; Donaldson, 2009; Manion, 1991; O’Brien & Li, 1999). 
This scholarship, a significant segment of which explores rural development 
policies and campaigns, has much to tell us about developmental ‘realities’ 
in rural China – particularly in relation to the extension of financial services 
as part of government-led development initiatives – but has, nevertheless, 
been largely neglected by research on rural finance. This has resulted in a 
relatively underdeveloped picture of how (and why) rural financial services 
are actually provided in townships and villages – a gap that this dissertation 
addresses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.  
 
Secondly, when local-level implementation is discussed, it is largely through 
the discourse of impact evaluation, which views financial services 
(particularly subsidised loans) as targeted external interventions with specific 
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objectives aimed at improving the situation in rural areas and the lives of 
rural people. From this perspective, transformation and variation in 
implementation is framed negatively as a ‘failure’ (because the objectives 
are not met), which is invariably blamed on incompetence or (more often) on 
collusion between greedy officials and elites at the local-level who ‘capture’ 
the funds for their own purposes (Hofmockel, 2005; L. Ong, 2011; Park & 
Ren, 2001). Moreover, these impact evaluations usually attempt to clearly 
define ‘target groups’ and ‘measurable’ variables denoting improvement, e.g. 
consumption, income, propensity to migrate, etc., in order to identify linear 
causation or correlation, rather than taking a more holistic approach, and 
thus suffer from the same weaknesses that have been identified in the global 
literature on microcredit impact evaluations (Bateman, 2013; Hulme, 2000). 
Even the small body of scholarship adopting micro level perspectives 
mentioned above, which provides detailed analysis of the ways in which 
microcredit and informal finance become embedded within local contexts, 
tends to focus primarily on the implications of these financial services for 
certain groups or singular aspects of livelihoods. Therefore, while the current 
body of research provides us with a relatively clear understanding of some of 
the ways in which financial services ‘impact’ specific actors, we still do not 
really understand how local variation in provision ultimately shapes the role 
that financial services play in processes of socioeconomic development 
more broadly, and the livelihood strategies of various actors at the local level 
(e.g. providers, borrowers and non-borrowers). For this reason, Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7 outline the multidimensional and paradoxical ‘impacts’ of 
microcredit programmes. 
 
Finally, due to the general neoliberal orientation of most existing research on 
rural financial services and microcredit in China, 29  there has not been 
sufficient engagement with the wider global debates over neoliberal modes 
of development in general, and the commercialisation and financialisation of 
local financial institutions and microcredit programmes in particular (i.e. the 
‘financial systems approach’), or the potentially negative impact they have 
                                            
29 Either overtly and explicitly, or implicitly through the adoption of neoliberal 
assumptions about ‘inclusivity’, the importance of ‘financial sustainability’, or 
uncritically accepting that more access to credit is inherently good.  
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had on local development and rural livelihoods.30 In this debate, researchers 
have provided evidence that in many developing and post-socialist societies 
– e.g. South Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Balkans, etc. – the increasingly 
neoliberalised microfinance industry has exacerbated inequality and 
undermined local development efforts. At the same time, microcredit has 
also been blamed for causing widespread risk, severe debt, distress and 
crisis at the individual, household, community and societal levels – with the 
impact on livelihoods being highly differentiated by caste, class, gender, 
ethnicity, and other social classifiers (Bateman, 2010; Bateman & Chang, 
2012; Maclean, 2013; Taylor, 2012). This research has gone beyond a mere 
description and analysis of rural people’s livelihood distress and suffering to 
question fundamentally the theoretical reasoning, logic and ideological pillars 
of the neoliberal assumptions underpinning the microcredit model and the 
concept of ‘inclusive finance’. The non-engagement with this global debate 
in the Chinese context suggests an urgent need to critically interrogate 
fundamental ‘truisms’, and to develop more reflexive perspectives drawing 
on international experience while staying grounded in holistic 
understandings of local contexts. For these reasons, Chapter 7 and Chapter 
8 explore the ‘alternative development’ literature and global critiques of 
microcredit in relation to the in-depth empirical data presented in this 
dissertation. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
By comprehensively charting the institutional trajectory and contours of the 
Chinese rural financial landscape since the founding of the PRC, this 
chapter shows that China’s rural financial system has, at different times, 
experienced either consolidation and contraction, or expansion and 
diversification. This is true for both government-subsidised financial services 
(as a means of facilitating local development), as well as for commercial 
financial institutions seeking access to rural financial resources (i.e. savings) 
and greater profits through investment in rural areas. This complex, dynamic 
and ideologically inconsistent financial terrain has played diverse and 
                                            
30 For this reason, the literature aimed at assessing impact mentioned above 
usually seeks to measure positive impact and does not consider the 
possibility of negative side effects of expanding the provision of financial 
services. 
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multiple roles in the ways in which different rural actors access, utilise and 
perceive financial services as vital elements in their livelihood strategies, and 
in local socioeconomic development more broadly, making attempts to box 
China’s rural financial landscape into a single ‘ism’ overly simplistic.  
 
Therefore, in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the Chinese 
microfinance industry, and address this dissertation’s overarching question – 
i.e. what role do microcredit programmes play in local processes of 
socioeconomic development and the livelihoods of diverse local actors? – it 
is necessary to identify and apply sophisticated conceptual, analytical and 
methodological approaches that have the ability to shed light on the 
socioeconomic, cultural and political processes, practices and dynamics 
involved in shaping local actors’ perceptions and understandings of financial 
information and services. At the same time, we must interrogate the 
negotiations that take place over the provision, acquisition and utilisation of 
financial services both within localities, and between local and non-local 
actors. However, a careful scrutiny of current scholarship reveals that, with a 
few exceptions, most research is mainly interested in more macro-structural 
issues related to the functioning of the rural financial system, the mechanics 
of service provision, particular elements related to the environment within 
which rural financial institutions operate, and/or assessing the linear causal 
impact of financial service extension (especially microcredit) on specific 
aspects of livelihoods and/or local development.  
 
The current body of research has, therefore, provided us with an invaluable 
understanding of the operation of the rural financial system and institutions 
from a top-down structural perspective, and has also successfully analysed 
key linear impacts and the ways in which financial services become 
embedded at the local level from the perspective of certain rural actors. 
However, it has not provided us with the tools to holistically analyse the 
complexities involved in rural financial organisation outlined above from the 
perspective of local actors themselves. Therefore, we now turn to Chapter 3, 
which will outline a conceptual and methodological approach grounded in an 
actor-oriented perspective that analytically focuses on the interfaces of 
interaction between different actors, the flows and linkages between 
interconnected financial landscapes, and the capabilities, resources and 
values associated with diverse local livelihoods. This framework, along with 
a detailed account of the socioeconomic background/context of the three 
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fieldwork sites, will set the stage for an in-depth analysis of the role that 
government-subsidised microcredit programmes play in dynamic processes 
of local socioeconomic development and the (re)production of the complex 
and diverse livelihoods of multiple rural actors, that is both grounded in 
ethnographic fieldwork in townships and villages, and also engages with the 
critical global debates outlined above. 
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual Approach, Methodology and the Field 
 
There is painfully little in-depth scholarly research on China that uses 
fieldwork and case studies. This is especially true in the rural sector. 
Research in the Chinese countryside is exceptionally demanding. However, 
it is only through such research that the challenges facing China’s policy 
makers can be fully understood. 
- Peter Nolan 
 
The renowned development studies scholar Robert Chambers identifies two 
paradigms in development inquiry and practice. The first he terms “‘Neo-
Newtonian’, which originates with physical things, and has underlying 
ontological assumptions of linear causality, predictability and regularity.” This 
is contrasted with the “Adaptive Pluralism” paradigm, which perceives 
“reality as non-linear, unpredictable and complex as it emerges from 
processes and interactions between people” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. 
N/A).31 As Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 illustrate – and as Aminur Rahman’s 
quote in at the beginning of Chapter 2 succinctly points out – the majority of 
research on the global microfinance movement and rural finance/microcredit 
in China is underpinned by ‘Neo-Newtonian’ understandings of social 
phenomenon. This is because they are based on approaches and modes of 
analysis that focus primarily on the structures of financial systems and 
institutions, and/or the evaluation of impact on ‘target groups’ through the 
identification of direct and linear causal relationships. While these bodies of 
research have been successful in producing detailed knowledge about how 
systems and institutions operate, and in the assessment of whether or not 
microcredit ‘works’ based on various normative and reductionist criteria, they 
have not been designed to address the more complex (and messy) 
questions related to how microcredit programmes are manifested at the local 
level, what heterogeneous implementation means for local development 
outcomes and the (re)production of diverse livelihood strategies – i.e. the 
                                            
31 For a useful table outlining the differences between these two paradigms 
see (Chambers, 2008, p. 173); also see (Chambers, 2010). 
 75 
questions that are central to this dissertation. Therefore, in order to address 
the research questions and objectives outlined in Chapter 1, it becomes 
necessary to shift away from the top-down ‘Neo-Newtonian’ paradigm, and 
instead adopt an epistemological stance that prioritises the different types of 
knowledge that emerge from people and their lived experiences. At the 
same time, it is important to interrogate the inherently relational nature of 
development processes and concepts, such as marginality, modernisation 
and exclusion (Mosse, 2010; Mosse & Kruckenberg, 2016; Pfaff-Czarnecka 
& Kruckenberg, 2016), through systematic analysis of the discontinuities and 
linages between individuals, groups and wider society (Long, 1999). 
 
This type of research approach, situated within the ‘Adaptive Pluralism’ 
paradigm, necessitates patience and a significant amount of time spent 
working with, talking to and observing people in their everyday lives through 
in-depth empirical fieldwork based on inductive and qualitative principles. 
This is, however, by no means a straightforward proposition. Conducting in-
depth fieldwork that focuses on people – and their experiences and 
perceptions – requires the formation of relationships with a variety of actors 
in the ‘field’. While this can be immensely rewarding (and fun), it is invariably 
challenging and time-consuming work in any context – and particularly in the 
case of rural China, as Peter Nolan’s statement above illustrates. After all, it 
is only within the last 30 years that ‘foreign’ researchers have been allowed 
to work in China with any level of flexibility (Thøgersen & Heimer, 2006; 
Thunø, 2006). However, despite the relative openness of the contemporary 
situation, the countryside has remained remote and difficult to access, both 
geographically and legally, especially for ‘outsiders’. Indeed, in all three of 
the townships documented in this dissertation, the most noticeable aspect of 
my positionality was that of an outsider, and in one of the locations I was the 
first foreign ‘visitor’ since the Japanese invaded during the Second World 
War.  
 
Of course, the challenges associated with working in rural China are not 
limited to outsiders. For instance, a local research collaborator who is an 
established academic in a Chinese university told me that it is also 
impossible for him to gain research access to field sites without good 
contacts in both the county and township governments, raising serious 
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questions as to how free any researcher is to pursue their own agenda.32 
Moreover, there are a host of other challenges that researchers must face, 
such as issues to do with language, with local dialects often being 
unintelligible even to native speakers of Mandarin Chinese (putonghua %
 ), and limited knowledge of local customs that vary widely across 
provinces, let alone the entire country. Unfortunately, these issues frequently 
leave both foreign and domestic researchers woefully ill-prepared in terms of 
linguistic and cultural fluency (Veeck, 2001). The point here is not to 
exoticise the fieldwork conducted for this Ph.D. dissertation, but rather to 
emphasise the difficulties involved in gathering data in a context where the 
researcher must maintain continuous critical reflexivity before, during and 
after the fieldwork is complete, in order to effectively question how 
positionality has affected the knowledge they have produced (Loubere, 
2014b; Maclean, 2007; Sultana, 2007). It also requires researchers to 
maintain openness and flexibility, and acknowledge that the purpose of 
fieldwork is not to confirm what they already think they know, but to 
fundamentally reshape their understandings of the very questions that are 
asked before entering the ‘field’ (O’Brien, 2006). 
 
With this in mind, this chapter seeks to provide an ‘audit trail’ for the 
research project by detailing its conceptual underpinnings, the processes 
involved in the collection and analysis of data, and the socioeconomic 
backgrounds of the three main fieldwork sites.33 The chapter represents a 
reflexive account of how the research was conceptualised, how questions 
were formulated, how access was granted/gained, who was spoken to, the 
specific methods that were employed to gather data, and, ultimately, how the 
research evolved throughout the entire process, in order to shed light on the 
nature of the knowledge produced by the project. The rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows. In Section 3.1 I outline the justification for adopting an 
actor-oriented perspective that analytically focuses on actor interfaces, 
livelihood strategies and financial landscapes, in order to conceptually and 
                                            
32 Of course, this is not unique to China, and similar questions could (and 
should) be raised in other contexts, including fieldwork in the United 
Kingdom or other countries in the so-called ‘Global North’. 
33 This type of audit trail is a necessary element of any research project, but 
is, unfortunately, often overlooked or omitted (Chambers & Loubere, 2016; 
Thøgersen & Heimer, 2006; Thomson, 2014). 
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theoretically move away from the ‘Neo-Newtonian’ paradigm outlined above. 
Section 3.2 details the methodological approach as well as the process and 
experience of fieldwork, and Section 3.3 is a detailed description of, and 
justification for, the specific methods utilised to collect and analyse data. 
Section 3.4 provides an overview of the socioeconomic backgrounds of the 
three townships where the vast majority of data was collected, and Section 
3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Approach: Reorienting Towards Actors 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Approach and Analytical Foci 
 
 
Adopting an actor-oriented perspective 
The ‘actor-oriented perspective’ to understanding social phenomena was 
initially developed by Norman Long in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to 
the dominance of positivist approaches to social research, and particularly 
research on issues related to socioeconomic development, which “espoused 
various forms of determinism, linearity and institutional hegemony,” and 
were, for the most part, “‘people-less’ and obsessed with the conditions, 
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contexts and ‘driving forces’ of social life” (Long, 2001, p. 1). Rather than 
representing a fully developed theoretical and methodological approach, 
actor-oriented modes of analysis are an attempt to conceptually shift the loci 
of research from top-down structures to the lived realities “of those 
inhabiting, experiencing and transforming the contours and details of the 
social landscape” (Long, 2001, p. 1), as they “attempt to come to grips, 
cognitively, emotionally and organisationally, with the situations they face” 
(Long, 2001, p. 20).34 Actor-oriented research is theoretically grounded in 
social-constructionist ontological and epistemological understandings of 
social process, in that social reality is perceived as being co-produced by 
different actors as they rework existing discourses and repertoires, “and 
react situationally and imaginatively, consciously or otherwise, to the 
circumstances they encounter” (Long, 2001, p. 3), resulting in the continual 
(re)making of local society, which itself consists of “a multiplicity of 
constructed and emergent realities” (Long, 2001, p. 2). In other words, actor-
oriented perspectives tilt “the balance towards the agency side of the 
structure/actor equation” (Long, 2001, p. 1), based on the assumption that 
even under conditions of severe constraint, actors can make choices 
(Giddens, 1986; Long, 2001), while also acknowledging that agency itself is 
socially constructed, and therefore cannot be separated from shifting 
patterns of knowledge and power (Long, 2001). 
 
This means that agency is inherently relational, as it is inevitably based on 
values, perceptions, interpretations and rationalisations, which are 
discursively expressed through negotiations with other actors (Hindess, 
1986), and which arise from cultural discourses that are in a continuous 
state of flux, and at any given time or place hold more or less sway with 
different individuals and groups (Long, 2001). These individual and group 
agencies are expressed in self-organising practices at the local level, 
resulting in ‘messiness’, complexity and unpredictability, which are ultimately 
the defining features of local social processes (Chambers, 2008). Robert 
Chambers refers to this as “self-organising systems on the edge of chaos” 
(Chambers, 2008, p. 174), which reveals that local self-organisation should 
                                            
34 Actors can be defined as any social unit that has agency, i.e. the ability to 
make decisions and carry out actions. However, broad social categories, 
such as gender, ethnicity, class, etc., which do not have the capacity to 
make and implement decisions, cannot be considered actors for the 
purposes of this type of research (Long, 2001). 
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not be viewed in terms of hierarchical organisational frameworks, but rather 
as the “outcome of the struggles and negotiations that take place between 
individuals and groups with differing and often conflicting social interests and 
experiences” (Long, 2001, p. 26). It is important to note that local self-
organisation of this nature does not simply apply to ‘indigenous’ action and 
behaviour, but also shapes interventions planned by outside actors (e.g. 
development programmes) through processes of ‘internalisation’ whereby 
the ‘external’ becomes reconstituted at the local level, and thus comes to be 
perceived in different ways, takes on different sets of meanings, and gets 
integrated into diverse strategies employed by a variety of local actors. 
Therefore, by focussing on the ways in which external interventions become 
internalised, actor-oriented research provides a distinct mode of analysing 
and understanding the formulation, implementation and implications of 
development programmes and policy (such as microcredit programmes) by 
looking at how these forms of external ‘development’ manifest themselves – 
often in heterogeneous ways – at the local level through the self-organising 
practices of the actors involved (Long, 2001). 
 
It is important, however, to emphasise that this focus on self-organisation 
should not be equated with ‘rational choice theory’ or the various types of 
‘methodological individualism’ that often underpin positivistic understandings 
of development as the aggregate of individual and group actions, and which 
are perceived as being predictable as long as the external inputs (i.e. 
variables) are known. Actor-oriented conceptions of self-organisation do not 
see actors as detached from their social worlds, but instead depict actors 
and their environments as being “reciprocally constituted” (Long, 2001, p. 4). 
Outcomes are not predictable or deducible, but are instead complex and 
emergent, and thus more than the sum of their parts. Therefore, self-
organisation of individual and group actors must be understood as both 
responding and contributing to (sub)cultural norms, the imperatives of 
dominant and subordinate discourses, and the underlying rules of 
institutions, systems and wider social networks, all of which are arenas of 
socio-political negotiation and struggle, and are fundamental to identities and 
values (Escobar, 2004; Long, 2001). Moreover, these emergent social 
processes are dynamic and overlapping, making it impossible to 
compartmentalise or define them in static terms. This means that instead of 
looking at separate actors, structures/institutions or local realities as 
atomised units whose distinctions are marked by solid boundaries, it 
 80 
becomes necessary to analyse the negotiations which have rendered 
boundaries in their current state, and also to acknowledge areas where 
these ‘units’ overlap and are in states of flux. In this way actor-oriented 
perspectives of development allow us to think beyond simplistic linear cause 
and effect relationships, such as ‘supply and demand’ or singular ‘impact’, 
which frame local actors as ‘passive recipients’ of external development 
interventions, and instead to begin identifying more holistically the complex 
and multifaceted ways in which development processes are constructed and 
transformed at the local level (Long, 2001). 
 
Analytical foci: Interfaces, livelihoods and landscapes 
In other words, the shift towards an actor-oriented mode has significant 
implications for where we focus our analysis when examining the provision 
of microcredit as a development intervention. Rather than attempting to 
diagnostically measure ‘impact’ on ‘target groups’, as if it were some kind of 
treatment to be administered for the affliction of ‘underdevelopment’, we are 
prompted to analyse where microcredit sits discursively within different (and 
often competing) rural development ideologies and narratives, how 
microcredit programmes institutionally ‘slot into’ the existing financial 
landscape, how and why these programmes come to be organised at the 
local level, how they fit into the strategies of diverse actors, and, ultimately, 
what kind of meanings are attributed to – and superimposed upon – the 
programmes themselves by different types of actors. In this dissertation, the 
shift from a structuralist/positivist (Neo-Newtonian) mode to an actor-
oriented (Adaptive Pluralist) perspective is operationalised through the 
adoption of three overlapping and complementary analytical foci: actor-
interface analysis, the livelihoods approach, and the financial landscapes 
approach. 
 
Interfaces 
Interrogating the interfaces of interaction between different actors allows for 
in-depth understanding of the negotiations, compromises and 
accommodations that ultimately shape the local manifestations of 
microcredit programmes. These interfaces are formed where different 
‘lifeworlds’ – which are often grounded in fundamentally different 
interpretations of social reality – meet, overlap and struggle over meaning 
and value (Long, 2001). While examining social linkages is important, it is 
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really the discontinuities, fragmentations, struggles, and boundaries that 
emerge from linkages and connections, that are the key analytical points for 
interface analysis, because this is where understandings of development 
come to be defined (Hebinck, Ouden, & Verschoor, 2001; Long, 1999, 2001; 
Long & Long, 1992). In the words of Norman Long, “continued interaction 
encourages the development of boundaries and shared expectations that 
shape the interaction of the participants so that over time the interface itself 
becomes an organised entity of interlocking relationships and 
intentionalities” (Long, 1999, p. 1). This allows us to perceive local 
implementation processes and the ultimate manifestations of development 
policies/interventions at the local level as the consequence of negotiations 
between diverse local actors, implementers and policy makers, resulting in 
heterogeneous outcomes across time and space (Long, 1999; Long & Liu, 
2009). In other words, by looking to the interfaces, it becomes clear that 
development interventions in general, and government subsidised 
microcredit programmes in particular, are not implemented in a linear 
process from the ‘central’ to the ‘local’, but are continuously being redefined 
through encounters which are marked by struggles over power and 
meaning, and are thus inherently relational constructs (Mosse & 
Kruckenberg, 2016). 
 
Livelihoods 
While a focus on interfaces allows for analysis of the emergent properties 
shaping microcredit implementation at the local level (i.e. the how and the 
why), an adapted livelihoods approach provides a means of investigating the 
role that these heterogeneous local manifestations of the microcredit 
programmes play in the strategies of diverse actors (including 
implementers/providers, borrowers, and those excluded from financial 
services), which ultimately sheds light on what microcredit actually means 
for different types of people, and the ways in which actors perceive 
development more generally. Beginning with the publication of Robert 
Chambers and Gordon Conway’s influential paper in the early 1990s 
(Chambers & Conway, 1992), the ‘livelihoods approach’ has marked a 
significant shift in development thinking, and has been adopted by major 
development NGOs (such as Oxfam and Care) and international 
organisations (such as the United Nations Development Programme and 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development), and has, thus, 
been the basis for development research and development projects around 
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the world (Helmore & Singh, 2001; Small, 2007). Drawing on Amartya Sen’s 
ground-breaking work on capabilities (Sen, 1981, 1984, 1985), Chambers 
and Conway define livelihoods as consisting of “people, their capabilities, 
and their means for living, including food, income and assets” (Chambers & 
Conway, 1992, p. iii). They depict the approach as a means of 
conceptualising the ways in which rural actors – particularly those at the 
margins of society – exercise their agency, make the most of their 
capabilities, and leverage various forms of knowledge and power in an 
attempt to gain access to resources and affect beneficial outcomes (both 
material and non-material) in the (re)construction and maintenance of their 
ways of life. Subsequent work has moved away from the focus on 
capabilities – i.e. actors’ abilities to perform activities necessary for the 
reproduction of their livelihoods, including adaptation, innovation, etc. – and 
has paid increasing attention to livelihood assets, which have been 
reorganised into different types of ‘capital’, such as natural capital (e.g. 
natural resources), financial capital (e.g. monetary assets), physical capital 
(e.g. infrastructure), human capital (e.g. skills, labour), social capital (e.g. 
social networks and institutions) and sometimes political and/or cultural 
capital (Bebbington, 1999; Ellis, 2000; Scoones, 1998). Livelihoods research 
has, therefore, largely become the analysis of the ways in which actors gain 
access to and utilise these various ‘capitals’, and what this means for 
‘livelihood outcomes’, which are defined as the ‘livings’ that are made from 
doing ‘livelihood activities’, taking into account gains/losses in capital, 
capabilities and/or access (Chambers & Conway, 1992). For this reason 
various researchers and institutions have devised visual frameworks to 
assist in the analysis of livelihoods and their components. Figure 3.2 below 
is one of the most widely used livelihood frameworks. 
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Figure 3.2: Framework for the Analysis of Livelihoods  
 
Source: (DFID, 1999) 
 
However, in recent years the livelihoods approach has increasingly been the 
subject of critique for it’s perceived tendency to ignore power relations, its 
inability to situate livelihoods within wider processes of long-run change, and 
its micro-focus – which fails to connect livelihoods to non-local processes of 
development, such as globalisation. In particular, Ian Scoones, one of the 
initial pioneers of the livelihoods approach, identifies the lack of focus on 
structures of power as being the key weakness of livelihoods studies, stating 
that power and politics need to “be central to livelihood perspectives for rural 
development. Politics is not just ‘context’, but a focus for analysis in and of 
itself. It is not just a matter of adding another ‘capital’ to the assets 
pentagon” (Scoones, 2009, p. 185). Additionally, some critics have pointed 
to the need to ‘historicise’ and ‘texturise’ livelihoods, due to the fact that 
livelihoods research often does little more than take a ‘snapshot’ of a specific 
time and place, without situating the contemporary situation within dynamic 
historical contexts, or conceptualising the critical linkages between the 
strategies that local actors adopt and wider processes of socioeconomic and 
ideological change (Lu & Lora-Wainwright, 2014; Rigg, Nguyen, & Luong, 
2014). In this way, the livelihoods approach has the tendency to produce 
micro-oriented explanations of “social behaviour primarily in terms of 
individual motivations, intentions and interests” (Long, 2001, p. 14), thereby 
leaving itself vulnerable to co-optation by neoliberal ideologies that seek to 
equate development with individual action. This produces a type of 
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ahistorical and insular research that detaches livelihood strategies from their 
underlying rationalities, resulting in analysis that is devoid of the kind of 
‘texture’ that is crucial for understanding why people make choices, take 
actions and ultimately construct their ways of life (Lu & Lora-Wainwright, 
2014; Rigg et al., 2014). These critiques have led scholars to theoretically 
develop the livelihoods approach to incorporate the role of context 
(historical, political, cultural, etc.) using pathways or trajectories approaches, 
which emphasise dynamic and differentiated strategies and perspectives of 
different types of local actors – i.e. the importance of multiple realities – and 
strive to situate these realities in wider processes of development and 
change across time and space (de Haan & Zoomers, 2005; Leach, Scoones, 
& Stirling, 2010; Scoones, 2009). 
 
While this move to historicise and contextualise livelihoods has done much 
to provide more nuanced and holistic understandings of the ways in which 
local people work within wider frames of reference when constructing their 
livelihood strategies, the approach still has problematic elements that need 
to be addressed before it can be integrated in an epistemologically 
consistent way within an actor-oriented mode of analysis for the purposes of 
this dissertation. For one, the visual representation of livelihoods in a 
framework is conducive to the depiction of the processes involved in 
making/maintaining a living as linear, and to the compartmentalisation and 
atomisation of the different livelihood ‘components’ for individual analysis 
(see the DFID framework above). This lends itself to macro-structural 
analyses based on measurable variables (e.g. income, growth, productivity, 
etc.) (Small, 2007), and is antithetical to the key features of the actor-
oriented approach and the Adaptive Pluralism paradigm, which emphasise 
the emergent properties of local “self-organising systems on the edge of 
chaos” (Chambers, 2008, p. 174). In other words, livelihood strategies, 
trajectories and pathways are more than the sum of their parts, and their 
different fluid elements (rather than static components) need to be visualised 
holistically as overlapping and dynamic, with changes taking place 
simultaneously rather than in a linear fashion. Secondly, the 
conceptualisation of assets as ‘capitals’ monetises non-financial resources, 
attributes and capabilities, and implies a fungible or transactional quality 
underpinning areas of human life that are not ‘economic’ in nature. Indeed, 
the economist Ha-Joon Chang observes that the discipline of economics 
wrongly attempts to claim that “economics can explain not just the economy 
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but everything else as well” (H.-J. Chang, 2014, p. 20). This is fundamentally 
misleading, and, more problematically, imposes neoliberal and culturalist 
discourses of value onto social interactions, setting the stage for ‘rational 
actor’ analyses that rely on “an ethnocentric ‘Western’ model of social 
behaviour based upon the individualism of ‘utilitarian man’ that rides 
roughshod over the specificities of culture and context” (Long, 2001, p. 14). 
Undoubtedly, understandings of livelihoods cannot simply be reduced to 
analysis of a set of ‘capital’ transactions by individuals and groups operating 
in a ‘homo economicus’ mode and their resultant outcomes, but must also 
include analysis of identities, values and meanings produced at the local 
level. For this reason I have decided to avoid using a visual livelihoods 
framework, and have instead opted to adopt Norman Long’s definition of a 
livelihood as “the idea of individuals or groups striving to make a living, 
attempting to meet their various consumption and economic necessities, 
coping with uncertainties, responding to new opportunities, and choosing 
between different value positions” (Long, 1997, p. 11).35 This will allow for a 
more holistic depiction of livelihoods as dynamic, intertwining and non-linear 
processes imbued with cultural meaning, diverse and differentiated identities 
and realities, and ultimately mediated by relationships (along with their 
associated differentials of knowledge and power), rather than simple 
transactions taking place over a set period of time in a certain place. 
 
Financial landscapes 
Therefore, by combining actor interface analysis with a modified livelihoods 
approach, it becomes possible to better understand how and why 
microcredit programmes are implemented at the local level, and what they 
mean for local strategies of development and the (re)production of local 
ways of life. However, it is also necessary to situate these microcredit 
programmes themselves within wider historical, socioeconomic and 
institutional contexts, in order to determine how microcredit (as a 
development intervention) has fit into, and been framed by, local modes of 
financial organisation, and wider processes and discourses of 
socioeconomic development and change. For this reason, I have also opted 
to focus analytically on ‘financial landscapes’ as a means of historicising and 
                                            
35 For a more detailed account of how Norman Long’s work can strengthen 
the livelihoods approach by providing ontological consistency see (Small, 
2007). 
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contextualising microcredit in rural China. As Frits Bouman and Otto Hospes 
(the originators of the concept of financial landscapes) point out, the 
‘landscape’ metaphor “is not only used to indicate the physical features of 
the financial landscape such as the offices of banks, cooperatives, credit 
unions…” but it also emphasises “regional diversity and historical change in 
financial eco-systems,” which “stimulates us to explore what relations, 
norms, actions and processes influence, directly or indirectly, the 
transactions of savers, borrowers and lenders” (Bouman & Hospes, 1994, p. 
1). This allows us to answer Long’s call to adopt “a modified political 
economy perspective,” which can deal with the ways in which rural financial 
services in general, and microcredit programmes in particular, are 
“structured by the larger arenas of economic and political power relations,” 
within wider regionalised systems of production (Long, 2001, p. 27 and 40). 
At the same time, it permits us to acknowledge the role that discourse, 
ideology, norms and identity play in shaping microcredit at the local level. 
Practically, this approach facilitates the analytical mapping (geographically, 
economically and socially, see Section 3.3) of the intersections between the 
implementation of financial services, rural livelihoods and rural development. 
It also prompts us to visualise the provision, acquisition and utilisation of 
microcredit as multidimensional, textured and fluid – based on the time, 
place and actors involved. Finally, it allows us to explore direct and indirect 
linkages and disconnects between financial services, modes of production 
and consumption – as well as the inherently human need to accumulate 
resources in an attempt to (re)produce certain ways of life. 
 
Ethnographies of development: Telling Chinese stories 
In this way, analysis of interfaces, livelihoods and financial landscapes can 
be integrated within a wider actor-oriented perspective to provide a 
comprehensive conceptual approach to understanding how microcredit is 
provided, accessed and utilised as a part of differentiated strategies at 
different levels, which are “mediated by institutions and social relations, 
including the market, the state, formal and informal rules and social and 
cultural norms” (H. X. Zhang, 2007, p. 202). Therefore, this approach 
effectively marries micro-level and historical-structural perspectives. It also 
allows us to see development processes as inherently relational constructs 
formed by the dynamic and fluid negotiations between actors at different 
levels (Giddens, 1986; Long, 2001; Mosse & Kruckenberg, 2016; Small, 
2007), thereby representing an “antidote to the excesses of structuralist and 
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culturalist types of explanation” (Long, 2001, p. 2), particularly with regard to 
microcredit as a facilitator of development, both in China and globally. In 
other words, this research seeks to answer Alberto Escobar’s call for “much-
needed local ethnographies of development” that are able “to investigate the 
concrete forms that concepts and practices of development and modernity 
take in specific communities” (Escobar, 1995, p. 13 and 222). At the same 
time, it seeks to go beyond the narrative of exceptionalism that is inherent in 
much micro-ethnographical research (Bebbington, 2000) by telling “local 
Chinese stories” in relation to the “broad canvass” (Tomba, 2012, p. N/A) 
that encompasses the discourses underpinning the wider “China Story,” 
which is told both by and about China (Barmé, 2012, p. N/A), while also 
relating these ‘stories’ to global discourses on development and change. 
 
3.2 Methodological Approach and Fieldwork 
If you want to know about rural credit, you need to go to the countryside, 
spend time there and talk to people. Reading papers and policies, and 
talking to officials in the city will tell you nothing. 
- Interview 02 
 
Shifting the focus of inquiry to actors themselves, the interfaces of 
interaction between them, their livelihoods and how this is all situated within 
socioeconomic and financial landscapes, requires a flexible, reflexive and 
pluralistic methodological approach to collecting and analysing data that is 
open-ended, avoids ‘methodological fundamentalisms’, and gives local 
actors a greater role in the definition of analytical concepts and frames 
(Chambers, 2008). It “calls for a detailed ethnographic understanding of 
everyday life and of the processes by which images, identities and social 
practices are shared, contested, negotiated, and sometimes rejected by the 
various actors involved” (Long & Liu, 2009, p. 71). For this reason, I elected 
to adopt a grounded ethnographic approach to empirical fieldwork drawing 
on the methodological tools found in social anthropological, sociological and 
human geographical modes of inquiry, while also utilising historical-structural 
documentary methods common to local political economy research. This 
allowed the research to take the context of rural China and the issue of 
socioeconomic development as its points of departure for social inquiry, 
rather than applying top-down theoretical frameworks based on disciplinary 
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knowledge. In other words, I adopted a combined and multifaceted 
methodological approach which allowed for the extrapolation of micro level 
theory that has the ability to contribute to the types of bottom-up locally-
grounded understandings of rural development in China that are needed in 
order to answer the research questions posed in this dissertation. 
 
Grounded ethnography and rapid rural appraisal 
The fieldwork itself was fundamentally underpinned by grounded theory, 
which outlines a systematic but open approach to data collection and 
analysis allowing concepts and theories related to social processes to 
inductively emerge from empirical data. This contrasts with top-down 
approaches that impose pre-set theoretical and conceptual constructs onto 
the research project before data collection in order to test hypotheses or 
frame findings (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 1992; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; C. Oliver, 2012; H. X. Zhang, 2003).36 This means 
that the concepts and theories that emerge are reflections of the perceptions 
and interpretations that local people have of their lived realities, and the 
actions they take as they interact with their environment (Goulding, 2002).37 
During and after the data collection, grounded theory approaches utilise 
qualitative coding techniques in order to identify, organise and compare 
emerging concepts, which allows researchers to construct “levels of 
abstraction directly from the data and, subsequently, gather additional data 
to check and refine… emerging analytic categories” culminating in “an 
abstract theoretical understanding of the studied experience” (Charmaz, 
2006, p. 6). In line with the constructionist underpinnings of the overarching 
                                            
36 Rather than going into the field with a completely ‘blank slate’ as is 
recommended by some grounded theory proponents, I conducted a 
systematic review of the literature before and during the main phases of 
fieldwork (see below for more details), which informed my theoretical and 
conceptual understanding of the data I was collecting, and which can be 
considered to be another type of ‘informant’ (Glaser, 1978; Goulding, 2002). 
Nevertheless, I strove to maintain an open mind throughout data collection 
as required for the production of grounded theories. 
37 Grounded theory approaches to data collection are especially well-suited 
to research in language-based area studies because, rather than taking 
theories associated with a discipline as the point of departure, language-
based area studies research starts with a focus on cultures and societies, 
and is, therefore, interested in understanding local concepts and knowledge 
rather than imposing outside frames. 
 89 
actor-oriented conceptual approach outlined above, this research adopts 
Kathy Charmaz’s version of grounded theory that acknowledges the 
interactionist nature of research as a joint-venture between the researcher 
and others involved in the research project, thus producing theory that is not 
discovered (i.e. an inherently positivist conceptualisation), but co-created 
(Charmaz, 2006), and emergent from complex and inherently relational 
processes (Glaser, 1992; Mosse, 2006; Mosse & Kruckenberg, 2016). 
 
Therefore, grounded theory – in conjunction with an ethnographic approach 
– is well suited to the creation of the ‘local ethnographies of development’ 
outlined above, which can give rise to the formulation of micro and meso 
level theories (Bebbington, 2000; Charmaz, 2006) that have the valuable 
ability to help explain the diverse social processes both emerging from and 
shaping China’s rapid socioeconomic transformation. Ethnographic inquiry 
utilises a number of methodological tools to describe and analyse the social, 
cultural, political and economic behaviour of individuals and groups by 
combining both ‘emic’ (i.e. local) and ‘etic’ (i.e. outsider) perspectives in a 
reflexive and iterative process that begins with the collection of broad 
contextual data on a defined thematic area and then narrows down to 
specific themes based on the concepts that emerge during the course of 
fieldwork (P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007; Goulding, 2002). This research 
drew on a number of common ethnographic methods, including participant 
observation, structured and unstructured interviewing, and the collection of 
artefacts and documents (P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007; Bryman, 2008). 
However, in contrast to traditional ethnography conducted by social 
anthropologists, which usually requires immersive fieldwork over a 
prolonged period of time (often one year or more) spent directly engaging 
with participants (Goulding, 2002), I opted to conduct fieldwork in four 
shorter phases, each lasting for one to three months. This decision was 
primarily made for two reasons. First there were a number practical issues 
related to field entry that could not be ignored and required time and 
patience to deal with – e.g. it was not possible to get a long-term research 
visa on my first trip to the field,38 nor would it have been politically or 
culturally feasible to spend a prolonged period in a remote field site without 
                                            
38  For more on the need to form relationships and be attached to an 
institution in order to get the proper visa for research in China see 
(Thøgersen & Heimer, 2006). 
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first forming close, trusting and reciprocal relationships with local people. 
Secondly, I envisioned short trips as having the potential to more easily 
facilitate reflexive analysis and engagement with the literature throughout the 
research process – e.g. in-between trips to the field I could return to the 
office in order to analyse data, form preliminary conclusions and check how 
they fit (or did not fit) with established knowledge in the field. 
 
For this reason, I opted to adapt some of the principles and techniques of 
Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) methodology in an attempt to gather data more 
efficiently and quickly. RRA is a set of methodologies that were developed in 
the 1980s by development researchers and practitioners as a reaction to the 
amount of time and resources needed for traditional ethnography (i.e. 
prolonged immersions) and questionnaire survey methods (i.e. large 
samples requiring a team of researchers).39 RRA emphasises the need to 
maintain flexibility and openness, and, therefore, adapts methods to be 
quicker and more adaptable in order to get faster and more useful results. 
RRA also utilises methods such as sketch mapping, to “flexibly follow up on 
leads” (Chambers, 1994, 2008; Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. N/A). In the 
words of Robert Chambers, “the methods of RRA seek a rigour of cost-
effectiveness through exploratory iteration and trade-offs between relevance, 
accuracy, and timeliness, ignoring inappropriate professional standards. 
They apply the principles of optimal ignorance and proportionate accuracy 
(or appropriate imprecision)” (Chambers, 2008, p. 67). 40  Like grounded 
theory, RRA aims to allow participants to create their own categories, rather 
than imposing conceptual schemes (e.g. from the literature or from our own 
perceptions) onto the field and the local people involved in the research. 
This openness and receptiveness was something that I strived to maintain 
during fieldwork, primarily by holding back, letting people speak and 
attempting not to dominate or interrupt, which are all principles of RRA 
(Chambers, 1994, 2008; Chambers & Loubere, 2016). 
                                            
39 Robert Chambers, one of the principal architects of RRA, describes in-
depth ethnography and questionnaires “as being ‘long and lost,’ because 
they took such a long time and also often generated data that was not 
particularly relevant” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. N/A). 
40 One such example of an ‘inappropriate professional standard’ is verbatim 
transcription. Therefore, I developed an RRA-style set of methods called 
‘systematic interview reports’ and ‘reflexive dialoguing’ as an alternative, 
which are covered in more detail below. 
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Ultimately, this pluralistic methodological approach based on grounded 
ethnography and RRA was selected to allow for as much flexibility as 
possible within the constraints that are inherent in this type of fieldwork. It 
was also utilised in an attempt to reduce pre-existing biases and avoid 
reinforcing the kinds of ‘blind spots’ associated with ‘rural development 
tourism’ (i.e. short visits to rural areas from an urban centre) (Chambers & 
Loubere, 2016), and to allow for unexpected discoveries – or serendipity – to 
be an integral part of the research design (Pieke, 2000). In other words, 
rather than going into the field “full of theory” (Pfaff-Czarnecka & 
Kruckenberg, 2016, p. N/A) like most social anthropologists, or applying 
reductionist strategies to limit the type and amount of data I was collecting 
from the beginning in a quantitative mode (e.g. through quantitative 
questionnaire surveys) – I instead sought to allow theory to emerge naturally 
from my interactions with various types of actors, and through observation of 
their interactions with each other, combined with the collection of 
documentary and visual sources. At the same time, I strived to take on 
principles and values associated with participatory modes of inquiry (which 
evolved out of RRA), such as “mutual respect, humility, listening, sensitivity, 
courage, awareness, integrity, curiosity, playfulness, humour, originality, 
[and] critical reflection” (Chambers, 2008, pp. 176–7). 
 
Preparing for fieldwork 
Based on the methodological approach outlined above, I started the 
research project with an exploratory orientation, defining the parameters of 
the research broadly as an attempt to examine the role that microcredit plays 
in rural China, rather than beginning with specific research questions or 
hypotheses to test (P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007). The goal was to 
identify the important areas that needed to be investigated within the scope 
of these parameters, based on the themes emerging from fieldwork and 
engagement with the literature. After defining my broad research areas, I 
conducted a thorough review of the theoretical/conceptual literature relevant 
to the project and the background literature on rural society, politics and 
development in China, followed by an in-depth systematic review of the 
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literature41 on the global microfinance movement, and rural financial services 
and microcredit in China.42 When reviewing the literature, I took notes in 
separate Microsoft Word documents for every item (e.g. article, book, etc.) 
and then imported these Word documents into the NVivo software package 
for coding and analysis, which allowed me to draw out the key themes 
present in the different bodies of scholarship in a grounded theory mode.43 I 
then used the same NVivo project file for my primary data analysis, which 
made it easy to identify crosscutting themes and/or issues I encountered 
which were absent from, or contradicted, the literature (see below for more 
on NVivo).44 In this way, my literature reviews helped me to develop a more 
focussed (but still flexible) idea of the issues I intended to study by providing 
important background/contextual knowledge about the Chinese rural 
development situation in general, and rural financial services specifically. 
Based on this knowledge, I made a preliminary research design and plan for 
fieldwork, and completed the ethical review and risk assessment processes, 
which were both accepted by the University of Leeds. Finally, in the spring of 
2012, I went on my first ‘scoping trip’ for the research project. 
 
My initial point of contact with the ‘field’ was Zhejiang University, which, 
along with the University of Leeds, is a member of the Worldwide 
                                            
41 For discussions on the importance of conducting a systematic review of 
the literature in the social sciences, see (Bryman, 2008; Hart, 1998; Mallett, 
Hagen-Zanker, Slater, & Duvendack, 2012).  
42 In addition to the systematic review of the English language scholarship, I 
used Google Scholar, CNKI, other Chinese electronic databases and the 
Zhejiang University library to search for relevant scholarship in Chinese. 
However, due to the time constraints of the Ph.D. and the dauntingly large 
number of articles and books on rural finance in Chinese, this review was 
not as extensive as the review in English. Nevertheless, in general, I found 
that the Chinese academic literature on rural finance and microcredit is 
similar to the English language literature in that it is primarily situated in the 
disciplines of finance and economics, and focuses on top-down approaches 
(see Chapter 2). 
43 In reality, I undertook these reviews of the literature before, during and 
after fieldwork as part of an iterative process where both engagement with 
scholarship and collection/analysis of primary data fed into the flexible 
research design and shaped the trajectory of the research project. 
44 For an overview of how to use NVivo for a critical and systematic review of 
the literature, see (Beekhuyzen, 2008). 
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Universities Network. This allowed me to apply for fieldwork funding to visit 
Zhejiang University from March to April 2012, and my connection with the 
institution allowed me to apply for a short-term research visa, which is vitally 
important in order to conduct research in China legally (Thøgersen & 
Heimer, 2006). This institutional connection with a Chinese university also 
provided the opportunity to meet and work with established academics and 
students in Zhejiang Province, who then subsequently introduced me to their 
colleagues in Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics. In this way my 
social and professional network expanded, and, through my new friends and 
colleagues, I was able to meet a range of different actors of relevance for my 
research, including government officials at various levels who facilitated my 
access to the rural field sites on this and later trips. Moreover, my contacts in 
Zhejiang and Jiangxi also accompanied me on initial trips to a number of 
townships and villages that they had access to, and helped me to decide 
which available sites would be most suitable for my research.45 During these 
trips I strived to keep my options open and maintain flexibility in order to 
avoid what Robert Chambers calls “premature closure” in the field 
(Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. N/A). I visited a number of different locations 
in Zhejiang and Jiangxi, and spoke with as many different types of people as 
possible, including academics, officials at different levels of government, 
migrant workers, farmers, and shopkeepers, among others. I also spent as 
much time as possible unhurriedly wandering around and observing 
everyday life in the places I visited, rather than following detailed itineraries 
or plans, in an attempt to allow for spontaneity and serendipity. 
 
Because Zhejiang is located in the more prosperous eastern coastal region, 
the locations I visited in the province were quite urbanised and ‘modern’, and 
marked by a relatively ‘developed’ financial infrastructure – i.e. a greater 
number of formal institutions, and especially commercial banks. Rural areas 
in Zhejiang were also better connected to urban areas (e.g. better quality 
roads), which allowed rural residents to more easily access the huge number 
of urban financial institutions. Moreover, informal finance was widespread 
and even institutionalised in Zhejiang counties and townships. Jiangxi, on 
                                            
45 Rather naïvely, I initially planned to gain access to rural fieldwork sites by 
simply riding a bicycle by myself across the countryside. However, it became 
immediately (and abundantly) clear that this would not be socially, politically 
or culturally acceptable. 
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the other hand, is located in the less prosperous central region, and the 
potential field sites generally had less access to formal financial services and 
particularly credit. Informal finance was also less institutionalised (i.e. usually 
provided through friends and family rather than underground organisations), 
meaning that the microcredit programmes had the potential to play more 
important (or at least more visible) roles in local development and 
livelihoods. More importantly, Jiangxi Province was the initial provincial pilot 
site for the EMP (see Chapter 4), and, as a poorer central province, is home 
to officially designated ‘poverty-stricken villages’ (fuchi pinkun cun"
) as part of the Poor Village Investment Programme, which are the target 
areas for the PAMP (see Chapter 4), while the wealthier Zhejiang Province 
does not have any nationally designated poverty-stricken villages. Finally, in 
Jiangxi I had the opportunity to work in a township that was in one of the 
original pilot areas for the RCCMP, which would not have been possible in 
Zhejiang. 
 
Based on these factors, I decided that northern Jiangxi Province had the 
best potential for productive and interesting fieldwork, so in discussion with 
my local colleagues/partners and future research assistants, three townships 
in different counties were selected, each of which represented intriguingly 
distinct socioeconomic and socio-political situations (see Section 3.4), and, 
thus, varied experiences and perceptions with regard to the implementation, 
acquisition and utilisation of microcredit. In order to comply with the 
University of Leeds’ ethical guidelines and to protect the anonymity of the 
interviewees, I have selected pseudonyms for the three townships based on 
their primary economic activities: the agricultural township (AT), the migrant 
work township (MWT), and the diverse economy township (DET). 
Additionally, in each township I selected one village to be the primary 
location for interviewing rural households, due to the fact that most of the 
township populations lived in villages – especially the farming populations. 
Different types of villages were selected in each site in order to provide a 
variety of contexts and perspectives. In other words, in line with Norman 
Long’s research style, my location sampling approach “commenced by 
selecting a number of contrasting social locations” within which it was 
possible to study “in depth the lifeworlds of different social groups” (Long, 
2001, pp. 23–4). After this scoping trip I retuned to Leeds but remained in 
contact with my research assistants. I also conducted preliminary analysis of 
the data I had collected, revisited the literature and sought out new 
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academic sources based on the themes that had emerged during the trip. At 
the same time, I began to plan and prepare for the three main fieldwork trips. 
 
In the field 
The main fieldwork for this research project took place over three trips 
lasting approximately two to three months each. The first trip was for more 
than two months from October 2012 to December 2012; the second trip 
lasted for just under three months from April 2013 to June 2013; and the 
third trip was for one and a half months from July 2013 to August 2013. The 
first trip was initially spent conducting interviews with officials at the 
provincial, prefectural and county levels, followed by two weeks in the AT 
and one week in the MWT. During this time I did not live in the townships or 
villages, but instead commuted daily from Nanchang with my research 
assistant to get to know local people and build up trust. The second trip was 
spent entirely in the MWT, where I lived with a family in the village and 
conducted interviews in both the village and the township, and also with 
some county officials when they visited the township. The third trip was 
spent entirely in the DET, where I lived with a family in the township centre 
and conducted interviews in the village, township and county. Most of the 
interviews were conducted jointly with a research assistant; however, there 
were also periods when I was the lone researcher at the field sites, during 
which time I conducted some interviews by myself, but more frequently 
engaged in unstructured conversations, and carried out socioeconomic 
mapping and other types of observation.46  
 
Conducting fieldwork in four shorter trips rather than one extended 
ethnographic immersion had both benefits and drawbacks. For instance, 
because I stayed at the sites for relatively shorter periods of time, I did not 
have a chance to do as much unstructured exploring and wandering as I 
would have liked. Moreover, I could not witness the passing of a full year in 
order to see how different seasons influenced life, and I felt as though I was 
always regarded as an ‘outsider’ who was perceived to be ‘on his way out’. 
                                            
46  Because I developed the ‘systematic interview report’ and ‘reflexive 
dialogue’ methods, both of which require two researchers (see below), I tried 
to ensure that most of the interviews were conducted with research 
assistants. 
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This perception, however, was also beneficial in certain circumstances 
because people seemed to be more willing to speak to me on short notice 
due to the time limitations – especially busy officials who might have put off 
our meeting if it was understood that I would be around for a long time. More 
importantly, I was able to get some ‘distance’ from the field between visits, 
which allowed me to reflect on what I had discovered (and what mistakes I 
had made) and devise better methods of conducting research on 
subsequent trips. Furthermore, it also helped me avoid getting ‘burnt-out’ 
and potentially allowed me to maintain good relationships with the people I 
worked with, who may have felt acute pressure to accommodate me if I had 
requested to live ‘on site’ for a year.47 
 
Decisions about who would take part in interviews and conversations were 
based on “judgement or opportunistic sampling” (Burgess, 1984, p. 55; H. X. 
Zhang, 2003, p. 255), which entailed selecting key criteria (i.e. types of 
actors), and attempting to find willing participants who met the criteria.48 In 
the early stages, and particularly with government officials at the provincial, 
prefectural and county levels, this necessitated a ‘snowballing’ sampling 
technique, beginning with initial contacts and then expanding my network 
through references and recommendations (R. Atkinson & Flint, 2001). In the 
townships and villages I would walk around trying to find people to talk to 
based on the flexible criteria and emergent themes – and also by asking my 
assistants to help set up interviews, asking interviewees to recommend 
others, and generally mobilising my growing network of contacts in the field 
to help me find other potential participants (i.e. ‘snowballing’). After 
conducting systematic household and business mapping (see below), I was 
able to revise my criteria based on the different types of actors in each site 
                                            
47  This raises the obvious point about the ethical issues involved with 
researchers ‘imposing’ themselves on local people, particularly in 
‘developing’ contexts, which need to be rigorously reflected upon. Ultimately, 
based on my experiences, I don’t think that it is possible to say that multiple 
short trips to the field is a better or worse means of conducting research than 
long-term immersions. Rather, the two methods are simply different and, for 
this reason, produce different types of data and knowledge, requiring 
researcher reflexivity before, during and after fieldwork. 
48 It is important to note that these criteria changed during fieldwork in an 
iterative process as new information presented itself (P. Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 2007). 
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and their relative socioeconomic situations, which allowed me to select 
respondents from different strata of local society with different livelihood 
strategies, and also different types of small, medium and large enterprises. I, 
therefore, did not attempt to get a ‘representative’ sample in order to 
produce ‘generalisable’ (by aggregate) or ‘replicable’ data, but instead 
targeted specific types of actors in an attempt to explore their lived 
experiences and perspectives in relation to the three microcredit 
programmes for the purpose of micro and meso level theory construction 
(Charmaz, 2006; H. X. Zhang, 2003). I then triangulated what I had 
discovered by crosschecking with different actors, through the collection of 
different types of data, and by letting themes, concepts and categories 
emerge as naturally as possible – in order to achieve what Robert Chambers 
refers to as a “rigour of trustworthiness” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. 
N/A). That being said, the interview/conversation sample size was, 
nevertheless, relatively large, consisting of 78 semi-structured interviews 
(lasting between 40 minutes to one and a half hours), and 41 unstructured 
conversations (lasting anywhere from five minutes to two hours), which took 
place primarily in the three townships/villages, but also at the county, 
prefectural and provincial levels. I should note that I did not pay any 
interviewees for their time, but in some cases I brought chocolates for 
female interviewees, and I also had packs of expensive Zhonghua cigarettes 
(zhonghua xiangyan 	'), so that I could offer male interviewees a 
cigarette during the interview or conversation (female interviewees rarely 
smoked). I also attempted to create a role for myself in the field (i.e. make 
myself ‘useful’) by teaching English to children in the local schools and in the 
homes of the people I stayed with.49 
 
Of course, the collection of this substantial qualitative data set, which forms 
the core foundation of this Ph.D. dissertation, would not have been possible 
without significant help, and I am heavily indebted to my research partners in 
China, and especially to my two research assistants who helped with data 
collection, organisation and, to a certain extent, in situ analysis. My first 
assistant was an M.A. student who worked with me during the scoping trip, 
the first main fieldwork trip and for half of the second trip. His M.A. 
supervisor agreed that the trips could be used to contribute to some of his 
                                            
49 For more on how researchers must continuously negotiate their role in the 
field, see (P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007). 
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coursework, and I also assisted him with his application for Ph.D. study, so 
he was not paid as a research assistant. The second assistant worked with 
me for half of the second trip and the entire third trip, and was a final year 
undergraduate student who was preparing to begin an M.A. programme. 
She saw the research project as a summer job to help her gain experience, 
and for this reason she was paid approximately RMB 150 per day as a 
formal research assistant.  
 
Collaborating with local partners is, of course, a common feature of research 
in rural China, which is often omitted or ‘glossed over’ in the writing-up and 
dissemination stages of research projects, with local collaborators being 
labelled as ‘informants’ or ‘translators’, understating the importance of their 
role in the (co)production of data and knowledge (Thøgersen & Heimer, 
2006; Thunø, 2006). In my case, my research ‘assistants’ became both 
professional colleagues and good friends. They provided invaluable support 
both tangibly and intangibly during fieldwork, and certainly played a role in 
shaping the research as it evolved. In-between interviews and in the 
evenings we shared ideas, feelings, hunches and perceptions. We were 
often surprised at how different our (emic and etic) perspectives were, and 
exploring these different worldviews brought out new realisations drawing on 
the relative strengths of our different types of knowledge (P. Atkinson & 
Hammersley, 2007; Bröckerhoff & Kipnis, 2014). Ultimately, it was through 
joint brainstorming and the sharing of ideas that many of the concepts and 
themes that would later form the basis for analysis emerged (Chambers, 
2008). There were, of course, also practical advantages to working with local 
partners in the field. For instance, since my assistants are both from 
northern Jiangxi, they were able to speak the local dialects, which proved to 
be invaluable with some interviewees who could not speak Mandarin 
Chinese well or who had heavy accents (particularly elderly farmers). In this 
way they played the role of semi-interpreters in certain interviews. Moreover, 
they also provided invaluable advice on sociocultural traditions and informal 
rules that I was unfamiliar with, but which shaped many of our social 
encounters, thus helping me to avoid insulting people or transgressing 
cultural norms, while also assisting with the interpretation of behaviours and 
actions based on the local cultural contexts. 
 
My research assistants were also vital to helping me secure access to the 
remote townships and villages where I conducted research, which would not 
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have been possible without social and political connections with local 
authorities. In all three townships my research assistants played a role in 
facilitating access, albeit through very different methods, which reflected the 
different power constellations they themselves were embedded within. This 
meant that I was perceived differently in the three townships (i.e. my 
positionality was differently constructed), and was, thus, able to speak with 
different types of actors and interact with people in different ways, raising 
important epistemological issues.50 For instance, in the AT and the MWT my 
access was dependent on official connections at the prefectural level, 
meaning that local officials and some households felt compelled to talk to 
me, resulting in a higher response rate amongst some actors. At the same 
time, however, it was clear that I was perceived to be associated with a 
‘higher power’. In the DET, on the other hand, I gained access as a friend 
and guest of a ‘normal’ – but well regarded – local household, meaning that I 
was not necessarily perceived as having anything to do with the 
government, and that people (especially family and good friends of the 
household) would speak to me more frankly. However, because I had not 
entered through top-down hierarchical channels, I was worried about my 
presence being met with suspicion by local and county authorities, 
potentially resulting in trouble for the family I was staying with and myself. 
Therefore, I proceeded with caution when attempting to contact local officials 
and financial institutions, and while I did manage to conduct interviews with 
these actors, it was limited in comparison with the AT and the MWT.51  
 
Ultimately, however, despite being largely defined by my ‘foreignness’, my 
positionality was constantly shifting in the field depending on where I was, 
how I got there, who I was with, who I was speaking to, and what I was 
doing. This meant that I was provided with different types of information in 
different contexts, which obviously has seriously epistemological implications 
for the data that was generated.52 While this would be seen as a failing in a 
                                            
50 For more on the various implications that the shifting nature of research 
positionality has on the knowledge that is produced, see (Loubere, 2014b; 
Sultana, 2007; Thunø, 2006). 
51 See Appendix A for detailed diagrams illustrating how I gained access to 
the sites and different actors in the three townships/villages. 
52 The issue of my role and position in the field as a researcher, and what 
this means for the relationships that were formed and the data that was 
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quantitative study attempting to create a ‘representative’ and ‘generalisable’ 
data set, in the case of my research it was invaluable as a method of 
presenting the voices and lived experiences of different types of actors in 
relation to microcredit. It also allowed for crosschecking and triangulation, 
which, as stated above, are necessary in order to achieve a “rigour of 
trustworthiness” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. N/A). 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
Interviews and conversations 
As stated above, the primary method of collecting data for this research 
project was through semi-structured interviews, or what Stig Thøgersen 
refers to as “dialogue-type interviews,” where the interview is based on a set 
of flexible questions, but is open-ended, allowing for “a clarification process 
with interruptions, repetitions and negotiations rather than a monologue or a 
series of questions and answers” (Thøgersen, 2006b, p. 121). Separate 
‘flexible interview outlines’ were designed for different types of participants, 
including borrowing households, non-borrowing households, large industries, 
financial institutions and government officials, which aimed at collecting 
different types of data, and also relating to actors in ways that were more 
natural to them socially, culturally and linguistically.53 The flexible interview 
outlines allowed me to pursue interesting and unexpected lines of inquiry as 
they presented themselves, in a ‘responsive interviewing’ mode (Rubin & 
Rubin, 2011). The interview outlines also evolved over the course of 
fieldwork as new questions arose during interviews and based on 
observation. 
 
                                                                                                                           
produced, is a topic that I have explored in conference presentations and 
publications (Crawford, Kruckenberg, Loubere, & Morgan, 2016; Loubere, 
2012, 2014b; Loubere, Morgan, Kruckenberg, De Beukelaer, & Hernandez 
Montes De Oca, 2012), and is important enough to deserve a chapter of its 
own. Unfortunately, there is simply not enough space in this Ph.D. 
dissertation to allow for a chapter of this nature. 
53 Interviews with households or microenterprises always started out with a 
basic set of questions about the household/family and their social and 
economic situations, which was triangulated with observational data and 
interviews with other actors in order to assess socioeconomic status. 
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The vast majority of the interviews (and conversations, see below) were 
conducted in Chinese, with both my research assistants and myself asking 
questions and taking notes. In a few cases, interviews were conducted 
primarily in local dialect, either because the interviewee did not have the 
ability to speak Mandarin, or because they felt more comfortable conversing 
in their own local language. In these cases my assistants acted as 
interpreters, but I would continue to ask questions in Mandarin as the 
interviewees could usually understand, even if they could not (or would not) 
speak the language. Where possible (and appropriate) interviews were 
recorded, although this was done in order to allow my assistants and I to 
return to the recordings later for verification purposes during the writing of 
‘systematic interview reports’ and ‘reflexive dialoguing’, not to produce full 
verbatim transcripts (see below for the justification of this approach). 
Depending on the attitude of the interviewee towards us, and their accent or 
language ability, either my assistant or I would lead the interview, with both 
strategies having their associated strengths and weaknesses.54 Prior to the 
interviews, interviewees were always told about the research in detail and 
provided with some material introducing the research. They were also 
informed that they were free to end their participation at any time, as is 
required by the University of Leeds Ethical Review Committee. Having two 
people engaged in the interviews was highly beneficial because it allowed 
one person to take notes (both on what was said and on observations of 
non-verbal cues and the environment) while the other engaged in 
discussion. During the interviews my assistants and I would often switch 
back and forth between the role of note-taker and interviewer, meaning that 
there were not many long pauses in the discussions, allowing the interviews 
flow more naturally. 
 
In addition to the formal semi-structured interviews, I also gathered a 
significant amount of data through unstructured conversations, which is not 
surprising considering I was living in the fieldwork sites and interacting with 
many different types of people on a daily basis. These conversations were 
with a wide variety of actors, covered a range of topics, and they usually 
                                            
54  There are obvious benefits associated with a native speaker leading 
interviews and conversations; however, research has also shown that non-
native speakers can be better suited to allow respondents to define their own 
concepts (in a grounded mode) during interviews by “deferring to their 
position as a language authority” (S.-H. Chen, 2011, p. 119). 
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occurred spontaneously – lasting anywhere from five minutes to two hours. 
Additionally, some conversations took place with government officials who 
were unwilling to be formally interviewed, but were willing to talk informally 
and off the record. Generally, conversations were not recorded and did not 
follow the format of the semi-structured interviews. Instead they were usually 
part of everyday life and were informal in nature, meaning that the types of 
information that I was presented with were different, but often of vital 
importance – especially for triangulation purposes. Whenever I had a 
conversation that was directly relevant to the research, I would write a 
‘conversation report’ using the same technique as the ‘systematic interview 
reports’ outlined below. In total I produced 41 conversation reports, which 
were imported into NVivo for analysis after fieldwork. Other conversations 
that were of less direct relevance to the research were reflected upon in my 
fieldwork journal (see below). See Reference Lists A, B and C for a complete 
list of all the interviews and conversations utilised in the writing of this Ph.D. 
dissertation. 
 
Systematic interview reports and reflexive dialogue 
While the semi-structured interview method outlined above is common to 
many types of qualitative research, I found that the standard approach of 
recording and transcribing interviews was not entirely suitable for the 
research that I was conducting. Like many other researchers, I began this 
research project assuming that recording interviews for full verbatim 
transcription was necessary to establish ‘validity’, ‘rigour’ and 
‘trustworthiness’, and that most of my data would emerge from these 
transcriptions. 55  However, I immediately encountered problems with this 
approach, which caused me to reflect on what the recording and 
transcription processes actually mean for the generation and interpretation 
of data. In the end, I determined that attempting to produce complete 
verbatim transcriptions of interviews would result in lower quality research 
for a number of reasons.  
 
                                            
55 Some researchers have started to question whether or not transcription is 
really a necessary step in ethnographic research (Halcomb & Davidson, 
2006; Lapadat, 2000; D. G. Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). However, in 
general, it is considered a standard and professional ‘best practice’ across 
disciplines (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003; Poland, 1995). 
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Firstly, verbatim transcription necessitates the audio recording of interactions 
with research participants; however, this is not always possible or desirable 
(P. Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007; Werner, 1999). Often people do not want 
to be recorded, or the environment is not conducive to producing a recording 
of sufficient quality. For instance, some of my interviews/conversations were 
conducted with street vendors at a busy township market; there was 
nowhere to sit or place a recording device and the background noise made 
any recording virtually unusable. Other times participants were happy to 
have an informal discussion, but became withdrawn and uncommunicative 
after I requested their consent to record. These examples illustrate the fact 
that important information is often presented when the recorder is off. 
However, research that relies on verbatim transcription as a means of 
proving ‘rigour’ will necessarily valorise the recorded while downplaying the 
significance of information collected in other ways. Second, it is widely 
recognised that transcription is technically very difficult (DiCicco-Bloom & 
Crabtree, 2006; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 
2003; D. G. Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). Spoken language is 
structured differently from written language, and things like incomplete 
sentences, pauses, self-corrections, partial utterances, and background 
noise all make producing a truly accurate verbatim transcription basically 
impossible – especially in a second language. More importantly, verbatim 
transcription on its own leaves out vital non-verbal modes of communication, 
such as posture, facial expressions and gestures that may change the 
meaning of what is being said. Researcher observations, feelings, hunches 
and positionality are also left unreflected upon in a ‘pure’ verbatim 
transcription. Moreover, because transcription takes place after fieldwork, I 
felt that it would have pushed critical engagement with the field to a later 
time when memories and feelings associated with the ‘fieldwork event’ would 
have faded. In this way, transcription reinforces the false dichotomy that the 
field is for collecting data and the office is for analysis, when in reality data 
collection in the field should include critical analysis of emerging themes. 
Finally, there was also the issue of time and resource limitations, as it would 
have simply taken too long to fully transcribe all the interviews myself, and it 
would have been too costly to pay assistants to help with the task. 
 
In other words, I came to realise that verbatim transcription is a 
methodological choice rather than a ‘best practice’ that should be blindly 
adhered to, and I decided that it was necessary to find a different way to 
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deal with the rich set of data that I was collecting through interviews and 
conversations. For this reason, I developed two interlinking methods that I 
refer to as ‘systematic interview reports’ and ‘reflexive dialoguing’, which are 
based on the principles of RRA. Systematic interview reports are co-
produced documents written by my research assistant(s) and myself. 
Reports were written based on our notes and memories from the interviews, 
and (when possible) we referred back to recordings for verification of details 
(see Figure 3.3 below for an overview of the process).56 Most days we 
conducted two to three interviews and, after returning to the house in the 
evenings, we would spend approximately one hour writing each report in 
Microsoft Word using the flexible interview outlines as templates. Usually we 
would each write one of the reports to save time, and if we had conducted 
three interviews I would write two reports and my assistant would write 
one.57 After completing the reports we exchanged what we had written, and 
the second person added further information, made note of additional 
observations and analyses, and highlighted points of disagreement or 
inconsistencies based on their own notes, memories and the recording 
where possible. Because the reports were written in Word, each author used 
a different text colour so that it was easy to determine who had written which 
parts of the text. These systematic interview reports allowed for the inclusion 
of observational material about the surroundings, non-verbal cues, the 
attitude and demeanour of the respondents, their reaction to different 
questions, and the types of ‘language codes’ that different actors employed 
when speaking (Thøgersen, 2006b), all of which are generally lost in a 
verbatim transcription that reduces the interview to text that is analysed long 
after the discussion actually took place.58 Moreover, the systematic interview 
                                            
56 I have presented on my use of these two methods at conferences and 
workshops (Loubere, 2014a), and in the future I plan to publish a paper 
outlining the methods in greater detail. 
57 As stated above, similar reports were also written for conversations of 
direct relevance. However, because conversations were unstructured, the 
reports were not based on any template and relied on memory rather than 
extensive notes. 
58 The argument could be made that transcription is inherently positivist, and 
therefore inappropriate for research based on a grounded actor-oriented 
approach. This is because transcription inherently assumes that meaning is 
the result of combinations of words (i.e. objective in an almost mathematical 
way), rather than emergent from discourse – which is complex, dynamic 
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reports also included preliminary reflections, analyses, triangulation, and 
hunches relating the interview to what had been said by previous 
respondents and/or observed during the course of fieldwork. Finally, 
interesting quotes were also included in the systematic interview reports, or 
we highlighted specific parts of the interview where good quotes might be 
extracted in the future by listening to the recording (where available). 
 
After the systematic interview reports had been written, exchanged and 
modified, my research assistant and I engaged in what I term ‘reflexive 
dialoguing’ about the interviews and conversations specifically, and our 
personal experiences of the day’s work in general. During this time we 
discussed points of interest and disagreement in the reports (referring back 
to recordings if possible) and, more generally, tried to make sense of what 
we had learned and put it into wider context. Reflexive dialoguing helped me 
to interpret what respondents were trying to say, even if they did not say it 
directly, and I feel the method was key to challenging “ethnocentric views 
and partial interpretations of empirical data” (Thunø, 2006, p. 246), which is 
vital in order to avoid imposing hegemonic development discourses onto the 
interviews/conversations through the act of unreflexive direct translation 
(Maclean, 2007). These reflexive dialogues also allowed the systematic 
interview reports to reflect a combined emic/etic perspective, which limited 
the inherent weaknesses associated with ‘pure’ insider or outsider research 
(Bröckerhoff & Kipnis, 2014). Moreover, the method also facilitated the 
formulation of concepts and codes, identification of key areas for further 
study, and provided a means of determining which aspects of the reports 
needed to be triangulated to assess validity through further 
interviews/conversations, observation or with documentary data. These 
reflexive dialogues usually lasted from between 30 minutes to one hour, and 
afterwards I would finalise the reports based on what had been discussed 
before retiring for much needed sleep.59 
                                                                                                                           
and, in addition to the words that are said, includes a host of other elements 
of great importance, such as non-verbal communication, intonation, etc. 
59 These were obviously very long and tiring days for both my research 
assistants and myself. Particularly in the summer months, it sometimes 
reached 40 degrees Celsius during the day, making fieldwork even more 
strenuous and leaving us exhausted in the evenings. It is, therefore, a 
testament to the work ethic and ability of my assistants that they were able 
to perform at such a high level throughout the immersive fieldwork trips. 
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Ultimately, the interlinking systematic interview report and reflexive 
dialoguing methods facilitated critical engagement with emergent themes 
during fieldwork, rather than after. They also resulted in a detailed set of 
concise, organised and rigorously co-reviewed interview/conversation 
reports (3000-5000 words in length) containing participant responses, rich 
contextual information, and preliminary analyses and coding, which allowed 
for much faster and more effective analysis after the fieldwork was complete 
(see below for more on analysis). These reports also often contain useful 
verbatim quotations, or have at least highlighted sections of the interview 
that are of particular interest and may yield good quotations, which have 
been included in the dissertation to more effectively and directly ‘give voice’ 
to the actors whose opinions, understandings and aspirations are at the 
heart of this research. 
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Figure 3.3: The Process of Producing Systematic Interview Reports  
 
 
Documentary data 
In addition to the interviews and conversations outlined above, I also 
collected a significant amount of primary and secondary documentary data 
before, during and after fieldwork. This includes policy documents issued at 
the national, provincial and prefectural levels, which were collected from 
officials themselves during interviews, or online from relevant websites and 
databases. These policy documents provide a broad understanding of the 
historical development of the programmes, and form the basis for the 
analysis of the formulation of policy for the microcredit programmes in 
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• Immediately after the interview the 1st researcher writes the systematic interview report 
(preferably digitally with text colour-coded by writer); contextual/observational 
information and preliminary analyses are included in the report. 
Step%4%
• The 2nd researcher reads the systematic interview report, adds additional information 
and highlights differences of opinion using colour-coded text. 
Step%5%
• The two researchers engage in reflexive dialogue and amend the interview report after 
discussing any differences of opinion (conferring with the interview recording when 
possible) and points of interest. 
Step%6%
• After the completion of fieldwork, useful quotations are identified from the interview 
reports and selectively transcribed from recorded interviews. 
Step%7%
• Interview reports are imported into a qualitative data analysis software package along 
with any other data collected during fieldwork and notes from the literature review. 
Step%8%
• The data and the literature are rigorously analysed in order to identify crosscutting 
themes, inconsistencies and gaps. 
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Chapter 4. I also collected various local government documents, particularly 
publicity for government programmes, and propaganda produced by local 
governments in an attempt to attract outside investment, which is often one 
of the most important duties of township officials (G. Smith, 2010). These 
documents provided useful background knowledge of the areas, albeit from 
specific (and potentially quite biased) perspectives. Linked to this, I also 
gathered as much material as possible from local financial institutions 
(especially the RCCs), such as publicity and propaganda for their products 
and services, and for the microcredit programmes themselves. Unfortunately 
(but unsurprisingly), financial institutions were not willing to provide sensitive 
documentary data related to their operation.60 I was, however, able to collect 
some sensitive primary documentary data from households and government 
officials through the use of a digital camera (with permission of the 
respondents), such as completed loan application forms, household 
registration documents (hukou ben 
 ), bank books, bank cards, 
identification cards, and even one letter of complaint about local government 
officials written by a local household. Finally, I also collected a range of 
secondary documentary data using the internet, such as newspaper articles 
and government reports.61 
 
These different types of documentary data facilitated the type of historical-
structural analysis usually associated with local political economy research, 
and allowed me to connect the lived experiences expressed in the interviews 
and conversations with the macro and meso structural aspects of the 
institutional and policy environments. Therefore, by combining these data, I 
was able to perceive a textured financial landscape mutually constituted by 
institutions, structures, discourses and actors at various levels. Documentary 
data that is directly referenced in this Ph.D. dissertation can be found in the 
bibliography (particularly policy documents). However, due to limited space, 
the huge amount of documentary data that has played a role in my 
understanding of the this project, and in order to maintain the anonymity of 
                                            
60  Sometimes information of this nature was provided during 
interviews/conversations with willing employees, but it is difficult to assess 
validity in these circumstances. 
61  For a detailed overview of the different types of documentary data 
available to social science researchers in China, see (Thøgersen, 2006a). 
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the fieldwork sites, I have decided against providing a comprehensive list of 
all the documentary data collected for the research project. 
 
Observation 
Observation was another crucial element of data collection and I utilised a 
variety of techniques to systematically document my observation of 
participants and local contexts. To begin with, as soon as I entered a 
fieldwork site I began writing a ‘contextual observation report’ based on a 
flexible template. Like the flexible interview outlines, the contextual 
observation report templates evolved throughout fieldwork and were tailored 
to each site, but in general they were meant to provide background 
information and useful socioeconomic indicators – e.g. population, land area, 
geography/environment, income, infrastructure, industry/business, cultural 
life, etc. – in order to provide a platform for analysis based on detailed 
contextual (or ‘grounded’) understandings of the places being researched. 
These contextual observation reports were complemented by over 1,200 
photos and videos of the different sites taken by my research assistants and 
myself. See Reference List D for details of all the observational reports that 
contributed to this dissertation. 
 
Additionally, I also conducted systematic mapping exercises in order to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the different socioeconomic landscapes of the 
three townships/villages. In particular, I mapped out the different types of 
housing and businesses operating in the different localities. In terms of 
households, I found that mapping of housing structures (i.e. the buildings 
themselves) is useful “as an indicator of poverty or prosperity… and may be 
useful (not least because so visible and easy to count) as a proxy for relative 
poverty or prosperity between villages and for the same village over time” 
(Chambers, 2008, p. 75). In other words, the most visible representation of a 
household’s socioeconomic status is usually the house where they live, so I 
created a typology of five household ‘classes’, with one having the highest 
socioeconomic status and five having the lowest, and I mapped out 
distribution of house class across the three townships/villages and also 
made a note of the house class of each interviewee in the systematic 
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interview reports.62 This not only allowed for effective comparison of the 
socioeconomic situations of the three sites, but it also aided in sampling, as I 
was able to ensure that I had a reasonable balance of respondents from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Outlining business type and 
distribution was also crucial to my understanding of how the local economies 
were structured in the three townships and how people/groups earned a 
living (e.g. what they used financial services for). For this reason, I 
systematically mapped out all the different types of businesses operating in 
the MWT and the DET (both townships and villages). Unfortunately, due to 
time and socio-political constraints, I was not able to systematically map the 
businesses in the AT, but I was able to get an accurate sense of the quantity 
and types of businesses in operation (see Section 3.4 below).63 Similar to 
the household mapping, the business mapping also played an important role 
in sampling because – by allowing me to visualise the different types of 
business/industry in each area – I was able to better target a range of 
businesses spanning the spectrum of local society for interviews. See 
Appendix B for tables detailing the results of the business mapping 
exercises in the MWT and DET, and Section 3.4 for an approximation of 
business types in the AT. 
 
Finally, ‘just being there’ – particularly living in households in the villages and 
townships, and spending all my free time (including meals) with local people 
– had a huge impact on me as a person and researcher (Caple, 2011; 
Okely, 1994), and represents experiential observational data. I tried to 
tangibly capture this data by keeping a reflexive field journal (Chambers & 
Loubere, 2016) that documented my thoughts and feelings with regard to 
conversations, encounters and observations, which did not fit neatly (or were 
too personal to be included) in the interview and conversation reports. I 
would usually write a few notes every day, and whenever I had some spare 
time or energy (usually every three to four days) I would compile these notes 
                                            
62 See Appendix C for the household class typology and tables showing the 
distribution in the three sites. 
63 While it is unfortunate that I was unable to do business mapping for the 
AT, based on the principle of ‘appropriate imprecision’, the approximate data 
I gathered is still valid and valuable. Indeed, as the old saying attributed to 
John Maynard Keynes states: “it is better to be approximately right than 
precisely wrong” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. N/A).  
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into a more formal journal entry that also linked what I was thinking and 
feeling at the time to my wider experiences and understandings of the 
fieldwork, the wider project, and what it all meant to me as a person. In this 
way, my journals provided ‘snap shots’ of my various mindstates, which 
have been very helpful in stimulating my memory during analysis. In total I 
have four fieldwork journals (one for each phase of fieldwork including the 
scoping trip) of approximately 10,000 words each (see Reference List D for 
more details).64 
 
Analysis 
Analysis of the diverse types of data outlined above was undertaken in a 
continuous iterative process both during and after fieldwork, through which 
concepts emerged that were grounded in the empirical data, were reflected 
upon and modified/adapted as new information was presented, and were 
then analysed in relation to the wider academic literature. Because I was 
working in a grounded ethnographic mode, in situ analysis coincided with the 
beginning of data collection, as I immediately started framing my 
experiences and conceptualising what they meant for the research. The 
interlinking systematic interview reports and reflexive dialoguing methods 
was another type of in situ analysis and also represented the beginning of 
the coding process, as themes began to emerge and were written down as 
textual frames of reference that would form my core understanding of the 
interviews when I revisited them after the fieldwork was over. These different 
forms of in situ analyses were consolidated through the writing up of 
preliminary analysis reports and/or progress reports for my supervisors 
approximately every two weeks while in the field. These reports outlined key 
questions, important findings and theoretically framed the data that had been 
(co)produced during fieldwork. They also played an important role in shaping 
the direction of the research, and largely followed the grounded theory 
approach to memo-writing, which aims to allow for “continuous interplay 
between analysis and data collection” (Goulding, 2002, p. 42). The 
analysis/progress reports also became valuable data for analysis in and of 
                                            
64 Robert Chambers notes that reflexive journals of this nature are vital to 
preserving ‘valid’ memories of fieldwork events, because “your memory 
tricks you… We manufacture memories and we massage them all the way 
through – particularly through repetition” (Chambers & Loubere, 2016, p. 
N/A). 
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themselves (C. Oliver, 2012), as they represented different stages of my 
understanding of the research (see Reference List D). 
 
These in situ analyses provided a solid foundation for further in-depth 
analysis of the data upon returning to the office. The vast majority of my data 
were already in a digital format, as my research assistants and I had been 
working in Microsoft Word to produce the various reports, and we had 
digitised as much ‘hard’ documentary data as possible while in the field 
using our digital cameras. After returning to Leeds, I digitally scanned all 
remaining hard data, which left me with a large (but well organised) digital 
data set that had already undergone preliminary analysis, but was in need of 
further coding (i.e. categorising or indexing) in order to draw out the key 
themes and concepts that would shape the research as a whole and 
determine which academic theories I needed to engage with (Bryman & 
Burgess, 1994). Therefore, I opted to import the entire data set into the 
NVivo software package. NVivo is a computer programme that enables 
researchers to efficiently organise different types of digital material (including 
Word documents, PDFs, images and audio-visual files), and apply ‘codes’ or 
categories to selected sections/parts of the data. These codes then allow the 
researcher to quickly see the themes that are emerging from the data and, 
because multiple codes can be applied to each section/part, it is possible to 
visualise how these themes overlap and intersect (Bazeley & Jackson, 
2013). NVivo also has a powerful search function, making it easy to run 
quires on words or phrases when working with large data sets. Because I 
used the same NVivo project file for the literature review (see above) and the 
primary data, I was able to see how the themes that emerged from my 
empirical data related to the key themes in the scholarship. Based on this in-
depth analysis of the data in NVivo, I constructed preliminary outlines for the 
overall Ph.D. dissertation and each individual chapter, identified key areas of 
the literature that I needed to explore in more depth, and highlighted parts of 
the interviews to revisit in order to clarify meaning and/or extract interesting 
verbatim quotations.  
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3.4 Introduction to the Field: The Socioeconomic 
Backgrounds of the Three Townships 
The final section of this chapter provides a detailed overview of the 
socioeconomic contexts of the three northern Jiangxi townships where the 
majority of data was collected for this Ph.D. dissertation.65 Jiangxi is located 
in China’s central region, which, along with the poorer western provinces, 
has been the target of a number of development policies and programmes 
(including the microcredit programmes discussed in this dissertation) aimed 
at replicating the kind of ‘modernisation’ that has occurred in the more 
prosperous eastern coastal region (Barabantseva, 2009). Jiangxi has 
historically represented a varied socioeconomic landscape. With its long 
growing season and extensive network of canals linking the province with 
important urban centres, Jiangxi has been one of the traditional ‘rice bowls’ 
of China. At the same time, the province has also been home to the 
historically important porcelain industry, mining, and – as one of the first 
areas to be controlled by the CCP – ‘Red Jiangxi’ played an important role in 
revolutionary history, with some of Mao Zedong’s early socioeconomic 
research taking place in the province (Mao, 1990; R. R. Thompson, 2009). 
This means that Jiangxi’s historical and contemporary ‘development 
situation’ is complex and cannot be fully explained or understood by its 
simple categorisation as an ‘underdeveloped central province’. 
 
                                            
65  As stated above, some data collection took place at the provincial, 
prefectural and county levels – i.e. interviews with officials and employees in 
financial institutions, and collection of documentary data. However, the vast 
majority of the fieldwork took place in the three townships/villages outlined in 
this section. 
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Figure 3.4: Map of Jiangxi Province  
 
Source: (R. R. Thompson, 2009) 
 
Therefore, in an attempt to understand different aspects of Jiangxi’s complex 
and differentiated socioeconomic landscape, I specifically selected three 
sites that represent a variety of physical geographies, types of 
socioeconomic development, institutional structures and sets of occupational 
opportunities (see Section 3.2 for more on location sampling). In other 
words, I selected sites that represent three distinct developmental and 
livelihood contexts – providing the means to analyse how microcredit is 
perceived by a variety of actors, and what it means for development in 
different socioeconomic situations.66 As stated above, the names of the 
                                            
66 Interestingly, these townships/villages fit three out of the four categories in 
Jonathan Unger’s typology of rural China – i.e. local government has taken 
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three townships have been anonymised through the use of pseudonyms in 
order to protect my respondents. Additionally, I have opted not to mention 
the names of counties or specific governmental departments at the 
prefectural and provincial levels in order to avoid the possibility of specific 
individuals being identified. Table 3.1 below summarises the key features of 
each site. 
 
Table 3.1: The Key Features of the Three Townships 
 Agricultural 
Township (AT) 
Migrant Work 
Township (MWT) 
Diverse Economy 
Township (DET) 
Distance to urban area 
(car) 
1.5 – 2 hours 
(bad roads) 
40 minutes (good 
roads) 
40 minutes (good 
roads) 
Average income per 
year (official estimates) 
RMB 6,000 
 
RMB 7,000 
 
RMB 5,000 
*This estimate is 
contradicted by 
observational data. 
Socioeconomic 
situation based on 
observational data 
Poorest of the 
three townships 
Poorer than the 
DET but richer than 
the AT 
Richest of the three 
townships 
Designated poverty-
stricken villages 
No Yes - 1 (provincial) Yes - 1 (provincial) 
                                                                                                                           
the lead (the MWT); private industry dominates (the DET); and the hinterland 
(the AT) (Unger, 2002b). 
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Main economic 
activities 
Rice farming 
Vegetable 
farming 
Contracting 
farmland 
Migrant work 
(30%) 
Migrant work (40%-
70%) 
Local construction 
Industrial park 
Local business 
Textile factories 
Local construction 
Farming 
Tourism 
Migrant work (40%) 
Financial institutions RCC RCC 
ABC ATM 
RCC 
PSBC 
ABC 
 
The agricultural township (AT) 
The AT has a population of over 30,000 people, administers just under 30 
villages, and is located approximately 60 kilometres outside of a major urban 
area in northern Jiangxi Province. However, despite the close proximity to 
the city, there are no major transportation links and the roads that do exist 
are small and largely in disrepair, making transportation difficult, especially 
during adverse weather conditions or the harvest season when farmers dry 
their rice on the sides of the roads. For this reason it takes between an hour 
and a half to two hours to travel the distance by car, and significantly more 
than two hours by bus. The distance and travel times from the township to 
the county seat are similar. Local officials estimate that the average yearly 
income in the township is around RMB 6,000, which would mean it is the 
second richest of the three townships after the MWT. However, based on 
observational data, both the township government and residents have 
significantly fewer resources than in the other two townships (i.e. it is the 
poorest of the three townships). Nevertheless, despite this fact, the AT is not 
home to any designated ‘poverty-stricken villages’.67 
 
                                            
67 AT Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 01; Interview 05. 
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Figure 3.5: View of the River in the AT 
 
 
The AT is located on a flood plain next to a large river and surrounded by flat 
agricultural land that is primarily used for rice farming. Because the township 
is subjected to regular flooding, agriculture (rather than industry) has 
remained the primary livelihood activity, and almost all the township’s 
agricultural land is cultivated. The fieldwork period coincided with one of the 
harvest seasons,68 and farmers were using both manual and mechanical 
methods to harvest their crops. In addition to rice farming, some of the land 
has been converted into vegetable greenhouses, principally because 
vegetables sell at a higher price than rice. With the notable exceptions of two 
TVEs – a brickmaking factory and a rice processing plant – there are few 
industries in the township, and there are not any large-scale businesses or 
much diversity in the types of commercial enterprises operating in the 
township centre, with most being related to agriculture, construction or daily 
necessities (i.e. small shops and restaurants).69 After agriculture, the second 
most popular livelihood activity is migrant work, with approximately 30 per 
                                            
68 Most rice farmers in Jiangxi engage in multiple cropping, i.e. two to three 
crops per year. 
69 AT Contextual Observation Report. As noted above, I was not able to 
systematically map out the businesses in the AT in the same way as the 
other two townships (see Appendix B). Nevertheless, in general AT 
businesses were smaller and less diverse than the other sites. 
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cent of the population currently working outside of the township, which is 
significantly less than the MWT or the DET. 
 
Figure 3.6: Mechanised Farming in the AT 
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Figure 3.7: Rice Collection in the AT 
 
 
The AT is physically smaller than the MWT and the DET, with the centre 
comprising of a main commercial street and two smaller intersecting streets. 
For the most part, the infrastructure and buildings in the township are old 
and worn down, especially in comparison with the other two townships. Most 
of the township housing was built in the 1980s or 1990s, and can be 
considered ‘class 3’ based on the House Classification Criteria (see 
 120 
Appendix C). The township is home to a primary school and a middle school, 
and a small health centre. The township government is housed in a small, 
old and rundown building, with a number of government offices also being 
located in different buildings around the township. The township RCC, on the 
other hand, is the newest building in the AT, and is large with a spacious 
courtyard. The RCC is the only financial institution in the AT, and there is 
only one branch in the entire township. Remittance services are also 
available to residents through China Post, but there is no branch of the 
PSBC located in the township.70 
 
Figure 3.8: Houses in an AT Village 
 
 
The village where I conducted most of my household interviews in the AT is 
located 10 kilometres away from the township centre on the bank of the 
river. There is no public transportation to the village, meaning that it takes 20 
minutes to travel from the village to the township by car or motorcycle, and 
over two hours to walk. The village itself has a population of just under 1,700 
people, or slightly more than 300 households, and is divided into seven 
                                            
70 AT Contextual Observation Report. 
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natural villages. Like in the rest of the township, the main livelihood activity is 
agriculture, and most households farm relatively large plots of land – of at 
least 10 mu (mu ) – and raise livestock, such as chickens, ducks, and 
water buffalo, along with some aquaculture. Additionally, some households 
rent land in neighbouring townships in order to scale-up their agricultural 
production, 71  and some local residents have started building vegetable 
greenhouses. There are five small shops selling daily necessities in the 
village (and one doubling as a hair dresser), but no other type of business or 
industry, and the shop owners all engage in farming as well. During 
fieldwork, the village committee was just finishing construction on a brand 
new three-story building to house the village government, which is actually 
larger than the township government building. Funding for this building has 
probably been made possible because the village was designated a national 
‘model experience’ for the XNCJS and has won awards for agricultural 
development.72 The village also has an elderly community centre, a small 
health centre and a primary school; however, these are all housed in small 
old buildings. The household mapping exercise also revealed that the vast 
majority of households live in class 3 (30 per cent) and class 4 (50 per cent) 
houses, and that there are no class 1 houses (see Appendix C). Finally, it is 
important to note that in the 1980s and 1990s there used to be a branch of 
the RCC in the village, which was closed in the late 1990s due to the rural 
financial crisis (see Chapter 2).73 
 
                                            
71 Since the ratification of the Land Rights and Transfer Agreement in 2008, 
it has been possible to rent agricultural land (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013; 
Veeck & Shui, 2011), and this practice is common in the township, with 
some households renting over 100 mu of outside land (Conversation 01; 
Interview 05). 
72 We were told that this was paid for by the county and that other villages do 
not have buildings like this. Moreover, during our interviews the village 
committee members presented us with packs of one of the most expensive 
cigarette brands in Jiangxi costing RMB 100 per pack (Interview 04). 
73  AT Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 01; Interview 03; 
Interview 04; Interview 07. 
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Figure 3.9: Village Committee Building with Rice Drying out Front in the AT 
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The migrant work township (MTW) 
The MWT is located approximately 40 kilometres outside of a major urban 
area in northern Jiangxi, has a population of about 15,000 people, and 
administers five relatively large villages. The township is connected to the 
city by a new high-speed road, meaning that it only takes 40 minutes to 
travel from the township to the city centre by car and about one hour by bus 
(depending on the traffic). The county seat is actually further away than the 
city, and therefore takes slightly longer to reach. Officials estimated that the 
yearly per capita income in the township is RMB 7,000, which would make it 
the richest of the three townships. However, the observational data revealed 
that the MWT government has significantly fewer resources than the DET 
government, and that most people in the DET have more money than people 
in the MWT, but that the richest residents in the MWT are wealthier than 
their counterparts in the DET (i.e. the MWT is more unequal). Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that the MWT is more prosperous than the AT (based on 
both official and observational data), the township has one provincially 
designated ‘poverty-stricken village’, while the AT has none.74 
 
Figure 3.10: The Main Road in the MWT 
 
 
                                            
74 MWT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 12; Interview 13; Interview 
14; Interview 15; Interview 16. 
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The MWT is bordered on one side by hills, forests and lakes, but the rest of 
the township is flat and, for the most part, suitable for farming. 300 mu of the 
township’s agricultural land is controlled by a commercial farm that cultivates 
crops and raises livestock, and which is 90 per cent owned by an SOE and 
10 per cent owned by private investors. This land has been rented from 
township residents on rolling five-year contracts. 75  Many of the poorest 
households rely on agriculture as their primary livelihood activity, often 
selling their produce in the township market. However, most household do 
not engage in agriculture as a livelihood strategy, 76  so much of the 
agricultural land has been abandoned (and now considered ‘dead land’), is 
under-utilised, or has been contracted to farmers coming from other 
townships (e.g. the AT).77 The main livelihood activity in the MWT is, as the 
pseudonym suggests, migrant work, with between 40 to 70 per cent of the 
population working outside of the township depending on the time of year. 
During fieldwork, the small proportion of working age males in the township 
was noticeable, and the demographic breakdown was consistent with the 
widely observed phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ elderly, women and 
children (Lin, Yin, & Loubere, 2014; H. Wu & Ye, 2014).78 This migrant work 
trend is responsible for the relative prosperity of many households in the 
township, as they benefit from remittances sent from their family members. 
However, it is also partially responsible for widening inequality, as 
households that do not have any members engaging in migrant work are 
usually poorer.79 The money flowing into the township from migrant work has 
also created a more dynamic commercial environment in the MWT, with 113 
small, medium and large businesses in operation in the township centre. 
Most of these businesses are related to the construction of new houses (see 
Appendix B), which is usually one of the first priorities for households when 
they can accumulate enough wealth through remittances or other means. 
                                            
75 Interview 49. 
76 Many of the elderly continue to farm very small plots of land for personal 
consumption and/or out of habit (MWT Contextual Observation Report; 
Conversation 08; Conversation 10). 
77 Conversation 12; Interview 37. 
78 One respondent told me: “You can see that most of the people in the 
village are elderly or children, the young adults have all gone to work in the 
cities” (Interview 30). 
79 Interview 09; Interview 17. 
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The largest business in the township is a construction company, which deals 
with both residential construction and infrastructure. This company had 
recently relocated from the city to the township to take advantage of 
preferential tax rates and lower costs. The township is also home to a new 
industrial park with room for 24 companies (at the time of fieldwork only nine 
companies had taken up residence in the park), which provides work for 
some locals and also attracts a limited number of migrant workers to the 
township, and there is also a profitable natural gas station located in one of 
the villages, which used to be fully state-owned, but has now been 
effectively privatised. Local people can also find seasonal work in the SOE 
commercial farm mentioned above.80 
 
Figure 3.11: View of the SOE Commercial Farm in the MWT 
 
 
Geographically, the MWT is significantly larger than the AT, but smaller than 
the DET. The township centre consists of three main commercial streets and 
a few smaller connecting streets. About 70 per cent of the buildings in the 
                                            
80  MWT Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 08; Interview 14; 
Interview 32; Interview 45. 
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township centre are newly built (within the past five years), and are four-
stories tall with room for a business on the ground floor and living spaces on 
the higher levels – i.e. class 2 buildings. The remaining 30 per cent are class 
3 buildings, which were constructed in the 1980s or 1990s, and are smaller, 
but still have space for both living and commercial activity. Approximately 20 
per cent of the commercial real estate is vacant. The MWT has a primary 
school, a middle school and a small health centre. The township government 
is located in a large and spacious building (with a big courtyard), which was 
built in the 1990s. The RCC on the other hand, is in a smaller new building 
next to the government. As in the AT, the RCC is the only financial institution 
in the township, and there is only one branch, which is located in the 
township centre. There used to be a branch of the ABC in the township but 
this was closed in the 1990s. However, there is now a cash machine for the 
ABC in the industrial park (approximately 15 minutes walking from the 
township centre), and residents can use the China Post for remittance 
services, but there is no branch of the PSBC.81 
 
The village I selected to study in the MWT covers a large area, and has a 
population of 3,800 (about 1,000 households) in 10 geographically dispersed 
natural villages, some of which are located in remote hilly areas and others 
next to the township centre. Because the village administrative area partially 
overlaps with the township centre, the village committee is actually located 
on the main commercial street of the township in a class 3 building. Due to 
the fact that the village is so large, I opted to focus my mapping exercises 
and interviews on two neighbouring natural villages (where I lived during 
fieldwork), located approximately two and a half kilometres from the 
township centre (i.e. a 30 minute walk). As would be expected, most people 
in the natural villages relied on migrant work as the main source of income 
for their households, which has allowed over 50 per cent of the population to 
build class 3 houses. However, 11 per cent of the population live in class 5 
houses, compared to five per cent in the AT and zero per cent in the DET. 
Moreover, there are also more class 1 houses in the MWT natural villages, 
indicating a higher level of inequality than in the other two townships and 
villages (see Appendix C). The poorer residents usually still farm, or they 
work as day labourers for construction companies or on the SOE 
commercial farm, which boarders the natural villages. Commercial activity in 
                                            
81 MWT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 38. 
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the natural villages is very limited, with only one small shop, a mechanic and 
two pig farms in operation. There is no school, so children must travel to the 
township to attend class, and there are no leisure or health facilities. Unlike 
the AT, there has never been a branch of the RCC in the natural villages or 
in the village that they are administered by, but there is more informal 
finance than in the AT.82 
 
Figure 3.12: Migrant Farmers on Rented Land in the MWT 
 
 
                                            
82 MWT Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 18; Interview 17. 
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Figure 3.13: View of a Natural Village in the MWT 
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The diverse economy township (DET) 
The DET is located on a well-maintained road connecting it to an urban 
centre and the urbanised county seat, which are both approximately 40 
kilometres away. It takes slightly over half an hour to travel to the city or the 
county by car, and about one hour in either direction by bus, with frequent 
departures from the township bus station. The township covers the largest 
area of the three, has the largest population with over 32,000 residents – 
including 1,000 migrant workers who have come to work in local factories 
and tea plantations – and administers 17 villages. I decided to conduct most 
of my household interviews in the DET’s largest village, which also overlaps 
with the township centre (administratively and geographically), making it 
practically difficult to draw a distinction between the two, as most of the 
people and businesses identified themselves as belonging to both the 
township centre and the village.83 Officially, the village has a per capita 
income of only RMB 5,000 per year, and has been designated a ‘poverty-
stricken village’ by the province. However, in reality the DET village is (by 
far) the richest of the three sites, based on observation and conversations 
with local officials.84 
 
                                            
83 This is quite different from the villages/natural villages in the other two 
townships, which are geographically distant and therefore have an identity 
that is separate from (but still linked to) the township. For this reason, my 
household mapping exercise covered the township centre (which is 
technically also the village), so I when I refer to the DET in the text I actually 
am referring to both the township and the village. 
84 DET Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 20; Conversation 21. 
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Figure 3.14: View of the DET 
 
 
Moreover, the township represents a significantly more diversified range of 
livelihood strategies and activities. In the 1990s, many of the township 
residents went to work in manufacturing centres in Zhejiang Province, and 
have since returned to set up small component ‘microfactories’ in the 
township that supply the larger factories in Zhejiang and provide work for 
locals and some migrants.85 The centre of the township is home to over 330 
businesses (including TVEs) of different sizes and scales (see Appendix B), 
and unlike the other two townships this commercial activity is diverse, rather 
than being dominated by construction (as in the MWT) or agriculture (as in 
the AT). The DET is also located in a county that is well known for tourism, 
and is therefore surrounded by scenic hills. While the township itself is not a 
tourist hub, many residents engage in tourism-related work/business in 
various parts of the county. Additionally, there is large-scale tea farming in 
the surrounding hills, and many people still cultivate rice and vegetables 
either as their primary or secondary livelihood strategy, so there is very little 
unused agricultural land. Finally, only 10 per cent of the village population is 
currently engaged in migrant work, while 40 per cent of the total DET 
population migrates to cities to earn a living, meaning that remittances still 
                                            
85 The DET is emblematic of the wider phenomenon of ‘returning migrant 
workers’ (fanxiang nongmingong # ), who often become local 
entrepreneurs while maintaining economic linkages with the areas and 
industries where they worked as migrants (Démurger & Xu, 2011). 
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represent an important source of income in the township, but not in the 
township centre/village itself.86 
 
Figure 3.15: Small Tea Processing Plant in the DET 
 
 
The DET centre is much larger than the AT or the MWT, and consists of a 
number of distinct residential neighbourhoods and commercial streets. The 
                                            
86 DET Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 20; Conversation 29; 
Conversation 31; Conversation 34; Interview 53. 
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township is home to a medium-sized hospital, a number of health clinics, 
large primary and middle schools, and a range of other facilities not available 
in the other two townships (e.g. a bus station). The DET government is 
housed in a modern building (less than five years old) that is at least twice 
as large as the MWT government and easily three times the size of the AT 
government. Most of the buildings in the township/village are modern and 
large. The commercial streets are primarily lined by class 2 and class 3 
buildings (three to four-stories high) with businesses on the first floor and 
residences on the higher floors, and almost all the commercial real estate is 
in use. There are also distinct residential neighbourhoods composed of 
predominantly class 2 (42 per cent) and class 3 (47 per cent) houses, and 
no class 5 houses, indicating a higher overall level of wealth and more even 
distribution of wealth than the other two townships (see Appendix C). The 
township is also home to a more diverse range of financial providers and 
services. In addition to the RCC, there are branches of the ABC and the 
PSBC (all located in modern buildings), and formal credit is much more 
widely available due to the fact that the township is in a county that was one 
of the model/pilot sites for the RCCMP (see Chapter 4). Moreover, because 
there is generally more capital available in the township due to a greater 
amount of commercial activity, informal finance is more widespread and 
semi-institutionalised.87 
 
                                            
87 DET Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 20. 
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Figure 3.16: Township Government Building in the DET 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide a comprehensive ‘audit trail’ summarising 
the research process that went into producing and analysing the data that 
form the basis of this Ph.D. dissertation. The first Section (3.1) detailed the 
conceptual and theoretical justification for adopting an actor-oriented 
perspective analytically focused on interfaces, livelihoods and financial 
landscapes, in order to answer the dissertation’s overarching research 
question and secondary research objectives. It is argued that this 
perspective allows for research to move away from a ‘Neo-Newtonian’ 
approach based on positivistic principles, and constrained by a focus on 
structures/institutions and top-down linear causality, towards an approach 
adhering to an ‘Adaptive Pluralist’ paradigm, and therefore more suited to 
analysing the complex realities emerging from the negotiations between 
different actors as they attempt to make sense of microcredit programmes 
and integrate them into local development and livelihood strategies. Section 
3.2 and Section 3.3 outline the process of fieldwork, detail the precise 
methods utilised to gather and analyse data, and describe the specific types 
of data collected. Both sections also reflect on how the different methods I 
utilised to gain access to the field and collect data have shaped the 
knowledge that has been created, and what this means for the findings of 
this research project more generally. Section 3.4 represents a detailed 
 134 
overview of the three townships/villages where most of the fieldwork took 
place, in order to provide the necessary background understanding of the 
different socioeconomic contexts examined in this Ph.D. dissertation. We 
now turn to Chapter 4, which outlines the formulation of the policy 
development of the three microcredit programmes at the central and 
provincial levels, and compares this with the realities of how these 
programmes have been implemented in the three townships. 
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Chapter 4 
The Policy and Practice of Government Microcredit in 
Jiangxi Province 
 
The mountains are high and the emperor is far away (shan gao huangdi 
yuan($). 
- Old Chinese saying 
 
Since the initiation of the first ‘modern’ microcredit projects in the 1980s, the 
Chinese microcredit sector has expanded and diversified, with the number of 
NGO/NPO programmes and commercialised MFIs increasing at a seemingly 
exponential rate, particularly over the last decade (see Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless, despite the rapid expansion of microcredit services provided 
by NGOs/NPOs and commercial MFIs, the three largest programmes run 
and subsidised by the government (the PAMP, RCCMP and EMP) are still, 
by far, the largest source of microcredit in rural China in both size (i.e. total 
amount of loans) and scale (i.e. outreach). These programmes, while being 
fundamentally different to NGO/NPO or commercial MFIs in a number of key 
aspects,88 have, to a certain extent, exhibited ideological characteristics of 
both the ‘poverty lending approach’ utilised by NGOs/NPOs, and the 
‘financial systems approach’ adopted by commercial providers (see Chapter 
1). For instance, all three of the programmes have provided loans at 
subsidised rates to different target groups that have been perceived to be 
‘financially excluded’. The programmes also all aim to jumpstart rural 
development and reduce socioeconomic inequalities by facilitating 
grassroots entrepreneurship, in much the same way that the Grameen Bank 
and other early proponents of the ‘poverty lending approach’ envisioned 
turning on “economic engines among the rejected population of society” 
(Yunus & Weber, 2007, p. 56). At the same time, however, government 
microcredit in China has also been influenced by the global microfinance 
                                            
88  Most notably, these government programmes are not institutions 
themselves like MFIs. Rather, they are intermediaries that facilitate 
microcredit transactions between rural borrowers and financial institutions 
(mostly state-controlled), and mobilise funds to pay interest. 
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movement’s shift towards the ‘financial systems approach’, as well as by the 
increased emphasis on ‘financial sustainability’ and ‘profitability’ in China’s 
financial sector more generally (Loubere & Zhang, 2015), which has 
prompted both the local implementers and the financial institutions providing 
the loans for the PAMP, RCCMP and EMP to think of their involvement in 
the programmes in more commercial terms.  
 
Ideologically these microcredit programmes have also been firmly situated 
within the government’s overarching rural development strategies and 
frameworks, including longstanding development narratives put forward by 
China’s top leaders. For instance, policies for the programmes have been 
framed as “following the guidance of ‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’ (Deng Xiaoping 
lilun &) and the ‘Three Represents’ (sange daibiao )” 
(JXPMoHRSS & JXPRCCU, 2009; State Council, 2003), while also being 
linked to efforts to create a ‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui !) 
and a ‘Well-off Society’ (xiaokang shehui ) (JXPPAO, JXPMoF, & 
JXPABC, 2006; PBC, 2001; State Council, 2002, 2003). Since the early 
2000s, the extension of ‘modern’ financial services in general (and 
microcredit programmes in particular) to rural areas has been identified as a 
key method of dealing with the sannong wenti, and the RCCMP has been 
especially singled out as an effective method of supporting rural people 
engaged in agriculture (MoF, 2010; PBC, 2001; State Council, 2003, 2014; 
Tang, 2006). More recently, the three programmes have also been 
integrated into newly emerging and overlapping rural development 
strategies, such as the XNCJS, which seeks to ‘modernise’ the countryside 
while maintaining its rural nature (State Council, 2006), and the CXYTH, 
which aims to “break down the systemic urban-rural dichotomy” (Weiguang 
Wang, 2013), with the RCCMP seen as a method of improving rural 
production (particularly through agricultural modernisation), the PAMP as a 
way of increasing rural consumption, and the EMP as a means of improving 
and ‘modernising’ the rural employment situation (JXPPAO et al., 2006; 
State Council, 2006, 2014).  
 
Therefore, similar to most other top-down rural development interventions in 
China, these government microcredit programmes are embedded within a 
number of overlapping (and sometimes conflicting or contradictory) 
development ideologies, discourses and narratives both within China and 
globally. This situation, unsurprisingly, has resulted in a complex and 
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dynamic environment that allows for a variety of interpretations of how policy 
should be implemented based on different developmental and ideological 
priorities, meaning that, in reality, there is often significant policy 
transformation from the centre to the local, and variation in the actual 
operation of the programmes across localities. This chapter aims to explore 
both the formulation of microcredit policy in China, as well as the reality of 
policy implementation in rural areas in order to set the stage for analysis of 
the reasons for the heterogeneous implementation of the programmes, and 
the nexus between microcredit provision, local development and livelihoods 
in subsequent chapters.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section (4.1) 
outlines how the policies for the three programmes have been formulated at 
the central and provincial levels, before turning to examine key areas that 
have been left open to local discretion. Section 4.2 explores the ways in 
which these microcredit programmes have manifested themselves in the 
three townships, and the perceptions of local implementers and borrowers 
towards the programmes. The final section (4.3) concludes and leads into 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 The Formulation of Microcredit Policy 
The PAMP, RCCMP and EMP were initiated at different times by different 
government entities and are, therefore, operationally different in a number of 
ways. This section reviews the policies for each of the programmes at the 
central and provincial levels in order to provide a detailed overview of their 
official historical development, objectives and ideological underpinnings – as 
well as the technical aspects related to programme administration, loan 
provision, interest payment, the application processes, etc. Table 4.1 below 
summarises the information. The section concludes by outlining key areas 
where the programmes are left open to local discretion.
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The poverty alleviation microcredit programme (PAMP) 
The PAMP was initiated in 1986 and was first piloted/modelled89 in a handful 
of counties around the country before being expanded nationwide as part of 
the central government’s general poverty alleviation programme. Over the 
approximately 30 years since its inception, administration of the programme 
has shifted between the ADBC, the ABC and PAOs at various levels, and it 
has also been co-opted by, and reformulated within, subsequent rural 
development programmes (L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 2001; Park & Wang, 
2010; Tsai, 2004). For instance, in the 1990s the PAMP became the largest 
component of the 8-7 Programme (Bislev, 2010), and since the early 2000s 
it has fallen under the umbrella of the Poor Village Investment Programme, 
which provides targeted funds for community-based activities in ‘poverty-
stricken’ villages, township and counties that are designated at the national, 
provincial and prefectural levels (Park & Ren, 2001; Park & Wang, 2010).90 
In recent years, the PAMP has been influenced by the general ideological 
shift towards more neoliberal approaches to rural development, and now 
emphasises the need to “follow the rules of the market in order to implement 
poverty alleviation and development” (JXPPAO et al., 2006). 
 
Unlike the other two programmes, which are supposed to be provided in all 
rural areas, because the PAMP is now part of the Poor Village Investment 
Programme, it is only offered in the designated poverty-stricken areas. There 
are two types of loans available through the PAMP. First, there are small 
loans for impoverished households. In order to be eligible for the loans, 
households need to have a special type of identification to prove that they 
are truly impoverished, which is usually provided by the township 
                                            
89  The modelling/piloting of policies and programmes, particularly rural 
development interventions, has been an integral part of China’s 
development planning (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013; Heilmann, 2008). 
90 Nationally designated poverty-stricken villages receive the most support 
followed by those designated at the provincial and prefectural levels. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, villages actively lobby to be designated as 
‘poverty-stricken’ making the final selection “very much a political question” 
(Bislev, 2010, p. 99; Park, Wang, & Wu, 2002). In my experience, villages 
expend a significant amount of time and resources attempting to 
successfully apply, and it is usually the richest villages that end up getting 
selected (see section 4.2).  
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government. Second, PAMP funds can also be used to provide larger loans 
to companies, cooperatives or government projects that ‘reduce poverty’ in 
some way – although the policies do not specify what counts as ‘poverty 
reduction’ in this context. The interest rate for the household loan is set at 5 
per cent, and the rate for companies, cooperatives and projects is 3 per 
cent. The loans themselves are provided by participating financial institutions 
at the township or county levels (usually RCCs or the ABC) that charge their 
normal interest rate of between 0.9 to 2.3 times the base rate set by the 
PBC. The difference between the subsidised rate and the rate charged by 
the financial institutions is jointly paid by the MoF at the central (80 per cent) 
and provincial (20 per cent) levels (JXPPAO et al., 2006; PAO, 2006). 
 
Due to the fact that the Poor Village Investment Programme is supposed to 
be community-based, with the needs of each poverty-stricken village being 
determined through a participatory approach (Park & Wang, 2010), technical 
aspects related to the application procedure and ultimate provision are left 
relatively open. For instance, there is no quota for the number of loans that 
should be provided, and there is no maximum or minimum amount for each 
loan. Moreover, local governments and PAOs have the power to determine 
whether they want to target households, companies, cooperatives or 
projects. 91  Depending on the locality, different administrative units at 
different levels have more power and interest in the administration of the 
PAMP.92  However, village committees are ultimately responsible for the 
organisation of the loans. Finally, local governments, PAOs and the financial 
institutions actually providing the loans have discretion with regard to how 
the loans are secured, and can rely on guarantors (danbaoren ), 
credit ratings, collateral, or can decide not to require any form of security 
(JXPPAO et al., 2006; PAO, 2006). 
                                            
91 Other studies have found that local governments overwhelmingly select to 
use the PAMP to fund local TVEs and/or government projects (e.g. 
infrastructure projects), which is framed as elite or government ‘capture’ of 
resources designated for poor households (L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 
2001). However, it is important to point out that according to the policy it is 
perfectly legal for loans to go to TVEs or local government projects, and it is 
unsurprising that localities choose to target these borrowers considering the 
lower interest rate for these types of loans and the fact that one large loan is 
much easier to administer than many smaller loans.  
92 Interview 16. 
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The rural credit cooperative microcredit programme (RCCMP) 
The RCCs have a long history of providing small loans to rural individuals 
and households. For instance, in the 1970s they sometimes offered loans to 
cover illness-related expenses, and in the 1980s and early 1990s they 
provided some loans for agricultural inputs (e.g. seeds, feed and fertiliser).93 
However, before the RCC reforms of the late 1990s household loans were, 
for the most part, very limited and RCCs primarily lent to TVEs and local 
governments (L. Ong, 2006).94 The RCCMP was initiated by the PBC in 
1999 as part of the rural financial sector reforms in an attempt to redirect 
lending to rural households. It was first piloted in a number of counties 
across the country and then expanded nationwide in the early 2000s (L. 
Ong, 2009a; Park, Ren, & Wang, 2003). Unlike the other two programmes, 
the RCCMP only provides loans for households, and not for companies, 
cooperatives or projects. While there is no specific quota for loan numbers or 
loan amounts, every RCC in the country is directed to use at least 60 per 
cent of their total savings for the RCCMP, and the policy states that RCCs 
that do not follow these guidelines will be “dealt with severely” (PBC, 2001). 
Therefore, the RCCMP is the largest microcredit programme in China, and, 
based on the fact that there are over 30,000 RCC branches across the 
country, it could be claimed that it is the largest microcredit programme in 
the world. 
 
The RCCMP has been heavily influenced by the global microfinance 
movement, and was initiated with the goal of providing credit to ‘financially 
excluded’ households. For this reason, the programme doesn’t require 
borrowers to have any collateral or a guarantor. Instead, the RCCMP 
operates using a credit rating system, with each household’s credit 
worthiness being determined by the village committee. 95  Therefore, 
households with a relatively low socioeconomic status or with a history of 
defaulting on loans will often be given a bad credit score, meaning that they 
                                            
93 Interview 01; Interview 35. 
94 Interview 01; Interview 05. Also see Chapter 2. 
95  Other research has documented that, in some cases, the township 
government allocates credit ratings to entire villages largely based on their 
socioeconomic conditions (L. Ong, 2011). 
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are not able to borrow individually. In these cases, households can form 
joint-liability groups to borrow from the RCCMP, i.e. emulating the ‘poverty 
lending approach’ pioneered by the Grameen Bank (see Chapter 1) (PBC, 
2001). Because the RCCMP is envisioned as a way to make credit easily 
accessible, the application process is supposed to be simple and 
straightforward. Prospective borrowers with a good enough credit rating are 
issued a loan card that they can use to borrow from the RCC at any time and 
receive the money immediately. The RCCMP utilises the progressive lending 
technique, so as soon as a loan is successfully repaid within the loan term, 
borrowers are eligible to borrow again at a higher limit. Upper and lower 
limits for loans are determined by local RCCs, but are usually between RMB 
10,000 and RMB 100,000. Failure to repay a loan within the specified time 
limit results in a bad credit score and ineligibility for future loans (X. Du, 
2008a; He et al., 2009; PBC, 2001).96 
 
The RCCMP is also different from the other two programmes in the way that 
it is subsidised. While the subsidies for the PAMP and the EMP are paid 
directly by the MoF at the central and provincial levels, township RCCs are 
required to provide the RCCMP without any fiscal support from higher levels. 
The interest rate for the RCCMP is set at 1.2 times the PBC base rate (i.e. 
6.72 per cent as of July 2015), and is, therefore, significantly lower than the 
rate that RCCs are normally allowed to charge for loans (i.e. up to 2.3 times 
the base rate or 12.88 per cent). The fact that township RCCs are effectively 
required to subsidise the RCCMP, along with the fact that they cannot 
require security on the loans, puts significant financial pressure on the local 
institutions, which is magnified by the recent emphasis on RCCs achieving 
‘financial sustainability’ (Loubere & Zhang, 2015). 97  That being said, 
township RCCs that do run into financial difficulties providing the RCCMP 
can apply for support from the county RCC union, which can subsequently 
apply for support from the provincial union. However, this is discouraged, 
with the mantra being “the centre supports but the local is responsible” for 
the RCCMP and other RCC reforms (PBC, 2001; State Council, 2003). 
 
                                            
96 Interview 55. 
97 Interview 01. Also see Chapter 2. 
 143 
The employment microcredit programme (EMP) 
The most recent government microcredit programme is the EMP, which was 
initiated in 2002 by the PBC, the MoF, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC, which has since been incorporated into the Ministry of 
Commerce [MoFCOM]), and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(MoLSS, which has since been transformed into the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security [MoHRSS]).98 As stated in Chapter 2, the 
EMP was formulated as the main pillar of the government’s re-employment 
campaign, which was devised as a response to the massive layoffs resulting 
from the restructuring and privatisation of SOEs in urban areas. Initially, 
therefore, the EMP was only provided in urban areas to people in 
possession of official documentation proving their laid-off worker status, and 
the goal was to provide loans to those who could ‘help themselves’ through 
entrepreneurial activity (PBC, MoF, SETC, & MoLSS, 2002),99 representing 
a significant shift in responsibility for social welfare from the ‘work unit’ 
(danwei ) to individuals and households (see Chapter 7 for more on 
neoliberalism and shifting responsibilities). 
 
Jiangxi Province was selected as the first pilot site for the EMP, mainly due 
to the fact that over one million workers were laid-off from SOEs in the 
province between 1998 and 2002. 100  The EMP was then scaled up 
nationally, and in 2006 the programme was extended to rural areas under 
the banner of the XNCJS, which aims to increase rural employment, and 
later in conjunction with the CXYTH, which aims to modernise agriculture 
and standardise financial service provision across urban and rural areas. At 
the same time, the target group for receiving the loans was expanded to 
include returning migrant workers, farmers, and agricultural cooperatives 
(JXPMoHRSS, 2012; JXPMoHRSS & JXPRCCU, 2009; JXPPG, 2009; State 
Council, 2006, 2014). At the national and provincial levels the programme 
has been deemed a success and is, for instance, credited with being directly 
responsible for 10 per cent of all new employment in Jiangxi Province. For 
                                            
98  The EMP is jointly administered, but the MoHRSS has the most 
responsibility and makes a majority of the decisions (Interview 02; Interview 
06; Interview 07; Interview 11). 
99 Interview 11. 
100 Interview 11. 
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this reason Jiangxi has continued to expand the EMP in terms of total 
funding, target area and target borrowers, and the province now accounts for 
one-fifth of all EMP loans nationwide and is considered to be a ‘national 
model’ (JXPMoHRSS, 2009; JXPMoHRSS & JXPRCCU, 2009).101 
 
In Jiangxi, the programme is subsidised by the central MoF, which pays 100 
per cent of the interest directly to the financial institutions providing the loans 
(meaning that borrowers pay no interest) at a rate of three percentage points 
higher than the prevailing interest rate set by the PBC.102 While this is lower 
than interest rates state-owned financial institutions are usually allowed to 
charge (see above), at least the interest payment is guaranteed by the 
central MoF (X. Du, 2008b; JXPMoHRSS, 2012; JXPMoHRSS & JXPRCCU, 
2009; JXPPG, 2009; MoF, 2008; State Council, 2008). Currently, EMP loans 
can be provided to individuals for a maximum of RMB 100,000 and to 
businesses, cooperatives or government projects that ‘promote 
employment’103 for a maximum of RMB 4,000,000; however, businesses can 
only get 50 per cent of the interest subsidised.104 The maximum loan term is 
two years, but this is decided at the local level (county or township) and 
normally only one year is given.105 Localities can also determine how to 
secure the loans, the most common method being through a guarantor with 
connections to the local government or an SOE/TVE. That being said, the 
local MoHRSS is also allowed to accept credit ratings, mortgages, joint-
liability loan groups, proof of assets, or nothing at all (JXPMoHRSS, 2012; 
JXPMoHRSS & JXPRCCU, 2009).  
 
                                            
101 Interview 02; Interview 06; Interview 07; Interview 11. 
102  In the more prosperous eastern coastal region, the provincial or 
prefectural MoF is required to pay the subsidy (MoF, 2008). 
103 Similar to the concept of ‘poverty reduction’ in the PAMP, it is not clear 
what constitutes ‘promoting employment’ in this case. 
104 In 2002 when the EMP began, the maximum loan amount was RMB 
20,000. From the beginning policies left the door open for local governments 
to initiate projects with the loans, effectively allowing for the loans to be used 
in a ‘local developmental state’ mode (JXPMoLSS, 2002; NCCPBC, 
JXPMoF, & JXPMoHRSS, 2004). 
105 Conversation 01; Interview 07; Interview 08. 
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In rural areas, the application process for the EMP is slightly complicated. 
Prospective borrowers need to first apply to the township level MoHRSS, 
and, if accepted, their documents are sent to the county level MoHRSS for 
approval. After the loan documents have been approved at both the 
township and county levels, they are then sent to an approved/participating 
financial institution at the county level where the final decision is made on 
whether or not to issue the loan.106 The financial institution’s decision is 
supposed to be based on an approach that prioritises financial 
considerations, i.e. repayment and profitability. Unsurprisingly, considering 
the number of different actors involved at different levels, this process can 
take many months and can represent a huge expenditure of time for both 
applicants and administrators.107 
 
Spaces for local discretion 
As with other centrally formulated development policies in China (see 
Chapter 5), there is significant room for local discretion built into all three of 
the government-subsidised microcredit programmes – both purposefully, 
through the delegation of responsibility to lower levels of government and 
less directly, due to vague and even contradictory ideological imperatives. 
This results in local implementers deciding which parts of the programmes to 
implement largely based on value positions, the outcomes of local 
negotiations and other context specific reasons. In other words, 
implementation emerges from the interfaces of interaction between actors at 
different levels, all of whom are embedded in distinct social, economic and 
political contexts. For instance, while all three programmes have national 
guidelines, provinces are ultimately responsible for designing their own 
specific policies.108 In the case of Jiangxi, county and township governments 
and financial institutions usually have discretion to experiment within these 
national and provincial guidelines without asking for permission from higher 
                                            
106 All state-owned banks and RCCs are approved to provide EMP loans, but 
different financial institutions agree to participate in different localities.  
107 Interview 08; Interview 30. 
108 This is consistent with research on other rural development frameworks 
and policies, such as the XNCJS and the New Cooperative Medical System 
(xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao 
) (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013; 
P. H. Brown, de Brauw, & Du, 2009). 
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levels of government,109 which is rooted in the longstanding tradition of 
policy experimentation/modelling in the Chinese countryside – or 
“proceeding from point to surface” (youdian daomian ) (Heilmann, 
2008, p. 2).  
 
This local discretionary power is significant across all three programmes in 
that local implementers and financial institutions are permitted to choose 
how loans should be secured, whether or not a quota should be enforced, 
which types of loans to provide and which groups to target (i.e. households, 
businesses, cooperatives, or projects) (JXPPAO et al., 2006; PAO, 2006), 
which effectively gives local governments the ability to utilise loans to push 
forward their own ‘development agendas’ (e.g. promotion of agriculture, 
infrastructure projects, etc.).110  More significantly, national and provincial 
policies provide a massive loophole for local governments by stating that 
microcredit implementation should always be “based on the actual (local) 
situation” (genju shiji qingkuang ) – which is undoubtedly a 
modern adaptation of the revolutionary approach to implementing policy “in 
accordance with local conditions” (yindi zhiyi 	) (Heilmann, 2008, p. 
7) – effectively creating a situation where ‘anything goes’ as long as it works 
(PBC, 2001; State Council, 2008). That being said, due to the ‘soft 
centralisation’ of control over some township agencies (i.e. co-optation by 
the county government), it is not always clear which ‘local’ level groups 
actually have the discretion. For instance, with the EMP, the MoHRSS is 
sometimes controlled at the county level (i.e. as a ‘vertical agency’) and 
sometimes controlled at the township level (i.e. as a ‘devolved work unit’), 
meaning that the final decision-makers differ across localities.111 Similarly, 
local level PAOs are often merged with other agencies and given a 
subordinated role, and it is difficult to assess how much power and 
independence township level RCCs have in relation to local government 
bodies and county level branches (see Chapter 5). 
                                            
109 Interview 02; Interview 05; Interview 07; Interview 11; Interview 16. 
110 As stated above, in the literature this is usually criticised as ‘mission drift’ 
or government/elite ‘capture’, and is blamed for low repayment rates 
(Hofmockel, 2005; L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 2001; Tsai, 2004). 
111 For more on ‘soft centralisation’, ‘vertical agencies’ and ‘devolved work 
units’ see (Mertha, 2005; G. Smith, 2015). 
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Compounding this ‘designed discretion’ is vagueness and contradiction with 
regard to the ideological underpinnings of the programmes. For instance, 
while all three of the programmes were originally designed to target and 
assist relatively marginalised and vulnerable groups through the provision of 
inherently risky loans (i.e. a social service), they have since evolved to 
adhere to a more neoliberal ‘financial systems approach’ to microcredit, 
which prioritises repayment, ‘financial sustainability’ and even profitability, 
and, therefore, sees the market as the solution to rural development 
problems (JXPMoHRSS, 2009; JXPPAO et al., 2006; State Council, 2009). 
Particularly over the past five years, the government agencies running the 
programmes and the participating financial institutions have been 
increasingly pressured to ensure that loans are repaid.112 For instance, one 
township RCC director told me:  
The central government has given us the responsibility to provide 
microcredit, but at the same time we need to meet our costs… 
We have less and less interest in providing these loans as the 
interest is low, and they are risky and unprofitable. We wish we 
could expand into more profitable business and charge higher 
rates of interest.113 
 
This ideological paradox can also be seen in the financial and social capital 
requirements that are built into the architecture of the programmes. For 
instance, prospective borrowers are explicitly required to already have a 
sufficient amount of financial capital to ensure repayment (JXPMoLSS, 
2002), and the short loan terms (one to two years) implicitly suggest that 
those without resources are not suitable to apply, as it is very difficult to start 
a profitable enterprise from scratch and fully repay the loan within such a 
short period of time. Moreover, the policies explicitly state that borrowers 
need to have a good reputation and high social standing in their 
communities – e.g. the RCCMP is disbursed based on locally determined 
credit scores, and the EMP policy states that borrowers should be “honest 
and trustworthy” (chengshi shouxin) (JXPPG, 2009). This means 
that local government agencies and financial institutions vet prospective 
                                            
112 Interview 01; Interview 08; Interview 11. 
113 Interview 01. 
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borrowers (and their guarantors) based on socioeconomic status, effectively 
excluding many of the marginalised people and groups that the programmes 
were supposedly designed to assist. 
 
4.2 A Tale of Three Townships: Microcredit Implementation 
at the Local Level 
The combination of vagueness and contradictory ideology outlined above 
has opened up a significant amount of space for local discretion and has 
transformed the three government-subsidised microcredit programmes into 
what could be considered general development microcredit programmes – 
where the definition of ‘development’ is determined through negotiations at 
the local level – as opposed to microcredit programmes specifically targeting 
certain groups (such as the very poor, farmers, and the unemployed) as their 
names and original mission statements suggest. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that all three of these programmes have manifested themselves in 
very different ways in each of the three townships. This section details the 
reality of microcredit implementation in the AT, MWT and DET, and the 
different ways in which the programmes have been perceived by 
implementers and borrowers. Table 4.2, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 below 
summarise this information. 
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Table 4.2: Im
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inistrative control 
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tow
nship) 
R
M
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R
M
B
 1,100,000 for the tow
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N
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er cooperative (all 22 loans) 
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N
/A
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R
S
S
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U
se 
N
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 – P
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m
e not im
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A
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nships; also for agricultural inputs 
B
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o m
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Loan security 
N
/A
 – P
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m
e not im
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C
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m
ittees 
Tow
nship governm
ent acted as guarantor 
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) 
N
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m
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N
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M
B
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M
B
 
600,000 
R
M
B
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Loan term
 
N
/A
 – P
rogram
m
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1 year – P
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ers could 
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m
ediately take out a larger loan after repaym
ent 
1 year 
P
erception (providers) 
Ignorance – There are no villages w
ith the ‘poverty-
stricken’ designation in the tow
nship and poverty 
alleviation w
ork w
as not a priority; the tow
nship P
A
O
 has 
been m
erged w
ith other departm
ents; tow
nship officials 
and the director of the tow
nship R
C
C
 have never heard of 
the P
A
M
P
 
R
espect – The tow
nship R
C
C
 director said that 
providing the R
C
C
M
P
 w
as challenging because of the 
high dem
and and lim
ited num
ber of staff, but that it w
as 
very effective and im
proved the lives of people in the 
tow
nship 
P
ride – The county and tow
nship M
oH
R
S
S
 both 
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M
P
 
P
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ers) 
N
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 – P
rogram
m
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ented, i.e. no borrow
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R
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orrow
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C
C
M
P
 
helped them
 increase their incom
e and im
prove their 
lives; they also believed that the loans should only be 
available for clever and hardw
orking people w
ho w
ere 
w
illing to take risks 
P
ride – The m
em
bers of the farm
er cooperative w
ere 
proud to be involved in a ‘new
 m
odel’ and to be using 
technology from
 a ‘m
ore developed’ region (Jiangsu); 
they also believed that the vegetable greenhouses 
could increase their incom
e and im
prove their lives 
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The PAMP 
Despite being more agricultural, more remote and both visibly and 
measurably poorer than the other two townships (see Chapter 3 and 
Appendix C), the AT has no designated poverty-stricken villages at the 
national, provincial or prefectural levels, while both the MWT and the DET do 
(see below). For this reason the township is not eligible for the PAMP, and 
none of the township or county officials had ever heard of the programme.114 
Rather than poverty alleviation, the township government saw agricultural 
modernisation and mechanisation as its priority, and the township PAO was 
run as a ‘hanging sign work unit’ (gua paizi danwei 
	).115 This 
allowed the township to allocate the resources that would have been spent 
on poverty alleviation work to agriculture and other priority areas.116 
 
The RCCMP 
In the 1980s and early 1990s there used to be RCC branches in a number of 
AT villages. But in conjunction with the rural financial sector reforms at the 
end of the 1990s (see Chapter 2), these branches were closed and during 
fieldwork there was only one branch for the entire township located in the 
township seat.117 However, since the early 2000s the AT RCC has set up 22 
cash machines around the township and it also started providing the 
RCCMP. The county designated a quota of RMB 50,000,000 per year for the 
programme in the township, and during fieldwork there were approximately 
2,000 borrowing households – or about 20 per cent of the total township 
households. That being said, the director of the AT RCC estimated that there 
was significantly more demand for the RCCMP loans – potentially up to 
                                            
114 Conversation 01; Interview 04; Interview 05; Interview 07; Interview 08. 
115 “Hanging sign work units” are “phantom agencies” with “no personnel 
assigned to them on a full-time basis” basically created to appease 
inspection teams from higher levels of government (G. Smith, 2010, p. 607).  
116 Conversation 01. 
117 AT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 05; Interview 24; Interview 
25. 
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RMB 100,000,000 – therefore many township households remained 
excluded.118 
 
In accordance with the national guidelines, the township RCC did not require 
any guarantor or collateral for the RCCMP, and credit scores were allocated 
to households by village committees based on their local reputation. 
Technically, joint-liability loans for borrowers with bad credit scores were 
available; however, the RCC director did not think that this method is 
“compatible with rural China’s situation”119 and, since there was more than 
enough demand from applicants with good credit ratings, the RCC allocated 
its entire quota to individual household borrowers. Both men and women 
could apply for the loans, but since men are usually considered the ‘head of 
the household’ based on household registration documents, more than 90 
per cent of the RCCMP loans in the AT were disbursed to male borrowers. 
The vast majority of the loans were for agricultural activities, with the 
township RCC director saying: “Local farmers are the main beneficiaries of 
the RCCMP because they can develop traditional agriculture through 
borrowing. SMEs can borrow from the county.”120 This was unsurprising 
considering that agriculture is the main activity in the township and the main 
priority of local development planners. In particular, farmers from the AT 
have used the loans to rent over 200,000 mu of land in neighbouring 
townships and counties in order to scale-up their agricultural production.121 
 
There were no upper or lower limits on RCCMP loan amounts in the AT, and 
loan sizes varied from RMB 3,000 to RMB 600,000, with the average loan 
standing at approximately RMB 25,000. The RCC charged 1.4 times the 
PBC base rate, which is higher than the amount permitted in the national 
                                            
118 Interview 05. It is important to note that the fact that households with 
good credit scores were sometimes unable to get loans undermined the goal 
of eliminating the loan application process and providing immediately 
accessible credit. This type of credit rationing mirrors Ane Bislev’s 
experience with some RCCs in the early 2000s (Bislev, 2010). 
119 Interview 05. 
120 Interview 05. 
121 Conversation 01; Interview 05. 
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policy guidelines (i.e. 1.2 times the PBC base rate).122 According to the 
director of the AT RCC, the programme has achieved 98 per cent 
repayment, and borrowers only default due to accident or personal tragedy 
of some kind.123 The director also said that “residents of the AT are more 
trustworthy than people in other townships” – an assertion that was repeated 
by others in the township during conversations and interviews.124 This high 
repayment rate, along with the fact that 7.84 per cent interest (1.4 times 5.6 
per cent) on a loan of RMB 25,000 is RMB 1,960 – or one third of the 
average income in the township – suggests that most RCCMP loans in the 
AT are, in fact, going to households that already have significant amounts of 
financial and social resources, as opposed to ‘financially excluded’ segments 
of local society. 
 
The director of the AT RCC saw the RCCMP as a necessary duty, telling me 
that: 
We must carry out the programmes directed by the county and 
the province in order to support and serve the sannong… We do 
not worry about accounting or investments here in the township, 
we just carry out the programmes, such as the RCCMP.125 
He said that the biggest challenge was the very high demand for the loans 
because the RCC only has four employees to deal with the entire township. 
However, he also said that he respects the RCCMP and that the loans have 
significantly improved the lives of township residents. At the same time, the 
RCCMP was described in positive terms by the borrowers themselves. For 
instance, one borrower who was using the RCCMP to rent over 100 mu of 
land from a neighbouring township said that it allowed him to double his 
income. He went on to frame himself and other successful borrowers as the 
rightful and deserving recipients of RCCMP loans, stating that: 
Local people borrowing from the RCCMP are mainly bold, 
intelligent and hard-working farmers who, in order to live a better 
                                            
122 As late as 2008 the RCC only charged an interest rate of 4.5 per cent 
(Interview 23). 
123 This was, of course, impossible to verify. 
124 Conversation 01; Interview 03; Interview 04; Interview 05. 
125 Interview 05. 
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life, take more risks and earn more money… of course, there are 
also some complacent and lazy people who want to borrow, but 
they cannot get loans.126 
 
The EMP 
The EMP was initiated by the county MoHRSS in 2008, and a quota of RMB 
1,100,000 (with a maximum loan size of RMB 50,000 over a 1-year loan 
period) per township per year was set.127  In the AT the MoHRSS was 
controlled at the county level (i.e. a ‘vertical agency’), so county officials took 
the lead in the implementation of the EMP and decided that the programme 
should be used to support agriculture, increase farmer incomes and help 
farmers become more entrepreneurial. Therefore, MoHRSS officials at both 
the county and township levels were instructed to target borrowers who 
would help achieve these goals.128  
 
In the AT, the director of the county MoHRSS became aware of a 12-
member farmer cooperative (nongmin zhuanye hezuoshe , 
hereafter FC) based in one of the township’s villages through mutual friends 
with its leader (who was also the village party secretary).129 This local leader 
was described by both county and township officials as being a very 
‘capable person’ (nengren ) who was good at organising the villagers 
and had gained technical knowledge of how to build vegetable greenhouses 
from a party-organised ‘model tourism’ trip to Jiangsu Province in 2006, 
which led to the construction of some small vegetable greenhouses in the 
                                            
126 Conversation 01. 
127  Counties have the discretion to set EMP quotas for the townships. 
Quotas are not dependent on county or township resources, but are the 
outcome of negotiations between various actors at the county level 
(Interview 07). 
128 Conversation 01; Interview 04; Interview 07. 
129 This village was one of the original pilot villages for the XNCJS and has 
won awards for being an ‘exemplary model’. It is also important to note that 
members of the FC had familial ties with members of the county government 
(Interview 25). 
 154 
village.130 Through this social connection, the county MoHRSS directed the 
township MoHRSS to support the FC in an application for the entire 
township loan quota (i.e. 22 loans of RMB 50,000 each) to build two large 
modern greenhouses in order to scale-up the cultivation of more profitable 
vegetables year-round. Rather than applying for the larger EMP loan for 
companies, cooperatives or projects (which is only half subsidised), the 
members of the FC were instructed to apply for loans individually in order to 
receive the full subsidy (i.e. zero per cent interest). The MoHRSS in both the 
county and the township then lobbied the township government to act as the 
guarantor for all the loans to ensure that the FC’s application for the EMP 
would not be deemed ‘too risky’ by the county financial institution providing 
the credit (in this case the county RCC).131 The members of the FC then 
gathered together the necessary documentation with the support of the 
township MoHRSS and applied for the EMP. However, since there were only 
12 FC members applying for the full quota of 22 loans, the household 
registration documents of other villagers were used in the loan application 
without their knowledge, which was effectively identity theft and meant that 
the FC added ‘fictitious members’ in order to apply for the loans. 132 
Ultimately, the FC’s application for the EMP was successful, and during 
fieldwork the greenhouses were under construction.133 
 
                                            
130  Interview 03; Interview 24. For more details on ‘model tourism’ see 
(Ahlers & Schubert, 2013). For more on vegetable greenhouses see (B. Wu 
& Zhang, 2013). 
131 The fact that the officials in the county MoHRSS were on good terms with 
the county RCC director and other employees also helped with the EMP 
application process. 
132 This information was discovered when the county MoHRSS let me look at 
the loan application documents and I saw that some of the applicants were 
villagers who were not part of the FC and who had no knowledge of the 
EMP. The phenomenon of ‘fictitious members’ in Chinese FCs and ‘ficticious 
groups’ for other types of microcredit is not uncommon, see (Augustin-Jean 
& Xue, 2011; Bislev, 2010). 
133  AT Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 01; Interview 03; 
Interview 07; Interview 25. 
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Figure 4.1: Small Vegetable Greenhouses in AT 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Construction of a Large Modern Vegetable Greenhouse in the 
AT 
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The people I spoke to who were directly involved in the EMP in the AT were 
proud of what had been accomplished, and were invested in ensuring that 
the programme became a ‘success’ in the township. The members of the FC 
felt pride in the fact that they were utilising farming technologies and 
methods that came from a ‘more developed’ and ‘modern’ eastern province 
(i.e. Jiangsu), and they were excited at the prospect of increasing their 
income and reducing the risks associated with a single crop (i.e. rice).134 The 
implementers (i.e. officials in the county and township MoHRSS) considered 
the AT experience to be a ‘new model’ for EMP provision that allows for 
more efficient, convenient and secure service through group loans with one 
guarantor (i.e. the township government), while also promoting cooperative 
and agricultural development, and they hoped that it would be adopted in 
other places.135 For instance, one official in the county MoHRSS said: 
The EMP is one of the ‘calling cards’ (i.e. priority policies) of the 
provincial MoHRSS… We hope to make a breakthrough with this 
new model, which represents an innovation in EMP service, and 
is unique in the province. Of course, this innovation is within the 
permitted scope of the policy.136 
 
                                            
134 Conversation 01; Interview 03, Interview 24; Interview 25. 
135  Considering that the AT experience with the EMP also came up in 
conversations with officials at the prefectural level (Interview 06), it seems as 
though their ambitions may be realised. 
136 Interview 07. 
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The PAMP 
Despite being significantly wealthier, more industrialised and less remote 
than the AT, the MWT is home to one official provincially-designated 
poverty-stricken village and was, therefore, eligible to run the PAMP 
(JXPPAO, 2011).137  However, similar to the AT, the PAMP was not in 
operation in the MWT, mainly due to the fact that poverty alleviation was not 
a priority in the township, which resulted in the PAO being merged with a 
number of other departments in 2013 – including agriculture, forestry, water 
management, the XNCJS and disaster/disease protection – into a new larger 
department called the Department of Agriculture, Technology and Publicity. 
As in the AT, none of the township officials had ever heard of the PAMP 
(including the previous director of the township PAO), and they didn’t show 
any interest when I told them about the programme. This indifference and 
apathy with regard to the PAMP was mainly due to the fact that most of the 
township officials did not believe that poverty alleviation work is important. 
Instead, they pointed to increasing economic growth, promoting 
infrastructure development and attracting outside investment as the best 
methods for reducing poverty – essentially conflating ideas associated with 
the local developmental state and trickle-down economics. That being said, 
one of the vice-directors of the MWT cryptically urged me to “look at the 
actual situation of poor households” myself, demonstrating that township 
officials also hold different opinions about the best methods of facilitating 
rural development.138 
 
An interview with the director of the county PAO shed further light on the 
reasons for the PAMP being neglected in the township. Unlike the township 
officials, he did know about the programme, but told me that microcredit is 
not an effective method to facilitate poverty alleviation, saying: 
The money isn’t enough and, even though the interest is 
subsidised, the poor cannot afford to pay it. The application 
process is time-consuming and difficult, borrowers need too many 
certificates to prove they are poor, so it is not a good way to help 
the poor. Instead the poor should be helped with the minimum 
                                            
137 Interview 12; Interview 15. 
138 Interview 12; Interview 13; Interview 14; Interview 15. 
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living standard guarantee (dibao ), and if they need to borrow 
they can borrow from friends and family.139 
He also said that poverty alleviation work in general is very difficult because 
it often is not clear who is really poor, and there are too many PAOs at 
different levels that do not coordinate their activities. He described his 
position as being a “volunteer job with no real rewards.”140 When asked 
about the designated poverty-stricken village in the MWT, officials at the 
village, township and county levels said that the village is not actually very 
poor, but it is the job of the PAOs to help villages to apply for the designation 
so that the county can get additional funds from higher levels.141 However, 
the county did not actually use all of these funds for the villages themselves, 
and instead of initiating projects or programmes (such as the PAMP), the 
county used some of the funds to send officials to the villages with money 
and food for poor households – which was described as being “nothing more 
than a photo shoot” by township officials.142 Ultimately, poverty alleviation 
work in the township mainly involved “improving the environment and 
investing in infrastructure,” and the actual work of helping the poor was left 
to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).143 
 
The RCCMP 
The director of the MWT RCC perceived the RCC’s role very differently from 
his counterparts in the AT and DET, and described his work by saying: 
The RCC gives the greatest possible support to farmers, provided 
they meet the conditions for this support… Our primary 
responsibility is to ensure repayment and to be financially 
                                            
139 Interview 16. 
140 Interview 16. 
141 Interview 13; Interview 16. The situation of non-poor villages being given 
the poverty-stricken village designation has been documented in the 
literature (Park & Wang, 2010). 
142 Interview 12; Interview 15. 
143  Interview 16. It is interesting that infrastructure was identified as an 
important component of poverty alleviation work, but the county nevertheless 
neglected the potential to use the PAMP to invest in infrastructure projects. 
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sustainable. We cannot lend to risky borrowers, it is against our 
directives from the county.144 
He then went on to describe the RCC’s role in the township’s development 
strategy: 
We aim to build an industrial township. With the nearby industrial 
zone driving economic development, people’s lives have 
improved. The government’s policies are very good and support 
the XNCJS, and economic development promotes comprehensive 
growth. At the same time, local people’s need for financial 
services has diversified to include business rather than just 
farming.145 
For this reason, the RCC in the MWT operated very differently from the 
RCCs in the other two townships, and the RCCMP – while nominally being 
provided – was basically unrecognisable from the programme described in 
the policy guidelines. According to the director and RCC promotional 
material, the RCCMP was available to any borrower with a good credit 
rating, and the MWT had a quota of RMB 50,000,000 (the same as the AT), 
with loans being provided at between 6 per cent and 8 per cent interest 
(JXPRCCU, n.d.).146 However, the director also said that the RCCMP was 
provided to both households and enterprises (which is contradictory to the 
central and provincial policies), and that loans were only provided to 
borrowers with collateral and based on the ‘feeling’ (ganjue ) of the loan 
officer and other RCC employees. 
 
Practically, this meant that very few households were borrowing from the 
RCC in the MWT, and despite an extensive search, I did not encounter any 
farming household borrowers. Interviews with RCC employees and small 
enterprise borrowers confirmed that it was not possible get a loan from the 
RCC without collateral and/or good social connections (guanxi ), but 
that interest was indeed around 8 per cent.147 Further investigation revealed 
                                            
144 Interview 10. 
145 Interview 10. 
146 Interview 10. 
147 Conversation 05; Interview 30; Interview 40; Interview 46. 
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that the main reason for the seeming lack of credit from the RCC was due to 
the fact that the vast majority of the funds were being lent to the largest 
construction company in the township. In an interview, the company owner 
divulged that the company was borrowing RMB 50,000,000 from the 
township RCC at a rate of 5 per cent per year (i.e. lower than the PBC 
mandated rate),148 which was not only the same as the amount supposedly 
allocated to the RCCMP, but also the largest single loan to any company in 
the county. This loan was primarily used for investment in infrastructure and 
residential construction outside of the township, which were the company’s 
key business activities.149 Therefore, while the RCC claimed to provide the 
RCCMP, it is clear that the financial institution effectively circumvented the 
programme in favour of large-scale lending, and required collateral for 
smaller loans, which was justified by claiming that the RCC’s primary 
objective was to achieve ‘financial sustainability’. Nevertheless, the 
subsidised interest rates remained in place, with an especially low (official) 
rate for the construction company. 
 
The EMP 
In the MWT the county MoHRSS initiated the EMP in 2008, and set a quota 
of RMB 600,000 per township per year, with loans ranging from RMB 10,000 
to RMB 50,000 (1-year loan period). The MoHRSS was controlled at the 
township level (i.e. a ‘devolved work unit’) with visibly less material and 
administrative support than its counterpart in the AT, and was located in an 
office with four people responsible for a number of other ‘hanging sign work 
units’ in addition to the MoHRSS. In reality, there was only one local official 
dealing with the EMP, and he also had a large number of other 
responsibilities for both the MoHRSS and other departments, many of which 
arose suddenly and unexpectedly (e.g. inspections from higher levels of 
government). Moreover, the county MoHRSS basically delegated full 
responsibility for finding and vetting borrowers, helping with applications, and 
                                            
148 While the official rate was 5 per cent per year, the owner said that, in 
reality, he was paying approximately 15 per cent interest after all the ‘grey 
costs’ associated with successfully applying for the loan (Interview 45). 
149 Interview 45. 
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ensuring that all the requirements were met, to the township MoHRSS, but 
retained final decision-making power over who received the loans.150 
 
The county MoHRSS also set different ‘development’ goals for the EMP in 
the MWT than in the AT. Officially the programme was supposed to promote 
‘economic development’ as opposed to support agriculture. Unofficially, 
however, the county MoHRSS ordered the township to achieve 100 per cent 
repayment, as this resulted in a monetary reward for the county from the 
province (one to two per cent of the loan total). Due to the lack of 
time/resources and the top-down pressure to ensure repayment – and 
because there was no bottom-up pressure from cooperative groups or 
interaction between potential local borrowers and the county MoHRSS (as in 
the AT) – the township official decided to target friends and family members 
that he knew he could trust to repay the loans, and who would be accepted 
by the MoHRSS and financial institutions at the county level with minimal 
problems. During the time of the interview the entire quota had been lent to 
this target group.151 
 
In contrast to the pride expressed by those involved with the programme in 
the AT, the implementation of the EMP in the MWT engendered feelings of 
exhaustion, annoyance and/or indifference. The township official told me that 
the EMP caused a significant amount of stress, not only because it was 
getting increasingly difficult to find a sufficient number of new borrowers 
every year (each with a suitable guarantor) that he could trust to repay the 
loans, but also because the lack of engagement from the county MoHRSS 
meant that the entire process was time-consuming. In other words, the EMP 
was unappealing to potential borrowers and wasted his own time. However, 
he felt that he had no choice but to prioritise the programme, because he 
feared his job promotion prospects would be damaged if he did not continue 
to ensure a 100 per cent repayment rate. He described the situation by 
saying: 
We have four people working in the office, and besides the EMP 
we are also in charge of social security, health insurance, work 
                                            
150 Interview 08. 
151 Interview 08. 
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placement, employment training, etc. – a lot of work, a multitude 
of things… The application and decision process for the EMP is 
too long. It takes at least one month and sometimes even two or 
three months for a decision, and the loans are often held up by 
the county MoHRSS or RCC, meaning that applicants cannot get 
the money for a long time.152 
 
The local borrowers of the EMP were also largely indifferent. Some were 
using the money to add to other investments or for consumption purposes, 
and some were using it to lend to family who had no access to loans, or 
even to others in the community for a profit.153 For instance, one EMP 
borrower told me: 
In 2009 I received a loan of RMB 50,000 from the EMP. I didn’t 
need the money, but I took it and lent it to others at 12 per cent 
interest per year. From RMB 50,000 I could earn RMB 6,000!154 
However, overall the borrowers were not particularly interested in the EMP, 
and perceived the loans as simply representing a small amount of extra 
capital. In reality, most of the borrowers in the MWT had little trouble gaining 
access to substantial loans from other formal and informal sources. 
Therefore, rather than feeling grateful towards the township official for 
providing them with interest-free loans, some of the borrowers actually felt 
as though they were doing him a favour because the application process 
was so time-consuming.155 Moreover, even potential future borrowers who 
were interested in accessing the EMP for investments in local enterprises 
were hesitant to apply due to the time commitment involved.156 
 
                                            
152 Interview 08. 
153 Interview 29; Interview 30. 
154 Interview 30. 
155 Interview 29; Interview 30; Interview 38. 
156 Interview 42. 
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The PAMP 
The largest village at the centre of the DET was designated a provincial level 
poverty-stricken village, meaning that officially the average income was less 
than RMB 2,000 per year (JXPPAO, 2011). However, in reality, this was the 
wealthiest village that I encountered in the three townships, primarily due to 
the fact that it is centrally located along a main road connecting two urban 
centres, and is, therefore, a hub of commercial activity (see Chapter 3). 
Interviews with village and township officials confirmed that the ‘poverty-
stricken’ village was, in actuality, the wealthiest village in the township 
despite being the only one to receive the designation. 157  Nevertheless, 
neither the village nor the township received any direct financial support, and 
were instead only provided with ‘technical support’ from the county PAO,158 
suggesting that the county kept a significant portion of the poverty alleviation 
funds transferred from the province for other projects. As such, as in the 
other two townships, the PAMP was not in operation, and village and 
township officials had never heard of the programme. Therefore, despite the 
fact that it is supposed to be a key component in the government’s flagship 
poverty alleviation programme, none of the local officials in these three 
townships were aware of the PAMP’s existence.159 
 
The RCCMP 
The DET is located in one of the counties where the RCCMP was originally 
piloted, so the programme was initiated in 2001 after a visit from Jiang 
Zemin and officials from the central PBC. During this visit a meeting was 
held in the township with the high-ranking officials asking local people what 
kinds of services they required from the RCC.160 Because the RCCMP pilot 
was considered a success and was expanded nationwide in 2003 (see 
section 4.1), the county has continued to prioritise the programme and 
officials even refer to it as their own county’s microcredit model, with the 
                                            
157 Conversation 20; Interview 18. Again, this points to serious problems with 
the process of designating poverty-stricken villages. 
158 Interview 21. Despite further questioning on this matter, it never became 
clear what ‘technical support’ actually meant in this context. 
159 Conversation 20; Interview 18; Interview 21. 
160 Interview 19; Interview 60. 
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slogan: “guided by the central bank, led by the RCC, supervised by the local 
government, and lent to rural households.”161 
 
According to local officials and employees in the DET RCC, over 5,000 
households are provided with loans through the RCCMP each year – or 
approximately 80 per cent of total households in the township – which was 
much higher than the other two townships.162 There was no form of security 
on these loans (i.e. no guarantor, collateral or credit rating required), and 
any first-time borrower could apply for a maximum of RMB 10,000. 
Borrowers were provided with a card that could be used to get a loan at any 
time, and as soon as a loan was successfully repaid it was possible to 
borrow again at a higher limit, with the maximum loan size set at RMB 
200,000. However, if a borrower defaulted on a loan they were no longer 
eligible for the RCCMP, and there were no joint-liability loans available. The 
annual interest rate on the loans was 6.5 per cent, which is actually lower 
than the rate specified in the policy. In other words, aside from the lack of 
joint-liability lending, the RCCMP was being run in accordance with (or 
perhaps better than) national and provincial guidelines.163 
 
The high rate of participation in the RCCMP in the township and the fact that 
implementation has closely followed the policy guidelines was, of course, 
mainly a result of the DET being one of the original pilot sites for the 
programme. Indeed, local implementers and officials in both the county and 
the township had pride in, and took ownership of, the programme and saw it 
as key to local development strategies. For instance, county officials have 
been quoted in national media discussing the programme’s success in 
helping rural people.164 The RCCMP was also credited with improving the 
financial performance of the RCC by reducing non-performing loans from 25 
                                            
161 Conversation 39. 
162 Conversation 39; Interview 18. This number was backed up by the high 
proportion of household interviewees who had taken out an RCCMP loan. 
163 Conversation 20; Conversation 39; Interview 54; Interview 55; Interview 
56. 
164 These sources are not referenced here in order to maintain anonymity 
with regard to the township location.  
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per cent to just 2 per cent.165 However, at the same time, township RCC 
employees were reluctant to discuss the programme with me, and the 
director of the township RCC actually refused an interview with the excuse 
that he did “not want too many people to find out about how good the 
programme is and then apply.”166 While this may have been merely a bad 
excuse to avoid talking to me, it is also possible that the RCC was finding it 
increasingly difficult to achieve ‘financial sustainability’ while simultaneously 
providing such a high quantity of subsidised RCCMP loans. This theory is 
also backed up by conversations I had with township officials who said that 
over the year preceding my fieldwork, the county had significantly tightened 
the township’s budget and threatened them with layoffs if ‘financial 
sustainability’ was not achieved.167 
 
Borrowers were largely happy with the RCCMP, and particularly those with 
small businesses said that the programme helped them get quick access to 
capital to purchase necessary supplies and materials.168 As far as most 
borrowers were concerned, the RCCMP also represented a transition into a 
more equitable mode of operation for the RCC. For instance, one borrower 
said: “Before it was only possible to borrow from the RCC if you had social 
connections, and if you didn’t repay the loan it didn’t matter. Now anyone 
can borrow as long as they meet the conditions.”169 However, they also 
seemed to take the programme for granted, and were surprised when I told 
them that the RCCMP was not operating in the same way in other 
townships. As far as the borrowers were concerned, the RCC had a duty to 
provide the RCCMP to any and all eligible borrowers.  
 
                                            
165 Conversation 39. This was impossible to verify. 
166 Conversation 22. 
167 Conversation 33; Conversation 34. 
168 Interview 54; Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 58; Interview 63. 
169 Interview 54. This statement also sheds light on why the RCCMP might 
have improved the RCC’s financial performance. 
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The EMP 
Similar to the other two townships, in the DET the EMP was initiated in 2008, 
but the county MoHRSS did not set any quota for the number of loans that 
should be provided, or designate a ‘development’ agenda for the 
programme, i.e. agriculture in the AT and economic development in the 
MWT. As in the MWT, the DET MoHRSS was controlled at the township 
level (i.e. a ‘devolved work unit’); however, it had visibly more resources than 
its counterparts in the MWT or the AT (e.g. more staff, nicer work space and 
no evidence of ‘hanging sign work units’) and the officials responsible for the 
EMP were not pressured to ensure 100 per cent repayment rates by the 
county. Therefore, the township MoHRSS initially provided loans to anyone 
who was eligible, and in 2012 they accepted 52 loan applications for RMB 
100,000 each, while also facilitating a loan of RMB 300,000 to the largest 
components factory in the township. Similar to the FC in the AT, this loan 
was, in fact, a number of smaller loans packaged together in order to receive 
the full subsidy from the central MoF, rather than a larger loan meant for 
companies ‘promoting employment’ as stipulated in the policy.170 
 
The loan application process was essentially the same as the other two 
townships, with one important difference – in addition to all the other 
requirements, borrowers also needed to travel to the county seat to 
complete a week of training on how to effectively use their loans. This meant 
that the 52 loans represented a huge amount of administrative work, not only 
for the township officials, but also for county level MoHRSS officials (who 
needed to organise these trainings) and the financial institutions providing 
the loans (who needed to vet a larger number of township borrowers and 
guarantors). Therefore, in 2013 the EMP was ‘temporarily’ halted in the DET 
in order to better allocate scarce time and resources to other more ‘useful’ 
activities and services.171 Ironically, the lack of a quota set by the county, 
which originally resulted in a larger number loans being provided than in the 
other two townships, ultimately became the justification for halting the EMP 
                                            
170 Interview 19; Interview 20; Interview 53. 
171  Conversation 34; Interview 19; Interview 20. Although it was never 
explicitly stated during interviews or conversations, it seemed that 
‘temporarily’ meant ‘indefinitely’ in this context. 
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altogether, as the township MoHRSS could exercise its discretion and simply 
decided that no one was eligible.172 
 
In the DET, the prevailing attitude towards the EMP was slight annoyance on 
the part of local officials (although not as pronounced as in the MWT) and 
indifference on the part of would-be borrowers. For instance, one household 
head told me: 
I know about the EMP because I saw the government 
propaganda about the programme, but I think it is too 
troublesome and complicated. First it is necessary to get proof of 
unemployment from the village, then apply to the county 
government. Very troublesome, I don’t want it.173 
The owner of the largest components factory did acknowledge that his loan 
of RMB 300,000 was of substantial help to his business, but also complained 
because he was required to secure nine guarantors, which he described as 
being very troublesome.174 Township officials felt that the programme was 
unnecessary (and therefore a waste of time), and as soon as there was 
consent from the county it was halted. Most of the households I spoke to 
either did not know of the existence of the EMP, or, if they were aware of the 
programme, did not know that it had been halted. However, even those 
households that did know about the EMP and were considering applying for 
one of the microloans were not upset when they discovered that the 
programme was no longer running. This was mainly because of the 
prevalence of the RCCMP in the township, which was more attractive to 
many borrowers (despite the higher rates of interest) due to the fact that 
there was no application process, no need for guarantors and because loans 
were provided immediately. For instance, one household said: 
The RCCMP is convenient because I have a card that I can use 
to borrow. The EMP needs two guarantors with connections to the 
government. The RCCMP doesn’t need any guarantors, but there 
                                            
172 Conversation 34; Interview 19. 
173 Interview 58. 
174 Interview 53. It should be noted, however, that this owner also used a 
portion of the EMP to lend to a friend at 12 per cent interest, just like in the 
MWT. 
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is a limit depending on the situation of the household. Some can 
borrow RMB 6,000 while others can borrow up to RMB 
100,000.175 
Moreover, because the DET is wealthier and relatively well connected to 
urban centres and regional production hubs (see Chapter 3), there was more 
capital available for informal lending. Unsurprisingly, most households would 
rather borrow from family or friends (usually at 0 per cent interest) than from 
institutions or microcredit programmes due to the convenience and lower 
transaction costs.176 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
Over the past three decades microcredit has undeniably become an 
important feature of the Chinese rural financial landscape. The rapid 
expansion of microcredit services in rural China has primarily been through 
the three government-run (and subsidised) programmes – the PAMP, 
RCCMP and EMP – which both draw on global narratives associated with 
the microfinance movement, while simultaneously being framed within 
Chinese rural development discourses and movements, such as Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents and attempts to create a 
Harmonious and Well-off Society. These programmes have also been co-
opted by, and have formed essential components of, various rural 
development policy frameworks, such as the Poor Village Investment 
Programme, the XNCJS and the CXYTH. At the same time, they have been 
subjected to a general ideological shift towards neoliberal approaches to 
financial organisation, which prioritise ‘financial sustainability’ and profitability 
over the social welfare considerations usually associated with ‘development 
microcredit’. These varied ideological influences, and the fact that policy 
guidelines for the programmes are often vaguely formulated at both the 
central and provincial levels, has left significant room for interpretation, 
negotiation and discretion by local implementers. This means that, similar to 
other rural development interventions, government-subsidised microcredit 
programmes in China undergo processes of transformation as policy ‘travels 
                                            
175 Interview 56. 
176 This general sentiment was widely expressed in interviews with both 
borrowers and non-borrowers across the three townships. 
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down’ from the centre to the local, and therefore vary in how they are 
implemented across localities.  
 
This chapter outlined the policy and practice of government microcredit 
programmes in rural China. It began by reviewing and synthesising primary 
policy documents formulated at both the central and provincial levels, 
followed by an analysis of the key areas/spaces left open to local discretion 
in the policies. The chapter then went on to detail the implementation 
realities of the three programmes in the three different townships, and 
illustrated the ways in which local implementers perceived the policies 
differently and took advantage of loopholes, resulting in significant 
transformation of the policies as they manifested themselves at the local 
level, and tremendous variation in the implementation of each of the 
programmes across the three townships. We now turn to Chapter 5 to 
analyse the key factors shaping the heterogeneous implementation 
outcomes of microcredit in the AT, the MWT and the DET. 
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Chapter 5 
Understanding Heterogeneity in the Implementation of the 
Microcredit Programmes 
 
The centre has policies, local areas have counter-policies (shang you 
zhengce, xia you duiceJF^J3^). 
- Old Chinese saying 
 
Over the past half century there has been a general shift towards ‘Neo-
Newtonian’ approaches in the social sciences which emphasise 
quantification, generalisability and replicability (Backhouse & Fontaine, 2010; 
Chambers, 2008). In the field of Development Studies, this has resulted in 
an increased focus on measurable results, and the popularisation of 
approaches that seek to evaluate the impact of development interventions 
through ‘evidence-based decision-making’, in order to determine ‘best 
practice’ and ensure programmes are ‘cost effective’ or providing ‘value for 
money’ (White, 2010). Impact assessment has become its own distinct area 
of research – incorporating academics, policy-makers and development 
practitioners – with most studies attempting to adhere to quantitative 
standards of ‘rigour’ by utilising sophisticated statistical analysis tools and 
avoiding selection bias through randomised control trials (RCTs). For the 
most part, this type of impact assessment research starts from the 
assumption that it is possible to attribute impact to causal ‘determinants’ and, 
in this way, identify the types of interventions that work best. Based on these 
determinations, successful development programmes are scaled up and 
standardised in an attempt to ensure uniform implementation (Center for 
Global Development, 2006; Hobbes, 2014; White, 2010). This focus on 
measurability sees development as inherently linear, and implies “some kind 
of step-by-step process whereby policy [is] formulated, implemented and 
then followed by certain results” (Long, 2001, p. 25).  
 
This obsession with measuring impact is especially true with regard to 
microcredit, where the vast majority of research begins with a variant of the 
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question ‘does microcredit work?’177 In many ways this is to be expected, 
considering the fact that the modern microfinance movement has been 
portrayed as the development intervention that will, in the future, relegate 
poverty to a museum.178 This has resulted in a large number of ‘impact 
assessments’ being developed in an attempt to determine how microcredit 
programmes impact on ‘beneficiaries’. Some of these assessments utilise 
qualitative or participatory approaches to measure less quantifiable concepts, 
such as empowerment or well-being (Copestake, Johnson, & Wright, 2002). 
However, more often they are positivistic in nature and utilise quantitative 
methodologies to measure the usual development markers – such as 
income, expenditure, consumption, assets, etc. (Hulme, 2000). A subset of 
research also approaches microcredit impact assessment from a ‘financial 
systems approach’, and therefore defines beneficial impact in terms of 
financial sustainability, and the ability of programmes and MFIs to scale-up 
their activities, thus assuming that increased access to credit is inherently 
good (Yaron & Benjamin, 1997). Unsurprisingly, these different definitions 
and methods of assessing impact have resulted in a variety of conclusions, 
with some research finding positive impact (Holcombe, 1995; Khandker, 
2005; Pitt, 2014; Pitt & Khandker, 1998); some research finding negative 
impact and/or fundamental flaws in the concept of microcredit as a 
development intervention and microcredit impact assessment itself 
(Bateman, 2013; Bateman & Chang, 2012; R. Montgomery, 1996; Rogaly, 
1996; Wood & Sharrif, 1997); and still other research finding evidence of 
both positive and negative impact, minimal impact or determining that there 
is not enough evidence to make a clear determination one way or the other 
(Angelucci et al., 2013; Duvendack et al., 2011; Roodman, 2012) (see 
Chapter 1 for more on these debates). Based on these assessments of the 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of microcredit as a development intervention, 
most research attempts to ‘work backwards’ in order to understand what 
went right/wrong in the design and implementation of the microcredit 
programmes, and then tends to outline ‘best practices’ to improve the policy 
                                            
177 A Google search of the phrase ‘does microcredit work?’ yields half a 
million hits, and there are too many articles, books and reports that have 
some version of this question as part of their title to cite here. 
178 Muhammad Yunus, who is often described as the father of the modern 
microfinance movement, has made statements along these lines at various 
points over the last three and a half decades (see Chapter 1) (Bateman, 
2010). 
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formulation and provision of microcredit in order to produce ‘better impact’ in 
the future (Hulme, 2000). 179  In this way policy formulation and 
implementation is perceived through a top-down structural functionalist lens 
(which is basically technocratic), where changes to programme design 
influence implementation and impact in a sequential causal chain of events, 
and assumes that standardisation can be achieved as long as ‘best 
practices’ are adhered to (Long, 2001). 
 
At the same time, however, there has been a significant amount of critique of, 
and resistance to, these dominant ideas about impact assessment with 
regard to development interventions in general, and microcredit in particular 
– essentially arguing for a shift towards approaches situated in the ‘Adaptive 
Pluralism’ paradigm. Recent research has pointed out that much impact 
assessment is top-down, reductionist and prescriptive, and therefore fails to 
take into account political considerations and complex systems at various 
levels that fundamentally shape development interventions (Jones, 2012). 
For instance, Norman Long notes that that “this separation of ‘policy’, 
‘implementation’ and ‘outcomes’ is a gross oversimplification of a much more 
complicated set of processes which involve the reinterpretation or 
transformation of policy during the implementation process” (Long, 2001, p. 
25). This means that the formulation and implementation of 
policy/programmes cannot be standardised based on ‘best practices’ with 
the expectation of producing specific and uniform impacts, because 
development interventions are necessarily reconstituted in heterogeneous 
ways depending on the local context and people involved. This realisation 
has resulted in a shift in focus towards complexity (drawing on complexity 
science), chaos, local self-organisation and emergence, in an attempt to 
understand development more holistically as sets of locally embedded 
processes, rather than attempting to identify universal models to scale up 
and adopt globally (Chambers & Loubere, 2016; Escobar, 2004; Hobbes, 
2014; Ramalingam, 2013). Implicit in this, is an actor-oriented understanding 
of development as inherently relational in nature (Mosse, Farrington, & Rew, 
1998; Mosse & Kruckenberg, 2016), in that development processes are 
constituted by sets of interlinking relationships, which are characterised by 
social arenas where actors struggle over meaning and power, resulting in 
                                            
179 Of course, studies that find microcredit to be fundamentally flawed outline 
alternatives rather than ‘best practices’. 
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unpredictable outcomes (Long, 1999, 2001; Long & Long, 1992). In this way, 
the implementation of development interventions is more than mere 
execution, and instead should be perceived as complex, dynamic and co-
produced pathways whose form and direction is continually under 
negotiation (Kruckenberg, 2015; Leach et al., 2010). 
 
Interestingly, an implicitly actor-oriented relational focus has been relatively 
common in research on local politics and local development in China. This is 
primarily due to the common acknowledgement of the importance of 
interpersonal relationships and social connections (i.e. guanxi networks) in 
shaping social processes in Chinese contexts (Kipnis, 1997); and the 
widespread interest in the heterogeneous implementation of development 
interventions at the local level stemming from the fact that development 
policy is often left relatively open to interpretation and experimentation 
(Heilmann, 2008; Heilmann & Melton, 2013).180 This has resulted in many 
studies taking the perspectives of local implementers as their point of 
departure and analysing the role that socio-political networks play in policy 
implementation, thus avoiding some of the mechanical top-down biases 
outlined above. Indeed, in-depth studies have explored processes of 
transformation and variation in provincial level development strategies 
(Donaldson, 2009), the campaign to Open Up the West (Goodman, 2004), 
the XNCJS (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013; Thøgersen, 2011), the New 
Cooperative Medical System (P. H. Brown et al., 2009), the abolition of 
agricultural taxes (L. C. Li, 2007), earmarked transfers from the central to 
local governments (Liu, Wang, Tao, & Murphy, 2009), the regulation of the 
FCs (Augustin-Jean & Xue, 2011) and agricultural industrialisation (Gao, 
2011), just to name a few. What emerges from these studies is a picture of 
local implementers as ‘street level bureaucrats’, who are intimately involved 
in shaping, and even defining, development policy through their everyday 
decisions (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003) – which is 
framed negatively as collusion (Tan, 2008; X. Zhou, 2010), or more 
                                            
180 Interest in local discretion in implementation practices is not restricted to 
development policy/interventions. Due to China’s large size and the 
traditional divide between central and local authority, heterogeneous 
implementation has been a key focus of much research on a variety of 
different types of policies, and has been utilised as a means of better 
understanding the workings of local societies in Chinese contexts (Chung, 
2000; Heilmann, 2008; Lampton, 1987; Manion, 1991; O’Brien & Li, 1999). 
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positively as strategic innovation and/or pragmatism (Ahlers & Schubert, 
2013; Thøgersen, 2011). While this body of research does not go so far as 
to explicitly explore complexity, self-organising systems or emergence like 
the research outlined above – and, for the most part, still perceives 
development policy implementation as linear with local implementers 
responding to external pressures and incentives – it does provide us with an 
in-depth understanding of local implementation processes, and the 
functioning of socio-political networks consisting of policy-makers, 
implementers and ‘beneficiaries’ at various levels. 
 
Surprisingly, microcredit schemes have been relatively overlooked in this 
large body of literature dedicated to shedding light on transformation and 
variation in the implementation of Chinese rural development policy. There 
has, of course, been some excellent research exploring the local workings of 
microcredit programmes, and exposing the ways in which their outcomes are 
negotiated by local actors and ultimately reflect heterogeneous local socio-
political and socioeconomic contexts (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Tsai, 2004). 
However, as stated in Chapter 2, the vast majority of research on Chinese 
microcredit has been structuralist and top-down in orientation, and has, 
therefore, been more interested in policy formulation and institutional 
organisation than with the actual operation of providers or implementation of 
policy at the local level (X. Du, 2008a; He et al., 2009; OECD, 2003; T. Sun, 
2008). When transformation/variation is discussed, it is often conceptualised 
negatively as ‘mission drift’ and/or government or elite ‘capture’ through the 
diversion and embezzlement of subsidised funds, causing the microcredit to 
be used ‘improperly’, which is invariably blamed on government ‘interference’ 
through market-distorting subsidies, and greedy officials/elites eager to take 
advantage of the programmes for individual gain (Hofmockel, 2005; OECD, 
2003; L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 2001). Implicit in these analyses is the view 
of microcredit as a ‘market-based’ development intervention that functions 
optimally when allowed to operate based on neoliberal market principles. 
What is missing, however, is an in-depth analysis of the different types of 
‘interference’ that occur as microcredit policy ‘travels down’, becomes 
internalised in different localities and is reproduced locally in heterogeneous 
ways, which is ultimately vital to an in-depth understanding of the role that 
microcredit plays in local development and livelihoods at the local level. 
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For this reason, this chapter aims to situate research on the policy and 
practice of microcredit in China, within the rich body of literature on the 
transformation and heterogeneous implementation of development 
policy/intervention in rural China. At the same time, it seeks to deepen our 
understanding of the diverse factors influencing and shaping this 
implementation by drawing on the development studies research mentioned 
above, which depicts development processes as complex, self-organising 
and ultimately emergent from the interfaces of interaction between diverse 
actors, and, hence, inherently relational in nature and more than the sum of 
sets of easily identifiable variables and constants. The rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 5.1 outlines how differentiated financial 
landscapes create segmented financial markets resulting in microcredit 
‘slotting in’ to different positions across (and within) the three townships, and 
causing the programmes to be interpreted in a variety of ways by local 
implementers and prospective borrowers. Section 5.2 explores the ways in 
which top-down pressures and incentives influence the implementation of 
the microcredit programmes and ultimately shape how microcredit fits into 
implementers’ livelihood strategies. Section 5.3 examines how microcredit 
provision is ultimately negotiated at the interfaces of interaction between 
individuals and groups with asymmetrical amounts of power, diverse goals 
and objectives, and various understandings of the role that microcredit 
should play in local development. Section 5.4 shows how all these 
exogenous, endogenous and relational factors combine to produce complex 
and emergent implementation realities that are more than the sum of their 
parts and thus difficult to predict, but which, nevertheless, provide important 
insight into the workings of local society, politics and development. Section 
5.5 concludes the chapter by setting the stage for the analysis of the 
differentiated roles that the microcredit programmes have played in local 
development and livelihoods across the research sites in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. 
 
5.1 Differentiated Financial Landscapes and Segmented 
Financial Markets 
One of the key reasons that development policy in China has historically 
been designed to allow for local discretion and experimentation is the 
acknowledgement of the country’s size and contextual diversity by central 
policy-makers. This has led to policy being understood as flexible sets of 
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guidelines or frameworks to be adapted to local conditions rather than 
specific instructions meant to be followed exactly (Heilmann, 2008; PBC, 
2001; State Council, 2008). The utility of creating space for local policy 
experimentation and modelling is evident in the AT, MWT and DET, as the 
three townships each represent distinct socioeconomic contexts, which have 
given rise to heterogeneous financial landscapes. These financial 
landscapes are differentiated in terms of their “physical financial 
infrastructure” (i.e. formal/informal financial service providers), and also vary 
in the ways in which “relations, norms, actions and processes” related to 
financial services are constructed and perceived by different actors (Bouman 
& Hospes, 1994, p. 1). This has resulted in financial markets that are 
differently segmented in terms of demand for, and access to, financial 
services, meaning that no one type of credit is universally desired or 
available (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Tsai, 2004). Thus, different types of credit 
(and their respective availability and utility) are perceived in diverse ways by 
different individuals and groups (i.e. ‘market segments’). This means that 
microcredit programmes – as an external interventions – necessarily ‘slot in’ 
to different positions and serve different segments of the market in different 
contexts, and in some cases may even contribute or respond to the 
emergence of “new market segments” (Bislev, 2010; Harper, 2012, p. 565). 
In this way, the three microcredit programmes are necessarily demanded, 
accessed and understood in very different ways across the three localities, 
and even by different actors within each township, necessitating variation in 
implementation practice at the local level. 
 
Demand for credit 
The different levels and types of demand for credit across/within the three 
townships is particularly evident. For instance, the AT is the most remote of 
the three townships and, because the township is flat and has a larger 
amount of good agricultural land, the main livelihood strategy has continued 
to be farming (see Chapter 3). In the words of one AT farmer: 
After the reform and opening, there was large-scale economic 
development and many rural people went to do migrant work. 
However, because we [people in the township] have more land, 
we stayed in the village to farm.181 
                                            
181 Interview 25. 
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This has led to widespread demand from many farming households for credit 
to support agricultural activities, such as purchasing inputs, 
purchasing/maintaining machinery, and the various costs related to supply 
and marketing. Additionally, since the ratification of the Land Rights and 
Transfer Agreement in 2008 – allowing rural people to rent land from each 
other – there has been demand for larger amounts of credit to scale-up 
agricultural production by renting unused farmland, particularly in 
neighbouring townships where many households have given up farming 
commercially. However, this demand has primarily been from wealthier 
households or groups who could be considered economic/political elites at 
the township and village levels, as poorer small-scale farmers do not have 
the means to scale-up their activities in this way. 
 
Financial market segmentation in the MWT and DET, on the other hand, is 
significantly more complex, and consists of a variety of different levels and 
types of demand for credit from a diversified range of actors. For instance, in 
the MWT there has been very limited demand for loans from village 
households, as most receive remittances from family members who are 
engaged in migrant work in urban areas. The majority of these households 
do not see any purpose for borrowing, as they are not interested in farming 
commercially or setting up a business.182 Migrant remittances have also 
become a source of credit in and of themselves, as some households 
informally pool their remittance funds in order to set up mutual support 
groups (similar to ROSCAs, see Chapter 2), and/or to invest in businesses 
either locally or outside the township. Therefore, demand for formal credit 
has further diminished, since the influx of capital from remittances allows for 
these types of informal arrangements, which are widely perceived to be 
more convenient than borrowing formally. That being said, there are also a 
variety of MWT businesses of varying sizes that require loans for day-to-day 
operation and expansion, and remittances or informal credit alone are often 
not sufficient (or sufficiently reliable), meaning that the owners also have a 
demand for formal credit services. 183  Indeed, the largest construction 
company in the MWT requires continuous large-scale financing from the 
                                            
182 Interview 34; Interview 37; Interview 39; Interview 41; Interview 44. See 
Chapter 7 for more on self exclusion. 
183 Interview 40; Interview 46. 
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RCC, and the main reason it moved its headquarters to the township from 
the city was because of an informal agreement that the company would be 
able to secure at least 50 per cent of the RCC’s lending capital.184  
 
In the DET, demand for credit is more complicated still due to the township’s 
wide range of socioeconomic activities, and also due to the fact that 
individuals and groups often employ multifaceted livelihood strategies. This 
means that some actors simultaneously demand different types of loans 
(both formal and informal) for different activities, and therefore represent 
multiple market segments at any one time, resulting in financial market 
segmentation that is both dynamic and complex. For instance, the largest 
components factory in the township accessed an EMP loan of RMB 300,000 
that was used for both investment in the factory, and also to engage in 
informal onlending, which provided higher rates of return than the main 
business.185 These multiple demands were not necessarily premeditated, but 
were instead flexible and responsive to the emergence of new opportunities. 
More commonly, households and businesses simultaneously accessed 
multiple sources of credit for a single project or consumption need. One 
household and operator of a microenterprise (a small bookstore) told me: 
To help my son buy a house I borrowed more than RMB 10,000 
from the PSBC. Friends and family also lent between RMB 
20,000 and RMB 30,000, and my son also borrowed money 
himself from a variety of sources.186 
Along the same lines, households and businesses also often demand loans 
to pay off other debts, which was referred to on a number of occasions as 
“destroying the west wall to build the east wall” (chai xi qiang, bu dong qiang 
Di(h	().187 Therefore, the credit demands of DET households and 
                                            
184 Interview 45. 
185 Interview 53. This was before the EMP was halted in 2013. 
186 Interview 58. 
187 This phrase was first mentioned in Interview 30 in the MWT, but also 
came up on other occasions in everyday conversation in the DET. Borrowing 
to repay other debts can obviously lead to destructive debt cycles (Taylor, 
2012); however, in the DET most interviewees using this technique did not 
seem to be in danger of defaulting, but were instead balancing debts and 
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businesses often defied simple or static characterisations, making attempts 
to classify demand into a typology both difficult and ultimately 
meaningless.188  
 
Credit supply and constraint 
Of course, the various types of demand outlined above are also linked to 
credit availability within and across the three localities. Credit has been 
particularly constrained in the AT, where the RCC is the only formal financial 
institution. This has resulted in a situation where only 20 per cent of the 
population has access to RCCMP loans, but over 40 per cent demand 
formal credit, meaning that the demand for farming activities outlined above 
has largely gone unmet. 189  Moreover, due to the township’s lack of 
socioeconomic linkages with more prosperous urban areas (e.g. through 
migrant work), there has been little capital readily available for lending on 
informal markets. Additionally, since the AT is not home to any designated 
‘poverty-stricken villages’ (despite being the poorest of the three townships), 
there has been no opportunity to utilise the PAMP as a means of meeting 
some of this demand. Of course, the EMP is in operation, and while it has 
been used to provide credit to normally excluded village actors, the scale is 
currently too small (i.e. 12 loans of RMB 50,000 each) to seriously alleviate 
the overall level of constraint in the township. This has meant that the supply 
of credit (and the implementation of the microcredit programmes) has been 
primarily mediated by socioeconomic status and guanxi networks, as only 
local elites (at the township or village levels) have been able to obtain the 
credit rating necessary to borrow from the RCCMP, and/or have 
friends/family with access to excess capital that can be used to provide 
informal loans on a consistent basis (see Section 5.3). 
 
                                                                                                                           
time limits in order to minimise interest payments and gain access to needed 
capital at crucial moments (DET Contextual Observation Report). 
188 There were of course some basic needs which households (particularly 
poorer households) across the three townships demanded credit for, such as 
housing and education for children. Access to, and exclusion from, the 
microcredit programmes for these consumption purposes will be covered in 
more detail in Chapter 7. 
189 Interview 05. 
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In the other two townships there are a variety of sources of formal and 
informal credit available to meet the more diversified demands/needs 
outlined in the previous section. There are also a greater number of 
socioeconomic linkages with actors in urban and peri-urban areas with more 
credit options. As stated above, in the MWT there has been a significant 
amount of capital inflow from migrant remittances, leading to increased 
stocks of local capital that can be used for informal pooling/lending. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the RCC is the only financial institution in the 
MWT, and that it provides very little credit to households and 
microenterprises, there has not been the same general perception of 
widespread credit constraint as in the AT.  
 
The DET also has a much more vibrant informal lending market, and most 
people utilise a combination of formal and informal credit when undertaking 
a project or making an investment.190 At the same time, however, the DET is 
also home to formal lenders that are not present in the other two townships. 
For instance, the ABC provides loans for households and microenterprises 
secured by guarantors or joint-liability groups, but the loan process is 
relatively complicated and the interest rate is slightly higher than the 
RCCMP. This has made the ABC less popular with small-scale borrowers, 
so the bank primarily targets the medium/large business market segment 
that is excluded from the RCCMP.191  Alternatively, the PSBC does not 
provide credit directly in the township, but does help prospective borrowers 
prepare application documents for submission at the county branch. Similar 
to the ABC, the interest is higher and the PSBC mainly targets larger-scale 
enterprises or projects.192 In other words, formal and informal sources of 
credit have moved in to accommodate a number of the diverse market 
segments in the DET. That being said, poorer segments of the population 
with lower socioeconomic statuses have, nevertheless, continued to be 
excluded in the DET, as well as the other two townships (see Chapter 7). 
 
                                            
190 Non-financial informal lending is also widespread in the DET, with many 
households borrowing labour and/or construction materials from each other 
when building new houses and repaying in kind or in cash (Interview 60).  
191 Conversation 36; Interview 55. 
192 Conversation 37. 
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Differentiated interpretations of microcredit function and utility 
These different types of demand and supply/constraint have meant that 
implementers, local businesses and households perceive the three 
microcredit programmes, determine their relative usefulness, and 
appropriate them (or choose to ignore them) within their own strategies for 
inducing development and reproducing livelihoods in different ways.193 For 
instance, in the AT both implementers and borrowers immediately saw the 
EMP as an important source of capital in the context of severe credit 
constraint. This resulted in collaboration between officials (at the village, 
township and county levels), farmers (in the form of an FC) and financial 
institutions (at the township and county levels), in order to create a new 
model for EMP provision that would meet the needs of an underserved 
market segment (i.e. small-scale farmers) and simultaneously fit in with the 
primary development strategy of the township and county – to support and 
modernise agriculture. The RCCMP was also perceived as a method of 
channelling capital to agricultural activities in the AT by providing funds to 
larger-scale farmers wanting to expand and scale-up farming activities by 
renting unused agricultural land. However, due to the limited amount of 
lending capital available through the RCC, this was mainly reserved for a 
few township elites who were able to use their connections to get the 
necessary credit rating.194 In other words, in both cases the RCCMP and 
EMP were perceived as a means of supporting agricultural development, but 
the programmes still ended up ‘slotting in’ to different market segments, with 
the RCCMP being appropriated by township elites and the EMP being 
incorporated into the development and livelihood strategies of officials at 
various levels and village level farmers who would have otherwise been 
excluded from the provision of formal credit. 
 
The MWT, on the other hand, has similar credit constraints to the AT, but 
there is much less demand for formal credit due the fact that most 
households receive migrant remittances and there is more widespread 
                                            
193 Of course, different actors also have different amounts of knowledge, and 
sometimes knowledge is purposefully withheld from certain segments of the 
population, which has the potential to dramatically change the ways in which 
microcredit is supplied, demanded and/or perceived. This is covered in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
194 Interview 23. 
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access to informal sources of credit. Therefore, implementers have not 
considered households to be a target market segment for the microcredit 
programmes, and the RCCMP has mainly been directed towards larger-
scale enterprises – which fits in with the township’s development strategy of 
maximising economic development. Meanwhile, the EMP and the PAMP 
were considered to be redundant and time-consuming, so rather than 
attempting to adapt the programmes to provide credit to underserved market 
segments, implementers simply interpreted their microcredit implementation 
duties in ways that reduced their time/work commitments. In the DET, the 
RCCMP has been perceived to be a key duty of the RCC due to the fact that 
the programme was initially piloted in the county/township. For this reason, 
80 per cent of the township households borrow from the RCCMP, meaning 
that the programme effectively serves a variety of market segments. At the 
same time, there are a number of other sources of formal and informal credit 
available to households and businesses, which (as in the MWT) has resulted 
in the EMP and PAMP being perceived as unnecessary (i.e. having no place 
in the segmented market) by implementers and prospective borrowers alike, 
and neither were provided during the fieldwork period.195 
 
Ultimately, it is clear that the differently segmented financial markets have 
played a role in shaping perceptions of how microcredit should ‘slot in’ to 
each of the townships’ financial landscapes. At the same time, the 
programmes were also often perceived within the context of local 
development strategies, such as agriculture in the AT and economic growth 
in the MWT. It is, however, also important to note that these landscapes and 
markets are dynamic, meaning that the types of demand and supply are in a 
constant state of flux. Therefore, due to the flexibility that is inherent in 
Chinese development policy, the microcredit programmes have the potential 
to be reinterpreted to serve different market segments and play different 
roles in local development, depending on shifting financial and 
developmental landscapes. 
 
                                            
195 Despite the fact that the EMP has zero per cent interest, it still has a 
higher transaction cost, particularly due to the required training in the county 
(see Chapter 4). 
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5.2 Strategising and Rationalising Pressures and Incentives 
The governor of the county has less power than one’s direct supervisor (xian 
guan buru xian guan /*T_). 
- Old Chinese saying 
 
The analysis in Section 5.1 details the ways in which differently segmented 
financial markets in the three localities have caused microcredit to be 
perceived in different ways by various local actors. This type of focus on the 
economic principles of supply and demand is common in much of the 
literature on microcredit in China (X. Du, 2008b; X. Li et al., 2011a; L. Xu, 
2009; Y. Zhao, 2011), and, as the previous section demonstrates, certainly 
plays an important role in shaping the environmental conditions that 
microcredit programmes operate in at the local level – albeit in more 
complex and dynamic ways than usually acknowledged. However, as 
development interventions and government policies, the three programmes 
are not only shaped by markets, but also by political considerations, which 
fundamentally underpin the ways in which local implementers (i.e. 
government officials) understand the programmes and incorporate them into 
their own livelihood strategies. Indeed, much literature on policy 
implementation in china points to the pressures and incentives influencing 
implementers, and stresses the importance of ‘scientism’ and the ‘audit 
culture’ associated with the ‘scientific development concept’ (kexue fazhan 
guan \.6j), which is conceived of as incentivising local officials to 
prioritise policy goals that are easily measurable and used to determine 
career advancement (Chung, 2000; Donaldson, 2009; Heberer & Trappel, 
2013; O’Brien & Li, 1999; S. Zhao, 2007). In the case of microcredit, there 
can be no doubt that these types of quantifiable exogenous and endogenous 
pressures and incentives have played an important role in influencing the 
implementation of the three programmes. However, as this section will 
illustrate, seemingly similar pressures and incentives have resulted in 
different outcomes across the three townships, meaning that they have not 
always been perceived in the same way. Moreover, local implementers 
demonstrated an ability to change their understandings of pressures and 
incentives over time. 
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Quotas 
For instance, local implementers have formulated different strategies to 
ensure that quotas imposed by higher levels of government are met in ways 
that limit time expenditure and risk, and fit into local development strategies. 
This is particularly evident with the EMP where quotas have been 
determined at the county level. In the AT, county and township implementers 
decided to provide the entire quota of 12 loans to a single borrower (the FC) 
with one guarantor (the township government). This saved time and hassle 
by eliminating the need to find one or more suitable guarantors for each 
individual loan, and also reduced monitoring costs and risks associated with 
having multiple guarantors. In the MWT, the township MoHRSS official 
limited time expenditure and risk by lending the entire quota to friends and 
family that he knew were able to find suitable guarantors and ultimately 
repay the loans without any problem. In the DET, meanwhile, the lack of a 
county-imposed quota was initially perceived as a mandate to provide the 
EMP to anyone who met the eligibility criteria; however, this understanding 
was later revised by local implementers to mean that the programme could 
be halted altogether, thus completely eliminating time expenditure and risk. 
 
The central government mandate that RCCs should use 60 per cent of their 
lending capital for the RCCMP has also been interpreted differently in the 
three localities. The quota was followed in the AT, but since the township is 
relatively poor and there are less migrant remittances bolstering local 
savings, the township RCC has relatively less capital and was thus unable to 
meet the demand for RCCMP loans.196  This meant that the RCC only 
provided loans to those with a high enough credit rating (i.e. high 
socioeconomic status and good connections), thus undermining one of the 
key principles of the programme – that all households should have the 
chance to borrow without the need for a guarantor and continue to borrow as 
long as they do not default. In the DET, on the other hand, this principle of 
(almost) universal provision of the RCCMP was upheld primarily because of 
a combination of top-down pressure and bottom-up expectations resulting 
from the fact that the DET was one of the initial pilot areas for the 
programme. This has meant that 80 per cent of the population borrows from 
the programme, which is possible, to a certain extent, because the DET is 
                                            
196 Interview 05. 
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more wealthy and therefore has more savings capital than its counterpart in 
the AT. However, it is also likely that the RCC has been using more than the 
required 60 per cent of total lending capital to finance the widespread 
provision of the programme.197 Finally, in the MWT the quota was met 
through a fundamental redefinition of the RCCMP as a programme aimed at 
large-scale enterprises rather than households, demonstrating the RCC 
manager’s active (but subversive) imagination and ability to reinterpret the 
programme to function in a way that fit his goals and didn’t conflict with other 
top-down pressures related to the RCC operating in a ‘financially 
sustainable’ way (see Chapter 4).198 County officials in the MWT and DET 
similarly reinterpreted the meaning of the quotas associated with the PAMP 
so that the poverty alleviation funds could be directed towards other ‘more 
productive’ areas.199 
 
Career advancement 
The role of policy implementation in influencing local officials’ career 
prospects is another key exogenous pressure that is often cited in the 
literature. As Luigi Tomba points out, “the process of policy selection by the 
central government has relied heavily on experiments engineered at the 
local level… The success of such experiments traditionally makes or breaks 
the careers of local leaders” (Tomba, 2012, p. N/A). The potential for the 
microcredit programmes to ‘make or break’ the careers of local officials was 
evident in the three localities. However, implementers (again) perceived this 
potential in significantly different ways. For instance, since the EMP does not 
feature prominently in the performance targets associated with the ‘cadre 
responsibility system’ (ganbu zeren zhidu 9so), or meet any of the 
four criteria in Graeme Smith’s “matrix of rural cadre decision-making” (G. 
                                            
197  This cannot be confirmed as RCC employees would not answer 
questions related to the total amount of capital used for the RCCMP; 
however, the attitude and comments of the director of the DET RCC during 
our brief conversation suggest that the RCCMP is particularly resource 
intensive (Conversation 22). 
198 Of course, this reinterpretation also required the tacit consent of officials 
and RCC employees at the county level. 
199 Interview 16. 
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Smith, 2013, p. 146),200 it is unsurprising that the implementers in the MWT 
and DET saw the programme as a potential career speed bump and sought 
to mitigate the risks associated with its provision by focusing on achieving 
the most quantifiable element (i.e. repayment rates) or by cancelling the 
programme altogether. However, despite the programme not having an 
obvious or directly measurable benefit to their careers, county and township 
officials in the AT perceived the EMP as a means of creating their own 
‘model experience’ (dianxing jingyan %ct) (Heilmann, 2008), which they 
hoped would improve their career prospects, 201  thus contradicting 
established theory on how and why implementers decide to devote time and 
energy to certain policies and not others in the Chinese context. 
 
Similar to the EMP in the MWT and the DET, the RCCMP seems to be 
widely seen as a task that needs to be completed in order to avoid careers 
being adversely affected, rather than an opportunity for career advancement. 
In the AT, for instance, the RCC manager treated the RCCMP like a duty 
and simply followed the instructions of his superiors in the county.202 In the 
DET, the RCCMP was already an established model, so there was 
significant pressure to maintain a certain implementation standard, but local 
implementers did not seem to perceive the programme as having the 
potential to provide for future career advancement in the same way that a 
new model/experiment may have.203 In the MWT, career advancement for 
RCC employees was dependent on the institution operating in a ‘financially 
sustainable’ way based on market principles. 204  Moreover, the RCC 
manager had significant pressure from county and prefectural officials to 
provide large-scale loans to the largest construction company,205  which 
                                            
200 i.e. it is not particularly measurable, it does not raise revenue, it does not 
provide much benefit to local officials or the shadow state, and it is not 
conducive to mass mobilisation. 
201 Interview 04; Interview 07. 
202 Interview 07. 
203 DET Contextual Observation Report. For this reason local implementers 
often try to make their mark with a new model rather than by 
improving/strengthening existing policies (Conversation 34). 
204 Interview 10. 
205 Interview 45. 
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probably also had a significant influence on his future career advancement. 
Therefore, the RCCMP was reinterpreted to meet these top-down 
imperatives. 
 
The PAMP was not perceived as a useful means of career advancement in 
either the MWT or DET. At the same time, it was not considered important 
enough to be detrimental to careers, and was thus ignored at the county 
level, and knowledge of the programme was not transmitted to township 
officials. This is, to a certain extent, understandable in the DET where the 
RCCMP dominates the financial landscape and serves multiple market 
segments (see above). However, it seems to show a lack of imagination in 
the MWT, where officials could have used the loans for infrastructure 
development – which is permitted in the policy and would have fit in well with 
the township’s stated development strategy – and the programme, therefore, 
could have served as a ‘model experience’ similar to the EMP in the AT.206  
 
Powerful actors and tipping points 
The direct influence and/or imagined influence of powerful actors at higher 
levels also served as a potent exogenous pressure for local implementers. 
The implementation of the RCCMP in the DET is a particularly good 
example of this, as the programme pilot was initiated on the direct orders of 
Jiang Zemin and the governor of the PBC during a town hall meeting in the 
township.207 This visit, which took place over a decade before my fieldwork, 
has remained fresh in the minds of local people, and was often brought up 
during interviews and conversations, with some people even showing 
pictures that they had saved from the event.208 For this reason, this town hall 
meeting, and the powerful image of officials at the highest level directly 
sanctioning the programme, can be considered a ‘tipping point’, which led to 
quick and sudden change (Chambers & Loubere, 2016). From this visit 
                                            
206 This may be due to the fact that the PAMP has been around much longer 
than the EMP, so local implementers may feel that the programme has ‘too 
much baggage’ and would not allow them to make their mark. 
207 Interview 60. 
208 DET Contextual Observation Report. There are too many interviews and 
conversation to cite here. 
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onwards, the programme instantly became a priority for county and township 
officials, and has now become normalised in the minds of local people as 
one of the RCC’s primary duties. Indeed, everyone I spoke to in the DET 
knew about the RCCMP and it was discussed as something that local 
people took for granted. 
 
To a lesser extent, the influence of powerful actors on RCCMP provision can 
also be seen in the MWT. Because the construction company is well 
connected with officials and RCC employees at the county and prefectural 
levels, and effectively moved to the township based on the promise of cheap 
large-scale loans, 209  the township RCC director has felt pressured to 
reinterpret the institution’s primary role, both directly, from county level 
superiors, and indirectly, through the imagined high level guanxi of the 
construction company boss.210 On the other hand, microcredit programmes 
in the AT seem to be less influenced by these types of powerful actors, and 
are instead shaped more directly by county and township implementers. 
That being said, if the provision of the EMP in the AT becomes a model that 
is replicated in other areas, the initial experimentation described in Chapter 4 
has the potential to be a ‘tipping point’ leading to widespread and rapid 
change in the way that microcredit is understood in the township and 
elsewhere in the future. 
 
Time and resource constraints 
Finally, resource constraints due to the ‘hollowing out’ of the townships 
through the elimination of revenue sources (e.g. the abolition of rural taxes 
and fees) and the ‘soft centralisation’ (from the township to the county) of 
income generating governmental departments (Mertha, 2005; G. Smith, 
2010), also represented a distinct set of pressures that microcredit 
implementers and other local officials felt acutely in all three sites, but, again, 
perceived and reacted to in different ways. Officials at the township level 
generally consider their jobs to be especially challenging, with one official 
saying:  
                                            
209 Interview 45. 
210 This reinterpretation is evident, since in the 1980s and 1990s there used 
to be small loans available for farming which have since been cancelled 
(Conversation 05; Interview 35). 
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We not only have to report to our superiors at higher levels, but 
we often have to deal with ‘regular people’ (laobaixing eW+) 
face-to-face as well. Sometimes regular people have problems 
and demands that are impossible to deal with, but higher level 
officials do not take this into consideration, they just think we are 
not doing a good job if the regular people complain. County 
officials just have to give us orders, they don’t deal with people.211 
Particularly in the MWT and DET, where the local MoHRSS offices are 
‘devolved work units’ (i.e. controlled and funded at the township level; see 
Chapter 4), EMP implementers said that their workload is unrealistic. The 
EMP is just one of many programmes that they are responsible for, meaning 
that they have to make decisions about which tasks to prioritise and 
complete on a daily basis.212 Similarly, the AT RCC has only four employees 
for the entire township, which ultimately makes it very difficult for the RCC to 
effectively serve the diverse needs of different market segments.213 This 
situation of overworked local officials has been exacerbated in recent years 
as township governments have been pushed to become more ‘financially 
sustainable’ and seek out new sources of revenue in order to cover budgets 
(and salaries). For instance, in the MWT the main priority of every township 
official is seeking outside sources of investment, particularly from large 
companies seeking to relocate to the township.214 In the DET this has been 
taken one step further, as the county government recently told township 
officials that if they did not bring in a certain amount of outside income 
annually they would face demotion and even layoffs.215 
 
This situation has caused local implementers to creatively rationalise 
reasons for changing the provision of microcredit services in order to save 
valuable time and resources. Most obvious is the cancellation of the EMP in 
the DET after a ‘reinterpretation’ of the lack of a quota with the tacit 
                                            
211 Conversation 34. 
212 Conversation 34; Interview 08. 
213 Interview 05. 
214 MWT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 14. 
215 Conversation 33. Township officials have also been told that they cannot 
have expensive meals or alcohol unless it is with a potential investor.  
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agreement of the county (see above),216 and the provision of the entire 
RCCMP quota to a large enterprise in the MWT. But even the provision of 
the EMP in the AT was designed to save time, as one MoHRSS official 
pointed out: “This village is a model of innovative service provision that 
reduces the time involved in providing services. It is also more convenient 
[for implementers] and promotes collective development.” 217  The non-
implementation of the PAMP was also an obvious attempt to save time and 
energy, and to divert funds to ‘more important’ development causes. Local 
implementers rationalised this by framing the PAMP as an ineffective 
programme that is not useful for, or desired by, the poor, as the loan 
amounts are too low and repayment too difficult.218 This went hand in hand 
with the general narrative espoused by many local implementers that 
microcredit is not a productive use of resources for development promotion, 
and that microcredit funds should be channelled into larger local enterprises 
and/or infrastructure that has the potential to scale-up development and 
provide taxes to the township governments.219  At the same time, local 
implementers also rationalised saving time and resources through service 
transformation and/or reduction by drawing on popular narratives of ‘Chinese 
exceptionalism’ or the uniqueness of China’s ‘national conditions’ (guoqing 
jueding #>0), and by pointing out that ‘local conditions’ should shape 
implementation as stated in the policies (see Chapter 4).220 
 
Local implementers as strategists 
The above examples and analysis illustrate that local implementers are 
subjected to a variety of exogenous pressures and incentives, usually 
emanating from more powerful actors or centres. However, it also shows 
that local implementers have not uniformly perceived these pressures and 
                                            
216 Interview 19; Interview 20. 
217 Interview 07. 
218 Interview 12; Interview 16; Interview 21. 
219 These arguments are almost Keynesian in nature, and mirror some of the 
key arguments in the growing body of literature critiquing the fundamental 
underpinnings of the global microfinance movement (see Chapter 1) 
(Interview 12; Interview 16). 
220 Conversation 34. 
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incentives across the three localities. This, in many ways, confirms the 
findings from an increasing number of studies indicating that the 
personalities, attitudes and background experiences of front-line 
implementers (i.e. street-level bureaucrats) are perhaps the most important 
‘variables’ shaping the final implementation of policy in China – often 
trumping top-down pressures and incentives – and emphasising the need to 
understand the diverse motivations underpinning the behaviour of local 
officials (Ahlers & Schubert, 2015; Bislev, 2010; Chung, 2000; Donaldson, 
2009; Mood, 2005; G. Smith, 2013). Indeed, the highly differentiated 
interpretations of the benefits and risks associated with microcredit provision 
for implementer livelihoods across the three townships demonstrates that 
local implementers cannot be reduced to ‘homo economicus’, robotically 
responding to external stimuli to maximise personal gains, but should 
instead be understood as complicated individuals/groups with different 
personalities and life histories that shape the ways in which they understand 
microcredit as a means of facilitating development and other objectives. 
 
This is clearly demonstrated in the provision of the EMP across the three 
localities. For instance, in the MWT and the DET, it is clear that the 
perspectives of local implementers were coloured by ‘numbness’ (mamu u
K) resulting from being charged with too many tasks and having too few 
resources to accomplish them all (G. Smith, 2010, p. 611). The ‘success’ of 
the AT model, on the other hand, was credited to the “enthusiasm of 
energetic officials” at the county, township and village levels. In particular, 
the “development spirit” (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013, p. 16) of the county 
official who had the imagination and drive to attempt to create a new ‘model 
experience’ despite few direct incentives, and the ‘capability’ of the local 
leader of the FC (i.e. nengren), who was able to acquire and transmit new 
technical knowledge at the village level. Obviously, environmental and 
exogenous factors played key roles in shaping the ways in which the 
programmes were implemented in these examples, but it was ultimately the 
personalities and decisions (i.e. agency) of those directly involved in the 
implementation at the local level that made the largest contribution to 
implementation outcomes. 
 
Therefore, the examples of microcredit provision outlined in this study 
contradict commonly held binary conceptions of local officials as either 
“principled agents” or (more nefariously) “wily defiers” (O’Brien & Li, 1999, p. 
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168), who are unable to resist the temptation to engage in corrupt activities 
in order to ‘capture’ subsidised credit or other development funds (L. Ong, 
2011; Park & Ren, 2001). For instance, while the cancellation of the EMP in 
the DET and the provision of loans to friends and family in the MWT could 
be considered collusion, ‘elite capture’, and “shirking” as opposed to 
“working” (O’Brien & Li, 1999, pp. 181–182), the decision-making processes 
of the local officials in these two places could also be described as a 
“pragmatic strategy of resource allocation under the conditions of financial 
scarcity” (Ahlers & Schubert, 2013, p. 2), since local implementers ultimately 
innovated policy implementation to meet local developmental needs with the 
resources available. Additionally, local implementers in the AT ‘colluded’ in 
order to provide individual loans to the members of the FC rather than the 
larger group loan outlined in the policy, as the central MoF only covers 50 
per cent of the interest payment for the larger loans. In other words, this 
represented the ‘capture’ of central funds in order to benefit local actors, and 
could therefore be perceived as either local corruption or beneficial 
strategising depending on one’s perspective. Even the RCCMP in the MWT, 
which would widely be considered to be a classic case of local corruption 
and diversion of credit from households to elite large-scale business, could 
also be understood within the township’s development strategy of attracting 
outside companies and investing in infrastructure in a local developmental 
state mode (Bateman, Duran Ortíz, & Maclean, 2011). In sum, while 
collusion and corruption at the local level undoubtedly exist and and even 
widespread, it is certainly not always clear-cut or binary. Ultimately, the 
implementation of the three programmes has reflected the ways in which 
implementers perceive and understand microcredit as a development 
intervention, what microcredit means and, most importantly, how microcredit 
can be most effective in the promotion of different conceptions of 
development at the local level. 
 
5.3 Interpersonal Relationships and Negotiations at the 
Interface 
Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 illustrate the ways in which local 
contexts/environments and exogenous pressures/incentives shape 
microcredit implementation at the local level. At the same time, the above 
analysis clearly demonstrates that the perceptions of different actors towards 
these external factors are highly differentiated both within and across 
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localities. These perceptions and interpretations are, to a certain extent, 
defined by the different personalities and backgrounds of the individuals 
involved in the microcredit programmes. Therefore, understanding these 
individuals’ worldviews and personal objectives can go a long way in helping 
us to better understand how and why they choose to steer development 
programmes, such as microcredit, in certain directions. Ultimately, however, 
it is not individuals who determine the final implementation outcomes of 
development interventions. Rather, implementation realities are co-produced 
by groups consisting of diverse individuals, often with different worldviews 
and understandings of development. Therefore, underpinning the different 
types of heterogeneous implementation outlined above are discontinuities, 
struggles and negotiations that take place at the interfaces of interaction 
between diverse actors at various levels. In the words of Norman Long, 
these inherently relational interfaces of interaction are where actors become 
engaged in each other’s projects and “locked into struggles over the 
attribution of social meanings to particular events, actions and ideas,” and, 
despite dramatic power asymmetries, “all actors exercise some kind of 
‘power’, leverage or room for manoeuvre, even those in highly subordinate 
positions” (Long, 2001, p. 17). 
 
Guanxi interfaces in the Chinese context 
In the context of rural China, these interfaces of interaction are largely 
understood as being the product of, or mediated by, overlapping networks of 
interpersonal relationships (guanxi wang ad). These networks have 
traditionally been based on lineage groups and rooted in local areas, but are 
increasingly incorporating larger groups of family, friends and other social 
contacts extending regionally and beyond – primarily due to rural-urban 
migration and other processes related to globalisation (Gold, Guthrie, & 
Wank, 2002; C. Wang, Ye, & Franco, 2014). Particularly in rural China, 
much research on local society focuses on how the formation/production of 
social relationships (guanxi) – and the associated concepts of ‘human 
feeling’ (ganqing @>) and ‘reciprocity’ (bao C)221 that underpin and give 
                                            
221 Reciprocity is key to guanxi production, as actors continually engage in 
reciprocal and mutually beneficial actions, which is also referred to as 
lishang wanglai (Y4<N). However, this does not simply imply material 
repayment, but is rooted in a philosophical tradition that understands the 
world as having balance and being based on the rules of cause and effect – 
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these relationships meaning – is central to social, economic and political life 
(Gold et al., 2002; Kipnis, 1997; Y. Yan, 1996). In other words, Chinese 
society (and particularly rural society) can be conceptualised as being 
composed of overlapping and interconnecting ‘particularistic ties’ between 
individuals and groups, which are both instrumental in nature, but also reliant 
on reciprocal actions grounded in ‘human feeling’ in order to be maintained 
and remain operational (C. Wang et al., 2014).222 
 
This understanding of society as being the product of overlapping 
relationships is strikingly similar to Norman Long’s conceptions of ‘actor 
interfaces’ and ‘social arenas’ described above and in Chapter 3. For 
instance, Fei Xiaotong – who is often referred to as the father of Chinese 
sociology – coined the term the ‘differential mode of association’ (chaxu geju 
7;O5) to liken the structure of Chinese society to “ripples formed from a 
stone thrown into a lake; each circle spreading out from the centre becomes 
more distant and at the same time more insignificant” (Fei, 1992, p. 65). In 
this way, in any given social situation, the proximity of relationships (ripples) 
to the central ego, where these relationships overlap, and, of course, the 
relative power of the different actors in different situations, ultimately 
determines the nature of social reality and structures societal arrangements. 
However, Fei and other Chinese theorists take the social constructivism 
underpinning Long’s conception of actor-interface analysis one step further 
by pointing out that – in the Chinese context – even seemingly durable 
concepts such as morality or logic are contextually defined at these 
interfaces/arenas, meaning that all social interaction (including the 
processes involved in determining policy implementation) is invariably the 
product of relationships between implementers and other actors (both locally 
and non-locally). However, these relationships are not static, but are instead 
continuously being renegotiated. Therefore, social reality is inherently 
relational and context specific (i.e. dependant on who is involved), and in a 
continuous state of dynamic flux (Fei, 1992; Liang, 1963). 
 
                                                                                                                           
with every action having an appropriate reaction (X. Chang, 2010; L.-S. 
Yang, 1957; Y. Yan, 1996). 
222  This element of instrumentality is one of the reasons that socio-
political/socioeconomic activities are so often framed as collusion and/or 
corruption, particularly with regard to local officials (see Section 5.2). 
 197 
This means that, while local implementers can be considered strategists (as 
outlined in Section 5.2), they should not necessarily be considered ‘rational’ 
or ‘utilitarian’ strategists acting in a ‘homo economicus’ mode or abiding by 
‘western’ conceptions of static morality and logic. Instead, these guanxi 
relations at the interfaces of interaction can influence implementation in 
ways that are defined by different ‘logics’ that emerge from relationships, 
and trump considerations related simply to personal gain and/or 
development imperatives (C. Wang et al., 2014). Therefore, in order to 
analyse development policy implementation in-depth, it becomes necessary 
to expand on common conceptualisations of local government organisation 
in post-reform China, such as ‘local state corporatism’ and the 
‘entrepreneurial state’ (Duckett, 2001; Oi, 1992), which, for the most part, 
depict local governments as unitary actors with singular strategies for 
increasing access to resources and promoting uncontested versions of 
development. This is not to say that these theories do not provide useful 
ways of understanding local governmental operation and behaviour, but 
rather that by incorporating actor-oriented approaches and interrogating the 
relationships and negotiations between diverse actors that underpin and 
shape everyday politics (C. Wang et al., 2014), it becomes possible to better 
understand why the operation/behaviour of local governments and officials 
results in specific (often unexpected) implementation outcomes. 
 
Negotiating local constellations of power 
The fundamental importance of these social networks and interfaces of 
interaction in dictating the implementation outcomes of the three microcredit 
programmes can be seen on a number of levels. For instance, even a 
seemingly structural/environmental factor – such as the township 
development strategies that shape local understandings of microcredit as a 
development intervention – are not uniform or uncontested, but rather 
formulated through negotiations and struggles between different actors at 
the local and non-local levels. Therefore, even if one understands the formal 
hierarchies that supposedly determine relative levels of power, there are 
often hidden interests, social connections and reservoirs of power that are 
not immediately observable (and are usually unquantifiable and relationally 
constituted), making it very difficult to truly determine where power and 
leverage lie in any given negotiation (C. Wang et al., 2014). 
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For instance, officials in the DET told me that, formally, the township party 
secretary is the highest-ranking local official, and therefore should have the 
most say when formulating local development strategies and priorities. 
However, in reality, the township people’s congress and the township mayor 
have a closer relationship with each other than either have with the party 
secretary, and are able to join forces in ways that marginalise the party 
secretary during decision-making processes. 223  To make things more 
complicated, seemingly less powerful actors may have social connections at 
higher levels or be integrated into social networks that endow them with 
unexpected leverage in certain situations. For instance, in the DET there 
were a few student cadres (daxuesheng cunguan ).VM/)224 working in 
the village and township governments, one of whom had family connections 
with high level provincial officials. For this reason, township officials saw him 
as both potentially dangerous and as a potentially good future connection, 
and gave him more respect and autonomy than would be expected for a 
position so low in the official hierarchy. Because he was especially 
interested in issues related to socioeconomic development, he was even 
allowed to participate in negotiations over the township’s development 
strategy. Therefore, the party secretary’s voice was effectively silenced, and 
the current set of development priorities were largely determined by a group 
including the township head, the people’s congress and the student cadre, 
among others.225 Of course, this one example only provides a superficial 
view of one set of complex negotiations that determine how development 
policy is interpreted and implemented at the local level, but it does illustrate 
that local development strategy, which shapes how microcredit is 
understood by local implementers, is ultimately the outcome of negotiations 
at the interfaces of interaction between individuals and groups. However, it 
also shows that it is not always clear who has the most power or leverage in 
                                            
223 Conversation 34. 
224 Student cadres are recent university graduates who are posted to a 
village or township to work as a local cadre for one or two years in order to 
learn about local government before becoming a full cadre, often at higher 
levels. 
225 DET Contextual Observation Report; Conversation 23; Conversation 33; 
Conversation 34. This lack of a powerful unitary vision may be the reason 
that the DET does not have a clearly defined development strategy. 
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any given situation, what is feeding reservoirs of power, or the ultimate long-
term goals of those involved in negotiations.226 
 
Negotiating microcredit provision 
With regard to microcredit implementation specifically, the provision of the 
EMP and RCCMP loans were the direct result of social networks and 
negotiations between implementers and other actors, some of whom were 
located outside the townships and wielded considerable amounts of power. 
For instance, the provision of the RCCMP (or at least the funds earmarked 
for the RCCMP) in the MWT was determined through negotiations between 
actors at the prefectural, county and township levels. This is because the 
construction company was able to leverage its connections with officials and 
RCC employees in the city and the county, and therefore entered into 
negotiations with the township RCC from a position of significant power. At 
the same time, by agreeing to provide the loans to the construction 
company, the township RCC manager effectively integrated himself into the 
company’s powerful guanxi network, which increased his local socio-political 
status.227 Ultimately, this allowed the company to secure large-scale loans 
that should have been set-aside for households, thus redefining the RCCMP 
in ways that were fundamentally contradictory to the programme’s goals. 
Nevertheless, despite coming from a dominant power position, the owner of 
the company was still required to observe the norms surrounding the local 
production of guanxi by inviting local officials and RCC employees to meals 
and offering gifts, which ultimately cost approximately 10 per cent of the loan 
total.228 Similarly, in the DET the owner of the largest components factory 
told me how his connections with the county government provided significant 
leverage in local negotiations, saying:  
                                            
226 For detailed examples of how negotiations and struggles over power and 
resources at various levels of government can influence policy 
implementation in unpredictable ways, see (C. Wang, Ye, & Franco, 2014). 
227 The RCC manager in the MWT seemed to have a higher status than 
other township officials. For instance, he was smoking cigarettes that were 
far more expensive than those of the township officials, and he spoke to the 
vice-director of the township like a subordinate (MWT Contextual 
Observation Report). 
228 Interview 45. Also see Chapter 4. 
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Politically the government has helped a lot. For instance, my wife 
is now a representative in the county people’s congress, and I am 
a member of the people’s political consultative conference and 
the vice-president of the county business federation. This has 
given the company a better platform for development.229 
In particular, these connections helped him to negotiate access to the EMP 
before the programme was halted. However, as with the construction 
company in the MWT, this required the maintenance of guanxi, which was 
both time and resource intensive. 
 
In other cases implementation outcomes were determined by negotiations at 
the very lowest levels. For instance, the provision of the RCCMP in the AT 
was based on credit scores, which were decided by village committees. 
Therefore, in order to be eligible to apply for loans in the township, 
prospective borrowers needed to have good connections with village 
officials, imbuing these local actors with significantly more power than their 
counterparts in the MWT or DET. Negotiations also took place between 
individuals and groups at different levels in the hierarchy with seemingly very 
different amounts of power. For instance, the provision of the EMP in the AT 
was the product of negotiations between county officials, township officials, 
the township RCC and local farmers. Because the farmers had formed an 
FC, they were more visible and had collective bargaining power, which 
allowed them to enter into negotiation with the more powerful county officials 
on more equal terms – albeit still from a clientelistic position of weakness – 
and gain access to a valuable resource that would not have been available 
to them individually. Finally, the provision of the EMP in the MWT is the most 
obvious example of guanxi dictating microcredit implementation, as the 
loans were only provided to those with close personal ties to the 
implementer. However, in this situation the operationalisation of guanxi 
networks was not for corrupt purposes, but instead represented trust, 
demonstrating that the concepts of ‘human feeling’ and ‘reciprocity’ that 
underpin these types of social relations are often more important 
considerations than the stated goals of development policy or even short-
term individual gain, i.e. ‘capturing’ subsidised funds for personal use. 
 
                                            
229 Interview 53. 
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Ultimately, the commonality (or constant) across the microcredit 
programmes in all three localities is that implementation outcomes were 
forged by negotiations between a variety of different actors, which were 
defined by guanxi networks and were, therefore, relational in nature. 
Instrumentality was a key feature of these relationships, as actors 
approached the negotiations over programme implementation with their own 
interests at heart. However, these interests were diverse and not always 
based solely on short-term material gains (i.e. as would be expected by the 
classic ‘homo economicus’), but were instead intricately linked to wider 
relational considerations involved in the maintenance of social connections, 
and underpinned by reciprocity and ‘human feeling’. For this reason, Fei 
Xiaotong’s concept of the ‘differential mode of association’ provides a useful 
way to understand microcredit implementation, since the interpretation and 
perception of microcredit as a development intervention generally, and the 
role of the programmes in each locality specifically, emerged from 
particularistic relationships, rather than from a static implementation logic or 
morality dictating how provision ‘should’ occur and how development 
‘should’ proceed (Fei, 1992). This means that, while we do understand the 
basic social frameworks structuring implementation behaviour, it is still 
nearly impossible to accurately predict what form implementation will take in 
different situations because the relational dynamics are not based on 
durable principles, but are instead in constant states of flux. 
 
5.4 Emergence and Complexity in Implementation Outcomes 
In other words, the inherently relational nature of microcredit implementation 
outlined above, resulting in unpredictable outcomes, essentially confirms 
David Mosse’s statement that conventional understandings of policy 
implementation processes and impact assessment are “nonsense” because 
they are “based on a very mechanical notion of pulleys and levers” (Mosse & 
Kruckenberg, 2016, p. N/A), rather than on an understanding of 
development interventions as facilitating the creation of diverse and dynamic 
development pathways (Kruckenberg, 2015; Leach et al., 2010). This is 
because top-down linear conceptions of development and impact (outlined in 
the introduction of this chapter) do not take into account “messy partnerships 
and relationships” (Chambers, 2008, p. 174) at different levels, which 
ultimately define implementation realities. Therefore, it becomes clear that 
actor-oriented perspectives that recognise “the central role played by human 
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action and consciousness” (Long, 2001, p. 13), and allow us to “deconstruct 
the concept of planned intervention so that it is seen for what it is – namely, 
an on-going, socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the 
execution of an already-specified plan of action with expected outcomes” 
(Long, 1999, p. 4), are the most appropriate means of gaining an in-depth 
understanding of heterogeneous development policy implementation 
outcomes at the local level. 
 
Specifically, actor-oriented approaches, allow us to avoid analysis based on 
simplistic linear conceptions that identify a limited number of key causal 
variables/determinants and static constants, and instead to understand 
development interventions as being co-produced and reconstituted at the 
local level, and, therefore, the result of complex, diverse and dynamic social 
processes that are inherently relational in nature. Indeed, the previous 
sections outline a large number of ‘variables’ and ‘determinants’, each 
contributing (to varying extents) to the heterogeneous implementation 
outcomes of the microcredit programmes, but which, at the same time, are 
largely context specific in that they were the product of specific times, places 
and people that were in states of continual and rapid dynamic change. 
Therefore, rather than starting at the top (i.e. central policy formulation) and 
working down in an attempt to understand all the ways in which policy 
implementation (and its associated ‘impact’) is influenced along the way, 
actor-oriented approaches prompt us to start from the bottom and 
conceptualise development interventions as “self-organising systems on the 
edge of chaos” that are being forged in zones “of diverse, self-organising 
and emergent complexity which lies between top-down rigidity and random 
chaos” (Chambers, 2008, p. 174). In this way, development 
programmes/policies do not really ‘travel down’ from the centre to the local 
level, getting ‘distorted’ along the way – but are instead necessarily locally 
produced, meaning that implementation outcomes are not simply the sum of 
their parts, but are emergent in nature and can only be understood by 
observing the bottom-up processes from which they originate. Therefore, the 
idea of assessing impact in order to outline ‘best practice’ is inherently 
flawed as these processes are not linear, durable or reproducible, but rather 
take different forms each time. In the words of Robert Chambers, “it’s 
Heraclitus, you can’t step in the same river twice” (Chambers & Loubere, 
2016, p. N/A). 
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As stated in Section 5.3, this understanding of development policy 
implementation as emergent from interface negotiations in complex and 
dynamic ways, mirrors established theories of the structure of Chinese 
society (particularly rural society), which depict social reality in China as 
being composed of interlinking and overlapping social relationships and 
networks (Fei, 1992; Liang, 1963; Y. Yan, 1996). This relational policy 
implementation is evident in all three of the microcredit programmes, but is 
particularly obvious in the provision of the EMP in the AT. In this case, two 
key individuals – the head of the FC and the head of the county MoHRSS – 
were the primary actors engaged in negotiation over how the programme 
would be implemented at the local level. In other words, these two actors 
effectively served as ‘linchpins’ in the emergent social process of 
implementation, in that without their involvement the implementation and 
associated outcomes would have surely transpired much differently. 
However, it is not just their individual agency, or ‘development spirit’ (Ahlers 
& Schubert, 2013), which was responsible for the creation of the AT model 
of EMP provision. Rather, it was the relational bonds that these actors 
formed with each other and others, creating new guanxi networks both 
locally and non-locally and forming the arenas for negotiations based on 
various understandings of development and microcredit, which ultimately 
resulted in the implementation of the EMP in the township. Therefore, only 
by focusing on these relational dynamics and acknowledging the role of self-
organising complexity in producing emergent outcomes – while also 
acknowledging the importance of environmental and exogenous factors in 
shaping these processes – is it possible to gain an in-depth understanding of 
how and why microcredit programmes (or development programmes more 
generally) are implemented at the local level in China and elsewhere. 
 
Of course, by focusing on actors themselves and rapidly shifting social 
networks, interfaces and arenas – making generalisation about, or prediction 
for, implementation becomes a much more difficult (perhaps even 
impossible) task. Moreover, impact assessment and determinations of ‘best 
practice’ become meaningless as uniform impact gives way to 
multidimensional impacts, and multiple understandings of impact by different 
actors. As Norman Long points out, at the local level there are “‘multiple 
realities’, which imply potentially conflicting social and normative interests, 
and diverse and discontinuous configurations of knowledge” (Long, 2001, p. 
19). This means that, rather than understanding heterogeneous 
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implementation in binary terms as a “danger or a blessing” (Thøgersen, 
2011, pp. 183–184), it is instead necessary to acknowledge that 
development policy implementation is usually simultaneously beneficial and 
detrimental (albeit to different degrees) depending on the focus of analysis 
and the perceptions of the actors involved (Lu & Lora-Wainwright, 2014). 
Indeed, the implementation processes and outcomes of the microcredit 
programmes in the three townships were perceived as actively contributing 
to rural development and diverse livelihoods by some, while others saw the 
programmes as useless or even detrimental to their livelihoods and 
understandings of how development should be promoted at the local level. 
Therefore, by analysing these different understandings, processes and 
impacts involved in, and emanating from, the microcredit programmes, it 
becomes possible to shed light on the ways in which development manifests 
itself at the local level, and, ultimately, what this means for the structure of 
local society. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the key factors leading to the heterogeneous 
implementation of the EMP, RCCMP and PAMP in the three townships. 
Section 5.1 outlined how the different socioeconomic, socio-political and 
geographical conditions led to the formation of differentiated financial 
landscapes in the three localities. This resulted in the microcredit 
programmes ‘slotting in’ to different positions within segmented financial 
markets and being interpreted differently by a variety of local actors. Section 
5.2 detailed the different types of exogenous top-down pressures and 
incentives that local implementers have been subjected to, and the diverse 
ways that these seemingly similar pressures/incentives have been perceived 
across the localities, thus shaping the ways in which microcredit has been 
understood by frontline implementers and incorporated into their 
development and livelihood strategies. Section 5.3 began by showing how 
actor-oriented approaches to understanding policy implementation both 
mirror and complement classic conceptions of the structure of rural Chinese 
society. It then went on to show how microcredit implementation outcomes 
were ultimately the result of negotiations at the interfaces of overlapping and 
interlinking guanxi networks. Finally, Section 5.4 served as a discussion of 
how all these factors combined to produce complex and emergent outcomes 
at the local level. 
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Based on the above, the chapter concludes that the heterogeneous 
implementation of the microcredit programmes in the three townships has 
been influenced by a number of exogenous, endogenous and environmental 
factors, which have shaped the ways that programmes have been 
internalised by diverse actors and reconstituted at the local level through 
processes of negotiation. This has resulted in implementation outcomes that 
are complex, emergent and highly unpredictable, as they are more than the 
sum of their parts, and inherently relational in nature. For this reason, the 
quote at the beginning of the chapter is slightly misleading. While local 
implementers certainly have their ways of reacting to top-down policies and, 
in some cases, even formulating ‘counter-policies’, these responses are not 
necessarily coherent or ‘rational’, but are actually complex outcomes 
emerging from self-organising processes and negotiations at the local level. 
This means that it is often not possible to determine or predict singular 
linear/causal ‘impact’ or prescribe a certain set of ‘best practices’ for 
development-oriented microcredit programmes in rural China, because the 
programmes themselves are understood and internalised differently by 
different actors in different contexts. For this reason, the chapter turns to 
actor-oriented analyses of policy implementation that focus on complexity 
and emergence. These types of actor-oriented approaches provide a novel 
and effective way to analyse the implementation of development 
policy/interventions (such as microcredit) in China and beyond, as they do 
not ignore structural/environmental factors or the fact that implementers are 
embedded within local contexts, but instead link these factors to the 
importance of personalities and networks of interpersonal relationships. 
Actor-oriented approaches also go beyond simplistic characterisations of 
implementer and other local actor behaviour as similar to that of ‘homo 
economicus’ – i.e. merely attempting to maximise material gains – and 
instead acknowledge the ways in which agency, morality and logic are 
relationally determined at the interfaces of interaction and negotiation, 
resulting in multiple realities, multiple impacts, and the complex emergent 
outcomes discussed above. We now turn to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
which, through a focus on actors, interfaces and negotiations, analyse the 
ways in which the three microcredit programmes have simultaneously held 
different meanings for different actors, and have, therefore, played multiple 
and sometimes contradictory roles in local livelihood strategies and the 
facilitation of socioeconomic development at the local level. 
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Chapter 6 
Taking Credit for Development: Microcredit as Modernisation 
and De-marginalisation 
 
The key to ending extreme poverty is to enable the poorest of the poor to get 
their foot on the ladder of development… the poorest of the poor are stuck 
beneath it. They lack the minimum amount of capital necessary to get a 
foothold, and therefore need a boost up to the first rung. 
- Jeffrey Sachs 
 
The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people so that they can 
devote themselves to peaceful labour and build China into a socialist country 
with a modern industry, agriculture, science and culture. 
- Mao Zedong 
 
The conceptualisation of development as something that can be instigated 
through external intervention (such as microcredit) is firmly embedded within 
a ‘linear progression development paradigm’ that sees society as moving 
from a traditional (less developed) to modern (more developed) state of 
existence. Within this paradigm, poor rural areas and their inhabitants are 
usually depicted as being positioned on the margins of society – far away 
from the developed centres. Because of this separation and distance from 
these centres of modernity, the rural is seen as ‘backward’ and therefore 
representing a lower stage on the evolutionary developmental ladder. Rural 
development interventions, therefore, aim to de-marginalise rural areas by 
bringing them closer to the centres where development emanates from. In 
particular, microcredit seeks to facilitate this type of development by 
providing the capital necessary to allow those marginalised places and 
people to enter the ‘modern’ world through integration into regional, national 
and global markets, and, in this way, cast off their ‘traditional’ modes of 
socioeconomic organisation. This market-oriented (neoliberal) version of the 
linear progression development paradigm was undoubtedly the main 
philosophy underpinning each of the microcredit programmes studied in this 
dissertation. Indeed, despite their different targets (and the highly 
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heterogeneous implementation), all three of the programmes implicitly 
sought to extend the ‘benefits’ of the modern financial industry to excluded 
rural areas, thereby incorporating the rural population into the wider market 
system operating in contemporary China in an attempt to reduce the 
dichotomous and unequal relationship between urban and rural areas and 
people.  
 
This chapter explores the ways in which the microcredit programmes have – 
in certain cases and for certain actors – managed to achieve this market-
oriented de-marginalising imperative, albeit in various (and often 
unpredictable) ways and to different extents due to the complex and 
emergent implementation outcomes outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. The rest 
of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 begins by providing a 
background of the ‘linear progression development paradigm’. The section 
then goes on to illustrate how contemporary Chinese visions of development 
– while being ideologically diverse – have adopted discourses that 
emphasise the need to de-marginalise rural areas through social and 
economic transformation and modernisation. Section 6.2 looks at the ways 
in which this imperative to develop through de-marginalisation has been 
variously interpreted at the local level, resulting in diverse local 
understandings of how development should proceed, which have shaped the 
role that microcredit has played in facilitating de-marginalisation across the 
three townships. Section 6.3, Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 go on to outline 
how the microcredit programmes have been successful in de-marginalising 
the townships and certain segments of the local populations based on the 
market-oriented linear progressive version of development – namely through 
transfers of capital and knowledge from central to local areas; the formation 
of new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages between rural and non-
rural regions and people; and the promotion of local cooperation, new forms 
of employment and increased ‘financial inclusion’. Section 6.6 then turns to 
analyse the ways in which these forms of de-marginalisation have influenced 
the livelihood strategies and outcomes of implementers and borrowers in the 
three localities. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter. 
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6.1 The Linear Progression Development Paradigm 
While contemporary understandings of ‘global development’ have their roots 
in classical theories of political economy and colonial economics (primarily 
from the 1800s), it was in the aftermath of the Second World War – with the 
worldwide economic rebuilding effort, widespread de-colonisation, and the 
division of the world into ideological camps composed of nominally 
sovereign nation states – that the idea of ‘underdevelopment’ (or the ‘third 
world’) in relation to the ‘developed’ west took hold, and what can be 
referred to as a ‘linear progression development paradigm’ was firmly 
established as the dominant method of defining what international 
development means and how it occurs. In this context, underdevelopment 
became a fundamental problem for countries and regions to tackle – 
especially in post-colonial areas – and was perceived by local leaders and 
the international community alike to be a policy priority. In particular, 
regardless of the political ideology, the underdeveloped were prompted to 
promote economic growth through industrialisation and technological 
modernisation in order to facilitate beneficial socioeconomic progression 
along predetermined ‘stages of development’ (Escobar, 1995; Nederveen 
Pieterse, 2010).230 In the words of Norman Long, this linear progression 
development paradigm: 
visualises development in terms of a progressive movement 
towards technologically and institutionally more complex and 
integrated forms of ‘modern’ society… through a series of 
interventions involving the transfer of technology, knowledge, 
resources and organisational forms from the more ‘developed’ 
world or sector of a country to the less ‘developed’ parts. In this 
way, ‘traditional’ society is propelled into the modern world… 
(Long, 2001, p. 10) 
 
Perceptions of how this linear development process does and should play 
out (and who benefits from it) have been ideologically varied, but are 
nevertheless primarily based on different strands of ‘western’ (i.e. European 
and North American) political economic theory, such as (neo)classical 
                                            
230 For explicit examples of development being broken down into inevitable 
‘stages’ that the underdeveloped must progress along, see (Rostow, 1960; 
Wallerstein, 2004). 
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economics, capitalist growth, Keynesianism, and various (neo)Marxist 
theories (e.g. dependency theory). Moreover, in the capitalist bloc 
development was essentially conflated with ‘westernisation’ through the 
replication of North American and Western European models (Escobar, 
1995; Long, 2001). In this way, the linear progression development 
paradigm has served to dichotomously divide the contemporary world into 
sets of ‘imaginative geographies’ (Said, 1979) consisting of socio-political 
and socioeconomic spaces defined as developed and underdeveloped. 
These spaces correspond with centres and margins/peripheries, thus 
assigning developmental identities to places and people, and delineating 
development within shifting boundaries that, for the most part, still shape 
how the socioeconomic ordering of the world is understood today (Escobar, 
1995). 
 
Over the past few decades, and particularly since the 1990s with the fall of 
the Soviet bloc, the linear progression development paradigm has been 
increasingly dominated by capitalist (and particularly neoliberal) ideology. 
This has meant that development and modernisation have come to be 
associated with a version of globalisation that requires the standardisation of 
the world economy by imposing “neoclassical economics on the south, [and] 
applying western standards of policy and systems of accounting to align 
economies and financial and credit regimes” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, p. 
5). This (almost) wholesale adoption of a neoliberal version of the linear 
progressive development paradigm has resulted in the creation of modern 
cosmopolitan centres that are integrally interconnected with world society, 
but are, nevertheless, situated within marginal regions and countries. 
Unsurprisingly, in most of the ‘underdeveloped world’ this has served to 
reinforce the dichotomous distinction between urban centres and the 
peripheral rural margins – which are then depicted as the embodiment of 
economic and social ‘backwardness’. In this way, rural areas are identified 
as being the culprits of wider national underdevelopment in relation to the 
western world, and, thus, rural development through their de-marginalisation 
becomes a chief development priority. This de-marginalisation entails 
integrating the peripheral rural sectors into the ‘modern’ market economy, 
and in so doing commoditising rural society. In the words of a World Bank 
report from the 1970s, “rural development is concerned with the 
modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with its transition from 
traditional isolation to integration with the national economy” (Long, 2001, 
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pp. 250–251). In other words, the neoliberal ideological turn over the past 
three decades and more has reinforced an understanding of the linear 
progression development paradigm which depicts rural areas and people as 
occupying a lower rung on the evolutionary ladder of development. This has 
prompted regions, countries and the international community to devise 
various types of intervention, such as microcredit, in order to allow marginal 
spaces and people to help themselves ‘catch up’ with more developed 
centres through integration into the world economy. 
 
This perception of development “as an inevitable, evolutionary trajectory” 
(Barabantseva, 2012, p. 66) towards a modernised end state has dominated 
the way that government, intellectuals and the populace as a whole have 
understood China’s socioeconomic situation and position in the world since 
the 19th century (Tong, 2000; Wheeler, 2005). Indeed, China’s perceived 
embarrassment on the international stage during the ‘century of humiliation’ 
(bainian guochiW:#f) – beginning after the Opium Wars in the 1800s – 
served to embed a persistent discourse within the national imagination 
emphasising the need to abandon the ‘traditional’ weak China and develop 
towards a ‘modern’ and strong Chinese state able to take back its rightful 
place at the centre, rather than on the margins, of world society 
(Barabantseva, 2012; Tong, 2000).231 The fixation on achieving modernity, 
development and de-marginalisation has been the primary motivation for 
Chinese leaders across the political spectrum, and Chinese development 
history over the past century and a half can be seen as a series of top-down 
interventions, admittedly shaped by different ideologies and modelled on 
different examples, but nevertheless all aimed at eliminating 
underdevelopment domestically in an effort to produce a strong China on the 
international stage. Indeed, in the first half of the 20th century the Nationalist 
government desired to remove the country’s shackles of ‘traditional 
weakness’, and, since the establishment of the PRC, successive 
governments with different ideological leanings (i.e. Mao Zedong vs. Deng 
Xiaoping) have sought to instigate the ‘Four Modernisations’ (sige 
xiandaihua !
T) – i.e. industry, agriculture, national defence, and 
science and technology – but have taken different approaches to achieve 
                                            
231 In other words, allow China to once again live up to the literal translation 
of its name – ‘centre country’ (Zhongguo #). 
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this goal (Barabantseva, 2012; A. Ong, 1996; Sanders et al., 2007; N. R. 
Smith, 2015; H. Wang, 2011; Wen, 2007; M. Yang, 1996). 
 
Figure 6.1: Traditional Village Intersected by a Modern High-speed Railway 
Line 
 
 
Of course, after the reform and opening, China’s development goals were 
reframed within a market-oriented approach – i.e. the ‘socialist market 
economy’ (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji Z8$cR) – which mirrored 
(and emulated) the dominant global neoliberal turn outlined above 
(Barabantseva, 2012). This shift towards market-orientation adopted a 
‘trickle-down’ economic approach that prioritised first developing certain 
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areas, sectors and people based on the promise of more widespread 
development in the future, and which brought about rapid, but unequal, 
economic growth (H. X. Zhang & Sanders, 2007).232 At the same time, the 
Chinese government emphasised the need to adopt a quantitative and 
scientific approach that sought to de-politicise and standardise development 
through the removal of ‘subjective factors’ (N. R. Smith, 2015). Therefore, 
Chinese development has increasingly been portrayed in quantifiable terms, 
such as increasing economic growth (particularly GDP growth), joining 
international (primarily neoliberal) organisations – such as the World Trade 
Organisation – and moving up the global rankings of various socioeconomic 
indicators, e.g. the World Bank’s Country Income Groups indicator 
(Barabantseva, 2009). The dominance of this quantitative and neoliberal 
version of the linear progression development paradigm is evident in policy 
and academia, and in some cases scientism is taken to the ridiculous 
extreme. For instance, a recent National Development and Reform 
Commission (guojia fagaiwei #1E,) study determined that China has 
now reached 62 per cent of some quantifiable developmental end-point 
obviously modelled on a Westernised conception of what development 
entails (Zhong, 2012). The necessity of measurable ‘progression’ (based on 
neoliberal ideals) has also embedded itself within the public imagination, and 
people in the townships where I did fieldwork articulated the need for 
continuous forward movement by saying things like: 
Everyone needs to progress every day. Take business for 
example – every year a business needs to earn money. If you 
don’t earn money and don’t lose money, a year has still past, so it 
is really a loss. So every day we must progress or else we will fall 
further and further behind others.233 
 
In other words, while China’s development ideology has changed from 
socialist to (predominantly) capitalist, post-reform China has remained 
embedded within the linear progression development paradigm, and 
                                            
232 The most obvious espousal of this transition to ‘trickle-down’ economics 
is Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote – “let some people get rich first” (rang 
yibufen ren xian fu qilai ls2rN) – which is covered in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
233 Interview 40. 
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therefore still seeks to achieve a modern and developed society through 
advances in technology and industrialisation. That being said, this 
development obsession has taken on increased significance since the 
reform and opening, as these goals have shifted to become the main policy 
priority through the de-politicisation of development, in contrast to the 
explicitly political goals of revolution or class struggle in the pre-reform era 
(Barabantseva, 2009; N. R. Smith, 2015).234 
 
Ultimately, therefore, this continued adherence to the linear progression 
development paradigm has resulted in Chinese development being defined 
as “a series of dichotomies and oppositions” (Barabantseva, 2012, p. 64) – 
both as a country in relation to the rest of the world, and domestically, with 
certain areas and groups being classified as developed or underdeveloped 
in relation to each other. The most obvious of these internal ‘development 
dichotomies’ is the one between China’s emerging modern cosmopolitan 
urban centres, and the ‘backward’/’traditional’ rural areas that are seen to be 
disconnected from the modern world. Of course, this dichotomy between 
rural and urban China is not just a contemporary phenomenon, and rural and 
urban spaces and people have historically been defined in opposition to 
each other (Murphy, 2004).235 But it has only been since the republican era 
at the beginning of the 20th century that this rural-urban dichotomy began to 
be perceived as ‘holding China back’. In this way, rural areas were explicitly 
situated in subordination to cities, resulting in concerted external intervention 
efforts in an attempt to bring the countryside and ‘peasants’ in line with a 
modernising China (N. R. Smith, 2015). 
 
Particularly in the post-reform era, due to the rapidly increasing development 
gap between rural and urban areas, the marginal nature of rural China has 
come to be perceived as not only detrimental to China’s development and 
                                            
234  There has been much research framing the ‘Chinese model’ of 
development as exceptional, and even suggesting that it represents a 
paradigm shift. However, while the Chinese experience does represent a 
unique development trajectory, it is, nevertheless, still firmly embedded 
within the linear progression development paradigm (Hsu, 2015). 
235 Indeed, Fei Xiaotong depicted rural society as being based on rituals and 
customs (lisu Y), which are fundamentally at odds with the emerging 
‘modern’ society grounded in law and reason (fali QU) (Fei, 1992). 
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modernisation goals, but also potentially dangerous for social and political 
stability (Hsu, 2015). Therefore, rural marginalisation has come to be 
conceptualised as a set of problems (i.e. the sannong wenti) that need to be 
solved through large-scale intervention (Day, 2008, 2013). For this reason, 
especially since the early 2000s, undoing the historical development 
dichotomy between rural and urban China has become a key policy priority, 
and has been pivotal to the government’s Number One Central Documents, 
5-year plans, and National Economic and Social Development Plans (Day & 
Hale, 2007; Fan, 2006; National Development and Reform Commission, 
2015; State Council, 2004, 2014). This has given rise to the overarching 
policy frameworks of the XNCJS and the CXYTH discussed earlier in this 
dissertation, which have emphasised the need to modernise agriculture, 
increase consumption and extend modern (urban) amenities to rural areas – 
such as pensions, healthcare, education and (most importantly) financial 
services (Ahlers, 2014; P. H. Brown et al., 2009; Harwood, 2013; N. R. 
Smith, 2015; State Council, 2006). 
 
Figure 6.2: Slogan for the XNCJS in the DET 
 
 
At its core, this renewed policy attempt to break down the rural-urban 
dichotomy is a call to bring the sannong in from the margins and create a 
more uniform development landscape across the country by accelerating 
rural China’s progression up the developmental ladder. In this way, these 
development efforts seek to de-marginalise rural places and their inhabitants 
in three key interlinking ways. First they aim to spatially de-marginalise 
geographically remote and unconnected areas and people by increasing 
physical and economic linkages through infrastructure development, 
increased trade, etc. Second, policy seeks to materially de-marginalise the 
rural by increasing basic consumption, and access to the types of ‘modern’ 
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commodities, services and technology enjoyed by the urban citizenry (i.e. 
the trappings of a modern life). Third, interventions have been formulated to 
temporally de-marginalise rural China by eliminating ‘backward’ modes of 
socioeconomic organisation through the improvement of the rural 
population’s ‘quality’ (suzhi bp ), ‘consciousness’ (yishi ?n ), ‘ability’ 
(nengli g) and ‘mentality’ (xinli =U) (Barabantseva, 2012; Murphy, 2004). 
In other words, contemporary Chinese rural development strategies 
essentially aim to make rural China more like urban China (H. Yan & Chen, 
2013), and in this way bring an end to the traditional ‘peasant’ society whose 
existence at the peripheral margins has been perceived as holding the 
country back from achieving modern development (Day, 2013). 
 
Figure 6.3: Slogan Calling for the Civilisation of the Peasantry in the DET 
 
 
6.2 Local Interpretations of Microcredit as a Means of De-
marginalisation 
In the context of this imperative to incorporate rural China into the ‘modern’ 
(urban) market-based economic system, the three microcredit programmes 
have been conceptualised as policy tools to facilitate spatial, material and 
temporal de-marginalisation in line with the overarching development 
strategies and plans outlined above (e.g. XNCJS, CXYTH, etc.). In 
particular, the PAMP – as an integral part of early poverty alleviation efforts, 
 216 
the 8-7 National Poverty Reduction Programme and the Poor Village 
Investment Programme – represents an attempt to increase consumption 
and the material well-being of the poorest and most marginalised rural areas 
and people (JXPPAO et al., 2006; Park & Ren, 2001; Park & Wang, 2010). 
The EMP, on the other hand, has been designed to de-marginalise areas 
spatially, by incentivising migrant workers to return to their rural origins and 
engage in entrepreneurial activities, thus providing investment and creating 
new linkages between rural and urban areas. At the same time, the EMP is 
also seen as a means of de-marginalising rural areas temporally by re-
integrating migrant workers who have learned ‘modern’ skills and values in 
the cities (i.e. ‘quality’, ‘consciousness’, ‘ability’ and ‘mentality’) back into 
‘traditional’ rural areas (JXPPG, 2009; State Council, 2014). Finally, the 
RCCMP aims to achieve comprehensive spatial, material and temporal de-
marginalisation by promoting ‘financial inclusion’ through the expansion of 
financial infrastructure and services to rural areas. This ‘inclusive finance’ is 
perceived as having the ability to increase consumption and allow 
microentrepreneurs to scale up their activities through widened access to 
financial capital, and as a means of promoting the development of a modern 
type of ‘financial consciousness’ in rural areas that can replace traditional 
forms of financial organisation (He et al., 2009; PBC, 2001; Sparreboom & 
Duflos, 2012; State Council, 2003). 
 
However, despite the paradigmatic coherence framing microcredit’s role in 
facilitating de-marginalisation based on China’s linear progressive 
understanding of development, perceptions of how de-marginalisation 
should be promoted by the microcredit programmes were shaped by 
negotiations over meaning between actors at various levels, and were, 
therefore, diverse. Indeed, while everyone I spoke to who was involved in 
microcredit at the local level agreed that the programmes’ main role was to 
de-marginalise rural areas and people, the ways in which microcredit was 
perceived as a catalyst for de-marginalisation differed markedly across the 
three townships, resulting in the complex and heterogeneous 
implementation outlined in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In other words, the 
complexity and emergence in the implementation of the programmes can be 
understood as representing ‘multiple developmentalisms’ (A. Ong, 1996), 
which are, nevertheless, still bounded by the overarching linear progression 
development paradigm. In practical terms, this means that the microcredit 
programmes have played significantly differentiated ‘developmental roles’ 
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across and within the townships – and, thus, facilitated spatial, material and 
temporal de-marginalisation in a variety of ways (or not at all). 
 
In general, the ways in which the programmes were successful in producing 
de-marginalising outcomes often aligned with local development strategies, 
which were ultimately shaped by local socioeconomic contexts and 
understandings of development. In the AT, for instance, local development 
was largely defined in terms of de-marginalising farmers and agriculture 
through technological improvements, scaling up production and increasing 
market access, 236  and the microcredit programmes were, therefore, 
mobilised to meet these goals. In the MWT, on the other hand, farming was 
considered to be a ‘backward’ livelihood strategy. For instance, one resident 
told me that “young people who have not developed well and the elderly stay 
in the village to farm. Most intelligent young people do migrant work outside 
or do business in the township.” 237  Therefore, industrialisation, external 
investment and improving transportation infrastructure were perceived to be 
the best methods of achieving socioeconomic development and de-
marginalising the township by bringing in taxes and expertise from ‘more 
developed’ areas and actors.238 For this reason, the microcredit programmes 
were reformulated to meet the needs of larger-scale business and 
development projects. In contrast, because of the high level of 
socioeconomic diversity in the DET, perceptions of how development should 
occur were less uniform than in the other two townships. For this reason, 
different actors understood de-marginalisation as emanating from a 
combination of investment in large- and small-scale businesses (of varying 
types), farming, and/or the formation of political and economic linkages with 
outside regions and people.239 Therefore, microcredit was perceived more 
flexibly as having a variety of de-marginalising potentials. 
 
                                            
236 Conversation 01; Interview 03; Interview 05; interview 07. 
237 Interview 09. 
238 Interview 08; interview 10; Interview 14. 
239 Conversation 24; Conversation 34; Interview 53; Interview 62; Interview 
65; Interview 66. 
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To summarise, microcredit ‘slotted in’ to diverse understandings of 
development and de-marginalisation at the local level, which were, 
nevertheless, still embedded within a neoliberal version of the linear 
progression development paradigm. We now turn to examine the ways in 
which these differentiated ‘developmentalisms’ reflected in the 
heterogeneously implemented microcredit programmes were able to 
‘successfully’ facilitate different processes of de-marginalisation in the three 
townships.  
 
6.3 Microcredit as De-marginalisation Through Capital, 
Knowledge and Technology Transfers 
One of the primary ways that local actors depicted microcredit as promoting 
de-marginalisation was by pointing to the programmes’ ability to facilitate 
flows of capital, knowledge and technology from ‘more developed’ (often 
urban) areas to the townships and villages. In this way, the programmes 
were seen as reducing development inequalities by reallocating resources 
and expertise to the peripheral margins that had previously been retained in 
economic and political centres. In line with the neoliberal version of the linear 
progression development paradigm, these flows were usually framed within 
a ‘trickle-down’ economics narrative, which characterised rural areas as the 
beneficiaries of more rapid development in other parts of the country. 
 
In particular, the formulation of the three microcredit programmes represents 
a concerted effort to transfer financial capital to rural areas in order to 
counter the notorious ‘scissors gap’ (rural-urban capital outflow) – i.e. the 
historical regime of extracting rural surpluses (e.g. savings) and transferring 
them to urban areas where there are more profitable investment 
opportunities (Feng et al., 2013; Tang, 2006; Tsai, 2004, p. 1503). 
Therefore, the three microcredit programmes were each successful in 
redistributing financial capital to the margins, or retaining resources that had 
previously been extracted from rural areas, albeit in various ways for actors 
at different levels. For example, despite the fact that the PAMP was not 
implemented in either the MWT or the DET, funds earmarked for the 
programme were, nevertheless, transferred from the province to the 
counties. These funds were then used for county level development projects 
and infrastructure, thus directly de-marginalising county governments 
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materially (in relation to the more prosperous provincial governments) by 
alleviating budget shortfalls. 240  At the same time, these development 
projects have the potential to produce further indirect de-marginalisation for 
other local actors at the county, township and village levels.241 
 
The EMP also facilitated capital flows from the centre to the margins through 
direct transfers from the central MoF to county level financial institutions to 
cover interest payments (see Chapter 4). At the same time, it also spatially 
and materially de-marginalised rural residents who would not normally be 
considered eligible for formal credit. This is due to the fact that the county 
institutions providing the EMP loans are usually uninterested in lending to 
those with a rural household registration because their houses are located 
on collectively-owned rural land and, therefore, cannot easily be used as 
collateral.242 In the AT, these flows of capital covering interest and facilitating 
increased access to loans allowed the members of the FC to increase their 
incomes through the sale of profitable vegetables. In the DET, before the 
programme was halted, the EMP allowed local households and enterprises 
to gain access to extra capital for projects – including ‘consumption’ projects, 
such as investment in improved housing. In other words, the EMP was 
successful in de-marginalising county financial institutions through capital 
transfers, and the programme also de-marginalised rural actors in relation to 
the county financial institutions by providing expanded access to investment 
capital. 
 
The RCCMP, on the other hand, does not facilitate capital flows from the 
centre to the local (as there is no central subsidy), but instead serves to 
block capital from exiting rural areas through the mandate that at least 60 
per cent of RCC loans must go to local actors, which is a major change from 
the situation in the 1980s and 1990s where a majority of RCC deposits were 
invested in urban areas by the ABC and PBC (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 
                                            
240 While county governments have not been suffering the same kind of 
budgetary crises that ‘hollow out’ township governments (G. Smith, 2010), 
their financial situation has, nevertheless, worsened in recent years 
(Interview 16). 
241 Interview 12; Interview 13; Interview 15; Interview 16; Interview 21. 
242 Interview 01; Interview 07. 
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4). In the AT, this retention of local capital for lending has allowed local ‘elite’ 
farmers – who are rich in comparison with other farmers in the township, but 
still marginal in comparison to county or prefectural level actors – to use the 
RCCMP to rent large tracts of farmland both in the AT and in neighbouring 
townships/counties (200,000 mu in total). This has allowed them to 
substantially scale up and mechanise their agricultural activities. At the same 
time, it has positioned the AT at the centre of a larger agricultural system, 
thus de-marginalising the township as a whole. Indeed, despite the fact that 
only the relatively wealthy farmers were able to take advantage of the 
RCCMP in this way, even some excluded actors perceived the programme 
as contributing to local de-marginalisation, with the head of one non-
borrowing household saying: “Giving loans to large-scale farming 
households so they can earn more money is a good thing because they can 
promote the overall development of the village.”243 
 
In the MWT, the RCCMP loans were packaged together. Therefore, rather 
than de-marginalising a number of smaller actors, the entire amount 
allocated to the programme (RMB 50,000,000) was provided to the largest 
construction company, which had moved to the township due to the 
exclusion and marginalisation that it had faced as a ‘small fish in a big pond’ 
in the city.244 Therefore, the retention of capital through the RCCMP allowed 
the construction company to, paradoxically, become de-marginalised by 
moving to a more marginal location. In contrast, in the DET the RCCMP was 
utilised by households and microenterprises for a wide range of de-
marginalising activities, including ‘productive’ investments and consumption 
spending. For instance, the RCCMP was used by some poorer households 
to send their children to university, which they would not have been able to 
afford otherwise. These children then often found jobs in urban areas where 
the universities were located, and were able to send remittances back to 
their families, thus spatially and materially de-marginalising their households 
(and the township more generally) through the creation of new 
socioeconomic linkages (see Section 6.4) and increasing household 
income.245 One rural resident emphasised the importance of this by saying: 
                                            
243 Interview 23. 
244 Interview 45. 
245 Interview 55; Interview 57; Interview 60. 
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“If my children receive a good education, they can go out to work and in the 
future they can return and build a house for me.”246 Indirectly, the increased 
access to formal finance provided by the RCCMP also resulted in increased 
amounts of informal finance available, often at no interest, for friends and 
family members of eligible borrowers in emergencies, which helped prevent 
exacerbated marginalisation that often occurs during and after crises.247 
 
The programmes also managed to facilitate temporal de-marginalisation 
through the transfer of knowledge, technology and expertise to the three 
townships from areas that were perceived to be ‘more developed’. For 
instance, in the MWT the RCCMP funds were used to lure the largest 
construction company to the township. This relocation brought knowledge 
and expertise of new and ‘more sophisticated’ construction techniques and 
materials from the city. While the company itself only engaged in a few 
projects in the townships itself, these projects did influence the ways in 
which other smaller construction companies operated, effectively diffusing 
(to a certain extent) new types of knowledge, which changed the way that 
real estate and infrastructure were developed locally.248 Similarly, in the DET 
the EMP was used to fund the largest components factory, which 
represented a transfer of manufacturing/logistical technology and knowledge 
from the ‘more developed’ manufacturing centres in eastern Zhejiang 
Province to rural Jiangxi Province.249 
 
In the AT, the EMP was also specifically utilised for temporal de-
marginalisation by transferring the knowledge of agricultural technology (i.e. 
vegetable greenhouses) gained by the village secretary during a ‘model 
tourism’ trip to the ‘more developed’ Jiangsu Province to local members of 
the FC. This knowledge/technology transfer was significantly different from 
the examples in the MWT and DET outlined above, in that it was not initiated 
by outside business interests seeking to establish a presence in the 
township. Instead, the adoption of new agricultural technology was initiated 
                                            
246 Interview 58. 
247 Interview 29; Interview 54. 
248 Interview 45. 
249 Interview 53. 
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by local people themselves based on what they felt would be most useful 
and beneficial. Therefore, the transfer of technology was more horizontal 
and egalitarian (at least amongst the members of the FC) and reflected local 
perceptions and needs, rather than being based on an intervention imposed 
by powerful external actors, which can often be unsuitable and result in 
unexpected outcomes causing more harm than good (Harriss-White, 2011). 
Indeed, other research has shown that new agricultural technologies (and 
vegetable greenhouses in particular) have the potential to spread much 
more quickly through this type of horizontal transfer of information (also 
referred to as ‘farmer innovation circles’), creating a de-marginalising domino 
effect (B. Wu & Pretty, 2004). This literature is backed up by my observation 
of the rapid adoption of the vegetable greenhouse technology by the 
members of the FC. Moreover, the fact that the FC’s use of the EMP has 
been designated as a model by the county and prefectural branches of the 
MoHRSS, means that this type of locally-led technology diffusion network 
might become a pilot programme that is encouraged and supported by local 
governments in other areas, thus facilitating wider ‘sustainable’ de-
marginalisation through the transfer of agricultural technologies to the 
surrounding townships and counties (B. Wu & Zhang, 2013). 
 
Figure 6.4: Rural Modernisation Through New Vegetable Greenhouse 
Technology in the AT 
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6.4 Microcredit as De-marginalisation Through the Formation 
of New Socio-political and Socioeconomic Linkages 
In addition to facilitating (and reversing) flows of capital and knowledge, the 
microcredit programmes have also aided in the creation of new socio-
political and socioeconomic linkages between the townships (and their 
inhabitants) and ‘more developed’ areas through the formation of new 
guanxi networks. These linkages and networks have the potential to help 
integrate the relatively marginal areas and actors into the expanding 
‘modern’ capitalist system – e.g. production networks, supply chains, etc. – 
thus de-marginalising them spatially. At the same time, this spatial de-
marginalisation has made certain township actors more visible to the political 
establishment at higher levels, thus providing new types of access to, and 
influence in, reservoirs of power that were previously off-limits or 
unattainable due to their marginal status.  
 
For instance, the use of the RCCMP to attract the largest construction 
company to the MWT not only resulted in flows of capital and knowledge 
from the city to the township, but also represented the formation of new 
business and political networks between rural and urban areas. Indeed, by 
moving the company headquarters to the township, the construction 
company created a business centre in a previously marginal space that 
became a hub connecting suppliers, manufacturers and clients across the 
region, while also setting up new supply chain relationships with other 
township actors. In this way, the construction company changed the nature 
of the development landscape, and increased connectivity between the 
township actors and the wider market. At the same time, the largest 
construction company also linked the township and certain local actors into 
its extensive (and expansive) guanxi network, spanning officials and 
businesses at the national, provincial, prefectural and county levels. This 
was particularly significant for the manager of the township RCC, who was 
able to integrate into this network through the provision of the large RCCMP 
loan and thus effectively increase his importance and power in relation to 
other officials locally.250 In other words, the case of the largest construction 
                                            
250 Interview 10; Interview 45. 
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company in the MWT represents multifaceted de-marginalisation on a 
number of levels for various actors. On the one hand, the company itself 
becomes (paradoxically) de-marginalised by moving to the more marginal 
township (see Section 6.3). At the same time the company de-marginalises 
the township by locating it at the centre of a business with tens of branches 
across Jiangxi Province and Guangdong Province. Finally, it also de-
marginalises low level officials by integrating them into wider political 
networks. 
 
In the DET, RCCMP loans were used by small components factories and 
other micro/small enterprises to create business linkages regionally and with 
the manufacturing centres in Zhejiang Province, thus connecting the 
township with wider economic networks. 251  Additionally, the largest 
components factory moved to the DET in order to reduce the cost of labour 
(i.e. DET labour is 1/3rd the cost of Zhejiang labour) 252  and, like the 
construction company in the MWT, to become a less marginal actor itself, 
with the owner saying: “because labour and rent in Yiwu are so expensive, 
there was little profit. Also, because it is easy to enter the market there, 
competition was fierce, so I left Yiwu.”253  Once the largest components 
factory de-marginalised itself by establishing its headquarters in the DET, it 
then used local loans, including the EMP, to form a network of branches of 
smaller factories across the county, and in this way created a diffused 
network of connections between marginal areas regionally and the ‘more 
developed’ centres in the east of the country. Additionally, both the factory 
owner and his wife were able to leverage their economic position and 
connections to gain influence in the county government, thus creating new 
socio-political connections between the township and the county (see 
Chapter 5).254 
 
                                            
251 Conversation 24; Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 63; Interview 71; 
Interview 74; Interview 78. 
252 Conversation 29; Conversation 31; Interview 53. 
253 Interview 53. 
254 Interview 53. 
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The use of the EMP to fund the FC in the AT also played an important role in 
producing new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages between actors at 
different levels. For one, as a ‘model experience’, the EMP-funded vegetable 
greenhouses created new ties between officials and RCC employees at the 
village, township and county levels, and also brought the work of these 
officials to the attention of the prefectural MoHRSS. In addition to generally 
de-marginalising the implementers by connecting them to higher levels of 
government, these new connections and the perceived ‘success’ of the ‘AT 
model’ has the potential to improve the job prospects of everyone involved 
by helping them progress up the career development ladder through 
promotion to less marginal areas in the future (e.g. from the county to the 
prefecture). At the same time, the members of the FC were able to utilise 
new socioeconomic networks to sell their vegetables in previously untapped 
urban markets, thus expanding their guanxi networks and effectively 
integrating themselves into the urban market economy, thereby transforming 
themselves into non-marginal actors within a marginal space.255 
 
Ultimately, these new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages initiated by 
the microcredit programmes served to de-marginalise the townships and 
certain inhabitants spatially, materially and temporally through increased 
connectivity between marginal and non-marginal spaces and actors. This 
was accomplished through new or strengthened connections between 
governments and financial institutions at different levels, through linkages 
between local actors and urban markets and/or suppliers, and by attracting 
large enterprises from non-marginal areas to the townships, thus co-opting 
their guanxi networks and also bringing much needed tax revenue to local 
governments with severe budgetary shortfalls. In other words, by facilitating 
the formation of new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages the 
microcredit programmes were successful in de-marginalising the townships 
in certain ways. However, the de-marginalising effects were not uniform 
across the three localities, and the actors involved varied substantially. 
 
                                            
255 Conversation 01; Interview 02; Interview 03; Interview 04; Interview 06; 
Interview 07; Interview 24; Interview 25. 
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6.5 Microcredit as De-marginalisation Through Employment, 
Local Cooperation and ‘Financial Inclusion’ 
It is also important to point out that the microcredit programmes have played 
a role in temporally de-marginalising the three townships by transforming 
local ‘traditional’ socioeconomic structures and modes of organisation. For 
instance, by attracting and supporting businesses to relocate from urban 
centres to the townships, the programmes have promoted new forms of 
‘modern’ employment that replace or complement agriculture (which is 
considered to be ‘backward’) and migrant work (which extracts talent from 
the townships). Indeed, both the construction company in the MWT and the 
largest components factory in the DET have created over 200 jobs in their 
respective localities. These jobs have been popular with local residents, and 
have also attracted some migrant workers from even more marginal nearby 
areas to relocate to the townships. This is because this type of wage 
employment pays up to RMB 100 per day,256 which is significantly more than 
the income from farming or from running most microenterprises – particularly 
small shops.257 At the same time, the RCCMP in the DET has also allowed 
for the establishment of a variety of smaller components factories and other 
businesses by returning migrant workers. These returning entrepreneurs 
often emulated the ‘modern’ modes of employment they experienced while 
working in the city, and their enterprises usually paid workers between RMB 
10 to RMB 100 per day.258 In general, the working conditions were better 
than rice farming, which is gruelling work, and the local wage employment 
allowed families to stay together by reducing the necessity for migrant 
work.259 
 
                                            
256  Construction work generally pays RMB 100 per day, while the 
components factory pay is based on the amount of work done, which can 
also be around RMB 100 per day if working quickly/efficiently and for long 
hours. 
257 Interview 45; Interview 53; Interview 61. 
258 Conversation 29; Conversation 31; Interview 61; Interview 63. 
259 DET Contextual Observation Report; Interview 24; Interview 61. It should 
be noted, however, that the air quality and safety standards in some of the 
smaller components factories were questionable at best. 
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In addition to facilitating material de-marginalisation through higher incomes, 
these new types of employment also had a temporal de-marginalising effect 
by providing workers with new types of freedom and inclusion in the labour 
market. In particular, the components factories tended to hire women and 
the elderly, many of whom were not previously engaged in wage income 
earning activities due to local customs dictating the role of different family 
members within the household unit. Some of the component factories even 
allowed women and the elderly to work out of their own houses (albeit at a 
reduced salary), meaning that they could earn income while simultaneously 
carrying out their ‘traditional’ duties, such as caring for children, cooking, 
cleaning, etc. 260  In this way, the new forms of employment effectively 
transformed women and the elderly into ‘modern’ citizens with an income, 
thereby integrating them into the wider capitalist system, and changing their 
socioeconomic role and status in relation to the household unit and local 
society more generally. The owner of the largest components factory proudly 
explained how the jobs provided by his factory benefited local people and 
the economy by drawing on wider narratives – both contemporary and 
traditional – of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘harmonious familial relations’ (jia he 
wanshi xing 1 ): 
My factory has a good impact on local society. For instance, some 
old people have no money. If their children don’t give them any 
money, then the family might not be happy. Now people in their 
60s and 70s can work in my factory and earn RMB 500 to 600 per 
month, which lets them buy things for their grandchildren, so the 
familial relationship will be more harmonious. It can also have a 
good impact on the relationship between husbands and wives, 
because originally only the man was working, so the wife would 
usually play majiang, wasting time and money… In terms of 
economic impact, my factory has also increased income. These 
good impacts are the result of government support by providing 
loans with no interest.261 
 
                                            
260 Conversation 24; Interview 60; Interview 70; Interview 78. 
261 Interview 53. RMB 500-600 per month assumes that the elderly are 
working slowly from their own homes while also taking care of the 
grandchildren. 
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In contrast to the new forms of employment outlined above, which played a 
role in transforming local society, microcredit also facilitated de-
marginalisation by actively strengthening pre-existing social cohesion and 
local modes of socioeconomic organisation. The most striking example of 
this is the EMP in the AT, which provided RMB 1,100,000 to the 12-member 
FC to undertake a large project involving both group coordination and 
individual responsibility, and hinging on group dynamics to spread risk.262 
This enabled the FC, which is an organisation originally based on a local 
kinship group, to substantially scale-up a project that had been previously 
initiated through group/communal pooling and savings arrangements, thus 
magnifying existing cooperative organisation, cohesion and action.263 In the 
DET the RCCMP also promoted local cooperation, as groups of households 
composed of friends and family were able to pool their loans together in 
order to mobilise substantial lump sums to fund larger projects, such as 
building a new house or investing in a business. Of course, in addition to the 
RCCMP loans, households often mobilised other types of capital to achieve 
their goals, such as savings, informal loans from other sources, and non-
financial loans of materials and labour.264 In this way, the formal RCCMP 
loans were incorporated into, and magnified, informal modes of financial 
organisation similar to ‘traditional’ ROSCAs. 
 
Therefore, in both the AT and the DET the microcredit programmes provided 
extra capital that allowed groups and their individual members to scale up 
projects, thus increasing income and improving livelihoods. However, this 
represented more than just material de-marginalisation, as it also gave the 
groups increased visibility and leverage with more powerful (and less 
marginal) actors. For instance, through the process of successfully applying 
for the EMP loans, the FC in the AT became visible to government officials 
                                            
262 In the words of one FC member: “Every household borrows RMB 50,000 
and the total amount is transferred to the FC. The FC coordinates the use of 
the money and each household is issued with their own farming 
responsibilities” (Interview 25). 
263 Interview 23; Interview 25. Research on microcredit often points to the 
potential for programmes to facilitate local cooperation, particularly with 
regard to women’s groups, thus empowering marginalised individuals 
(Sanyal, 2014). 
264 Interview 55; Interview 57.  
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and financial institutions at the township, county and prefectural levels, and 
ultimately became the centre of a proposed pilot programme, thus investing 
others in their success. This form of empowerment has significantly spatially 
de-marginalised the FC, and has also allowed the group to assert a form of 
collective bargaining to gain access to resources that would not have been 
available to them individually (or even to the group as a whole) without the 
existence of the EMP. 
 
Of course, underpinning the socioeconomic transformations and 
strengthening of local forms of cooperation outlined above is the idea that 
increased inclusion into the financial system not only has the ability to 
facilitate local development, but that providing credit access to excluded 
segments of the society is inherently de-marginalising in and of itself 
(Sparreboom & Duflos, 2012). Based on this, the programmes were 
successful in facilitating de-marginalisation by increasing ‘financial inclusion’ 
in all three of the townships, albeit in different ways for different actors. For 
instance, as stated above, the programmes have indirectly instigated 
increased ‘financial inclusion’ by adding capital to the informal financial 
market – as EMP loans were used for onlending and RCCMP borrowers 
frequently informally pooled their funds.265 This increase in ‘curb market’ 
activity is consistent with Kellee Tsai’s observation that sometimes “the scale 
of informal finance actually increases in communities that have been 
targeted for a greater supply of official credit” (Tsai, 2004, p. 1488). It can 
also be perceived as a beneficial development, as informal financing is 
viewed as necessary by the vast majority of rural people, and was used by 
well over 90 per cent of interviewees. Of course, the programmes also 
promoted ‘financial inclusion’ more directly through the general increase in 
access to formal credit across the three townships. For instance, in the AT 
the EMP provided the FC with access to formal credit that was previously 
unavailable, and the RCCMP provided increased access to loans for large-
scale farmers. In the MWT, the RCCMP was used to provide a large amount 
of capital to the construction company that had been excluded by financial 
institutions in the city. Most notably, in the DET 80 per cent of the population 
was included in the formal financial system thanks to the RCCMP. This is 
because any household (even poor households) that were able to meet the 
                                            
265 Interview 30; Interview 53. 
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basic requirements could borrow, whereas in the past households had to 
rely on good guanxi with RCC employees in order to get loans.266  
 
This increased formal ‘financial inclusion’ was perceived as temporally de-
marginalising borrowers by instilling in them a modern ‘credit consciousness’ 
based on ‘law’ and ‘reason’ rather than ‘traditional’ guanxi-based 
understandings of credit grounded in local customs.267 This new sense of 
‘credit consciousness’ was praised as beneficial progression for rural people, 
transforming them from ‘backward’ peasants into ‘modern’ citizens with a 
higher level of ‘quality’. For instance, the RCC director in the AT said: “The 
biggest change has been in the local farmers’ mind-set. Before they just 
focused on saving, now they also think about borrowing.” 268  This 
understanding of formal credit was also equated with other beneficial traits 
associated with modernity, such as ‘creditworthiness’, which were then 
ascribed to groups and communities, thus depicting them as more ‘modern’ 
and ‘developed’ than their more marginal counterparts in other places. For 
instance, the director of the MoHRSS in the AT attributed the success of the 
RCCMP to a uniform localised ‘modern’ culture by saying: “The township 
has been able to lend out so much money each year because of the local 
customs and culture. Local farmers in this township are trustworthy.”269 
 
The increased use of formal credit was also seen as facilitating wider 
temporal de-marginalisation by spreading knowledge of other formal 
financial services, thus fostering a wider ‘financial consciousness’ amongst 
the marginal rural population. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s rural 
residents often hid money in their homes (e.g. in closets, walls, beds, etc.), 
which was sometimes stolen or lost – e.g. money sometimes went rotten 
after floods, or was eaten by insects.270 However, after using formal credit 
                                            
266 Interview 18; Interview 54; Interview 55. 
267 See the explanation of Fei Xiaotong’s conceptions of lisu and fali above 
(Fei, 1992). 
268 Interview 05. 
269 Conversation 01. 
270 In the MWT I was told a story about a household that had saved RMB 
60,000 to pay for their child’s future wedding. They hid the money in the 
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services rural people often gained a greater appreciation for, and trust in, 
local financial institutions and their ability to provide a more secure method 
of saving financial capital.271 In this way, through a change in ‘mentality’ rural 
people shifted from using insecure ‘traditional’ methods of saving, to safe 
‘modern’ formal accounts in the RCC. This transition into formal savings also 
allowed the RCC to mobilise local deposits for investment and increased 
lending locally. Similarly, formal loans also introduced local actors to the 
RCC remittances service, which provides households with the ability to send 
money within the province free of charge. In the past, residents would often 
use the PSRB (which became the PSBC after 2006) to remit money. 
However, the service was slow and relatively expensive, so some migrants 
would informally remit their earnings by bringing large amounts of cash with 
them when they returned home to visit their families.272 Obviously, this was a 
very dangerous proposition, particularly during festival periods when many 
people are travelling, and there have been some high profile cases of 
migrants losing huge amounts of savings (Anon., 2013). Therefore, the RCC 
remittances service provides increased security for migrant workers sending 
money home through the ‘modern’ financial network for consumption 
purposes or for local investment that has the potential to diversify and 
improve local economies (i.e. countering the ‘scissors gap’ discussed 
above).273  Unsurprisingly, the DET had the highest level of this type of 
formal ‘financial consciousness’, most likely due to the prevalence and wide 
coverage of the RCCMP.274 
 
                                                                                                                           
walls, but one night it was stolen and the culprit was never caught 
(Conversation 18). 
271  Interview 05; Interview 31; Interview 32; Interview 48; Interview 56; 
Interview 70. 
272  Interview 07; Interview 38; Interview 41; Interview 48; Interview 56; 
Interview 74; Interview 76. 
273 Interview 40; Interview 53. 
274 DET Contextual Observation Report. That being said, I still encountered 
many households that refused to use ‘modern’ financial and insurance 
services because they did not trust or understand them. Even one jewellery 
shop with over RMB 1,000,000 worth of merchandise purchased a safe 
rather than insurance (Interview 26; Interview 39; Interview 47; Interview 51; 
Interview 71). 
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6.6 Microcredit and Local Livelihood Improvement 
Of course, by facilitating the different types of de-marginalisation outlined 
above, the microcredit programmes were also credited with playing a 
beneficial role in the (re)production of local livelihood strategies and 
outcomes. In particular, microcredit helped shape the ways in which rural 
actors went about acquiring and securing consumption/economic 
necessities, how they coped with challenges and responded to opportunities, 
and their values and identities, which, crucially, defined “individual belonging 
and… aspirations for social and economic transformation” (Christiansen, 
2010, p. 141; Long, 1997). Of course, due to the heterogeneous 
implementation of the programmes and the varying perspectives of what 
constitutes beneficial linear progressive development, livelihood 
transformation manifested itself in diverse and unpredictable ways for 
different actors in different localities. 
 
For instance, in some cases the microcredit programmes played an 
important role in the livelihood strategies of local implementers – paving the 
way for easier access to economic resources and allowing implementers to 
take advantage of opportunities that would not have been possible without 
the programmes. Most obviously, EMP implementers in the AT were able to 
utilise the programme in order to become more visible to their superiors at 
higher levels of government, and, in this way, shape new livelihood 
trajectories that were integrally linked to taking advantage of the opportunity 
to create a successful policy pilot/model. Similarly, in the MWT the director 
of the township RCC was able to package the RCCMP into one large loan 
for the construction company in order to take advantage of the opportunity to 
link into wider socioeconomic networks at the county and prefectural levels, 
thereby increasing his power in relation to other officials at the township 
level. In other words, in both of these cases the microcredit programmes 
made it possible for local implementers to improve their job prospects and 
potentially increase their incomes and access to financial, social and political 
resources. At the same time, the programmes also played a more profound 
role in the identity formation of the implementers in both the AT and MWT. 
Indeed, in both cases implementers proudly identified themselves as 
effective leaders and/or policy innovators. They also perceived themselves 
as being leading contributors to the rapid and beneficial development and 
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de-marginalisation of rural China through its integration into the urban-based 
market system. 275  This identity based on a capitalist vision of rural 
development and de-marginalisation, in turn, shaped how these actors 
perceived opportunities (for themselves and for other local actors) and went 
about acquiring livelihood resources. 
 
Of course, the programmes had their most visible de-marginalising ‘impact’ 
by improving borrower livelihoods, albeit again in diverse ways for different 
types of borrowers. For instance, in the DET the RCCMP (and the EMP 
before its cancellation) helped local inhabitants (especially returning migrant 
workers) to take advantage of the opportunity to open businesses, thus 
increasing income and access to livelihood resources. In the words of one 
local entrepreneur: “The EMP has had a big impact on our household, it 
solved the issue of my wife’s employment and improved our economic 
situation… If we didn’t get the EMP we couldn’t have opened our shop.”276 
Microcredit also allowed existing local microenterprises in the township to 
take advantage of investments and business opportunities that would have 
been impossible without the fast access to capital. One such example was 
an aquaculture microenterprise that used the RCCMP loans to pay for the 
expenses involved in making business connections with customers in 
neighbouring Zhejiang Province, thereby spatially de-marginalising the 
business by linking it into regional supply chains.277  
 
In the MWT, the EMP did not obviously contribute to borrower livelihood 
improvement, as the loans were often perceived as redundant sources of 
capital. However, in some cases households did increase income through 
onlending,278 and other households used the loans for investment in urban-
based stock markets. While this was ultimately a risky use of the credit, it did 
de-marginalise the households (in a neoliberal sense) by allowing them to 
                                            
275 See Chapter 4. For instance, the director of the RCC in the MWT was 
proud that the institution was ‘financially sustainable’ unlike RCCs in other 
areas (Interview 10). 
276 Interview 56. 
277 Interview 78. 
278 Interview 30. 
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participate in the ‘modern’ financial market in a way that was not possible for 
much of the rural population.279  
 
Of course, the EMP in the AT was the most obvious example of a 
microcredit programme playing a beneficial role in the livelihoods of 
borrowers by allowing the members of the FC to take advantage of the 
opportunity to invest in the vegetable greenhouses. Not only did this 
investment make the borrowers’ lives easier, as vegetable farming is 
significantly less gruelling than rice farming, it was also extremely profitable, 
as the vegetable greenhouses allowed the FC members to grow more 
profitable ‘cash crops’ (chilli peppers and Artemisia), which could earn RMB 
6,000-7,000 per mu per year – as opposed to the RMB 600-700 per mu per 
year for rice farming. This meant that some members of the FC were able to 
earn over RMB 80,000 per year, and even spatially de-marginalise 
themselves by using the extra income to invest in valuable property in the 
city.280 Overall, the EMP was described as helping the members of the FC to 
achieve the next step in a linear progression of self development and 
livelihood improvement in the context of rural China’s perceived inevitable 
march towards a ‘developed’ endpoint with better conditions for its 
inhabitants. In the words of one member of the FC: 
The 1970s were very difficult, sometimes we even didn’t have 
food and farming was very hard. With the beginning of the 
household responsibility system in the 1980s life got better year 
on year, but farming was still difficult. In recent years, since we 
have been using the vegetable greenhouses, life has gotten much 
better.281 
 
In addition to generally improving borrower access to consumption and 
economic necessities, the programmes also permitted borrowers to take 
advantage of opportunities to diversify and secure livelihoods, which is vital 
to the sustainable (re)production of livelihood strategies (Hospes & Lont, 
2004). In particular, by investing in vegetable greenhouses, the members of 
                                            
279 Interview 38. 
280 Interview 23; Interview 24; Interview 25. 
281 Interview 25. 
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the FC in the AT transitioned from single-crop farming (rice) to multiple 
crops, thus diversifying their sources of income and reducing the risks of 
crop failure. 282  In the DET, the RCCMP allowed households to open 
microenterprises that contributed to multifaceted livelihood strategies 
including farming, migrant work, and even wage income in the local 
components factories, thus making households more resilient to shocks and 
crises. 283  More generally, the loans also had the potential to help 
microenterprises ‘smooth over’ periods when business was slow, and 
allowed households to diversify their future livelihood strategies through 
investment in necessary consumption activities and ‘human capital’, such as 
building houses or paying for their children’s education, while maintaining 
savings for emergencies.284 In other words, by allowing households and 
businesses to take advantage of opportunities to diversify income sources 
and become more financially secure, the microcredit programmes helped 
borrowers to ‘help themselves’ overcome structural constraints that had 
previously marginalised them. 
 
These tangible livelihood benefits outlined above had a very real (and 
important) impact on how borrowing households constructed their identities 
and defined themselves within the wider development landscape. For 
instance, as stated in Chapter 4, the members of the FC in the AT were 
proud that they were utilising modern agricultural technologies, and, like the 
EMP implementers, perceived themselves as being at the forefront of rural 
China’s rapid development. When asked why others were not able to get 
loans, many of the FC members drew on neoliberal discourses and 
narratives – such as Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote “let some people get 
rich first” – that justified and framed their privileged status as necessary for 
rural China’s ultimate future ascension to a state of ‘development’. In this 
way, they identified themselves as the rural elite whose role it was to lead 
the way to de-marginalisation through ‘positive’ actions (based on a 
neoliberal ideology), such as astutely noticing and exploiting entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and being willing to take risks.285 At the same time, they 
                                            
282 Interview 23; Interview 24; Interview 25. 
283 Interview 55; Interview 56; Interview 58; Interview 61; Interview 66. 
284 Interview 22; Interview 38; Interview 57; Interview 78. 
285 Conversation 01; Interview 25. 
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placed the blame for the exclusion of others from the microcredit 
programmes squarely on the shoulders of the excluded themselves, with 
statements like: “The wealthy are courageous people who dare to take risks 
and intelligent people who are ready to innovate. The poor are generally 
complacent and lazy. They envy the rich people, but also can recognise their 
own incompetence.”286 These borrowers also continually pointed out that 
successful de-marginalisation required hard work, and that the poor and 
marginalised should not blame the government – saying things like:  
In the past the emperors levied agricultural taxes to pay for the 
army. Now the Party’s policy is good, they have eliminated 
agricultural taxes and introduced agricultural subsidies, so we are 
very satisfied. However, the income gap continues to widen, even 
within rural areas. The main reason is because people do not 
want to work.287 
 
Similarly, in the MWT, households that were able to borrow from the EMP or 
the RCC stressed that the poor had no one to blame but themselves, and 
prescribed more individual effort as the route to de-marginalisation,288 with 
one borrower saying: “Through their own efforts they should improve their 
social standing, and also ensure that they have the ability to repay the 
loans.”289 The owner of the largest construction company also justified his 
‘capture’ of the RCCMP by saying that most of the residents in the MWT did 
not have ‘credit consciousness’ and therefore did not deserve loans because 
they were not as trustworthy as his company.290 Of course, due to the easier 
access to the RCCMP in the DET, this discourse of individual responsibility 
for exclusion was even more widespread, with most households saying that 
only the untrustworthy were not allowed to borrow. Ultimately, therefore, 
inclusion into the programmes played a key role in borrowers constructing 
identities as local social and economic elites, positioned at a higher (i.e. 
superior) stage of linear development than non-borrowers, which, of course, 
                                            
286 Interview 04. 
287 Interview 25. 
288 Interview 09; Interview 32. 
289 Interview 29. 
290 Interview 45. 
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shaped the ways in which they (re)produced their livelihood strategies going 
forward. 
 
In other words, the microcredit programmes have – in some cases and for 
certain actors – ‘improved’ livelihoods by allowing implementers and 
borrowers to gain access to resources, diversify livelihood strategies and 
take advantage of opportunities, thereby enhancing career prospects, 
scaling up businesses, allowing for house construction and access to 
education, and providing a financial buffer for investments and emergencies 
– all of which have had substantial de-marginalising effects. Moreover, the 
programmes have been utilised by implementers and borrowers alike as a 
means of increasing and strengthening social networks, which has been 
identified by other research as a key element in improving sustainable 
livelihoods and facilitating local development (Ye, Wang, & Long, 2009). 
Microcredit has also allowed actors to identify themselves as successful 
members of the ‘winning’ cohort, contributing to the modernisation and 
development of rural China, albeit based on a neoliberal version of the linear 
progression development paradigm. Therefore, all of these ‘improvements’ 
are perceived as being symptomatic of ‘modern’ livelihoods, which are 
increasingly standardised based on ‘developed’ (urban) modes of existence, 
and positioned in contrast to traditional livelihood modes, which are then 
depicted as being ‘backward’ and ‘uncultured’ (meiyou wenhua PJG). 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter begins by showing how the three microcredit programmes have 
been framed within a neoliberal version of the linear progression 
development paradigm, which depicts rural areas and people as being 
backward and peripheral, and therefore in need of modernisation and de-
marginalisation through integration into the wider market economy. This is 
in-line with the general global discourse of development, and also reflects 
contemporary Chinese understandings of development as technological 
progression, modernity and de-marginalisation (both domestically and on the 
world stage). Within these paradigmatic confines, it is clear that in all three 
townships, microcredit has successfully facilitated de-marginalisation and 
livelihood improvement for certain actors and in certain ways. Indeed, this 
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chapter illustrates how the microcredit programmes have contributed291 to 
spatial, material and temporal de-marginalisation by initiating flows of capital, 
knowledge and technology from central (urban) areas to the three 
townships; by facilitating the creation of new socioeconomic and socio-
political linkages between marginal and non-marginal areas/actors; and by 
‘modernising’ employment, providing platforms for local cooperative action 
and expanding financial inclusion. 
 
However, despite the paradigmatic coherence, the nature of this de-
marginalisation varied significantly across the three localities for two key 
reasons. First, as with all rural development interventions (particularly in the 
Chinese context), implementation at the local level was highly 
heterogeneous and emergent from complex negotiations at the interfaces of 
interaction between diverse actors (see Chapter 5). Second, while rural 
development itself was uniformly understood as the need to spatially, 
materially and temporally de-marginalise rural areas and people – there was 
little consensus on how these processes of de-marginalisation should 
proceed, with different localities (and actors within these localities) 
prioritising different sectors and people to be the recipients of the de-
marginalising efforts. Therefore, each of the programmes in each of the 
townships can be considered to have produced de-marginalisation, just in 
different ways. Even the programmes that would widely be considered to 
have ‘failed’ – such as the non-implementation of the PAMP in the MWT and 
DET, and the ‘capture’ of the RCCMP in the MWT – still resulted in de-
marginalisation for certain actors. Therefore, this chapter challenges the 
assumption that top-down ‘best practice’ to ensure a specific type of de-
marginalisation can be identified, as the de-marginalisation outcomes were 
ultimately reflections of local perceptions of what rural development means, 
and which development paths should be followed in order to reach the ‘next 
stage’ of linear development.  
 
In this way – because de-marginalisation was not uniform, but instead 
benefited certain areas and actors – the microcredit programmes also 
                                            
291 It is important to note that we cannot attribute causation here, but instead 
should recognise that the programmes contributed to de-marginalisation 
within the wider developmental landscape. 
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played a role in widening the gap between the newly de-marginalised and 
the still marginal, usually based on existing social, economic and political 
segmentation at the local level. Rather than being a flaw in the formulation or 
implementation of the microcredit programmes, this is a fundamental feature 
of the linear progression development paradigm, particularly in its neoliberal 
form. Ultimately, therefore, the concepts of development, modernisation and 
de-marginalisation are relational in nature, meaning that the linear 
progression development paradigm produces the very divisions between 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ that it seeks to eliminate, thereby 
“concealing the fact that both exist within unequal relations between centre 
and periphery–relations that involve domination and subordination” (H. 
Wang, 2011, p. 95). Therefore, while microcredit has successfully instigated 
some processes of de-marginalisation, it has simultaneously contributed to 
deepening various local discontinuities and has exacerbated exclusion, 
inequality and distress in various ways for different actors. We now turn to 
Chapter 7 to explore these undercurrents of marginalisation in more depth. 
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Chapter 7 
Indebted to Development: Microcredit, Precarious 
Livelihoods and Undercurrents of Marginalisation 
 
Microfinance does not simply smooth over contemporary processes of 
agrarian change. Rather, it tends to reflect and reproduce their central 
contradictions and power dynamics.  
- Marcus Taylor  
 
Deng Xiaoping said ‘let some people get rich first’. The clever will get rich 
first and the lazy will fall behind. Everyone’s situation is different and more 
conservative people will usually be left behind. 
- Interview 29 
 
The shift towards a neoliberal-oriented rural development strategy in China 
since the reform and opening (i.e. the adoption of a ‘socialist market 
economy’), has meant that ‘beneficial’ progression along the linear path 
towards a higher stage of development has increasingly been understood as 
coinciding with integration into the wider market system. This market-based 
development ideology sees rural de-marginalisation as resulting from the 
promotion of entrepreneurial activity and ‘beneficial’ competition at the local 
level.292 As the most recent National Development and Reform Commission 
report states, the Chinese government’s development policy now seeks “to 
establish a sound, unified, and open nationwide market system that ensures 
orderly competition, puts forward more reform measures to invigorate the 
market, and turns the new benefits of reform into a new driving force for 
development.” (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015, p. 
18). While it is acknowledged that this type of competition results in 
increased inequality through the creation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, this 
                                            
292 Entrepreneurial activity can, of course, be perceived in very different 
ways. For instance, in the AT the FC was considered to be entrepreneurial 
for building greenhouses, while in the MWT, migrant work was considered 
an entrepreneurial pursuit. 
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situation is depicted as a necessary and inevitable side-effect of 
development, and something that is accepted by society at large – even the 
segments of the population that are not directly benefiting. In the words of 
one wealthy household in the MWT: 
The income gap has been increasing. Before we were all farming 
and none of us had any money. Now some people go out to earn 
money and some stay in the village to farm, so the gap is 
growing. However, this increasing gap does not affect the 
relationship between the rich and poor villagers. The poor 
acknowledge the rich villagers’ achievements.293 
 
Of course, as stated earlier, microcredit as a development intervention – and 
particularly microcredit based on the ‘financial systems approach’ – mirrors 
this understanding of development and de-marginalisation as emerging from 
individual entrepreneurial effort at the local level leading to increased 
economic integration. For this reason, microcredit programmes seek to 
include the previously excluded marginal areas and actors into the ‘modern’ 
financial system, and provide the capital necessary to produce the type of 
entrepreneurial activity that is seen as allowing rural people to ‘develop 
themselves’ through engagement with the wider market economy and 
contemporary urban-based cosmopolitan society. In this way, proponents of 
microcredit (in China and globally) envision microloans, and the ensuing 
local entrepreneurship, as playing an important role in improving local 
economies by lifting entire communities out of their ‘underdeveloped’ and 
‘backward’ modes of existence, thereby de-marginalising them spatially, 
materially and temporally. For this reason, microcredit is seen as allowing 
the benefits of ‘modern’ capitalist society to ‘trickle-down’ to marginal rural 
areas and actors, and, thus, justifying uneven development as necessary in 
order to instigate the type of progress that will eventually benefit everyone 
(i.e. ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’). 
 
However, by depicting underdevelopment and marginalisation as simply 
symptoms of disconnection with the wider market economy (i.e. separation 
from development), both microcredit specifically, and neoliberal 
understandings of the linear progression development paradigm more 
                                            
293 Interview 43. 
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generally, ignore (or obscure) the ways in which developed/central and 
underdeveloped/marginal spaces and people are dichotomously co-
produced and mutually constituted in relation to each other (i.e. already 
integrally connected) within development landscapes that are fundamentally 
shaped by unequal relationships of power and subordination (Weber, 2006). 
Therefore, while microcredit (and other top-down neoliberal interventions) 
does have the ability to facilitate rapid development and de-marginalisation 
for certain areas, groups and individuals (see Chapter 6), it simultaneously 
reflects – and often reproduces and/or exacerbates – inequalities and 
patterns of marginalisation at various levels that characterise the relationship 
between the marginal and non-marginal in China and other ‘developing 
contexts’ worldwide.  
 
This chapter aims to outline these varied undercurrents of marginalisation 
that accompanied, and were intimately related to, the de-marginalising 
outcomes recorded and analysed in Chapter 6. In this way, this chapter (and 
the continued discussion in Chapter 8) represents a critique of the role that 
microcredit can, and should, play in local development strategies and the 
(re)production of livelihoods in rural China and beyond. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 outlines the literature critiquing 
the linear progression development paradigm, and illustrates how the 
paradigm itself actively produces the underdevelopment and marginality that 
it purportedly seeks to eliminate. The section then goes on to show how 
marginalisation needs to be understood as sets of unequal and mutually 
constituted dichotomous relationships (i.e. ‘relational marginality’), rather 
than reified as a ‘backward’ mode of existence that can simply be eliminated 
through external intervention aimed at instigating ‘progress’. Section 7.2 
analyses how this concept of ‘relational marginality’ has characterised the 
development landscape in rural China, and shows how development 
interventions, such as microcredit, have shifted and sometimes transformed 
relationships of marginalisation, but, ultimately, have done little to change 
the underlying causes and conditions of marginality itself. Section 7.3, 
Section 7.4 and Section 7.5 outline the heterogeneous and complex ways in 
which the microcredit programmes have produced undercurrents of 
marginalisation in the three townships. In particular, the sections show how 
microcredit has facilitated the diversion and extraction of rural resources, 
excluded certain actors and areas from development opportunities, and 
aggravated various types of risk, distress and social strife at the local level – 
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all of which have had significant negative impacts on the ways in which local 
actors (re)produce their livelihood strategies and form their livelihood 
identities. Section 7.6 concludes and leads into the final chapter of the 
dissertation. 
 
7.1 The Unequal Foundations of Development and Relational 
Marginality 
As stated in Chapter 6, contemporary definitions of the concept of 
development have invariably been grounded in the linear progression 
development paradigm, which depicts cultures and societies, countries and 
regions, as moving – step by step – from a marginal traditional (‘backward’) 
state of existence to a more modern (‘civilised’) one. The work of those 
involved in the field of global development has, therefore, been to assist the 
‘underdeveloped’ places and people to adopt policies and modes of societal 
organisation that will best facilitate this transition. However, while the linear 
progression development paradigm has undoubtedly maintained its position 
as the dominant way of understanding and attempting to instigate 
development in China and globally, in recent decades it has come under 
increasingly strong critique – both for its perceived failure, and for being 
conceptually and theoretically unsound. In particular, critics have pointed to 
the fact that the global development project has not lived up to its promise to 
reduce the stark developmental gaps between the ‘developed world’ and the 
‘global south’. Indeed, regardless of how progressive development is defined 
or measured, inequalities have persisted worldwide – narrowing in some 
places and expanding in others – and there is little consensus on whether 
even basic ‘progress’ towards a standard level of development, such as 
through the reduction of global poverty, has been achieved (Kirk, Brewer, & 
Hickel, 2015; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010; Reddy & Minoiu, 2007). The 
perceived failure of development is seen to have become more acute with 
the rise of the neoliberal version of the linear progression development 
paradigm since the 1980s, as the logic of unfettered free market capitalism 
as a means of promoting development has “resulted in systems in which the 
few benefit at the expense of the many” (Escobar, 2004, pp. 349–350), 
primarily through the “dispossession, confiscation or privatisation of crucial 
livelihood resources” (Mosse, 2010, p. 1171), thus pushing disadvantaged 
groups and people further to the margins of the economy and society 
(Hickel, Brewer, & Kirk, 2015). 
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In addition to the empirical failure of the global development project, recent 
research on ‘alternative development’ has increasingly pointed out that the 
conceptualisation of linear progressive development itself is, at best, 
problematic. This is primarily due to the fact that it is grounded in teleological 
thinking and, rather than allowing for the emergence of complex and multiple 
non-uniform modernities, produces a falsely dichotomous relationship 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ modes of existence, which are then 
normatively framed as negative/inferior and positive/superior in relation to 
each other based on western-centric socioeconomic and socio-cultural forms 
(Barabantseva, 2012; de Sousa Santos, 2004; Gibson‐Graham, 2005; Long, 
2001; Tipps, 1973; Wheeler, 2005). Fundamental to this critique is the 
observation that the knowledge underpinning the concept of development – 
i.e. the ability to define what development actually means – is a social 
construct that has been produced within regimes marked by unequal 
structures of power. In the words of Arturo Escobar: “development has relied 
exclusively on one knowledge system, namely, the modern Western one. 
The dominance of this knowledge system has dictated the marginalisation 
and disqualification of non-Western knowledge systems” (Escobar, 1995, p. 
13). In this way, development has essentially entailed the 
replication/adoption of ‘western’ social, economic, political and cultural 
modes, which is often unfeasible, unsuitable and/or undesirable for 
‘underdeveloped’ places and people, thus perpetuating the creation of areas 
and populations that are deemed to be spatially, materially and temporally 
marginalised in relation to the more powerful centres where development 
knowledge is produced (Escobar, 1995; Wen, 2007). In other words, by 
controlling the knowledge that defines the binary oppositions underpinning 
the concept of development – e.g. margin vs. centre, traditional vs. modern, 
uncivilised vs. civilised, etc. – the linear progression development paradigm 
actively produces the underdevelopment that it purportedly seeks to 
eliminate, by systematically ignoring and repressing multiple forms of 
development and change that emerge from actors and areas with less 
power. In this way, it is the very concept of ‘development’ itself that is 
responsible for instigating the further marginalisation and disempowerment 
of the ‘underdeveloped world’ (Escobar, 1995, 2004; Long, 2001).294 
                                            
294 This situation has resulted in widespread movements both globally and in 
China, often termed ‘alternative development’, which seek to opt out of the 
 245 
 
Ultimately, therefore, development and underdevelopment are mutually 
constituted through the (re)production of ‘development dichotomies’. These 
dichotomies are, in turn, composed of sets of interlinking unequal 
relationships at different levels, which produce the patterns of spatial, 
material and temporal marginalisation that characterise the development 
landscape in China and beyond. Indeed, development and 
underdevelopment – and their corollaries wealth and poverty – are “created 
by people… one cannot be separated from the other” (Hickel et al., 2015). In 
the same vein, Charles Tilly coined the term ‘durable inequalities’ to refer to 
the most persistent unequal social and historical relationships between 
individuals, groups and areas, showing that these inequalities are the result 
of the “institutionalization of categorical pairs,” such as minority/majority 
race, male/female, citizen/non-citizen, and – most importantly for this 
dissertation – urban/rural (Tilly, 1998, p. 8). Consequently, marginalisation 
(as the result of inequality) cannot be detached from the social and historical 
contexts which have given rise to its existence, but instead must be 
conceptualised as a form of ‘relational marginality’ emerging from these 
unequal dichotomous relationships, and thereby defined in relation to non-
marginal and developed centres. In this way, marginality or “remoteness is 
not simply a static condition found somewhere out there beyond the pale; 
rather, it is always being made, unmade, and transformed… edges and 
remote spaces are intimately bound up in the construction of centres” 
(Harms et al., 2014, pp. 362, 365). Simply put, a centre can only exist in 
relation to the margins, just as development can only be understood in 
relation to underdevelopment, hence, de-marginalisation will implicitly 
require the shifting and reformulation of interlinking marginal relationships, 
thereby causing increased marginalisation elsewhere (Mosse, 2010; Pfaff-
Czarnecka & Kruckenberg, 2016).295 
 
                                                                                                                           
linear progression development paradigm by adopting multiple and 
‘sustainable’ forms of development based on local practices and cultures. 
See, for instance, (Day, 2013; de Sousa Santos, 2004; Escobar, 2004; 
Gibson‐Graham, 2005; Hale, 2013; Wen, 2007). 
295 For more on the ‘zero-sum’ nature of de-marginalisation efforts based on 
the linear progression development paradigm see the discussion in Chapter 
8. 
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It is, of course, important to note that these interlinking marginal 
relationships exist at different levels of analysis. For instance, rural areas are 
marginal in relation to the city just as a poor village household is marginal in 
relation to a local elite, or a disempowered family member is marginal in 
relation to the head of the household. Moreover, these marginal 
relationships are “situated in dynamic fields of power” (Harms et al., 2014, p. 
364), which are constantly being contested but are, at the same time, 
shaped by the persistence of historical power imbalances represented by 
longstanding durable inequalities embedded within sociocultural contexts 
(Tilly, 1998).296 Consequently, marginal places and people are characterised 
by their relative lack of power. This results in their exploitation and exclusion 
from opportunities and access to resources by elites – referred to by Tilly as 
‘opportunity hoarding’ (Tilly, 1998) – which has obvious implications for the 
ways in which identities are formed and society is structured – i.e. the 
processes that underpin the (re)production of development landscapes and 
livelihoods at different levels. Of course, top-down (external) development 
interventions seek to eliminate the various types of exploitation and 
exclusion resulting from marginalisation. However, the formulation and 
implementation of these interventions is invariably shaped by the same 
sociocultural and socioeconomic conditions and relationships that give rise 
to the very inequalities and imbalances that produce the marginalisation in 
the first place. In other words, they are embedded within a development 
paradigm which has given rise to global and local ‘development 
dichotomies’, and are thus constituted within (and play a role in creating) a 
system that is responsible for (re)producing the ‘third world’ (Escobar, 1995). 
 
This is particularly evident with interventions that are grounded in a 
neoliberal version of the linear progression development paradigm – such as 
microcredit – as they perceive marginalisation and underdevelopment as 
conditions that arise from a lack of connection with markets located in non-
marginal centres. In this way, marginalisation is detached from the sets of 
interlinking unequal relationships (and underlying constellations of power) 
that have given rise to (and sustained) it, and the condition of marginality is 
                                            
296 Indeed, power is of fundamental importance to marginalisation and future 
research would do well to deepen our understanding of relational marginality 
by explicitly exploring the role of multidimensional power in its formation. 
Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but potential 
directions for future research are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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reified and ‘localised’ by attributing its existence to the inherent 
characteristics of the people and places that are afflicted with it (Appadurai, 
1997; Barabantseva, 2009). Simply put, marginality is de-historicised and 
de-contextualised – it is depicted as existing in a vacuum and responsibility 
for its existence is shifted to the marginalised themselves, implying that 
marginal existences can be eliminated by merely transforming the 
‘backward’ nature of the afflicted and strengthening the connections with the 
very centres that have produced their marginalisation in the first place. 
Indeed, as stated above, in the case of microcredit, marginality has been 
framed as the result of disconnection with the wider market economy, and 
the remedy is perceived to be including marginal areas and actors into the 
formal financial system by issuing them with formal credit (and debt), thus 
attending to certain symptoms of marginalisation, while ignoring the 
underlying causes (Weber, 2006). Therefore, it should be no surprise that 
attempts to de-marginalise rural areas, groups and individuals through 
microcredit (or other neoliberal interventions) simply shift marginalisation 
around – reducing it in some places and exacerbating it in others – without 
actually eliminating it (i.e. rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic). 
 
7.2 The Rural-Urban Dichotomy and Relational Marginality in 
the Chinese Context 
As stated in Chapter 6, rural and urban areas in China have historically (but 
particularly since the mid-1800s) had a dichotomous relationship based on 
an unequal distribution of power and resources, which has resulted in rural 
areas being socially and economically constructed as the marginal 
periphery, while urban areas have been positioned as the modern centres. 
This durably marginal relationship between rural and urban areas has 
persisted in paradoxical ways despite being nominally subjected to 
ideologically diverse external attempts to eliminate it over the past century. 
For instance, throughout the Mao period rural society was subjected to 
radical restructuring efforts aimed at creating a ‘modern’ peasantry, rural 
industry and industrialised agriculture. However, at the same time, surpluses 
were extracted from rural areas in order to facilitate a more ambitious 
modernisation development agenda in urban areas in order to ‘catch up’ with 
the cities of the ‘developed world’ (see Chapter 2) (J. Brown, 2012; Sanders 
et al., 2007; N. R. Smith, 2015; H. X. Zhang & Loubere, 2015). In the post-
reform era, on the other hand, the adoption of market-based approaches to 
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economic management has resulted in rapid but extremely unequal 
economic growth, which has allowed for the transformation of China’s urban 
areas into ‘modern’ cosmopolitan centres that are integrally connected to the 
world economy. However, this has often been at the expense of rural areas 
that are ‘left behind’ and sometimes pushed even further into 
impoverishment and marginalisation due to their inability to gain access to, 
or retain, development resources. 
 
Of course, much research has pointed to the liberalisation and marketisation 
of the rural economy as driving rural development and improving the lives of 
the peasantry, particularly through the reduction of absolute poverty (S. 
Wang, 2013; Yao, 2000; K. X. Zhou, 1996). Moreover, the majority (but not 
all) of the people I spoke to during fieldwork said that their lives had 
improved over the past three decades, particularly pointing to the fact that 
rural diets had been enhanced with meat being more readily available, 
whereas in the pre-reform era it was a luxury. That being said, my 
respondents also uniformly pointed out that the gap between rural and urban 
areas, and between the rich and the poor locally, had grown at an 
astounding rate since the reform and opening, ultimately illustrating that the 
neoliberalisation of the Chinese development model has left rural China and 
its population in a more tenuous position in relation to the rapidly developing 
cities, thereby actively exacerbating the historical marginal relationship 
between rural and urban areas for a number of reasons (albeit to different 
extents in different places). For one, the encouragement of market-based 
competition and the application of financialised organisational systems 
emphasising efficiency and profit over social goals have pushed rural 
resources (e.g. savings) and people (e.g. migrant workers) to flow to more 
profitable urban areas or risk ‘failing’ at the margins (Loubere & Zhang, 
2015; Sanders et al., 2007). Moreover, local governments have been 
systematically defunded in favour of governments at higher levels (i.e. 
‘hollowed out’), while also coming under increased pressure to achieve 
‘financial sustainability’ and even profitability, thereby reducing their capacity 
to provide rural areas and people with basic and necessary services (G. 
Smith, 2010; Wen, 2005). At the same time, macro level historical 
institutional and structural inequalities and patterns of marginalisation have 
been maintained or strengthened – such as the dichotomous division of 
household registration documents into rural and urban – which 
disadvantages rural actors through various types of policy discrimination, 
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particularly in terms of work, benefits, resources and services (G. Chen & 
Chun, 2004; Sanders et al., 2007; L. Zhang, 2007).297 This has resulted in a 
solidified and more durable unequal relationship between marginal and non-
marginal China, which is best represented by what Wen Tiejun refers to as 
the ‘three big disparities’ – between regions, income and urban/rural areas 
(Wen, 2007). At their most extreme, these disparities manifest themselves 
as seemingly intractable rural impoverishment, and by the early 2000s some 
nine per cent of the rural population was living in a type of absolute poverty 
that had become “increasingly impervious to change” (Sanders et al., 2007, 
p. 30). 
 
Of course, neoliberal development has not only made the rural more 
marginal in relation to the urban, it has also served to exacerbate local 
inequality within rural areas themselves. For instance, the widespread 
privatisation movement in the 1990s and early 2000s has allowed managers 
and other local elites to buy out (or appropriate) the profitable TVEs that 
played a vital role in rural China’s industrialisation throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Herrmann-Pillath, 2009a), thereby transferring nominally public 
resources to private hands and creating a class of wealthy rural business 
elites, often with strong ties to local government.298 At the same time, in situ 
urbanisation, or ‘townisation’ (Guldin, 2001), and increased transportation 
and communication linkages between rural and urban areas have resulted in 
many rural spaces having a type of ‘remote proximity’ to urban centres 
(Harms et al., 2014). While this would seem to break down rural-urban 
dichotomies and reduce marginalisation, in reality the dichotomies shift, but 
persist, resulting in the rural being both less and more marginalised. This is 
because only some rural actors are able to link into centres and access 
certain elements of urban modernity, while others cannot make these 
                                            
297 The reformulation of the rural as a subaltern and marginal space that is 
lower on the evolutionary scale can also be seen in popular discourse, with 
terms such as the ‘left behind’ women, children and elderly being used to 
depict rural areas as undesirable places only home to those with no escape 
(Lin, Yin, & Loubere, 2014; Ye, Wang, & Zhang, 2010). 
298 For example, the previous manager of the only natural gas station in the 
MWT is now its owner and one of the richest people in the township with an 
annual income of over RMB 1,000,000. He is also the village head of the 
largest village in the MWT, and has good connections with officials in the 
township and county (Interview 32). 
 250 
connections and are thus ‘left-behind’, becoming even more marginal in 
relation to other rural actors and the rapidly developing cities. 299  This 
situation has both reinforced existing local unequal relationships – e.g. 
between elite and poor households, farmers and businesses, etc. – and has 
also formed new marginal relationships that were not present before the shift 
to a neoliberal approach that necessitates and encourages the formation of 
inequality. Ultimately, therefore, marginal and non-marginal actors and 
spaces have been increasingly positioned in close proximity to each other, 
making the rise of extreme inequality more visible and obvious. At the same 
time, the transition towards a neoliberal mind-set has shifted the 
responsibility for the unequal nature of these relationships of marginality to 
the marginal actors themselves, framing them as ‘lazy’, ‘stupid’ or ‘without 
ability’, and prompting them to ‘work harder’ and to be more ‘clever’ in order 
to escape from their marginal state.300 
 
The embeddedness and recent exacerbation of the unequal relationship 
between rural and urban areas was evident during fieldwork, and, despite 
the formation of new socioeconomic and socio-political connections with 
urban areas (see Chapter 6), it was clear that the townships’ historical 
marginal positions in relation to the nearby cities had become more 
entrenched. For instance, township officials in the DET expressed their 
desire for urban benefits and services to be extended to rural areas in order 
to reduce the growing rural-urban development gap, but they conceded that 
townships and villages now receive less support from higher levels of 
government than before, making their jobs much harder. They ultimately 
concluded that programmes like the CXYTH are futile because there are too 
many rural areas that are very poor, and as urban China gets richer more 
people will want to move and/or invest there, making it impossible to 
overcome the historical divide between rural and urban areas. 301  Poor 
households were also acutely aware of how urban living standards had been 
improving rapidly in relation to the living standards of those at the margins, 
                                            
299 At the same time, marginal zones have increasingly emerged in non-
marginal urban areas, resulting in slums and the emergence of ‘urban 
villages’ (chengzhongcun &M). 
300 Conversation 01; Interview 25; Interview 26; Interview 29. 
301 Conversation 34. 
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and the head of one household expressed his frustration at the extremity of 
this discrepancy by pointing out that rural people are even marginal in 
relation to animals in urban areas, saying: 
On the TV I often see people [in the city] spending lots of money 
to raise dogs and cats as pets, but I think they should use this 
money to help poor people. So many people are very poor and 
have hard lives; people are more important than animals! If I 
could get some help I could finish building my house and rent it to 
increase my income.302 
 
At the same time, as stated above, it was uniformly acknowledged that the 
gap between the rich and the poor had been increasing within all three 
townships, with interviewees making statements like:  
The income gap has been growing. Now there is labour freedom 
and freedom to earn money. Those with money can earn more 
money, and those without money will not earn much. The rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer.303 
Of course, these local inequalities were often simply exacerbated versions of 
longstanding marginal relationships based on historical hierarchies and 
structures of power at the local level. Indeed, local socioeconomic 
stratification was reflected in the division of land after the initiation of the 
household responsibility system, as marginal households received farmland 
of poorer quality and in worse locations.304 Additionally, township residents 
with non-local household registration documents were systematically 
marginalised through exclusion from local services, such as access to 
healthcare and formal financial institutions. 305  That being said, the 
neoliberal-orientation of rural economic management and development 
strategies has exacerbated this local relational marginality in the three 
townships in a number of ways. For one, costs have risen across the board 
                                            
302 Interview 59. 
303 Interview 57. 
304 Conversation 07; Interview 17; Interview 33. 
305 Interview 64. 
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while the income of poor households has stagnated.306 In particular, the cost 
of food has increased, causing some poor households to have less food 
security than during the pre-reform period. Additionally, the fees associated 
with education have risen substantially, making it difficult for poor 
households to provide for their children’s future success, thus creating the 
conditions for the continuation of relational marginality into the future.307 One 
rural resident in the AT explained how the increasing costs had marginalised 
his household: 
How can we improve our living standards? My grandchildren are 
now in school and I need to pay the tuition fees for them. Next 
year my grandson will attend high school in the county where the 
fees will be higher… We don’t spend much on food. We mainly 
eat what we grow and sometimes buy some meat for our 
grandchildren. Our main expense has been the schooling fees. 
Before it was for my children, now for my grandchildren. But now 
it is too expensive so my granddaughter cannot attend high 
school.308 
In addition to food and education, poor households also pointed to housing 
as a visible indicator of marginality, complaining that their houses were 
shabby (and sometimes unliveable) in relation to the wealthy segments of 
society who had all built new houses within the past decade. Even when 
marginal households were able to get together useful lump sums of capital in 
order to invest in housing, they were often unable to get permission to build 
or fix their houses due to their lack of social connections.309 This situation led 
the head of one class 4 household in the MWT to ask: “We are all supposed 
                                            
306 Rural people often refer to the cost of pork as an indicator of rising living 
costs and inflation. In 1958 one jin (jin H; 0.5 kilograms) of pork cost 0.7 jiao 
(jiao k; 0.1 RMB); during fieldwork the price for one jin was RMB 12 
(Interview 27). 
307 Conversation 34; Interview 26; Interview 51; Interview 76. 
308 Interview 28. It is important to note the durable gender inequality implicit 
in this statement, as the little money that is available is utilised to provide the 
grandson, rather than the granddaughter, with an education. 
309 Conversation 38; Interview 33; Interview 52. 
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to have a ‘Xiaokang’ life now, but how is this possible if we don’t even have 
adequate housing?”310 
 
This local relational marginality was most pronounced in the inequality 
between farmers and the emerging class of rural entrepreneurs, often with 
government connections and funded with remittances from migrant work. In 
the words of one local entrepreneur: “The inequality gap in rural areas is 
widening because some people have businesses, which earn much more 
money than farming. Farmers have the lowest status, the hardest lives and 
earn the least amount of money.”311 To give a specific example of this 
socioeconomic disparity, one rural resident in the MWT said: 
Since the reform and opening the average income in the village 
has increased by over 10 times. Now people do not want to farm 
because farming even one mu is very hard work and it can only 
earn RMB 300 [per month]. In the township the average wage for 
one day of work is RMB 120-130. My son has opened a roast 
duck restaurant in Shanxi and in one day he can earn RMB 700-
800 – some days he even earns RMB 1,000! Doing business is 
the best way to earn money.312 
In other words, households who were not able (or willing) to engage in 
migrant work or open a business have quickly become severely 
marginalised in relation to those who could. 313  Moreover, the farmers’ 
position has become more precarious since the neoliberal reforms of the 
1990s led to the closure of the Agricultural Technology Extension Stations 
(nongye jishu zhan BL] ) and the Grain Management Offices 
(liangguan suo `_A), which has forced agricultural producers to deal with 
middle-men on the open market, thereby pushing up the price of agricultural 
inputs (e.g. seed, fertiliser and pesticides) and pushing down the price of 
rice.314 Ultimately, the vast majority of interviewees agreed that farming is 
                                            
310 Interview 36. 
311 Interview 30. 
312 Interview 17 
313 Interview 60; Interview 66; Interview 70; Interview 78. 
314 Interview 58; Interview 74. 
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hard, risky, backbreaking work, with low remuneration and no security (e.g. 
health benefits or a pension), and farmers are left in a very tenuous situation 
in the long term as their health invariably fails due to the gruelling nature of 
the job. 
 
Of course, as stated above, top-down development interventions aim to 
reduce these growing inequalities between rural and urban areas, and within 
rural areas themselves, in order to alleviate some of the most damaging side 
effects of market liberalisation. However, due to the embeddedness and 
durability of these development dichotomies at different levels, external 
interventions have often served to reproduce and strengthen relational 
marginality rather than eliminate it. Indeed, even basic welfare interventions 
not based on market-oriented rationalities that explicitly targeted the poor in 
an attempt to reduce absolute poverty and create a standard level of 
development were, inevitably, incorporated into sets of unequal marginal 
relationships. For instance, the Minimum Living Standard Guarantee 
Programme, which aims to provide a basic level of income for very poor rural 
households, did not reach its target group in any of the three townships, and 
instead was distributed to relatively rich households based on existing 
socioeconomic networks.315 In the words of one poor household: “We don’t 
know any officials and have no connections, so we cannot get the minimum 
living standard guarantee. However, many households that have money and 
connections are able to get it even though they don’t need it.” 316 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Microcredit, as a neoliberal intervention that 
necessitates the creation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, played an even more 
explicit role in reproducing marginal relationships, both between rural and 
urban areas, and within townships – ultimately increasing risk, distress and 
destabilising the livelihoods of marginal actors in a variety of ways. We now 
turn to look at how these undercurrents of marginalisation manifested 
themselves in heterogeneous ways across the three townships. 
 
                                            
315 AT Contextual Observation Report; MWT Contextual Observation Report; 
DET Contextual Observation Report; Interview 17; Interview 21; Interview 
33; Interview 34; Interview 37; Interview 44; Interview 52. 
316 Interview 51. 
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7.3 Microcredit as Resource Diversion and Extraction 
To begin with, it is important to point out that microcredit has actively 
facilitated the transfer of resources from the marginal to the non-marginal. Of 
course, Chapter 6 illustrates how the three programmes played different 
roles in countering the notorious ‘scissors gap’ by instigating flows of capital, 
knowledge and technology from central to marginal areas. However, 
because the programmes were embedded within the wider market-oriented 
financial system that encourages investment in profitable and secure urban 
areas over less profitable and risky rural ones, and due to the fact that their 
implementation was shaped by unequal structures of power at the local 
level, the PAMP, EMP and RCCMP also facilitated the diversion of 
resources to local non-marginal actors (often depicted as ‘elite capture’), and 
the extraction of resources from the villages/townships to urban areas. 
Ultimately, these processes of diversion and extraction undermined much of 
the de-marginalisation outlined in Chapter 6. 
 
For instance, while it is true that the PAMP in the MWT and the DET 
represented an inward flow of financial capital from the more central 
provincial MoF to the relatively marginal county governments, the funds 
were originally intended to be disbursed to even more severely marginal 
poor households. Therefore, the PAMP was effectively diverted from the 
very marginal to a relatively non-marginal (and actually quite powerful) local 
actor. Similarly, the EMP facilitated capital transfers from the central MoF to 
local financial institutions in order to pay the interest payments on loans to 
marginal actors. However, while this de-marginalising goal was 
accomplished, in all three townships the EMP required that borrowers have 
guarantors with connections to the local governments, thus ensuring that 
only the relatively well-connected and non-marginal local actors would be 
able to get loans. For instance, in the MWT the EMP was only provided to 
actors with close connections to the township MoHRSS official in charge of 
implementation and a sufficient amount of savings to ensure repayment. In 
the AT the FC was composed of the elite village households, including the 
village secretary. Additionally, the use of the EMP for onlending in the MWT 
and DET – primarily to those excluded from the formal financial system – 
represented the transfer (or ‘capture’) of capital from the marginal (and often 
desperate, see Section 7.5) to the less marginal through the payment of high 
interest rates on loans that were originally interest free. 
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The RCCMP, on the other hand, has (nominally) served to slow down the 
direct rural to urban capital outflow of RCC deposits that occurred in the 
1980s and 1990s by mandating that RCCs lend at least 60 per cent of their 
savings within the township (see Chapter 2).317 However, with the exception 
of the DET (to a certain extent), the RCCMP funds have largely been 
funnelled to relatively non-marginal actors, primarily due to the neoliberal 
imperative pushing the RCCs to achieve ‘financial sustainability’. In the AT, 
for instance, RCCMP borrowers were required to have a good credit score 
and the approval of RCC employees. This meant that only (relatively) rich 
farmers with substantial resources at their disposal and good local 
connections were able to get the loans in order to scale-up their activities. In 
the MWT, on the other hand, the entire amount earmarked for the RCCMP 
was diverted to the largest construction company. While this did serve to de-
marginalise both the company and the RCC manager (see Chapter 6), it 
also represented a diversion of financial capital meant for rural households 
and small enterprises, to the largest and least marginal business in the 
township.318 This has substantially changed the role of the RCCs, as in the 
1980s and 1990s farmers were able to get small RCC loans in order to buy 
seed and fertiliser.319 One poor household described the situation by saying: 
“Only the rich who don't need loans can get them but the poor who need 
them cannot.” 320  And the owner of the MWT construction company 
conceded that, due to the focus on ‘financial sustainability’, the RCC is now 
                                            
317 The policy clearly states that 60 per cent of local deposits should be lent 
through the RCCMP. However, one county level official pointed out that the 
restructuring of the financial system has put RCCs under the administration 
of county and provincial unions, saying: “All branches of the RCC are part of 
the same system, so the county can mobilise township savings and 
redeposit them in a higher level branch… This is not a great help for rural 
development” (Interview 07). For more on this restructuring and the de-
localisation of the RCCs, see (Loubere & Zhang, 2015). 
318 It should be noted that the RCCMP in the MWT also fed into local 
corruption, as the company was required to spend approximately 10 per cent 
of the entire loan capital in ‘entertainment’ costs in order to ensure continued 
receipt of the credit (Interview 45). 
319  Interview 17; Interview 32; Interview 34; Interview 35; Interview 36; 
Interview 51. 
320 Interview 33. 
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“Suspicious of the poor but loves the rich” (xianpin aifu -qS2 ). 321 
Ultimately, therefore, while the three programmes undoubtedly managed to 
de-marginalise certain local actors in relation to less marginal actors at 
higher levels, these same beneficiaries could also be considered non-
marginal in relation to other more marginal actors, many of whom were the 
original stated targets of microcredit. Simply put, the microcredit 
programmes diverted funds towards local ‘winners’, which allowed them to 
continue to accumulate resources and solidify their local elite status, and, in 
this way, the programmes served to reproduce certain marginal relationships, 
e.g. county vs. household, elite vs. non-elite, business vs. farmer, etc., rather 
than eliminate them.322 
 
In addition to exacerbating local relational marginality through the diversion 
of microcredit funds, the programmes have also served to aggravate the 
unequal relationship between the townships and urban areas by facilitating 
the outflow of valuable resources. For instance, while the largest 
construction company in the MWT has invested in some local infrastructure 
projects, thus promoting local employment, the vast majority of its business 
is conducted outside the township, often in more urbanised areas with higher 
returns on investment. Moreover, the company primarily invests in 
speculative infrastructure, such as commercial real estate, rather than more 
‘productive’ transportation or communications infrastructure. In other words, 
the company essentially takes local capital (primarily local household 
deposits) and transfers them to less marginal areas in search of quick 
                                            
321 Interview 45. 
322 As stated in earlier chapters, this is widely depicted as systemic ‘elite 
capture’ of subsidised credit (L. Ong, 2011; Park & Ren, 2001). However, 
this is misleading for a couple of reasons. First, the elites ‘capturing’ the 
microcredit are different in each locality, therefore the suggestion of a 
uniform local elite class does not really exist. Second, these local elites can 
also be considered to be marginal in relation to actors at higher levels, and 
since the programmes are designed to be implemented flexibly, they are 
often just as eligible (if not more so) to receive the credit than more marginal 
actors, even if they are not the original stated targets. Therefore, ‘elite 
capture’ cannot be blamed solely on local corruption or poor implementation, 
but instead should be understood as a reflection of relational marginality at 
different levels that are a fundamental feature of the neoliberal orientation of 
microcredit. 
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profit.323 This trend of investing the loans and/or profit made through the 
loans outside the townships, often in more profitable urban areas, was 
common across the programmes and localities. For instance, in the AT 
some members of the FC used their earnings from the vegetable 
greenhouses to purchase urban investment properties and RCCMP 
borrowers used the loans to rent land in neighbouring townships. Meanwhile, 
in the MWT EMP borrowers often used the loans to invest in businesses 
outside the township, with some even using the funds to ‘play’ the stock 
markets in Shenzhen and Shanghai.324 
 
Moreover, even the forms of de-marginalisation resulting from increased 
socioeconomic and socio-political interconnectedness between the 
townships and urban centres/markets outlined in Chapter 6 are not 
necessarily durable or sustainable. For instance, the owner of the largest 
components factory in the DET said that his profits have been decreasing 
due to competition and rising costs, and indicated that in the future he may 
opt to move to an even more marginal area with lower costs,325  thus 
eliminating jobs that local people have come to rely on and extracting the 
investment that was made possible through local deposits and subsidies. 
The owner of the construction company in the MWT also complained about 
the ‘grey’ costs of gaining access to the loans (i.e. bribes and ‘entertaining’), 
and did not rule out moving in the future if a better opportunity arose 
elsewhere.326 More troublingly, it was not clear from the interview whether or 
not the construction company actually repays the entire loan at the end of 
each loan term, or if it simply pays the interest and indefinitely postpones the 
repayment of the loan capital as so often happens with RCC loans to large 
industry and local governments (L. Ong, 2006). Therefore, the diversion of 
the funds earmarked for the RCCMP to the construction company ultimately 
represents a low return on investment of local deposits (because of the 
                                            
323 Interview 45. 
324 Interview 23; Interview 25; Interview 31; Interview 32; Interview 38. The 
RCCMP in the DET is probably the best example of microcredit retention 
due to the more dynamic local business atmosphere. 
325 Interview 53. 
326 Interview 45. 
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below market interest rate of five per cent) that may not even be fully repaid 
and is, for the most part, not reinvested into the local economy.327 
 
Additionally, while the microcredit programmes did facilitate certain types of 
knowledge and technology transfers from ‘more developed’ areas to the 
townships (see Chapter 6), they also indirectly facilitated the extraction of 
local talent and associated resources. Indeed, children’s education was a 
priority for households across the three townships and paying for school fees 
and materials often necessitated borrowing money, either from microcredit 
or informal sources. However, none of the three townships had a high school, 
meaning that children needed to move to the county in order to study, and 
attending university obviously entailed moving to the city. Therefore, in order 
to ensure a high quality education for their children, rural households were 
required to transfer large amounts of financial capital to urban and peri-
urban areas to pay for fees, materials and living expenses (which are 
significantly higher than living expenses in the township). More importantly, 
this situation resulted in the most accomplished rural students leaving the 
township (at least those who could afford to) and often permanently 
relocating to urban areas for work. While this may have been good for 
individuals and their households, it also resulted in the extraction of human 
resources from rural areas, thus further marginalising the townships more 
generally. Moreover, while some successful children were able to get good 
jobs and remit financial capital back to the townships, more often entire rural 
households and extended families needed to continue to send money to the 
children to help pay for oppressively expensive housing in the cities, which 
was seen as a family investment and a necessity in order for the children to 
find a spouse. 328  In other words, while the loans did aid in the ‘self 
improvement’ (i.e. ‘self de-marginalisation’) of local actors through increased 
                                            
327 Better examples of sustainable local investment through large companies 
were the SOE farm in the MWT and the large tea company in the DET, both 
of which borrowed from urban banks for large-scale investment at the local 
level (Conversation 11; Interview 49; Interview 75). However, even these 
examples also have their own undercurrents of marginalisation in the form of 
severe pollution, which ruins the health and livelihoods of local farmers, as 
well as coercive practices employed by the companies in collusion with local 
governments to push farmers off their land without sufficient compensation 
(Conversation 06; Conversation 07). 
328 Interview 60. 
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access to education, they also facilitated the extraction of money, energy 
and skills from the townships to non-rural areas. 
 
Ultimately, therefore, the programmes reflected some of the fundamental 
characteristics of a neoliberal version of the linear progression development 
paradigm. Namely, that more resources should be distributed to local 
‘winners’ so that they can continue to push forward development through 
further integration into the market system; and that resources should flow to 
urban areas where investments are more secure and profitable. In this way, 
microcredit was a facilitator of flows of capital and knowledge from the 
centres to the margins, but only within a logic that necessitated the ultimate 
repatriation of the original resources back to the centre along with additional 
valuable resources that had previously been held at the local level, resulting 
in overall exacerbation of the marginal relationship between rural and urban 
areas. 
 
7.4 Microcredit as Exclusion 
At the heart of these processes of diversion and extraction are shifting 
patterns of socioeconomic inclusion/exclusion at the macro, meso and local 
levels that are implicit in the phenomenon of relational marginality. With 
regard to microcredit in the three townships, this meant that, while certain 
actors were ‘financially included’ and thus de-marginalised through the 
formation of new socioeconomic/socio-political linkages and integration into 
the wider market system (see Chapter 6), other actors were simultaneously 
marginalised due to their exclusion. This inclusion in, or exclusion from, the 
microcredit programmes often reflected both longstanding durable 
inequalities and more dynamic unequal relationships based on local contexts 
and political economies.  
 
For instance, microcredit implementation was embedded in the unequal 
relationship between different levels of government, with higher-level (more 
urban) governments often having the ability to dictate inclusion and 
exclusion from the programmes. Most obviously, the non-implementation of 
the PAMP in the MWT and DET represents the countywide exclusion of both 
the township’s PAOs, which should have been responsible for the funds – as 
well as the poor rural households, who should have been the recipients of 
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the credit. County PAO officials justified this inclusion of the non-marginal 
county at the expense of the exclusion of the more marginal township and 
village actors by saying that the microcredit funds would be wasted on the 
poor/marginalised households in the poverty-stricken villages because they 
did not believe microcredit was an effective development strategy. Instead, 
they advocated consolidating the microcredit funds at the ‘more developed’ 
county in order to fund development projects whose benefits would ‘trickle-
down’ to the marginal areas/actors in the long term (see Chapter 4). The 
unequal relationship between business and farming was also reflected in 
exclusion from the programmes. This is because farming is an inherently 
risky activity with relatively low returns on investment. This means that it is 
difficult for farmers to predict if or when they will be able to repay loans, 
rendering them unattractive borrowers for officials and financial institutions 
increasingly pressured to operate in a ‘financially sustainable’ way. 
Businesses (particularly larger businesses), on the other hand, are both 
more profitable and more able to predict future cash flows, and are thus a 
safe bet for financial institutions lending based on market logic and requiring 
repayments on a strict schedule. Finally, non-locals were also systematically 
excluded from the programmes, as township or county financial institutions 
required local household registration documents for all loan applications.329 
Therefore, in order to engage in entrepreneurial activities, ‘outsiders’ either 
needed to borrow from the financial institutions in their hometowns, or 
borrow informally at higher rates of interest.330 
 
Gender was also an important point of exclusion, as the vast majority of 
loans were taken out by household heads who were invariably male.331 This 
was primarily due to the fact that the institution of the household in rural 
                                            
329 Of course, this requirement was conspicuously absent with regard to 
large or wealthy actors, such as the non-local construction company in the 
MWT or the components factory in the DET. 
330 Conversation 12; Interview 48; Interview 62; Interview 64. Often, it is also 
difficult for non-locals to borrow informally, as they do not usually have large 
guanxi networks and are thus considered to be untrustworthy. 
331  This is in contrast to the global microfinance movement that 
overwhelmingly targets women operating in joint-liability loan groups in an 
attempt to promote female empowerment and challenge the durable 
inequality between the genders (Maclean, 2013; Marr, 2012; Sanyal, 2014) 
(see Chapter 1). 
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China, and its formalisation through the household registration system, “is 
patriarchal, patrilineal and virilocal” (Jacka, 2013, p. 1001), as marriage 
requires a female to leave her family and join her husband’s family, both 
physically (often in a different township) and legally (by joining the husband’s 
household registration documents). 332  Since the household registration 
documents were used to apply for microcredit (or any other loan), the vast 
majority of loans were disbursed to the head of the household, who was a 
male. Technically, of course, females could apply for loans themselves, as 
long as they had a local household registration and met all the requirements. 
However, in practice, 90 per cent of all loans went to males.333 Indeed, the 
subordinate (and marginal) position of the female within this system is 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that if a local woman marries an outsider 
and brings him to live in the township, neither of them can access formal 
sources of credit locally because they would have a non-local household 
registration.334 Moreover, if one member of the household defaults on a loan, 
then no one else with the same household registration can borrow. This 
adversely affects females, especially those who are separated from their 
husbands but not officially divorced.335 
 
Of course, inclusion in the programmes was also highly dependent on 
socioeconomic status, and almost everyone I spoke to confirmed that 
without guanxi it is impossible to get any kind of credit, particularly 
subsidised microcredit. One household in the AT described this need for 
social connections to get the RCCMP by saying: 
Borrowing from the RCC is very difficult. It is necessary to have a 
guarantor, and if you want to borrow smoothly you should also 
have a good relationship with the workers in the RCC. The RCC 
charges interest, but in addition it is necessary to provide a 
‘commission’ [i.e. a bribe]. The amount of the ‘commission’ 
                                            
332 Interview 26; Interview 39. 
333 Conversation 34; Interview 07; Interview 10. 
334 Interview 62. 
335 Interview 61. More importantly than losing the right to credit, separated or 
divorced women often lose their rights to joint property, which is, again, often 
solely in the name of the head of the household (Conversation 23; Interview 
42). 
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depends on the amount of the loan… most households cannot 
meet the conditions to get a loan.336 
While the ability to utilise socioeconomic status to get loans often coincided 
with material wealth, even relatively well-off households were excluded from 
borrowing if they did not have connections with the right people.337 For 
instance, the owners of the largest village shop in the AT did not have good 
connections with the village or township governments, so they were forced 
to borrow from financial institutions in the county at higher rates of interest 
and using their car as collateral. When asked if they wanted to access the 
EMP or RCCMP they said: 
Of course we wish we could get this type of microcredit! If we had 
easy access we could use this money to restock our store and the 
loans could also be used to purchase pesticides and fertilisers for 
farming… However, we haven’t even applied because we have 
no money, don’t know people, and have no guanxi, so they will 
not accept our application… if the process was more open and 
fair we would apply for the EMP.338 
On the other hand, households with good connections but who did not 
actually meet the loan criteria were often still included. One such borrower 
explained this situation by saying: 
To apply for the EMP it is necessary to have a laid-off worker 
certificate. I have no formal employment in a company, and I have 
a rural household registration, so I could get the certificate, as 
they didn’t know that I have a small shop. It is also necessary to 
have a guarantor with a formal job whose salary comes from the 
MoF [i.e. related to the government]… My guarantor is the head 
of family planning in the township. He is a good friend, we often 
go out drinking together.339 
                                            
336 Interview 24. 
337 This mirror’s Ane Bislev’s findings (Bislev, 2010). 
338 Interview 27. 
339 Interview 30. And sometimes those with good connections do not even 
need to repay, with one household saying: “Those with good guanxi can 
borrow money from the RCC and never repay because they know the RCC 
director. RCC directors usually stay for four years, so these people can just 
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Ultimately, therefore, these forms of exclusion both reflected and reinforced 
local structures of power and pre-existing marginal relationships, while also 
facilitating the creation and strengthening of linkages between local 
political/economic elites and individuals/groups at higher levels, thereby 
making local inequalities more durable and further marginalising the 
unconnected through exclusion from credit and from social networks. 
 
At their core, of course, the different patterns of inclusion/exclusion outlined 
above were characterised by differentiated amounts and types of 
knowledge. Indeed, excluded groups and individuals were often unaware of 
the existence of microcredit, or other formal financial services for that 
matter.340 At the same time, knowledge about the microcredit programmes 
was often carefully managed by relatively non-marginal actors, and in some 
cases this knowledge was clearly considered to be a resource worth 
protecting. For instance, members of the FC in the AT withheld information 
about the EMP and their involvement in the programme from other villagers, 
and one member of the FC even lied to my research assistant and me about 
his investment in vegetable greenhouses.341 In the DET, on the other hand, 
the RCC manager refused to speak with me about the RCCMP because he 
“did not want too many people to find out about how good the programme is 
and then apply.” 342  For this reason, only certain actors with the right 
connections (albeit different actors in each township) were able to gain 
knowledge about the different programmes and gain access.343 In the words 
of one excluded and knowledgeless actor in the AT: “I don’t know about any 
microcredit projects. Only the village leaders know about this and they do 
not publicise it in the village – they will not declare it.”344 
 
                                                                                                                           
wait until the director has gone and then they forget about the loans” 
(Interview 76). 
340 Conversation 09; Conversation 12; Interview 28; Interview 36; Interview 
39; Interview 44. 
341 AT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 04. 
342 Conversation 22. 
343 Interview 35; Interview 39. 
344 Interview 28. 
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At the same time, even when they were aware of the programmes’ 
existence, the excluded often lacked the types of ‘modern’ knowledge 
necessary to take advantage of microcredit or the formal financial system 
more generally. Indeed, even non-borrowing households with sophisticated 
understandings of how to use formal finance found the microloan application 
process to be complex and confusing, with one local entrepreneur in the 
MWT saying: 
The application process [for microcredit] is complicated. You need 
to provide a business license, bank account information, your 
identification card, household registration, and other documents. 
You would think this would allow you to borrow RMB 400,000 - 
500,000, but actually it is only for RMB 100,000. Of course, for 
wealthy people these conditions will be relaxed.345 
Therefore, marginal households without this type of ‘modern’ knowledge 
often dismissed the idea of applying for loans out of hand, saying things like: 
“We don’t have any education, so we don’t understand anything.”346 This 
resulted in many of the local poor avoiding the formal financial system 
altogether and operating primarily in cash, as long-term savings and 
borrowing with set repayment dates did not fit their lifestyle.347 For example, 
in the DET there was a migrant family of Hui ethnicity (huizu "I) operating 
a small restaurant. All the family members were illiterate, making it difficult 
for them to keep track of finances in a ‘modern’ way and nearly impossible 
for them to utilise formal financial services. Therefore, rather than save or 
borrow from formal institutions, they lived day-to-day without a systematic 
method of accounting. When members of their wider social network (many of 
whom lived in nearby cities and counties) needed money, they transferred 
what they could to them. Similarly, when they needed larger lump sums they 
relied on their social network. However, this was not recorded in a 
financialised way and, as Muslims, they did not charge or pay interest on 
these ‘loans’. Instead, financial capital was seen as a relatively uncountable 
resource that existed within the network rather than being owned exclusively 
by individuals or households.348  While this form of social and economic 
                                            
345 Interview 40. 
346 Conversation 17. 
347 Conversation 09; Interview 33; Interview 36; Interview 52. 
348 Interview 64. 
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organisation suited the Hui household, it was obviously not conducive to 
borrowing from a formal financial institution. 
 
In other words, the excluded were perceived to be temporally marginalised 
and ‘backward’ due to their lack of ‘financial consciousness’, and the types 
of knowledge they did possess were considered undeveloped and not useful 
for inducing a neoliberal version of linear progressive development. 
Ultimately, therefore, local society in the three townships was segmented 
based on differentiated understandings of ‘modern’ financial services, with 
some actors having sophisticated knowledge of how to mobilise resources 
through the formal financial system (i.e. some even had credit cards from 
urban banks), 349  while others have maintained ‘traditional’ modes of 
communal financial organisation that are not conducive to participation in the 
new ‘developed’ market economy. In this way, knowledge of the existence of 
(and how to access) microcredit programmes specifically, and the formal 
financial system more generally, has divided rural areas into ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’ (roughly corresponding with the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ that have 
emerged from marketisation), thus facilitating the further de-marginalisation 
of local elites at the expense of, and in relation to, the relatively powerless 
and knowledgeless marginal segments of local society. 
 
Of course, lack of knowledge was not the only reason for exclusion from the 
programmes, and plenty of local actors were aware of the existence of 
microcredit and had the ‘modern’ knowledge necessary to apply, but were 
either directly excluded through rejection or indirectly excluded in more 
subtle ways. In particular, similar to Ane Bislev’s findings with regard to NGO 
microcredit programmes and the PAMP in the early 2000s (Bislev, 2010, 
2012), much of the exclusion in the three townships was the result of actors 
excluding themselves (i.e. self-exclusion) from even applying for microcredit 
(particularly middle-income households). In many cases, this was because 
households relied on remittances and had no use for loans, as they were not 
engaged in entrepreneurial activities.350 In the words of one small-scale 
farming household in the AT: “We don’t need the loan because we are just 
                                            
349 Interview 50. 
350  Interview 17; Interview 23; Interview 31; Interview 34; Interview 39; 
Interview 41; Interview 44. 
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farmers. We don’t want to run a business, so the loan is unnecessary.”351 
Others excluded themselves because the application process for the 
microcredit programmes was perceived to be too troublesome and time-
consuming, and informal sources of credit were easier to access and had 
lower transaction costs. Two self-excluded local actors in the DET and MWT 
expressed this sentiment by saying: 
I know about the EMP because I saw the government 
propaganda about the programme, but I think it is too annoying 
and complicated. First it is necessary to get proof of 
unemployment from the village, then apply to the county 
government. Very troublesome, I don’t want it.352 
And: 
Now there are not many people who borrow money from the bank, 
unless they want to do business. No one borrows money for living 
expenses. Currently, if you work hard you can survive 
independently… We don’t do business so we don’t need a loan. 
Borrowing from the RCC is very troublesome, I prefer to save my 
energy and borrow from other sources. It is too annoying and 
complicated to provide collateral or get a guarantor… If I need 
money urgently, I won’t go to the bank, I will borrow from my 
friends or family.353 
Indeed, many households pooled financial resources within their social 
networks (i.e. variations on the traditional ROSCA), and in this way provided 
and accessed informal sources of credit without interest or delay during 
times of need, but in more ‘modern’ financialised ways than the Hui migrants 
mentioned above.354 Additionally, it is important to mention that many rural 
households were uninterested in borrowing formally because they did not 
want to go into debt, which they perceived as risky and potentially 
                                            
351 Interview 28. 
352 Interview 58. 
353 Interview 39. 
354 Interview 34; Interview 41; Interview 44; Interview 47; Interview 66. Some 
local actors did point out, however, that informal loans come with their own 
transaction costs related to returning the favour, sometimes at inopportune 
moments (Interview 50; Interview 60). 
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dangerous. Households were especially wary of using their houses as 
collateral, as losing their homes would undoubtedly result in future 
marginalisation.355 
 
Of course, as stated above, other households did want to borrow but 
decided against applying for loans because they knew their applications 
would be unsuccessful, primarily due to a lack of guanxi. However, the 
poorest and most marginalised households often did not have social 
networks that they could rely on for informal loans in times of great need. 
Therefore, despite the knowledge that they would likely be rejected, the most 
marginal sometimes desperately (and usually unsuccessfully) turned to the 
microcredit programmes as a source of financial capital in times of crisis. For 
instance, one poor household in the MWT was in the middle of building a 
new house when the son became seriously ill, necessitating expensive 
hospitalisation. The household borrowed from every source available to 
cover the medical bills and continue building their house, as they were living 
with a neighbour (i.e. essentially homeless) until the new house was 
complete. Unfortunately, the amount they were able to borrow from friends 
and family was not sufficient, so they applied to the numerous times RCC for 
loans. Unsurprisingly, the RCC rejected every loan application, as the 
household was not perceived to have the ability to repay, and was, thus, 
considered to be a risky borrower.356 This type of rejection and exclusion 
from microcredit programmes that were perceived to be meant for the most 
marginal segments of the society understandably caused resentment and 
anger, which was often framed in terms of class conflict. For instance, one 
group of excluded day labourers said: 
We cannot get loans. If we want to borrow we need to find a 
guarantor and have collateral… Guarantors must have money, 
and only those in a good situation can make contact with the RCC 
– only 10 per cent of people are in a good situation, while 90 per 
cent are in a bad situation.357 
                                            
355 Interview 02; Interview 22; interview 27; Interview 39. 
356 Interview 51. 
357 Interview 35. 
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And the disabled head of one of the poorest households in the MWT 
described his exclusion from microcredit by saying: 
It is very difficult for us to borrow money because we have no 
guanxi. The poorer we are, the harder it is to get a loan. The EMP 
is like the ‘icing on the cake’ for the rich, but it does not provide 
the poor with any temporary relief.358 
 
Frustration with the RCC was also visually expressed in graffiti playing on 
official slogans. For instance, in Figure 7.1 below the official slogan stating 
that the RCC is the ‘rural people’s bank’ was changed to say that the RCC 
was actually interested in ‘getting rich first’ (or serving the rich). This was 
obviously a play on Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote – ‘let some people get 
rich first’ – and highlighted the exclusion implicit in the requirement for RCCs 
to be ‘financially sustainable’ and profit-seeking. However, during interviews 
the excluded and marginalised usually (but not always) stopped short of 
blaming overarching development policy or the central government, and 
instead pointed the finger at local implementers – holding them accountable 
for ‘ruining’ good central policies through corrupt local practices. 
 
Figure 7.1: Graffiti on an Advertisement for the RCC in the AT 
 
                                            
358 Interview 33. 
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Based on the above, it is clear that, while microcredit has played a role in 
de-marginalising certain segments of local society by including them in 
modern (urban-based) networks and modes of socioeconomic operation, it 
has simultaneously served to consolidate power and resources in the hands 
of local political and economic elites. At the same time, it has excluded 
marginal individuals and groups from potentially transformative livelihood 
opportunities and access to vital capital to cover expenses during crises. 
The most obvious example of this type of exclusion from opportunity was the 
EMP in the AT, which allowed the 12 members of the FC to invest in highly 
profitable and risk-reducing vegetable greenhouses. Indeed, in this case the 
microcredit represented more than just financial capital – it represented 
inclusion into the ‘developed’ vanguard at the local level, and many of the 
villagers took the exclusion personally. For instance, the head of one 
household described the FC by saying: 
Now there are greenhouses made of steel, but we normal people 
cannot join the FC and plant our crops in them. Only officials and 
party members can do this. We want to join the FC but are not 
given a place… There isn’t any way for us ordinary villagers to 
participate, we cannot fight with them. In my heart I am unhappy 
and uncomfortable, but the greenhouses are limited and I cannot 
join.359 
Similarly, access to credit was identified as a crucial factor in the ability to go 
into business, and thus improve livelihoods, with one household stating: 
“Doing business is impossible without access to capital.”360 In other words, 
excluded households were often relegated to pursuing farm work as a 
livelihood strategy, which, as stated above, is much less profitable and much 
more difficult than operating a business. 
 
Of course, this type of ‘elite capture’ is unsurprising as microcredit inherently 
seeks to fund ‘winners’ at the local level in order to instigate bottom-up 
development, and is, in this way, simply a reflection of the wider 
neoliberalisation of the rural economy and development landscape. 
                                            
359 Interview 28. 
360 Interview 30. 
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Therefore, exclusion from the programmes is better understood as being a 
symptom, rather than a cause, of marginal relationships at different levels, 
which are themselves shaped by, and embedded within, the neoliberal 
version of the linear progression development paradigm. For instance, the 
systematic devaluation of local modes of socioeconomic organisation and 
the labelling of local forms of knowledge as ‘backward’ has created a 
situation where marginal places and people are not considered to be 
suitable borrowers, particularly in a market-based ‘financial systems 
approach’ to providing microcredit. Indeed, exclusion from microcredit is just 
one manifestation of wider socioeconomic exclusion from the ‘winning’ side 
of post-reform China’s rapid development and modernisation. Many of the 
excluded rural actors I spoke with, and particularly those who were most 
desperate to get credit, were already in significant amounts of informal debt 
to others in the community (often failing to repay for years), and were 
seeking loans to meet basic needs, to survive or to get through a crisis. 
Because of this they did not have a plan for how these loans would be 
repaid, and they also would have agreed to pay very high rates of interest.361 
To put this another way, many actors were already locked into destructive 
debt cycles due to their marginal status in relation to ‘successful’ segments 
of the society, and the extension of additional credit would have done little to 
address the underlying reasons for their marginality,362 and could actually 
cause more harm than good.363 Therefore, this chapter does not mean to 
suggest that the solution to the exclusion outlined above is simply inclusion 
into the microcredit programmes, as in reality this could serve to further 
marginalise the already marginal and desperate actors described in this 
section. 
 
                                            
361 Interview 33; Interview 35; Interview 36; Interview 59. 
362  This point was made in detail by county level PAO officials, who 
suggested expanding basic social services and welfare rather than providing 
credit, see Chapter 4. 
363 See (Taylor, 2012) for an example of how widespread ‘financial inclusion’ 
caused devastating results in India. 
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7.5 Microcredit as Precarity, Risk and Exploitation 
Just as exclusion from microcredit was, in reality, a reflection of wider 
marginalisation, inclusion into the programmes was also mediated by 
marginal relationships at different levels. For this reason even involvement in 
the microcredit programmes often reinforced social pressure, risk, distress 
and the exploitation of marginal actors, thus exacerbating already precarious 
livelihoods and pushing the relatively powerless further to the margins. For 
instance, in some cases the microcredit programmes added significant 
amounts of pressure to the already stressful jobs of local implementers. As 
stated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, implementers in the MWT and the DET 
saw the EMP as a time-consuming challenge that had the potential to 
negatively impact their career prospects and future livelihoods, and therefore 
determined that the implementation of the programme needed to be 
navigated skilfully. Especially in the MWT, where the EMP had a quota 
imposed by the county with strict orders to ensure repayment, the local 
implementer was the marginal actor in relation to his superiors in the county 
MoHRSS, and was essentially forced to use valuable time and livelihood 
resources (e.g. social capital) in order to ensure that the entire EMP quota 
was lent out and repaid on time. However, despite the fact that he was 
required to do all the work and take the risks to his career, it was his 
relatively non-marginal county superiors who gained all the benefits from the 
programme in the form of the cash reward from the province for full 
repayment. 
 
At the same time, microcredit often put significant amounts of pressure on 
borrowers. Indeed, just as credit has the potential to positively impact 
livelihoods, its corollary – debt – can represent stress and even danger to 
borrower livelihoods in certain situations. As stated previously, in all three of 
the townships, poor and marginal households often sought loans (both 
formal and informal) to cover livelihood necessities, such as housing, 
education for children and medical expenses. These loans were often taken 
out of desperation, because the households had no other place to turn for 
the necessary financial capital to cover these expenses. Obviously, in these 
cases the poor knew that credit was not the real solution to their problems, 
and they tried to avoid debt as much as possible. The head of one marginal 
household described his perception of debt by saying: “When I have no 
money I think about borrowing from somewhere, but borrowing means 
repaying and the interest is very high. I can’t repay the interest let alone the 
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capital, so I don’t dare to borrow!”364 However, when there was no other 
option and the need for financial capital was unavoidable, households 
borrowed where possible, either from formal or informal sources. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, marginal households often had great difficulty 
repaying loans on time or at all. Indeed, in all three townships there were 
examples of poor and desperate households borrowing from the microcredit 
programmes or from informal lenders locally to cover basic expenses and 
necessary projects. Unfortunately, however, credit often only covered parts 
of their projects – e.g. a half-completed house, part of a medical treatment, 
etc. – and, therefore, after default they were left in debt, labelled as 
untrustworthy for not repaying, and, to make matters worse, had not even 
fully acquired the thing that they so desperately needed to borrow for in the 
first place.365 
 
Microenterprises also often found the debt from loans to be oppressive, as 
the earnings from small business could be variable and unpredictable. In this 
way, microenterprises, similar to farming, were not always suited to strict 
repayment timetables, and even the subsidised interest could be difficult to 
repay with meagre profits. This situation caused stress for small business-
owners across the three townships (especially in the DET due to the more 
easily accessible RCCMP), with some even losing their microenterprises 
upon default and being forced to turn to more difficult, risky and less 
profitable farming. 366  Even the more successful larger businesses were 
sometimes pushed into instability and precariousness due to the microcredit 
schemes. For instance, some of the operators of the components factories in 
the DET said that the formal credit they were able to gain access to from 
microcredit and other sources was not enough to ensure that they 
maintained a sufficient amount of operating capital. This was because the 
factories often had to front substantial amounts of capital in order to buy the 
components and even pay for the shipping costs themselves before being 
reimbursed at a later date. In other words, they were in a marginal 
                                            
364 Interview 72. 
365  Interview 31; Interview 33; Interview 36; Interview 52; Interview 59; 
Interview 66. This situation went from bad to worse when a household’s 
main income earner became unable to work or passed away. 
366 Conversation 04; Interview 42; Interview 59; Interview 60; Interview 76. 
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relationship with the larger factories in the less marginal Zhejiang Province, 
and therefore had no choice but to take on a majority of the up-front 
expenses and the risks. Moreover, because the loan process often took time 
(particularly for the EMP), businesses were sometimes left in limbo at crucial 
moments, being forced to go into debt at higher rates of interest from 
informal sources or sell off assets in order to continue their business 
balancing act and stay afloat.367 While the rural financial landscape currently 
has few formal lending options covering rural households and enterprises 
during times of need or distress, this is quickly changing with the 
formalisation of MLCs and VTBs, and their rapid expansion at the county 
level (see Chapter 2). However, these institutions are often little more than 
formalised loan sharks, often mainly catering to gambling debts and 
charging interest rates of over 50 per cent per year. 368  If these new 
commercialised institutions start to penetrate the townships, it is possible 
that rural China may see more ‘financial inclusion’. At the same time, 
however, MLC and VTB expansion would likely subject rural areas to the 
types of exploitative and aggressive lending practices associated with the 
microcredit industry in other parts of the ‘developing world’, which has been 
widely shown to increase suffering and facilitate further marginalisation 
(Bateman, 2010; Hickel, 2015; Taylor, 2011). 
 
                                            
367 Conversation 24; Interview 53. 
368 Conversation 35; Conversation 41. 
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Figure 7.2: A Recently Opened MLC in the County of the DET 
 
 
The distress resulting from exclusion from the programmes, or inclusion 
resulting in heavy indebtedness with no solution in sight, often led to despair 
and hopelessness, and ultimately played a role in the formation of marginal 
livelihood identities that were positioned in subordination to the identities of 
‘successful’ borrowing members of local society. Some of the excluded 
actors saw their inability to get credit as a symbol of their lower 
socioeconomic status, and sought to gain access – not for projects or 
investment, but in order to feel included in the ‘successful’ strata of 
society.369  This is because the poor were usually embarrassed by their 
socioeconomic positions and sought to hide their problems from others. For 
instance, the disabled head of one of the poorest households in the MWT 
                                            
369 Interview 35. 
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tried to avoid talking about his health or housing problems with others in the 
village, saying: “My hardships are something only I know.”370 When they 
were able to borrow, the poor were especially embarrassed by their inability 
to repay, stating that it caused them to lose face with their neighbours and 
other people that they had to interact with daily. For instance, the head of 
one poor household in the DET said: 
Because I defaulted on loans in the past I am no longer able to 
borrow… In total I borrowed between RMB 150,000 - 160,000, 
some from the bank and some informally, including borrowing 
materials for building my house… Now the people I borrowed 
from come to ask me to repay, but I have no money, I feel very 
embarrassed.371 
Interestingly, these marginal households were often the only ones with 
revolutionary-period decorations and/or pictures of political leaders from the 
pre-reform era (e.g. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai). They also often talked 
about how life was more fair before the reforms – i.e. the adoption of a 
neoliberal version of the linear progression development paradigm – and 
how local political leaders are no longer trustworthy, essentially identifying 
themselves with the old order as a statement against their exclusion from 
China’s post-reform development.372 Ultimately, these marginal households 
were pessimistic about their future, and excluded themselves from the 
widespread narrative of beneficial progressive development coinciding with 
rapid economic growth that most people had adopted. 
 
In addition to negatively impacting on the livelihood strategies and outcomes 
of individuals and households, research has also observed the potential for 
microcredit to break down local forms of social cohesion, thereby damaging 
local societies and economies (Bateman, 2010; Maclean, 2010). During 
fieldwork, both implementers and borrowers echoed this critique by stating 
that Grameen-style joint liability loan groups were unsuitable in the context 
of rural China, and expressing fear that local ‘harmony’ could be damaged if 
one group member defaulted on a group loan forcing others to pay their 
                                            
370 Interview 33. 
371 Interview 59. 
372 Interview 33; Interview 51; Interview 59, Interview 72. 
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share.373 However, despite the fact that the programmes shunned the group-
lending model, microcredit still managed to subtly undermine social cohesion 
in the three townships in indirect ways. In particular, as stated in Chapter 6, 
the provision of microcredit resulted in increased informal lending, including 
the profit-oriented onlending of subsidised credit from non-marginal to 
marginal actors at higher rates of interest. While this was potentially 
beneficial for actors unable to get formal credit, it also led to usurious and 
exploitative loan sharking, which took advantage of desperate marginal 
households with nowhere else to turn. One household described their 
previous interaction with a loan shark by saying: “I borrowed from a loan 
shark at 2 points. For RMB 10,000 I had to pay RMB 200 per month [24 per 
cent per year].”374 Others said that loan sharks can even charge interest 
rates of up to 150 per cent annually, either for cash loans or loans of 
materials and labour for building houses.375 Obviously, this type of increased 
informal financial activity at high rates of interest is based on the implicit 
threat of violence – which is a fundamental feature of the creditor/debtor 
relationship (Graeber, 2011) – and can even result in the emergence (or 
expansion) of organised crime. Indeed, there were stories of borrowers 
being physically assaulted after defaulting on informal loans, and one 
interviewee had suffered a broken arm in the past. Moreover, even if 
borrowers fled due to default, their families were sometimes subjected to 
intimidation and even violence.376 This is because informal lending is often 
accompanied by informal vigilantism to ensure the repayment of debt (and 
interest), thus creating an environment where the relatively wealthy and non-
marginal loan sharks are able to consolidate financial capital and power at 
the expense of marginal (often desperate) actors. Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 
illustrate this disturbing overlap between informal lending and violence, 
which undoubtedly has negative implications for social cohesion at the local 
level. 
 
                                            
373 Conversation 17; Interview 13; Interview 16; Interview 54. 
374 Interview 30. 
375 Interview 23; Interview 41. 
376 Conversation 42; Interview 22; Interview 30. 
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Figure 7.3: An Advertisement for Informal Credit in the DET 
 
 
Figure 7.4: An Advertisement for Guns in the DET 
 
 
More dramatic, however, than these examples of microcredit increasing 
stress and having a negative impact on identities and social cohesion, is the 
fact that the microcredit programmes were also, in some cases, utilised to 
actively exploit and further marginalise certain segments of local society in 
all three townships. For instance, the 12-member FC in the AT was only able 
to gain access to the entire quota of 22 loans by falsifying the documents of 
non-borrowing households and claiming them as fake FC members – 
obviously with the blessing of the township and county branches of the 
MoHRSS. The households that were instrumentally used in this way were 
relatively marginal and powerless, and had no knowledge that their 
 279 
identification documents had been used to apply for loans. In one case, the 
FC used the information of a low level administrative worker in the village 
government. This abuse of power was not difficult, as she was already in a 
subordinate position in relation to the head of the FC, who was also the 
village secretary, and her identification documentation was easily available 
to every member of the village government. In this way, the FC was able to 
transfer risk to unwitting marginal villagers while retaining the entirety of the 
substantial benefits associated with borrowing from the EMP and building 
the vegetable greenhouses.377 
 
Another example of microcredit being used even more maliciously occurred 
in the MWT seven years before fieldwork and a few years before the 
construction company arrived to claim the entire RCCMP quota. At this time, 
a local socioeconomic elite with connections to the township and county 
governments borrowed a substantial amount of money from the RCC 
(originally earmarked for the RCCMP) in order to purchase a large tract of 
farmland in one of the MWT villages and convert it from communal rural land 
to land for commercial real estate development. Many of the villagers did not 
want to sell their land, as the village was relatively poor and their livelihoods 
revolved around farming. However, due to political pressure from above and 
the high level guanxi of the buyer, they had little choice but to sell for RMB 
7,000 per mu. The sale was pushed through quickly in order to avoid local 
protest, but afterwards the villagers discovered that the land was actually 
worth up to RMB 40,000 per mu. To make matters worse, by the time of 
fieldwork the local elite had still not developed the land, but instead left it 
vacant and was waiting for the price to rise in order to resell the land in the 
future. Some of the villagers attempted to return to the land, citing a policy 
that reverts sold farmland back to the original farmers if it is left undeveloped 
for a certain number of years. However, the local elite has threatened to 
destroy their crops. The villagers are now looking into the possibility of 
submitting a petition (shangfang m) to the city government or higher.378 
Simply put, in this situation loans from the RCC facilitated the dispossession 
of land, which was a crucial livelihood resource for the dispossessed, at an 
                                            
377 AT Contextual Observation Report; Interview 07; Interview 26. 
378 Conversation 16; Conversation 17. 
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unfair level of compensation. At the same time, it also needlessly reduced 
agricultural production by leaving good farmland unused. 
 
Marginal households were also actively coerced into knowingly going into 
debt in order to cover costs imposed by more powerful actors. For instance, 
in the MWT one of the poorest households was pressured to borrow RMB 
1,500 informally (because he could not access formal credit) to ‘donate’ to 
the reconstruction of the village ancestral hall (zutang ['), which was 
contracted to a company owned by the son of one of the richest and best-
connected households in the village. He protested this ‘donation’, explaining 
that he did not even have enough money to fix the holes in the roof of his 
own house. However, he was told that if he did not pay, his children would 
not be accepted in the village. Therefore, in this case informal credit 
essentially facilitated the transfer of capital from the marginal and poor to a 
company associated with the non-marginal and rich.379 In the DET, on the 
other hand, the party secretary of one of the villages in the township 
attempted to expropriate some of the residential land of a poorer and more 
marginal neighbour household in order to enlarge his own house. This 
resulted in conflict, finally leading to a physical altercation. Ultimately, due to 
the obvious imbalance in political power between the two households, the 
head of the marginal household was jailed for two years and required to pay 
RMB 80,000 to the village secretary for his role in the fight (along with losing 
the land). Because the household did not have this sum of money, they were 
coerced into borrowing from the RCCMP and, in the end, defaulted on the 
loan. This meant that they were no longer able to borrow from the RCCMP, 
and therefore were not able to access formal credit to complete the 
construction of their house. Moreover, even if they had the money, the 
village secretary has used his connections in the township to make it very 
difficult for the household to get the necessary permits to continue 
construction. In other words, this household now lives in a half-completed 
structure, has no access to formal credit, is severely politically and socially 
marginalised, and the head of the household cannot find work because of 
                                            
379 After of the completion of the ancestral hall, all the names of the donors 
were listed on a plaque in order of the donation amount (highest to lowest). 
Since the poor household donated the least, it was last on the list. The head 
of the household said this embarrassed him and made him lose face 
(Conversation 04). 
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his criminal record. While microcredit did not cause this situation, it did 
contribute to the household’s further marginalisation.380 
 
The examples given above illustrate that, in addition to providing capital, 
microcredit represents time expenditure and added responsibility on the part 
of implementers and borrowers. More importantly, we cannot forget that 
credit necessitates debt, which implicitly has the potential to cause distress 
and further marginalisation if borrowers are unable to repay for any reason. 
Moreover, as the microcredit programmes are ultimately reconstituted at the 
local level through heterogeneous implementation, they are often actively 
incorporated into local political economies and structures of power, 
becoming another tool that the non-marginal can use in order to exploit less 
powerful members of society and push them further to the margins. This 
results in the continuation of regimes marked by the unequal distribution of 
livelihood resources and opportunities, thus exacerbating existing marginal 
relationships. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
While Chapter 6 demonstrated that the microcredit programmes have been 
successful in facilitating various forms of local development and livelihood 
improvement, thus de-marginalising individuals and groups in the three 
townships; this chapter shows that these patterns of de-marginalisation only 
occurred in relation to other undercurrents of marginalisation. In this way, the 
microcredit programmes contributed to the diversion and extraction of 
resources from poor to rich actors/areas, the social and economic exclusion 
of marginal actors, and, more troublingly, the active exploitation of 
disempowered individuals and groups, pushing them further to the margins 
of China’s ‘modern’ socioeconomic development landscape. These 
undercurrents of marginalisation played a role in reducing the capacity of 
marginal actors to implement and maintain livelihood strategies, resulting in 
the production of livelihood identities that have been framed as inferior to the 
‘successful’ non-marginal actors, thus reinforcing ‘development dichotomies’ 
at various levels. 
                                            
380 This interview was extremely emotional and members of the household 
broke down into tears when explaining their ordeal (Interview 72). 
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Of course, the types of marginalisation that were produced and/or 
strengthened by microcredit varied due to heterogeneous implementation, 
with different ‘elites’ taking advantage of the programmes and different types 
of actors being marginalised depending on the programme and the locality. 
However, for the most part, these forms of marginalisation reflected both 
local patterns of inequality and power, as well as the wider political economy 
of development in post-reform China, which is embedded within an 
increasingly neoliberal version of the linear progression development 
paradigm. This market-oriented approach to development encourages 
competition and the creation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and, thus, 
simultaneously produces both marginality and non-marginality in relation to 
each other. Therefore, the three microcredit programmes ultimately served 
to shift and transform certain marginal relationships – in some cases 
reducing the distances between marginal and non-marginal spaces and 
people, and in other cases expanding, strengthening or creating new 
unequal relationships at different levels. In other words, rural development in 
China (and by extension the microcredit programmes) is inherently relational 
in nature, and rather than producing uniform and equitable development, 
“the success of some is linked to the failure of others” (Mosse, 2010, p. 
1158). For this reason, impact cannot be understood linearly, but instead 
must be perceived through the relationships and interfaces of interaction 
between the actors involved. We now turn to Chapter 8, which will serve as 
a discussion of the key findings in this dissertation, and will outline the 
implications that an actor-oriented relational approach to understanding 
development has for microcredit and other neoliberal development 
interventions in China and beyond. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
The very language we use to describe the self-made ideal has these fault 
lines embedded within it: To ‘pull yourself up by your bootstraps’ is to 
succeed by dint of your own efforts. But that’s a modern corruption of the 
phrase’s original meaning. It used to describe a quixotic attempt to achieve 
an impossibility, not a feat of self-reliance.  
- John Swansburg 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation represents the distillation, synthesis and analysis of a 
huge set of qualitative data – consisting of systematic observation, 
interviews, conversations, photos/videos and a variety of different types of 
documentary material. This data was collected over more than half a year of 
in-depth empirical fieldwork, primarily in three townships (and villages) in 
rural Jiangxi Province, but also at the county, prefectural and provincial 
levels. Through a broad, exploratory and open research orientation – paired 
with a grounded ethnographic methodological design – this research project 
has sought to texturise and deepen our understanding of how government 
microcredit is formulated, implemented and perceived at the local level in 
order to answer the overarching research question: What role do microcredit 
programmes play in local processes of socioeconomic development and the 
livelihoods of diverse local actors? In this way, this dissertation departs from 
conventional mainstream research on microcredit and rural finance in China, 
which is dominated by the disciplines of finance and economics, quantitative 
and positivistic approaches, normative conceptions of the benefits of 
‘financial inclusion’, and a focus on systems and/or institutions rather than 
local actors themselves. This concluding chapter summarises and highlights 
the main findings and original contributions, and outlines the key ways in 
which future research can build on the work in this dissertation (and address 
its limitations) in order to further improve our understanding of how 
microcredit programmes (and rural development interventions in general) 
are implemented at the local level – thereby facilitating, transforming and/or 
(re)producing processes of (under)development and (de)marginalisation in 
the context of rural China and elsewhere. 
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8.1 Dissertation Summary and Original Contributions 
The dissertation is composed of an introduction, six core chapters, and this 
conclusion. Chapter 1 began with some historical context by outlining the 
trajectory of socioeconomic development in rural China since the initiation of 
economic reforms in the 1970s and detailing the parallel evolution of the 
global microfinance movement. This was followed by an analysis of the 
ideological similarities between the two movements – which has 
unsurprisingly led to the adoption of microcredit as a means of promoting 
rural development in the country. The chapter then went on to outline the 
reasons why the research is important, the research questions and 
objectives, the original contributions, and, finally, provided a roadmap for the 
rest of the dissertation. Chapter 2 also began with a historical overview, but 
this time of the transformation of the rural financial system in China since the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949 in order to contextualise microcredit’s 
place in the dynamic rural financial landscape. This was followed by a 
comprehensive review of the literature on rural finance and development in 
the country, ending with a detailed analysis of the key strengths and 
weaknesses in our current understanding of the nexus between rural 
finance, local development and livelihoods. Chapter 3 then picked up where 
Chapter 2 concluded by outlining how an actor-oriented livelihoods approach 
can address some of the key weaknesses in the current state of the art and 
answer the research questions at the centre of this dissertation. The chapter 
then elaborated on the grounded ethnographic methodological approach 
employed in the research project, and detailed the specific types of data 
collected, as well as the methods and analytical techniques utilised. The 
chapter concluded by providing contextual backgrounds for the three 
townships – the AT, MWT and DET – where the vast majority of the data 
collection was undertaken. 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the policies and practices of the three microcredit 
programmes examined in this dissertation – the PAMP, RCCMP and EMP – 
based on the empirical fieldwork conducted in the three townships. The 
chapter began by examining microcredit policy formulation at the national 
and provincial levels based on analysis of primary policy documents and 
interviews with government officials, and then identified key areas where the 
policies have been left relatively open to interpretation, allowing for flexible 
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experimentation by local implementers. The chapter then went on to detail 
the realities of the local implementation of each of the programmes in the 
three townships – revealing high levels of heterogeneity. Chapter 5 analysed 
the key reasons for this heterogeneous implementation at the local level. It 
began by examining the ways in which differentiated financial landscapes 
and segmented financial markets influence local interpretations and 
understandings of microcredit as a resource, before going on to look at how 
exogenous and endogenous pressures and incentives are internalised in 
varied ways by local implementers. The final sections of the chapter 
illustrated how implementation outcomes are complex and emergent from 
dynamic ‘actor interfaces’, meaning that heterogeneous implementation is 
relational in nature and, therefore, cannot be standardised through top-down 
enforcement of ‘best practice’. 
 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 analysed the ways in which the heterogeneous and 
emergent implementation has resulted in the microcredit programmes 
facilitating certain processes of development and de-marginalisation, while 
simultaneously producing and feeding into other undercurrents of 
marginalisation, albeit in different ways across the three localities. 
Specifically, Chapter 6 began by showing how the programmes have 
enabled flows of capital, knowledge and technology from non-marginal and 
‘more developed’ regions and actors to the three townships. The chapter 
then illustrated the ways in which the programmes have played a role in the 
formation and strengthening of new socioeconomic and socio-political 
linkages, while also contributing to the creation of ‘modern’ modes of 
employment, cooperation and inclusion at the local level, thereby de-
marginalising some actors and improving certain livelihoods. Chapter 7, 
however, responded by detailing the microcredit programmes’ simultaneous 
production of marginalisation. In particular, the chapter pointed to the 
different ways that the programmes facilitate the diversion and extraction of 
resources from marginal to non-marginal actors/areas, and the fact that the 
programmes reflect and reproduce various forms of socioeconomic 
exclusion at different levels, ultimately exacerbating already precarious 
livelihoods by transferring risk to marginal actors and facilitating their 
exploitation in different ways depending on the programme and location. 
 
The in-depth exploration of the policy, practice and outcomes of the three 
primary Chinese government microcredit programmes outlined above has 
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made a number of key original contributions to how we conceptualise and 
undertake research on development in rural China, and the role that 
microcredit and other top-down plans, projects and interventions play in local 
development processes and livelihoods strategies. In the first place, this 
research project has made an important original empirical contribution to the 
field through the collection of data on programmes – and in localities – which 
have not been the subject of previous study. While there are a few examples 
of high quality in-depth empirical research on rural finance (both formal and 
informal) and microcredit at the township and village levels in China (Bislev, 
2010, 2012; L. Ong, 2006, 2009b; Tsai, 2000, 2002, 2004; Tsien, 2002; Y. 
Zhao, 2011), these studies are the exception rather than the rule, and, in 
general, research on these subjects in the Chinese context has not been 
grounded in detailed in-depth ethnographic fieldwork. Indeed, as Professor 
Peter Nolan explicitly states in the quotation at the beginning of Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation: “There is painfully little in-depth scholarly research on 
China that uses fieldwork and case studies” (Nolan, 2011, p. xv). Therefore, 
this in-depth ethnography consisting of rich qualitative and documentary 
data collected over more than half a year in previously unexamined localities 
is a much-needed addition to our limited amount of primary data and 
analysis on Chinese microcredit and rural finance. Additionally, while there 
has been previous research on government microcredit programmes, such 
as the RCCMP and the PAMP (Bislev, 2010, 2012; Hofmockel, 2005; L. 
Ong, 2011, 2012; Park & Ren, 2001; Tsai, 2004; Y. Zhao, 2011), this 
dissertation is the first ethnographic study of the EMP in rural areas, in either 
English or Chinese.381 Ultimately, therefore, this research project is based on 
a huge set of primary data, which represents a significant original 
contribution to the field of research on rural finance, microcredit and rural 
development in China. 
 
This Ph.D. dissertation also makes important original contributions to how 
we approach and conduct research on issues related to microcredit, rural 
finance and development in China and other contexts. Specifically, this 
project has drawn on conceptual and methodological approaches utilised in 
                                            
381 The EMP has only been mentioned in passing in a small number of 
English-language research outputs. While there are more studies into the 
EMP in Chinese, these have not been grounded in in-depth ethnographic 
fieldwork and primary qualitative data. 
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the rural development literature in order to design a novel actor-oriented 
livelihoods approach that framed and guided the research and analysis. In 
particular, the research built on other studies in rural China centring on 
notions of livelihoods and social capital (Bislev, 2010; Lu & Lora-Wainwright, 
2014; Ye et al., 2009), but shifted the analytical foci towards interfaces, 
holistic livelihoods and financial landscapes, ultimately developing a more 
relational conceptualisation of development in the rural Chinese context. 
This novel approach provided the means to uncover new perspectives, 
discover new connections and linkages, and give voice to actors who had 
been largely underrepresented in previous research. Of course, the 
development and application of this locally (and relationally) focused actor-
oriented livelihoods approach required the collection of an in-depth 
ethnographic data set, which is (as stated above) a challenging proposition 
in rural China. Therefore, I opted to develop new methodological tools in 
order to facilitate the collection of high quality data more quickly and begin 
the process of data analysis while still in the field. Specifically, I pioneered 
two interlinking and unique methods over the course of the research project 
– which are referred to as the ‘systematic interview report’ method and the 
‘reflexive dialogue’ method. These two new methods allowed for the reliable 
and rapid collection of in-depth ethnographic data from interviews, 
conversations and observation, which were then subjected to rigorous peer-
review and multiple forms of critical reflection. In this way, ‘systematic 
interview reports’ and ‘reflexive dialoguing’ can be adopted by other 
research across disciplines and in any number of contexts, and, therefore, 
represent a significant methodological contribution (see Chapter 3). 
 
These empirical, conceptual and methodological contributions outlined 
above provided the means to collect and analyse unique sets of data (in 
novel ways), which allowed this research project to address the primary 
research questions and objectives outlined in Chapter 1 and, in this way, 
make a number of important original contributions to our current 
understanding of the policy, practice and outcomes of microcredit 
programmes, as well as processes of socioeconomic development more 
generally. Of course, due to this project’s exploratory, grounded and actor-
oriented approach primarily focusing on the micro level – which necessarily 
allows for the co-existence of diverse (and often competing) local realities – 
the findings outlined in the chapters of this dissertation are not clear-cut or 
particularly prescriptive, and can even seem to be paradoxical. Indeed, the 
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complex, emergent and relational nature of implementation outcomes, and 
the multidimensional ‘impacts’ of the programmes on local actors and 
processes of development, inherently defy generalisability (by aggregate), or 
the identification of clear and predictable patterns or trends. In other words, 
this Ph.D. project simply underlines the fact that China’s rural development 
and financial landscapes are complex and dynamic, making any attempts to 
box them into a single ‘ism’ overly simplistic, reductionist and misleading. 
Nevertheless, there are, undoubtedly, some key lessons to be learned from 
the findings in this dissertation that can speak to wider issues surrounding 
how we understand development as a process, the functioning of external 
development interventions, and the role of microcredit in facilitating 
socioeconomic change in rural China and other parts of the world. 
 
8.2 Key Findings: Addressing the Research Questions and 
Objectives 
In particular, this dissertation has made an original contribution to our 
understanding of how microcredit programmes (and other development 
policies/interventions) are implemented, the types of ‘impact’ they have, and 
how we should perceive microcredit’s role in socioeconomic development 
and the (re)production of rural livelihoods more generally. For instance, with 
regard to implementation, this dissertation illustrates that, while microcredit 
and the expansion of ‘financial inclusion’ has been increasingly identified as 
a means of facilitating rural development and de-marginalisation by the 
central, provincial and local governments – the actual implementation and 
perceptions of the microcredit programmes (and the extension of formal 
financial services more generally) has been characterised by extreme 
variation across the three townships and at different points in time. In the 
first instance, this heterogeneity can be traced back to the policy formulation 
of the three programmes at the central and provincial levels. Indeed, while 
all three programmes explicitly sought to de-marginalise rural actors, the 
types of de-marginalisation envisioned varied, and often reflected the shifting 
development ideologies and priorities that were dominant at the time of their 
conceptualisation. For example, the PAMP was initiated in the 1980s when 
rural poverty was seen as the most visible and pressing manifestation of 
rural marginality. The RCCMP was conceptualised over a decade later at the 
turn of the century, and reflected the dominant perception that ‘financial 
inclusion’ was the answer to de-marginalisation in rural China. The EMP, on 
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the other hand, is the most recent policy addition to China’s ongoing 
financially-oriented rural development efforts, and depicts rural de-
marginalisation as being instigated by local entrepreneurship.  
 
All of these visions of microcredit as a facilitator of rural de-marginalisation fit 
squarely within the linear progression development paradigm. However, they 
are also flexible, allowing for shifting developmental priorities at different 
levels. For instance, the PAMP has been reformulated and co-opted by a 
number of different overarching development frameworks over the course of 
its existence. At the same time, the policy wording for all the programmes is 
vague, allowing for local experimentation. This means that both the central 
formulation and local implementation of the microcredit programmes have 
been marked by dynamism and influenced by diverse perspectives at 
different levels, which has, unsurprisingly, resulted in high levels of variation 
in implementation outcomes across time and space. Indeed, with all three 
programmes across all three localities the most recognisable pattern or 
“norm was the uniqueness of diversity” (Chambers, 2014, p. 53). Like other 
research, this dissertation began by outlining some of the key ‘variables’ 
contributing to this heterogeneous implementation, including contextual 
factors – such as differentiated financial landscapes and differently 
segmented financial markets; and exogenous/endogenous pressures and 
incentives – such as quotas, career considerations, distributions of power, 
and time/resource constraints. However, unlike most research on external 
development interventions in China or elsewhere, this dissertation 
determines that these ‘variables’ are themselves dynamic, heterogeneous 
and context/time specific – meaning that the actual implementation 
outcomes were the result of a confluence of diverse and unpredictable 
factors, making it impossible to accurately predict or generalise the key 
‘determinants’ influencing implementation in each case. More significantly, 
the dissertation concluded that these infinite variables were not equally 
weighted, and that their importance in shaping implementation was mediated 
by relational considerations. Simply put, the implementation of the 
programmes was influenced by a wide range of factors, which were 
perceived differently by actors at different levels and with different amounts 
of involvement/power in the programmes, who then entered into negotiation 
with each other, ultimately producing the varied implementation outcomes. 
These outcomes were, of course, not static, but constantly shifting based on 
continuous and ongoing negotiations. 
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Therefore, the implementation of the microcredit programmes can best be 
characterised as complex, emergent and inherently relational in nature. This 
obviously contrasts with dominant mainstream conceptualisations of 
development interventions as linear – travelling from central formulation to 
local implementation with clear goals and intended outcomes based on the 
‘medical-esque’ diagnosis of a problem that requires ‘treatment’ (Long, 
2001). This dominant understanding of linear development perceives 
heterogeneous implementation as the result of ‘irregularities’ or ‘distortions’ 
that can (and should) be eliminated through strict adherence to ‘best 
practice’. The heterogeneous implementation marked by high levels of 
complexity outlined in this dissertation, however, illustrates that development 
interventions in general, and microcredit programmes in particular, should 
actually be understood as “self-organising systems on the edge of chaos” 
(Chambers, 2008, p. 174). This is because any external intervention is 
ultimately locally internalised and reconstituted, and thus transformed into a 
local “socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution 
of an already-specified plan of action with expected outcomes” (Long, 1999, 
p. 4). In other words, attempting to determine sets of ‘constants’, ‘variables’ 
and ‘determinants’, represents the application of unsuitable natural science 
methods to dynamic and complex social situations, thereby creating 
oversimplification and misleading information. Ultimately, therefore, all 
development interventions, including microcredit, need to be understood as 
more than the sum of their parts – i.e. emergent from relational processes 
that are co-produced at the interfaces of interaction between diverse actors. 
 
At the same time, this dissertation has also illustrated how the complex, 
emergent and heterogeneous implementation of the microcredit 
programmes in the three townships has necessarily resulted in differentiated 
‘impact’ – or, more accurately, has caused the programmes to play a variety 
of very different roles in local development strategies and the livelihoods of 
diverse local actors. Indeed, rather than inducing some uniform vision of 
development and de-marginalisation through a top-down linear causal chain 
of events, the programmes instead tended to reflect different perceptions of 
what development and de-marginalisation actually entails – which, again, 
emerged from the negotiations between different actors based on their 
interpretations of the wider political economy of development. In this way, 
the roles of the programmes – while still situated within the linear 
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progression development paradigm – were largely framed by local contexts 
and/or the individuals/groups who wielded the most power in negotiations 
over implementation. For instance, in the AT the EMP and RCCMP were 
utilised to finance different types of investment in agriculture, in the MWT 
microcredit was diverted to large industry, and in the DET the programmes 
largely funded microenterprises and SMEs. In other words, microcredit 
utilisation and the resultant ‘impact’ were complex, emergent and basically 
unpredictable (in the same way as the processes of implementation), as the 
programmes became facilitators of (de)marginalisation for distinctly different 
sectors, groups and individuals in each of the three localities. 
 
The fact that the role microcredit played in local development and livelihoods 
was socially constructed and emergent from relational processes, 
necessarily meant that the ‘impacts’ produced by the programmes were 
complex, multiple and perceived differently by different actors. Moreover, 
rather than eliminating ‘development dichotomies’, microcredit actively 
reproduced and strengthened marginal relationships and unequal structures 
of power at different levels that framed and defined the development 
landscapes. Therefore, rather than simply playing beneficial roles in 
development and livelihoods, the programmes produced paradoxical or 
contradictory ‘impacts’ by enabling de-marginalisation for some, while 
simultaneously feeding into undercurrents of marginalisation for others. 
Indeed, while the programmes can be credited with facilitating flows of 
capital, knowledge and technology from central to local areas/actors, the 
formation of new socioeconomic and socio-political linkages, and the 
promotion of new forms of employment, cooperation and inclusion; they also 
allowed for the diversion and extraction of rural resources, produced various 
types of socioeconomic exclusion, and played a role in the exacerbation of 
livelihood precarity by enabling the exploitation of marginal actors. In this 
way, microcredit largely reflected China’s paradoxical development 
landscape by reproducing both dynamic and durable inequalities at different 
levels, albeit in diverse ways across the three localities. Ultimately, therefore, 
both implementation and impact were complex, emergent and inherently 
relational in nature – resulting in multidimensional, dynamic and 
unpredictable outcomes, which were perceived as beneficial by some and 
detrimental by others, rendering attempts at aggregate generalisation about 
impact meaningless. 
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The findings outlined above obviously contradict the dominant understanding 
of development as “emanating primarily from external centres of power via 
interventions by the state or international bodies, and following some broadly 
determined developmental path, signposted by ‘stages of development’,” 
and instead expose the linear progression development paradigm as being 
“tainted by determinist, linear and externalist views of social change” (Long, 
2001, pp. 10–11). Moreover, and more importantly, these findings point to 
the fact that the very marginality that microcredit and other development 
interventions seek to eliminate is itself the product of unequal relationships 
at different levels, which are mutually constituted and co-produced at the 
interfaces of interaction between different actors and areas. These patterns 
of inequality, marginality, and the ensuing exploitation and impoverishment 
are “not just part of nature” (Kirk et al., 2015, p. N/A) – i.e. ‘stages’ that can 
be ‘evolved’ out of – but are, instead, socially constructed within regimes 
characterised by differentiated structures of power and subordination. 
 
The relational and dichotomously mutually constituted nature of the concepts 
of development and underdevelopment, centrality and marginality, prosperity 
and impoverishment, etc., is particularly evident in the neoliberal version of 
the linear progression development paradigm – embodied by the ‘financial 
systems approach’ to microcredit and adopted by China since the reform 
and opening. This is because neoliberal linear progressive development 
explicitly necessitates the production of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the quest to 
instigate developmental progress. It is an unavoidable ‘zero-sum game’ due 
to “the difficult fact that the processes that allow some to escape from 
poverty traps are the same that allow the exploitation of others” (Mosse, 
2010, p. 1172). Indeed, in the words of Henry Bernstein: “there are no win-
win solutions within capitalism” (Bernstein, 2010, p. 98). Therefore, 
neoliberal linear progressive development is itself responsible for the 
continued production of the ‘third world’ that it purports to be in the process 
of eliminating (Escobar, 1995). 
 
In this way, microcredit is no ‘paradigm shift’ for development, but is instead 
“the neoliberal development strategy par excellence” (Hickel, 2015, p. N/A), 
as it depicts underdevelopment and marginalisation as being the result of 
simple exclusion from the market system. Reasons for this exclusion are 
framed as local issues, such as the spatial marginality of a given locality due 
to its distance from developed centres, and/or temporal marginality resulting 
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from the ‘backward’ mentalities of the local inhabitants. Discussions of power 
disparities and exploitation are also limited to the local level, where 
‘traditional’ perceptions of gender and class, or established local power 
structures, are blamed for exclusion from the all-empowering market. 
Expanding the provision of credit, therefore, is depicted as essentially de-
marginalising in and of itself, as it brings the marginal into the formal 
financial system, thereby integrating them into the wider capitalist economy. 
This ‘inclusion’ is also seen to have the potential to transform the ‘backward’ 
and ‘traditional’ attitudes and habits of the marginal populace into ‘modern’ 
ones of higher ‘quality’, thus smoothing over inequalities in opportunity 
created by local power disparities. In other words, microcredit does not 
perceive marginality and poverty “as a consequence of a particular way in 
which society is organised through relations of power and domination… [but] 
as the consequences of unfulfilled market potentials” (Weber, 2006, p. 44). 
Therefore, by individualising and localising the causes of marginality, 
microcredit effectively ignores the wider structures of power and durable 
inequalities that are ultimately responsible for the production of 
marginalisation, thus shifting the responsibility for development and de-
marginalisation to those disadvantaged by the unequal development 
landscapes themselves. At the same time, this individualisation of 
developmental responsibility obscures microcredit’s role as a financing 
mechanism (and creator of debt) for a system that requires the creation of 
‘winners’ at the expense of ‘losers’. In reality, this means that microcredit 
providers either have to exclude some ‘unsuitable’ borrowers at the local 
level due to their perceived inability to repay, or lend to everyone and accept 
the fact that some projects will fail, resulting in the exacerbation of the 
precarity of already marginal livelihoods. In this way, microcredit ascribes 
unrealistic de-marginalising abilities to the ‘free market’ ignoring the fact that 
economic liberalisation often benefits the already powerful. To put this 
another way and return to the quotation at the beginning of Chapter 7, 
“microfinance does not simply smooth over contemporary processes of 
agrarian change. Rather, it tends to reflect and reproduce their central 
contradictions and power dynamics” (Taylor, 2012, p. 609). 
 
Ultimately, therefore, while microcredit – both in China and elsewhere – 
undoubtedly has the ability to produce certain forms of de-marginalisation for 
some areas and actors, it is also the reflection of sets of interlocking and 
mutually constituted ‘development dichotomies’, and thereby necessitates 
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the (re)production of durable inequalities and marginal relationships at 
different levels. This means that microcredit does not have the ability to 
eliminate marginality or underdevelopment, regardless of whether or not 
‘best practices’ are followed, but instead can only diminish some marginal 
relationships while strengthening others (or creating new ones) – albeit in 
different ways due to the complex, multidimensional and heterogeneous 
implementation and impacts outlined above. This fundamental inability of 
microcredit to address the underlying reasons for the production of 
marginality was perhaps most concisely expressed by the head of one poor 
household in the AT in response to a question about how microcredit could 
better serve him and other marginal actors in the community:  
I don’t have any recommendations. We cannot afford to buy a 
house, we have just enough to eat and no money saved. Even if 
the village built a credit union it wouldn’t help. Without a basic 
amount of money, there is no help for normal villagers.382 
 
More damningly, however, microcredit is also a visible manifestation of an 
ideological system (neoliberalism) that systematically shifts the responsibility 
for development and de-marginalisation to the poor and marginal 
themselves, thus inherently exacerbating their precarity. This mirrors the 
increasingly neoliberal development orientation in rural China since the 
reform and opening, which has discursively framed development as an 
individual responsibility and elevated ‘self-sufficiency’ to a central position in 
development strategy – making ‘humanistic modernisation’ (rende 
xiandaihua XT ) and the improvement of ‘quality’ individual 
imperatives and even patriotic duties (Barabantseva, 2009; Murphy, 2004), 
thus putting the onus on marginal actors to change their own socioeconomic 
conditions by ‘pulling themselves up by their own bootstraps’. This effectively 
de-historicises and de-contextualises marginality by obfuscating the fact that 
it is, in reality, systemically produced through unequal relationships of power 
(Kirk et al., 2015). In this way, microcredit is a key component in an 
ideological approach to development promotion that creates the very 
marginalisation and underdevelopment that it purportedly seeks to eliminate, 
while shifting responsibility for this production of underdevelopment to its 
victims. Therefore, while we cannot generalise about how microcredit 
                                            
382 Interview 28. 
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programmes will be implemented at the local level or predict the precise 
patterns of impact that they will produce in different contexts, this 
dissertation has clearly illustrated that microcredit seeks to address the 
symptoms of systemic marginalisation, while not only ignoring the 
fundamental causes that it is implicit in creating, but also shifting 
responsibility for them to powerless and marginal actors. Simply put, 
microcredit does not produce any ‘win-win’ or net reduction in marginality, 
but is instead embedded within, and contributes to, shifting patterns of 
marginalisation and underdevelopment at the local level.  
 
8.3 Directions for Future Research 
Of course, this dissertation represents an initial attempt to explore 
government microcredit in China in a grounded holistic way, and therefore 
has its own limitations and areas that require further scrutiny. For this 
reason, future research on microcredit and rural development, both in China 
and globally, can build on (and improve) the empirical/methodological 
contributions and the key findings in this dissertation – and address some of 
the study’s limitations – in a number of important ways. Firstly, future 
research should be aware from the outset of the need to be more reflexive 
and critical of the normative conceptual categories underpinning the 
concepts of development, modernisation and de-marginalisation, which are 
primarily defined by (neo)classical economic theories and an “ethnocentric 
‘Western’ model of social behaviour based upon the individualism of 
‘utilitarian man’ that rides roughshod over the specificities of culture and 
context” (Long, 2001, p. 14) (see Chapter 3). In particular, future research 
should move away from the misleading characterisation of 
underdevelopment, marginalisation and poverty as necessary stages of 
development that can simply be progressed out of by identifying models to 
emulate or ‘best practices’ to follow. As stated above, this linear and 
universalist understanding of progressive development de-historicises and 
de-contextualises the ‘afflictions’ of underdevelopment and marginalisation, 
essentially detaching them from the very conditions that result in their 
production. Therefore, future research should take care to conceptualise 
underdevelopment, marginality and poverty as relational issues that are 
produced at the interfaces of interaction between actors at various levels, 
and across time and space (Escobar, 1995; Mosse, 2010). 
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This shift towards an actor-oriented relational approach to understanding 
development and marginality will allow for a more nuanced, historicised, 
contextualised and, ultimately, realistic depiction of the processes involved in 
implementing development interventions in general, and microcredit 
programmes in particular, as well as their complex and multidimensional 
outcomes and ‘impacts’ – i.e. the role they play in local development and 
livelihoods. Future inquiry could enrich this approach by drawing on research 
in a variety of fields and disciplines. For instance, research on decision 
making in behavioural psychology could complement and improve our 
understanding of implementers as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ by shining a light 
on how individual perceptions and group dynamics shape implementation at 
the local level (Kahneman, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lipsky, 1980; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). At the same time, by drawing more heavily on 
the classic literature on ‘unintended consequences’ in the field of global 
development (Hirschman, 1967), alongside a deeper engagement with the 
emerging body of research on ‘complexity theory’ in both the natural and 
social sciences – focusing on chaos, self-organising systems, non-linearity 
and emergence – future research could potentially create a framework for 
understanding heterogeneity, both with regard to implementation and 
‘impact’ (Chambers & Loubere, 2016; Escobar, 2004; Hobbes, 2014; 
Ramalingam, 2013). Finally, and most importantly, the issue of 
multidimensional power needs to be placed at the centre of inquiry. Too 
often the current body of research frames power as two-dimensional, 
depicting local structures of power as adhering to a uniform (thus 
predictable) hierarchy, and framing the local powerful ‘elite’ as the biggest 
threat to ‘failed’ microcredit implementation due to their ‘homo economicus’-
induced lust for subsidised credit. This ignores the ways in which unequal 
power relationships manifest themselves in diverse ways at different levels, 
resulting in dynamic patterns of marginalisation and differentiated 
developmental landscapes within which the programmes are formulated and 
implemented, thereby influencing the roles that they play in (re)producing 
local development processes and livelihood strategies. Therefore, it is 
crucial that future research projects draw on the established (and in many 
ways classic) body of literature on multidimensional power, which explores 
diverse forms of durable inequality and exploitation (Foucault, 1982; 
Hathaway, 2015; Lukes, 2005; Mosse, 2010; Tilly, 1998), in order to better 
understand the unequal marginal relationships that underpin microcredit 
implementation and outcomes. This is of particular importance as a means 
of critiquing the notion of ‘empowerment’ as being one of the results of 
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microcredit, which ignores the fact that the relationship between creditor and 
debtor is inherently unequal and implicitly premised on the threat of violence. 
In the words of David Graeber: “there’s no better way to justify relations 
founded on violence, to make such relations seem moral, than by reframing 
them in the language of debt… because it immediately makes it seem that 
it’s the victim who’s doing something wrong” (Graeber, 2011). 
 
At the same time, in order to shift from a linear to a relational mode of 
inquiry, future research could also build on and improve the grounded 
ethnographic methodological approach and specific methods employed (and 
pioneered) in this research project. In particular, projects exploring 
microcredit or other development interventions could utilise and adapt the 
innovative ‘systematic interview report’ and ‘reflexive dialogue’ methods 
(outlined in Chapter 3), in order to better map complex marginal 
relationships at the local level. Additionally, these methods could be 
improved through the application of participatory methodological 
approaches. For instance, ‘systematic interview reports’ could be co-
produced in participatory groups and ‘reflexive dialogues’ could be expanded 
to include research subjects as well as researchers. Moreover, other 
participatory methods could be utilised, such as participatory wealth ranking, 
transect walks, participatory mapping, participatory video/photography, etc. 
(Chambers & Loubere, 2016; Shah, 2016), which would serve to provide a 
more nuanced depiction of how local people perceive the webs of marginal 
relationships that shape their development landscapes. At the same time, 
the detailed ethnographic portraits produced by the methods described 
above could be strengthened and corroborated by quantitative methods, 
such as participatory statistics and network analysis (Holland, 2013; Scott, 
2012). Traditional statistical methods could also be utilised to explore 
marginal relationships at the meso and macro levels by mapping out flows of 
capital and other resources between rural and urban areas/actors, thereby 
providing a clearer picture of the wider political economy of development. 
While this still would not allow for aggregate generalisation or policy 
prescription, it would provide the means to theorise at multiple levels and 
extrapolate more precise understandings of the role that microcredit plays in 
different development landscapes. Ideally, therefore, future research 
projects would involve large research teams operating in a variety of 
localities, at different levels, and employing mixed-methods approaches. 
These teams could systematically adapt and improve some of the basic 
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methodologies utilised in this dissertation in order to map out marginal 
relationships across China and within localities, thereby more completely 
outlining where processes of marginalisation emerge from, how they 
manifest themselves across time and space, and how different development 
interventions engage with marginality at different levels. 
 
Of course, rural China’s financial and development landscapes are in a state 
of rapid and sustained flux. Therefore, there is undoubtedly a need for 
continued research that engages with these processes in-depth, but also 
quickly produces outputs that keep up with the dynamism of the 
environment. For this reason, research projects should look back to some of 
the key principles of RRA (Chambers, 1994, 2008; Chambers & Loubere, 
2016), and also utilise quick and open access dissemination mediums, such 
as blogs, working papers, reports, etc., alongside peer-reviewed journal 
articles and books, which traditionally have longer turn-around periods and 
limited access. Indeed, this issue is most obviously highlighted by the fact 
that recent major shifts in the systemic and ideological structuring of the rural 
financial landscape – such as the introduction of the EMP, the legalisation of 
new commercialised and cooperative financial service providers (MLCs, 
VTBs and RMCCs), the increased prevalence of the ‘financial systems 
approach’ as the operational principle of traditional financial service 
providers, and the introduction (or return) of state-owned commercial banks 
to the countryside – have not been the subject of in-depth research in 
English, and have also received scant attention in the Chinese-language 
literature. Considering the importance that financial systems and institutions 
play in promoting different versions of development – and the potential they 
have to cause serious crisis, even destroying local and national economies, 
and exacerbating inequality and marginalisation – there can be no doubt that 
China’s rapidly shifting rural financial terrain needs to be continuously and 
vigilantly monitored. At the same time, our understanding of what financial 
systems and services mean for local development and livelihoods needs to 
be broadened, and the perspectives and voices of all the actors involved – 
especially the most marginal – need to be recorded, represented and 
analysed in a more balanced way going forward.  
 299 
References 
 
Reference List A: Interviews with Officials and Employees of 
Financial Institutions 
Interview 
number 
Interview 
date 
Interviewee(s) description 
Interview 01 2012-04-03 
Director of the township level RCC in a 
township neighbouring the AT 
Interview 02 2012-11-01 Official in the prefecture level MoHRSS 
Interview 03 2012-11-02 
Party secretary of a village committee in the 
AT 
Interview 04 2012-11-05 
1) Village head of a village committee in the 
AT; 2) Director of the AT MoHRSS 
Interview 05 2012-11-05 Director of the township level RCC in the AT 
Interview 06 2012-11-06 Official in the prefecture level MoHRSS 
Interview 07 2012-11-13 
Official in the county level MoHRSS (AT 
county) 
Interview 08 2012-11-14 
Director of the township level MoHRSS in the 
MWT 
Interview 09 2012-11-14 
Deputy party secretary of a village committee 
in the MWT 
Interview 10 2012-11-14 
Director of the township level RCC in the 
MWT 
Interview 11 2012-11-15 Official in the provincial level MoHRSS 
Interview 12 2013-05-03 
Deputy director of the township government in 
the MWT; highest ranking deputy director and 
responsible for the other deputy directors 
Interview 13 2013-05-03 
Deputy director of the township government in 
the MWT; previous director of the township 
PAO in the MWT 
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Interview 14 2013-05-03 
Deputy director of the township government in 
the MWT; responsible for attracting and 
managing outside investment 
Interview 15 2013-05-03 
Party secretary of a village committee in the 
MWT 
Interview 16 2013-05-03 Director of county level PAO (MWT county) 
Interview 17 2013-05-28 
Retired party secretary of a village committee 
in the MWT 
Interview 18 2013-07-26 Accountant of a village committee in the DET 
Interview 19 2013-07-29 
Deputy director of the township government in 
the DET; responsible for attracting and 
managing outside investment 
Interview 20 2013-07-29 
Employees in the township level MoHRSS in 
the DET 
Interview 21 2013-07-29 
Deputy director of the township government in 
the DET; responsible for poverty alleviation 
work 
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Reference List B: Interviews with Households, 
Microenterprises and Large Industry 
Interview 
number 
Interview 
date 
Interviewee(s) description Location 
Interview 22 2012-11-02 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Small shop; 
Farming 
Credit sources383: No formal loans 
Nanchang 
City 
Interview 23 2012-11-05 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
AT 
Interview 24 2012-11-09 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming 
(vegetable greenhouses) 
Credit sources: EMP 
AT 
Interview 25 2012-11-09 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming 
(vegetable greenhouses) 
Credit sources: EMP 
AT 
Interview 26 2012-11-10 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Farming; 
administrative work in village 
committee 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
AT 
Interview 27 2012-11-10 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Shop; farming 
Credit sources: Loans from county 
level financial institutions 
AT 
                                            
383 Over 95 per cent of all households and microenterprises have borrowed 
informally, so this section only mentions formal loans. 
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Interview 28 2012-11-10 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
AT 
Interview 29 2012-11-12 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: EMP 
MWT 
Interview 30 2012-11-12 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: EMP 
MWT 
Interview 31 2012-11-13 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 32 2012-11-15 
Household classification: Class 1 
Income sources: Owner of natural 
gas station 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
MWT 
Interview 33 2012-11-15 
Household classification: Class 5 
Income sources: Farming; odd jobs 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 34 2012-11-15 
 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Farming; salary 
work on the SOE farm; migrant 
work 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
 
 
MWT 
 303 
Interview 35 2013-05-07 
Household classification: Class 4 
(Interview with members of five 
different households – all class 4) 
Income sources: Salary work for a 
local construction company; 
farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 36 2013-05-08 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 37 2013-05-09 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Salary work for a 
local construction company 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 38 2013-05-13 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: EMP 
MWT 
Interview 39 2013-05-13 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Migrant work 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 40 2013-05-14 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
MWT 
Interview 41 2013-05-15 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Salary work in a 
local factory; food preparation; 
migrant work 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
 
MWT 
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Interview 42 2013-05-16 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 43 2013-05-16 
Household classification: Class 1 
Income sources: County official 
(retired) 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 44 2013-05-17 
Household classification: Class 2 
(owns multiple houses) 
Income sources: Migrant work; 
village shop; minimum living 
standard guarantee 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 45 2013-05-20 
Industry type: Construction 
company (largest in township) 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
MWT 
Interview 46 2013-05-21 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Township 
business owner; farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 47 2013-05-22 
Household classification: Class 3 
(owns multiple houses) 
Income sources: Farming; salary 
work on the SOE farm; migrant 
work 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 48 2013-05-23 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Township 
business owner (migrant to the 
township) 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
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Interview 49 2013-05-23 
Industry type: Commercial farm 
owned by an SOE 
Credit sources: County level 
financial institutions 
MWT 
Interview 50 2013-05-24 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 51 2013-05-28 
Household classification: Class 5 
Income sources: Farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 52 2013-05-29 
Household classification: Class 5 
(attempting to build a class 3 
house) 
Income sources: Farming; migrant 
work; odd jobs 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
MWT 
Interview 53 2013-07-26 
Industry type: Components factory 
(largest in township) 
Credit sources: EMP; county level 
financial institutions; large informal 
loans from business associates at 
20 per cent interest 
DET 
Interview 54 2013-07-27 
Household classification: Class 3 
(currently building a class 2 house) 
Income sources: Township 
business owner; retired village 
official 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 55 2013-07-27 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
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Interview 56 2013-07-28 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business owner; school 
headmaster 
Credit sources: EMP; RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 57 2013-07-28 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: RCCMP; county 
level government student loan 
DET 
Interview 58 2013-08-01 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Township 
business owner; farming 
Credit sources: RCCMP; PSBC 
DET 
Interview 59 2013-08-01 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 60 2013-08-02 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Farming (large-
scale) 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 61 2013-08-03 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Migrant work; 
salary work in a local factory 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 62 2013-08-03 
Household classification: Class 2 
(rented) 
Income sources: Township 
business owner (migrant to the 
township) 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
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Interview 63 2013-08-03 
Household classification: Class 3 
(very large house) 
Income sources: Township 
business owner (multiple 
businesses); salary work in a local 
components factory 
Credit sources: RCCMP; EMP; 
ABC 
DET 
Interview 64 2013-08-04 
Household classification: Class 3 
(rented) 
Income sources: Township 
business owner (migrant to the 
township) 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 65 2013-08-04 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Township 
business owner 
Credit sources: RCCMP; ABC 
DET 
Interview 66 2013-08-05 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Migrant work; 
farming 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 67 2013-08-05 
Household classification: Class 3 
(currently building a class 2 house) 
Income sources: Township 
business owner (multiple) 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 68 2013-08-06 
Household classification: Multiple 
properties and a flat in Guangzhou 
Income sources: County official; 
multiple businesses 
Credit sources: Large informal 
loans from business associates 
DET 
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Interview 69 2013-08-06 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Salary work for a 
local construction company; 
migrant work; salary work in a local 
components factory; farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 70 2013-08-06 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Farming; salary 
work in a local components factory 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 71 2013-08-07 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business; migrant work 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 72 2013-08-07 
Household classification: Class 4 
Income sources: Township 
business; Farming 
Credit sources: No formal loans 
DET 
Interview 73 2013-08-08 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Tea farming; tea 
processing plant 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 74 2013-08-13 
Household classification: Class 3 
(Rented) 
Income sources: Township 
business; farming (large-scale) 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 75 2013-08-13 
Industry type: Tea company 
(largest in township; famous brand; 
branches around the country) 
Credit sources: County and higher 
level financial institutions 
DET 
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Interview 76 2013-08-14 
Household classification: Class 2 
Income sources: Township 
business; renting out commercial 
property; hotel; salary work in the 
bus station 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
Interview 77 2013-08-15 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Truck driver; 
salary work in the bus station; 
investment in the bus station 
Credit sources: RCCMP; ABC 
DET 
Interview 78 2013-08-15 
Household classification: Class 3 
Income sources: Aquaculture; 
farming; salary work in a local 
components factory 
Credit sources: RCCMP 
DET 
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Reference List C: Unstructured Conversations 
Conversation 
number 
Conversation 
date 
Conversation description 
Conversation 01 2012-11-05 
Director of the township level MoHRSS 
in the AT 
Conversation 02 2013-05-03 Microfinance industry insider 
Conversation 03 2013-05-06 Owners of a small shop in the MWT 
Conversation 04 2013-05-07 
Poor household without access to 
formal credit in the MWT 
Conversation 05 2013-05-08 
Township level RCC employees in the 
MWT 
Conversation 06 2013-05-08 
A group of villagers upset with pollution 
from the SOE commercial farm in the 
MWT 
Conversation 07 2013-05-09 
Elderly farmer with wealthy children 
living in various cities in the MWT 
Conversation 08 2013-05-10 
1) Elderly farmer in the MWT; 2) Young 
worker in the township industrial park in 
the MWT 
Conversation 09 2013-05-14 
Owner of the largest construction 
company in the MWT 
Conversation 10 2013-05-15 
Elderly farmer living in a class 1 house 
paid for by remittances from his 
children 
Conversation 11 2013-05-16 Middle-income household in the MWT 
Conversation 12 2013-05-21 
Migrant farmers from a township 
neighbouring the AT who have 
contracted approximately 180 mu of 
farmland in the MWT 
Conversation 13 2013-05-22 
County level insurance company 
employee in the MWT 
Conversation 14 2013-05-22 
Migrant street vendor at the weekly 
market in the MWT 
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Conversation 15 2013-05-22 
Migrant street vendor at the weekly 
market in the MWT 
Conversation 16 2013-05-23 
Township management officer in the 
MWT 
Conversation 17 2013-05-24 Local street vendor in the MWT 
Conversation 18 2013-05-29 Party secretary for a village in the MWT 
Conversation 19 2013-07-24 A group of street vendors in Nanchang 
Conversation 20 2013-07-26 
A group of village and township officials 
in the DET 
Conversation 21 2013-07-26 Leader of a natural village in the DET 
Conversation 22 2013-07-30 
Director of the township level RCC in 
the DET 
Conversation 23 2013-07-31 
University student who returned home 
for a visit in the DET 
Conversation 24 2013-08-01 
Owner and a group of employees of the 
largest components factory in the DET 
Conversation 25 2013-08-01 
A group of small shop owners in the 
DET 
Conversation 26 2013-08-01 Middle-income household in the DET 
Conversation 27 2013-08-02 Street tailor in the DET  
Conversation 28 2013-08-02 
A group of residents living by the river 
in the DET 
Conversation 29 2013-08-03 
Components factory employee in the 
DET 
Conversation 30 2013-08-05 Owner of a small shop in the DET 
Conversation 31 2013-08-06 
1) Component factory employee in the 
DET; 2) A farmer in the DET 
Conversation 32 2013-08-08 Motorcycle taxi driver in the DET 
Conversation 33 2013-08-08 Student cadre in the DET 
Conversation 34 2013-08-08 
A group of officials from the DET and 
neighbouring townships 
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Conversation 35 2013-08-09 
County level MLC employees in the 
DET 
Conversation 36 2013-08-12 
Township level ABC employees in the 
DET 
Conversation 37 2013-08-12 
Township level PSBC employees in the 
DET 
Conversation 38 2013-08-13 Construction worker in the DET 
Conversation 39 2013-08-15 
Township level RCC employees in the 
DET 
Conversation 40 2013-08-15 Poor household in the DET 
Conversation 41 2013-08-16 County level MLC borrower in the DET 
Conversation 42 2012-11-12 
University student who returned home 
for a visit in the MWT 
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Reference List D: Observational Data 
• AT Contextual Observation Report 
• AT Village Contextual Observation Report 
• MWT Contextual Observation Report 
• MWT Village Contextual Observation Report 
• DET Contextual Observation Report 
• DET Village Contextual Observation Report 
• DET County Contextual Observation Report 
• Scoping Trip Fieldwork Journal 
• Trip 1 Fieldwork Journal 
• Trip 2 Fieldwork Journal 
• Trip 3 Fieldwork Journal 
• Scoping Trip Preliminary Analyses and Progress Reports (Compilation) 
• Trip 1 Preliminary Analyses and Progress Reports (Compilation) 
• Trip 2 Preliminary Analyses and Progress Reports (Compilation) 
• Trip 3 Preliminary Analyses and Progress Reports (Compilation) 
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Appendix A: Accessing the Fieldwork Sites 
 
The Agricultural Township 
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The Migrant Work Township 
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The Diverse Economy Township 
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Appendix B: Business Mapping Results 
Migrant Work Township Businesses 
Business Type Number of Businesses 
Construction/Construction materials 27 
Appliances and things for the home 8 
Hardware/Fix-it 3 
Supermarkets (large and medium) 9 
Small convenience shops 13 
Restaurants (large and medium) 5 
Restaurants (small) 4 
Bakeries 1 
Hotels 2 
Motorcycle sales and repairs 4 
Computers 1 
Printing 2 
China Telecom 1 
China Unicom 1 
China Mobile 3 
Clothing 8 
Hair dressers 2 
Baby milk powder 1 
Pharmacies 2 
Car washes 1 
Gas Stations 1 
Majiang halls 4 
Internet bars 1 
Pool halls 1 
Natural Gas Plants 1 
Commercial Farms 1 
Pig raising facilities 5 
Private kindergartens 1 
Industrial park factories 9 (13 vacancies) 
Street vendors A variety of vendors selling 
diverse products and 
services; also a daily wet 
market and a large market 
every Wednesday 
Total 122 (excluding street 
vendors) 
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Diverse Economy Township Businesses 
Business Type Number of Businesses 
Construction/Construction materials 42 
Factories (textile components) 12 
Appliances and things for the home 42 
Hardware/Fix-it 10 
Supermarkets (large and medium) 8 
Small convenience shops 19 
Restaurants (large and medium) 3 
Restaurants (small) 10 
Hotels 13 
Motorcycle sales and repairs 7 
Bicycle sales and repairs 1 
Computers 3 
Printing 1 
China Telecom 3 
China Unicom 1 
China Mobile 6 
Clothing/shoes 45 
Hair dressers 12 
Pharmacies 6 
Mechanics (large vehicles) 7 
Car wash and car accessories 3 
Gas stations 2 
Agricultural products 14 
Tea processing plants 1 
Rice processing plants 1 
Specialist food shops (e.g. fruit) 17 
Bottled water 4 
Daily necessities 2 
Baby products 1 
Toy stores 2 
Book stores 2 
Musical instruments 1 
Cosmetics 3 
Jewellery 3 
Funeral materials 1 
Yarn/thread 2 
Train/lottery tickets 1 
Photography 1 
Eye/sun glasses 1 
Fishing equipment 1 
DVDs 1 
Majiang halls 1 
Pool halls 1 
Massage parlours 3 
Internet bars 1 
Private kindergartens 1 
Private summer schools 1 
Street vendors A variety of vendors selling 
diverse products and 
services 
Total 332 (excluding street 
vendors) 
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Appendix C: Household Socioeconomic Classification and 
Mapping Results 
 
Household Socioeconomic Classification Criteria 
Class 1 • Obviously larger than other houses in the community (3-4 stories) 
• Built within the last decade 
• Concrete construction (brick interior) and modern amenities (e.g. air 
conditioners, large TVs, computers with internet access) 
• Located on larger plots of land than other houses, better locations 
• Owned by local elites or family of wealthy/powerful people living outside the 
community 
Class 2 • Large houses built within the last decade, but not as big as Class 1 houses 
(2-3 stories) 
• Sometimes only partially furnished 
• Concrete construction (brick interior) and maybe some modern amenities 
(e.g. air conditioners, large TVs, computers with internet access) 
• Located on normal-sized plots of land, normal locations 
• Usually financed with remittances from migrant work or local business, 
some informal loans 
Class 3 • Medium-sized houses built in the 1980s-1990s (2 stories) 
• Concrete construction (brick interior), often with tiles on the exterior walls 
• Usually basic interiors without modern amenities (e.g. fans instead of air 
conditioners) 
• Located on normal-sized plots of land, normal locations 
• Financed with savings and/or informal loans 
Class 4 • Small houses built in the 1960s-1980s (1-2 stories); sometimes much older 
• Traditional grey/red brick and wood construction 
• Basic interiors without modern amenities; often farm tools and animals also 
in the house 
• Located on relatively smaller plots of land than newer houses 
• Built by the residents with help of others in the community in the 1960s-
1980s; sometimes much older houses that have been maintained by the 
inhabitants (e.g. traditional houses of elites in early 1900s) 
Class 5 • Small houses built in the 1950s-1970s (1 story) 
• Mud brick and wood construction  
• Very basic interiors without modern amenities; often poorly maintained (e.g. 
holes in the roof); farm tools and animals also in the house 
• Located on relatively smaller plots of land than the newer houses; often 
located on relatively poor quality farmland 
• Built by the residents with help of others in the community in the 1950s-
1970s; inhabited by the poorest people in the community 
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Household Socioeconomic Mapping Results 
 
Agricultural Township (Village) Household Class Distribution 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Storage Abandoned 
0% 15% 30% 50% 5% 0% 0% 
 
Migrant Work Township (Village) Household Class Distribution 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Storage Abandoned 
2% 4% 53% 13% 11% 7% 10%  
 
Diverse Economy Township (Village/Township) Household Class 
Distribution 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Storage Abandoned 
<1% 
(only 1) 
42% 47% 9% 0% 0% 2% 
 
 
